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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH
1.1. Mens rea and defences
If John refused to kill the police commissioner, the drug syndicate would kill his 
family. He there fore felt he had no choice but to assassinate the man. John heads 
over to a press conference, where the police commissioner is presenting his 
department’s latest successful operation against the drug syndicate. However, just 
as he is about to shoot, a police offi cer spots John, jumps in front of the commissioner 
and is killed instead.
After John is arrested, several questions arise. First of all, did he commit 
murder? Does it matter that he killed the police offi cer and not the planned target? 
Can it be said that he intended to kill the commissioner, if all he wanted was to save 
his family? Or should the reasons for his actions be considered under a defence 
instead? After all, should he be punished for favouring the lives of his wife and 
child over that of one person? Finally, should a member of the drug syndicate be 
tortured in order to fi nd the whereabouts of John’s family?
These questions illustrate some of the issues of mens rea and defences. In short, 
mens rea encompasses the subjective elements of a crime, like intention, as well as 
the doctrines that govern its application. Defences, simply put, refer to those 
situations where the defendant should not be held liable, even though he formally 
committed an offence. For example, John will argue that although he killed the 
police offi cer, he should be acquitted because of invincible coercion.
Mens rea and defences are both legal tools that enable courts to communicate 
why the defendant is blamed, tools that enable courts to explain what degree of 
reproach is directed against the defendant. This degree is based on the level of 
control and choice of the defendant over his actions. A specifi c category of defences, 
called justi fi  ca tions, communicates what exactly is a criminal wrong. Under certain 
circum stances, committing an offence is not wrongful, but right, or at least 
permissible conduct. An excuse makes sure that only those who deserve to be 
punished are held criminally liable. It communicates that an offence has been 
committed but emphasizes that the defendant cannot be blamed for it.
1.2. The general part of criminal law
Mens rea and defences are principles that are generally applicable to all or almost 
all crimes. Together with principles such as attempt and legality, they form the 
general part of criminal law. This is contrasted with the collection of different 
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offences that exist in a criminal legal system, called the special part. General 
principles of crimi nal law provide clarity and simplify the criminal code. Instead of 
having to repeat the rules governing mens rea or defences in each offence, one can 
refer to these rules provided for in detail by the general part.
A general part of criminal law serves a normative purpose as well, in the sense 
that liability for an offence can only follow in conformity with the general part. An 
offence can defi ne whether somebody has done something wrong, but the general 
part determines whether or not that person is, or ought to be held liable for the 
wrongdoing. Regardless of the defi nition of an offence, general principles of 
criminal law safeguard that a person cannot be convicted for an offence if he has 
not committed a wrongful act and can be held blameworthy for it. For example, 
where manslaughter is considered a crime in the special part, the general principle 
of self-defence can preclude criminal liability.1 The general part of criminal law 
thus enables a critical evaluation of criminal liability. It is the foundation of every 
criminal justice system, whether codifi ed or not. The aim of this book is to provide 
such general principles for the European criminal justice system, which is currently 
still lacking most of these principles.
1.3. European criminal law
This research deals with mens rea and defences in European criminal law. In the 
past decades, the process of European integration has infl uenced all fi elds of law, 
and eventually also substantive criminal law. Whereas the creation and enforcement 
of criminal liability used to be purely a national matter, this has changed into a 
shared responsibility of the European Union and its Member States. For example, 
Union law can limit the scope of domestic criminal law by precluding criminal 
penalties that, due to their excessive or discriminatory effects, violate one of the 
rights to free movement.2 On the other side of the coin, the Union can oblige its 
Member States to create or extend criminal liability. This competence of the Union 
has developed from a mere requirement of Member States to take measures that are 
effective, dissuasive and proportionate, which could bring about an obligation to 
apply criminal law in some cases,3 to a full-fl edged competence of the Union to 
require the Member States to criminalize certain conduct.4
Besides this indirect enforcement of criminal offences through national law, the 
Union also enforces its own legislation, as it investigates and in some cases 
1 Cane 2007, pp. 467–470.
2 See for example, 29 February 1996, Case C-193/94, Criminal proceedings against Sofi a Skanavi 
and Konstantin Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929.
3 21 September 1989, Case 68/88, Greece v. Commission [1989] ECR 2965. In this case, the ECJ 
held in §24 that Member States must make sure that “infringements of Community (JHB: now 
Union) law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous 
to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance.”
4 Article 83 TFEU.
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sanctions fraud relating to the EU budget. The possibility under the Lisbon Treaty 
to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce can be seen as an extension of 
the direct competences in criminal law of the Union. European criminal law can 
thus be described as a hybrid system, a multi-layered patchwork of legislation and 
case-law of European and national origin.5 It ranges from Union law that can be 
directly enforced by the Union’s institutions, bodies, offi ces and agencies to national 
law that has somehow been infl uenced by Union law. The Union has exclusive 
competence in some areas, like competition law, but usually shares the competence 
to determine and enforce criminal liability with its Member States.6
For example, in Framework Decision 2002/475, as amended by Framework 
Decision 2008/919, the European Union obligates its Member States to criminalize 
certain terrorist conduct. The responsibility for the so-called ‘fi ght against 
terrorism’ is shared, because the European Union determines (to a large extent) the 
scope of criminal liability, which the Member States must implement and enforce. 
A Directive or Framework Decision cannot of itself determine or aggravate criminal 
liability. Implementation is required, as legal subjects can only be held liable for 
infringing the national law that implements the European legal instrument.7 
Secondly, the European Union creates numerous instruments to assist the Member 
States in enforcing anti-terrorist legislation, such as the simplifi cation of surrender 
procedures by the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant8 and the extension 
of powers of investigation in the obligation to retain communication data for a 
longer period.9
2. THE NEED FOR A GENERAL PART OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW
This shift of competences in criminal matters raises numerous issues. We can ques-
tion the democratic legitimacy of decision-making in the EU10 or even the process 
of Europeanization itself. We can ask ourselves which issues of criminal law should 
remain national and for what reason.11 This research concentrates on a practi cal 
legal consequence of this shared responsibility, namely the need to identify a 
5 Klip 2012, p. 1.
6 Articles 3(2) TEU, 3 TFEU and 4(2)(j) TFEU. Competition law is also criminal law, see II.1.4. 
Even in this fi eld of law (article 105 TFEU), the responsibility is shared. In order to counter 
fraud against the EU budget, the Union also depends on Member States for coercive measures.
7 Articles 288 and 291 TFEU; 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, criminal proceedings against Maria 
Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 and 8 October 1987, Case 80/86, criminal proceedings against 
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV [1987] ECR 3969.
8 Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190/1.
9 Directive 2006/24 of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of 
public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58, OJ 2006 L 105/54.
10 In regard to the creation of a ‘European Corpus Juris Criminalis’, see Gleβ 2002, p. 128.
11 See Verheijen 2006.
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general part of criminal law for the European Union. The European Union has 
obliged Member States to criminalize different forms of undesired behaviour, but 
has not established the complete scope of this ‘criminalization’,12 omitting to defi ne 
general principles, doctrines, elements or conditions of criminal law that apply to 
these crimes.13 For example, the Union refers to ‘attempt’ and ‘intention’ in its 
legislation, but it has not deter mined what qualifi es as such. In other words, the 
so-called general part of criminal law remains somewhat of a blind spot in a Union 
that focuses predomi nantly on the special part of substantive criminal law.
I will explain below that as a consequence, national principles and concepts are 
applied to EU legislation, which leads to diverging outcomes in criminal liability. 
This is incompatible with the purpose of EU legislation, which is the convergence 
of legal systems by approximation. In addition, this is inconsistent with the idea of 
one area of Freedom, Security and Justice. As this fi eld of law continuously grows, 
the lack of general principles of European criminal law is becoming increasingly 
problematic. This research aims to contribute to the conceptualization of mens rea 
and defences as important elements of the general part. It is part of a bigger project 
that aims to identify the whole general part of criminal law for the EU.14 By 
answering the central question of this book – what mens rea and defences should 
look like in a general part of European criminal law – an important portion of this 
general part is fl eshed out.
2.1. Implementation of Union legislation in national law
When the EU determines there is certain conduct within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice15 that merits punishment, but is not criminalized by all 
Member States, minimum standards are drawn up in Directives, and before the 
entering into force of the treaty of Lisbon, in Framework Decisions. This technique 
is called approximation or ‘minimum harmonization’.16 In the preambles of the 
above mentio ned Framework Decision on terrorism, we can read that terrorism 
under mines universal principles, common to the Member States and on which the 
Union is based, and that the approximation of the defi nition of terrorist offences is 
necessary to combat and prevent terrorism.
12 Clearly, the terms ‘criminalization’ and ‘offence defi nition’ do not apply to the defi nitions of 
conduct given in Framework Decisions and Directives, as they are merely an obligation to create 
a criminalization or offence defi nition.
13 The term ‘general principles of Union law’, see Tridimas 2006, should be distinguished from 
‘general principles of criminal law’, see Ashworth 2006. The former concept is broader, also 
encompassing principles of a non-criminal nature.
14 For example, in other books, it will be discussed whether and on what basis the terrorists can be 
held liable for the attempted assassination committed by John and whether the Union should 
have jurisdiction based on the circumstance that the assassination was directed against a 
Member of its Parliament.
15 Article 29 TEU and Article 67 TFEU.
16 Article 31(1)(e) TEU. See also Article 83 TFEU.
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The purpose of these instruments is usually to create a minimum level of 
criminalization. It obligates Member States to criminalize conduct that fulfi ls 
certain minimum elements. For example, the required minimum elements of a 
terrorist offence can be an explosion that is committed intentionally and with a 
terrorist intent, such as the view to seriously intimidate a population. Member 
States must at least criminalize this conduct and they are thus free to adopt wider 
defi nitions of criminal offences, provided this does not violate fundamental rights, 
freedoms or other provisions of Union Law.17 This means that a Member State also 
fulfi ls its obligation to implement, if it (also) makes punishable the negligent rather 
than intentional causing of an explosion.18
These legislative instruments can be considered the special part of European 
criminal law. It is common to refer to concepts of the general part of criminal law in 
legislation, but in the EU this technique leads to problems because the scope of that 
general part is uncertain. Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/475 defi nes 
terrorist offences:
“Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional 
acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defi ned as offences under national law, 
which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organisation where committed with the aim of (…)”
I have italicized the elements of the offence that refer to general concepts of 
criminal law, namely the subjective elements or mens rea standards. Article 2(2) of 
the said Framework Decision reads:
“Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following 
intentional acts are punishable: (a) directing a terrorist group; (b) participating in 
the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material 
resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that 
such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group.”
17 Some Framework Decisions and Directives aim for ‘maximum’ or ‘full harmonisation’, which 
implies that the Member State is not allowed any discretion in implementation. The scope of 
intended harmonisation can be derived from the wording, goal(s) and legal basis of the 
instrument, see Kristen 2004, pp. 44–49. For example, in Directives that grant procedural rights 
to the suspect and accused, Member States are free to provide for more protection, see also 
Article 82(2) TFEU.
18 See by way of example, recital 12 of the preamble of Directive 2008/99 of 19 November 2008 on 
the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 2008 L 328/28. By contrast, Nilsson 
2011 argues that if an offence element has been included to restrict the scope of the 
criminalization, like the adding of the element ‘seriously’ to intimidating a population in the 
mentioned Framework Decision, Member States are not free to implement national offences that 
do include the ‘simple’ intimidation.
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2.2. Autonomous or national concepts
The numerous references to general concepts beg the question as to what the 
intended scope of criminal liability is supposed to be. The special part of criminal 
law cannot be understood without reference to the principles that are generally 
applicable to it. Are the Member States to apply their own general concepts of 
criminal law or does the Framework Decision refer to ‘EU general concepts of 
criminal law’? On the one hand, it can generally be said that elements of an ‘offence 
defi nition’ in a Directive or Framework Decision must be interpreted autonomously; 
the national judge is required to interpret the implementation legislation in light of 
the wording and purpose of the Union instrument rather than national law.19
On the other hand, we see that Member States do interpret these defi nitions 
according to their national law. In the absence of a clear indication of their meaning 
in the legal instrument and given the availability of the instrument in all national 
languages, it is quite understandable that these notions are interpreted in a national 
way.20 It could even be perceived as a margin of discretion for the Member States 
when implementing the Union instrument. After all, one can argue that, given the 
traditionally sovereign view on criminal law, the responsibility for criminal matters 
can only be shifted explicitly. When there is no clear obligation to approximate, 
Member States will use this discretion to retain their national law.
I will explain that when general concepts in EU law are given a national 
meaning, this results in very different outcomes as to the question of criminal 
liability. This is contrary to the harmonizing purpose of EU legislative instruments 
and the policies of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. For this reason, Union 
law should be interpreted autonomously, which brings about that a general part of 
European Criminal law must be developed. I will illustrate this divergence here by 
reference to the legal systems of England, Germany and the Netherlands. The legal 
system of England includes that of Wales, but I will refer to England from now on, 
also when referring to UK legislation.
2.3. Recklessness or dolus eventualis
Consider the offence element of intention. As will be explained in this book, all 
three legal systems distinguish between direct and indirect intent. The most serious 
subjective element in all three legal systems consists of a form of intention that 
concentrates on the will or desire of the actor to bring about a certain result. A 
second type of ‘indirect intent’ exists when the actor knows his conduct will almost 
19 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
20 Report of 6 November 2007 from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Framework 
Decision 2002/475 of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, COM (2007) 681 and its annex; 
SEC (2007) 1463 and §2 of the German International Criminal Code (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch). 
See also Gropp in Weick 1999, p. 118 and Gröning 2010, p. 130.
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certainly bring about consequences, which he does not desire or primarily aim at. It 
deals with side-effects, of which the actor knows that they are almost certain to 
occur.
So far, there is no difference between the three legal systems. This changes, 
however, when we consider that indirect intention is the lowest form21 of intention 
in England, whereas in Germany and the Netherlands, there exists an even lower 
form of intention called ‘bedingter Vorsatz’ and ‘voorwaardelijk opzet’ respectively. 
Translated into Latin, this dolus eventualis is about the conscious acceptance of a 
substantial risk. When distinguished from indirect intention, the consequence need 
not almost certainly occur, but merely probably. In addition, the actor should accept 
that these consequences can occur or at least take this for granted. Consider that the 
police are pursuing a person, who is suspected of terrorist acts. They drive at a very 
high speed through a pedestrian-only area. The suspect knows there is a 
considerable chance a pedestrian might get hurt or even die when hit by the car but 
accepts this possibility, as he wants to shake off his pursuers at any cost. Any 
pedestrian killed, is killed with dolus eventualis. In conclusion, the concept of 
intention is much broader in Dutch and German law than in English law.
As an illustration, let us assume that Hans belongs to an organisation that aims 
for separation of the province of Friesland from the rest of the Netherlands. In order 
to show the Dutch government and people that this is an organisation to be reckoned 
with, Hans places a bomb inside an aircraft and warns the authorities. Ten minutes 
after the bomb alert is given, the aircraft explodes. The authorities report one 
fatality, an employee of the KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, who was servicing the 
landing gear at the time. We can alter this case to a German or English setting to 
apply different jurisdictions.
It is not likely that Hans knew that there would be a fatality in the ordinary 
course of events, which is required to prove indirect intention as to this death. It is 
more likely that he appreciated there was a substantial chance that someone would 
be killed by the explosion, for example someone who would try to defuse the bomb, 
and that this awareness did not stop him from carrying out his plans. He thus 
consciously accepted the risk of fatalities, which qualifi es as (conditional) intent as 
to these fatalities in Germany and the Netherlands. He would be liable for an 
intentional attack upon a person’s life that may cause death, with a view to seriously 
intimidating a population. This qualifi es under Article 1(a) of Framework Decision 
2002/475. By contrast, in English law this attack would not be deemed intentional, 
because in England dolus eventualis is insuffi cient to qualify as intention.
The English legal system operates with three subjective elements as to conduct 
and consequences, whereas the German and Dutch only distinguish between 
intention and negligence. The English apply the concept of ‘recklessness’ that can 
be positioned in between intention and negligence. Recklessness resembles dolus 
eventualis because it is about the conscious taking of an unacceptable risk. In fact, 
21 It should be noted that indirect intention is not a ‘form’ or type of intention in England, but 
merely evidence from which intention may be inferred, see IV.2.3.2.
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it is even broader than that because it requires no additional element of accepting or 
taking this chance for granted. The illustration of Hans is therefore not meant to 
show that criminal liability is stricter in England, but merely to show that when 
European legislation refers to ‘intention’, the national scope of this concept is very 
different. Recklessness is no form of intention. Hans’ attack could be qualifi ed 
under English law as a reckless attack, but this is not what the Framework Decision 
aims to criminalize. He could even be convicted of manslaughter (reckless killing) 
under English law, or under less grave variations of terrorist offences under this 
Framework Decision. However, the attack cannot be labelled under English law as 
an intentional attack upon a person’s life with a ‘terrorist’ intent, whereas it could 
be labelled as such in other Member States. The starting point of Framework 
Decision 2002/475 is that Hans’ attack would be qualifi ed similarly in all Member 
States, and more importantly, that Hans’ attack would be qualifi ed as an intentional 
attack upon a person’s life with a ‘terrorist’ intent, thus labelled as a specifi c 
terrorist offence.22
I have shown that one difference in the implementation of EU legislation arises 
out of the different concepts of intention in the legal systems. From this difference 
in the scope of intention, another major difference follows with regard to the scope 
of attempt. The three legal systems are also different as to attempt, because in 
England, the subjective element that is encompassed in the doctrine of attempt must 
at least be one of indirect intention. There can be no construction of dolus eventualis 
to bring about criminal liability for an attempt, such as in Germany or the 
Netherlands.
Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475 requires Member States to 
criminalize the incitement, aiding or abetting and attempt of most of the offences 
mentioned in articles 1(1), 2 and 3. It should be emphasized that the Commission is 
aware of the problem here illustrated. It recognizes that harmonization is hampered 
by the lack of a defi nition in Framework Decision 2002/475 of ‘incitement’ and 
‘aiding and abetting’ and substantial differences in the national legal systems 
regarding these forms of participation and attempt.23
Finally, the Union has determined very little in relation to general defences, 
which brings about that the application of defences to an offence based on a 
Framework Decision or Directive remains a national matter. The availability of 
self-defence, necessity or duress to the implemented criminal offence, depends on 
the national general part and consequently, so does the scope of criminal liability. 
In the aforementioned example, John would be charged with (attempted) murder. 
22 See, for example, the Report of 8 June 2004 from the Commission based on Article 11 of the 
Framework Decision 2002/475 of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, COM (2004) 409, p. 5: 
“Although structurally similar to other instruments aimed at the harmonisation of a particular 
fi eld of criminal law, this Framework Decision thus differs from those that do not require the 
incorporation of “specifi c offences” as long as the conduct to be criminalised is already covered 
by a generic incrimination.”
23 See the annex to the abovementioned report of 8 June 2004, SEC (2004) 688 and the annex to its 
aforementioned follow-up report of 6 November 2007, SEC (2007) 1463.
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Before an English court, he could not raise the defence of duress to a charge of 
murder, which thus seriously seem to limit his possibilities to be acquitted.
2.4. Convergence or divergence
The lack of any guidance by the Union on the general part of criminal law can be 
explained by the fact that the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon 
have always focused on the special part. Article 83 TFEU, for example, only deals 
with the defi nition of criminal offences and sanctions. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
general part of European criminal law brings about problems. The effect of the 
current technique of approximation through Framework Decisions and Directives 
differs from its harmonizing purpose. In the absence of clarity on what these 
general concepts exactly refer to, Member States interpret these concepts in a 
national manner. The English legislator thus reads ‘intentional’ as encompassing 
only direct and indirect intention, whereas the German and the Dutch legislator 
would also include dolus eventualis as a form of intent that suffi ces to make the act 
criminal.
These differences in criminal liability are contrary to the goal of approximation 
by implementing Directives and Framework Decisions and contrary to the idea of 
one area of Freedom, Security and Justice as well as the equal treatment of EU 
Citizens.24 The result is divergence rather than convergence. This is not what the 
EU aimed at by approximating criminal law. The uniform application of Union law 
throughout the Union requires an autonomous and uniform interpretation 
throughout the Union of that legislative instrument.25 The elements of Directives 
and Frame work Decisions refer to European general concepts of criminal law, 
although no one is quite sure on the exact content of this general part. Some of these 
concepts have already been identifi ed and applied by the ECJ, such as the principle 
of non-retro activity,26 lex mitior,27 and proportionality.28 The identifi cation of these 
concepts strengthens the argument that EU legislation refers indeed to European 
general concepts of criminal law and moreover, that currently unidentifi ed concepts 
will also eventually become clear.
Defi ning the general part of criminal law can enhance the quality of EU law and 
its implementing provisions. In the absence of an indication on how these general 
concepts used in EU legislation should be interpreted, autonomously or nationally, 
it is unclear for Member States what the Union wants them to minimally 
24 Articles 2, 3 and 29 TEU and Articles 67(3) and 325(4) TFEU.
25 17 July 2008, Case C-66/08, Szymon Kozlowski [2008] ECR I-6041, §42. See also the Opinion of 
AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of 22 February 2005, Case C-498/03, Kingscrest Associates Ltd, 
Montecello Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2005] ECR I-4427, §23.
26 10 July 1984, Case C-63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk [1984] ECR 2689.
27 3 May 2005, C-387, 391 and 403/02, criminal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi and others 
[2005] ECR I-3565.
28 29 February 1996, Case C-193/94, criminal proceedings against Sofi a Skanavi and Konstantin 
Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929.
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criminalize. AG Kokott tried to put into perspective the problem of non-uniform 
interpretation and application by reference to general concepts such as ‘serious 
negligence’ in Directive 2005/35 on ship-source pollution. She argued that, “the 
directive does not lay down a defi nitive, uniform standard but merely minimum 
requirements which by their nature do not call for uniform transposition in the 
Member States.”29 In other words, divergence is not a problem, as long as Member 
States transpose the required minimum level of criminalization into their national 
law and Member States are allowed to adopt more stringent measures.
However, in the absence of any guidance by the EU, how are Member States to 
fulfi l this obligation if they cannot know what the minimum requirements are 
supposed to encompass? Should the yardstick be the lowest common denominator 
of all national concepts, that is, the law of the Member State with the strictest 
interpretation of a certain general concept? In that case, the strict English meaning 
of intention, for example, would probably be deemed to be the minimum 
requirement under EU law. Besides the fact that the lowest common denominator 
would fi rst have to be establi shed, another problem of constructing a general part of 
European criminal law in this way is that such a general part will be inconsistent. 
When a certain Member State applies a strict meaning of a specifi c concept, this is 
generally counterbalanced by a wider scope of another concept or rule of procedure 
to avoid legal loopholes. For example, the lack of dolus eventualis in England is 
counter balanced by the concept of recklessness. If we were to adopt from different 
Member States the concepts with the strictest meaning, this would result in a patch-
work of concepts that lacks consistency and coherency and would bring about legal 
loopholes. As a result, it is questionable whether such a general part is useful at all.
The EU can enact legislation of better clarity by realizing that the scope of 
criminal liability depends on the interaction between a specifi c offence and the 
general part that applies to it. The legislator and judiciary in the Union also need to 
realize that approximation is made diffi  cult from the outset if general concepts from 
domestic legal systems, such as reck less ness, are merely translated in different 
language versions of legislation and case-law.30 Currently, European legislation 
refers to either European concepts of uniden tifi ed content or national general 
concepts. Regardless of the point of view one takes, the Union cannot possibly 
foresee the scope of its intended criminalization.
This blind spot on the general part also infl uences procedural European criminal 
law. For example, the European Arrest Warrant lists offences for which persons can 
be surrendered without a test of double criminality. The assumption is that these 
offences are criminalized in all Member States. Whereas that may be true, the 
different versions of the Framework Decision mention very different offences. For 
example, the Dutch version refers to ‘opzettelijke brandstichting’, which as 
mentioned above can thus also be fulfi lled by dolus eventualis. The English version 
29 Opinion of AG Kokott on 20 November 2007, Case C-308/06, Intertanko a.o. v. Secretary of 
State for Transport [2008] ECR I-4057, §150.
30 See IV.6.7.2.
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refers to arson, for which intention but also recklessness suffi ces. The German 
version, on the contrary, merely refers to ‘Brandstiftung’, an offence which can be 
committed either by intention or negligence.31 In case of a surrender request of a 
person suspected of starting a fi re negligently, the German authorities, in contrast 
to the Dutch authorities, would thus be able to merely check the list.
2.5. Direct enforcement
With the growing number of Directives on criminal law, the number of diverging 
examples will also increase. As the scope of European criminal law expands, the 
need to identify a general part of criminal law thus becomes greater. Regardless of 
whether one is in favour of the process of European integration or not, we need to 
realize that this process will undoubtedly continue; the only question is at what 
speed this will happen. There eventually will be a ‘genuine’ or ‘independent 
European criminal law’. The establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s 
Offi ce (EPPO) is likely to be one of the fi rst key developments in this progression. 
Under article 86(1) TFEU, the EPPO is competent for crimes affecting the fi nancial 
interests of the Union, which may be extended under article 86(4) TFEU to other 
serious cross-border crimes.
Clearly, article 86(2) TFEU states that the EPPO is supposed to prosecute certain 
crimes before national courts, which arguably implies that the EPPO should rely on 
national law when prosecuting the crimes under his jurisdiction. In other words, a 
conservative way to establish the EPPO would be to have a national prosecutor with 
an ‘EPPO-hat’ prosecuting crimes affecting the fi nancial interests of the EU in his 
national court under the already existing national rules on substantive and 
procedural criminal law, which may be subject to harmonization by EU law.32
However, one of the most important rationales to establish the EPPO is that 
Member States do not fulfi l their obligations to implement or ratify on time. In the 
context of offences affecting the fi nancial interests of the Union, only a few States 
have implemented the pertinent legislation fully. Secondly, there is the problem of 
signifi cant differences in the legal framework relating to these offences. As noted, 
European legislation loses much of its approximative function due to the application 
of national general principles of criminal law to EU criminaliza tions. Because of 
this, the fi nancial interests of the EU are not equivalently protected, leaving gaps in 
criminal liability, which hampers judicial cooperation and encou rages forum 
shopping by perpetrators.33
31 Article 157 of the Dutch Criminal Code; section 1(3) of the English Criminal Damage Act 1971 
and §§306 and 306a-f of the German Criminal Code.
32 Green Paper of 11 December 2001 on criminal-law protection of the fi nancial interests of the 
Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM 2001/715, §4.2 and 5.1.
33 Communication from the Commission on the protection of the fi nancial interests of the 
European Union by criminal law and by administrative investigations, 26 May 2011, COM 
(2011) 293.
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Only direct application of Union law can truly overcome these problems. The 
creation of a Directive,34 which (correct) implementation into national law the 
Commission can monitor and enforce is only a second best option. A Regulation 
containing Union offences and Union general principles of criminal law can be 
applied immediately and uniformly by the EPPO. It would increase legal certainty 
for defendants that operate in multiple Member States and make the legal system 
that the EPPO has to work with less much clearer, even if it would take national 
judges some time to get used to this new legal system. From a perspective of 
subsidiarity, autonomous EU criminal law, as an alternative to further 
harmonization by Directives, limits the infl uence of European law on the national 
legal system and thus helps it to remain more consistent.
The need to identify a general part of criminal law for the EU does not, however, 
depend on the existence of an autonomous or directly applicable European criminal 
law. This need also follows, as I have demonstrated, from the current use of general 
concepts of criminal law in EU legis lation. It will only become more acute when a 
system of direct enforcement enters into force. The Council apparently recognizes 
the need for a general part, concluding that model provisions for criminal law can 
overcome problems of interpretation and implementation of EU law.35 Since 2011, it 
is clear that the Commission also appreciates the need to provide for uniform 
interpretations of general principles of substantive criminal law in order to ensure 
an effi cient implementation of EU legislation.36 As part of a more effi cient 
legislative instrument on the protection of the EU’s fi nancial interests, the 
Commission foresees that such a proposal “may include (…) more systematic rules 
on aiding and abetting, instigation, attempt, as well as on intent and negligence.”37
2.6. Guidance
It can be expected that Member States will oppose the (autonomous) European 
interpretation of these concepts.38 Nonetheless, when a question on the 
interpretation of one of these concepts in a certain Framework Decision or Directive 
comes up in a preliminary procedure before the ECJ, it is interpreted in an 
34 Proposal for a Directive on the criminal-law protection of the Community’s fi nancial interests, 
Brussels, 23 May 2001, COM (2001)272, as amended by COM (2002) 577. A new proposal may 
be expected soon, see the Communication mentioned above.
35 Draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
deliberations, Brussels, 27 November 2009 16542/2/09 REV 2.
36 Commission Communication: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573, p. 12.
37 Communication from the Commission on the protection of the fi nancial interests of the 
European Union by criminal law and by administrative investigations, 26 May 2011, COM 
(2011) 293, p. 11.
38 Note for example that the several Member States and the Commission had reservations to the 
above-mentioned Council conclusions, see p. 2 and Council document 16798/09 of 27 November 
2009.
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autonomous manner. Clearly, the interpretation of ‘serious negligence’ in the case 
of Intertanko and others39 is strictly limited to the use of that concept in Article 4 of 
the pertinent Directive, but it can be expected that the Court will adopt the same 
interpretation of this concept when it is used in other EU legislation. The ECJ will 
continue to play a role of paramount importance in identifying this general part of 
criminal law of the EU. The Court has always taken a pro-active role in the process 
of European integration in criminal law, which will only be strengthened by its 
extended competences under the Lisbon Treaty.40
The results of this research may therefore guide the Union legislator as well as 
its judiciary. I hope to promote a thorough debate on the contents of such a general 
part within the institutions and Member States of EU. In addition, this legal 
research can be of assistance to acceding and candidate countries, showing what the 
EU standards in criminal law are. The comparative legal research can also be useful 
for domestic legislative and judicial powers in the Member States that want to know 
how a similar problem is dealt with in another legal system.
Furthermore, this research can foster the understanding of national authori ties 
of the approaches to substantive criminal law in other Member States. In this way, 
the mutual trust between judges, prosecutors and police offi cers in the EU will 
increase, which is essential to cooperation and further integration in criminal 
matters. In any event, this academic exercise contributes to the international 
exchange of scholarly thought. It stimulates debate on the need and scope of 
European criminal law and paves the way for future research.
3. OUTLINE
As noted, this research focuses only on mens rea and defences, leaving other 
general principles of substantive criminal law to related projects. The central 
question of this research is therefore: what should mens rea and defences look like 
in a general part of criminal law for the European Union?
In the chapters on mens rea, I will formulate answers on questions relating to 
the scope of fault elements like intention. Should it encompass the foresight of risks 
or should dolus eventualis be deemed a relic of the past? Should intention relate to 
each and every single offence element of should strict liability be allowed in 
European criminal law? What is the effect of mistakes on fault? Does it matter if 
the mistakes merely relate to the identity of the victim or whether they originate 
from intoxication? Did John intend to kill the police offi cer? Did Hans intend to kill 
the KLM employee?
In the chapters relating to defences, I will fi rst discuss whether such a concept 
can be distinguished from the offence defi nition? Is there a difference between 
39 3 June 2008, Case C-308/06, Intertanko a.o. v. Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR 
I-4057.
40 Article 267 TFEU.
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negating the charge and raising a defence? Can we discern another category of 
defences, besides justifi cations and excuses? What if the defendant was mistaken on 
the facts giving rise to a defence? Should an excusatory version of self-defence be 
available in European criminal law? Should John be able to rely on duress when 
prosecuted by the European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce? What about torturing 
terrorists or shooting down an airplane that is hijacked by terrorists?
I will present the results to this question in an integrated manner. Rather than 
fi rst describing the different national perspectives, as is common in legal compa ri-
son, I will immediately submit, wherever possible, what mens rea and defences 
should look like in a general part of criminal law for the EU. This is founded on the 
fragments of Union law and the common ground of national legal concepts. Only 
when signifi cant national differences exist, are these addressed explicitly and 
separately, after which a choice is made in favour of one of those approaches. The 
choices are based on certain criteria, which are defi ned next.
In the following chapter, I will explain in detail how I set up and conducted this 
research. I will account for which legal systems were included into the comparative 
legal research and which conditions were used to make a synthesis. At the same 
time, features of those legal systems that are important to understand the compa-
rative results are introduced. In the second and third part of this book, the results of 
the research on mens rea and defences are presented. In the fi nal part of this book, I 
summarize the results and conclude with general observations.
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The research was divided into two stages. In order to identify what mens rea and 
defences in a general part of criminal law for the European Union should look like, 
I fi rst established what mens rea and defences look like in national and Union law. 
After all, a general part of European criminal law should be construed out of the 
legal traditions of the Member States and the fragments of criminal law originating 
from Union law. In addition, it needs to be in line with the requirements that can be 
derived from the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR). 
As will be explained here, the selection of these sources follows from article 6 TEU, 
article 67(1) TFEU and the case-law of the ECJ.
In a second stage of this research, I compared the concepts of national and 
Union law and made a synthesis of mens rea and defences. The synthesis is based 
upon funda men tal rights and the common ground of mens rea and defences in 
national and Union law. In choosing between competing approaches to legal 
concepts, I applied certain criteria, such as that a general part of European criminal 
law should be consistent, coherent and enforceable. I will explain why these 
requirements were selected and what they entail. The synthesis is presented and 
defended in the second and third parts of the book.
In the past, similar endeavours have been undertaken. Consider the Model Penal 
Code of the United States, the Rome Statute on an International Criminal Court 
established, the draft Common Frame of Reference on European civil law and the 
Corpus Juris projects on the protection of the fi nancial interests of the EU by 
criminal law. Before I started to collect the data for this research, I studied the 
method applied in these projects in order to learn from past experience and 
scrutinize my own method. In this chapter, I will refer to these projects to highlight 
the similarities and differences of this research. Amongst others, this project differs 
with the Corpus Juris projects, because in those studies, national contact points 
gathered the information, rapporteurs wrote comparative law analyses and fi nally, 
experts wrote syntheses.1 In this project, the person gathering the national ‘data’ is 
the same person doing the comparative analyses and synthesis.
As noted, the increasing infl uence of the EU in criminal matters raises numerous 
issues. This research does not apply to institutional issues, such as what the legal 
basis of a general part of criminal law for the European Union could be. I do not 
address the question whether a political will can be found to establish a general part 
of criminal law. Neither do I attempt to answer the question whether this general 
part should be codifi ed or not. To emphasize, this project does not aim at 
codifi cation. A European general part is not the same as a ‘European Model Code’.2 
1 Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, foreword, p. VI and 33 and Cullen 2003, p. 7.
2 See Enschedé 1990.
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I will rather provide an extensive and complete discussion on what mens rea and 
defences should look like. These results will offer to political bodies a set of 
arguments to evaluate what formal legislation on a general part should look like. By 
separating this academic task from political negotiations, it was possible to keep out 
any political conside rations in constructing the synthesis, which also distinguishes 
this project from the Corpus Juris projects.
1. FIRST STAGE: GATHERING DATA
In the fi rst stage of this research, I gathered all the relevant sources for comparison. 
Like the Corpus Juris, this general part is based on the law of the representative 
Member States (acquis commun) and the EU (acquis communautaire), the latter 
consisting of the general principles of Union law identifi ed by the ECJ and the 
requirements of the ECHR.3 The ECJ identifi es the general principles of Union 
Law, including those on criminal law, by considering the constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and the guidelines supplied by the international treaties on 
human rights.4 The domestic traditions of the Member States and the ECtHR case-
law are therefore the most important inspirations for the Court in identifying Union 
law. This has been codifi ed in articles 6 TEU and 67(1) TFEU. A general part of 
criminal law for the EU must follow the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States and it must comply with the requirements under the ECHR and the CFR.5
1.1. Comparative legal research
It follows that a general part of criminal law for the EU needs to be based on the 
gene ral principles of criminal law of its Member States. Hence, the comparative law 
method was used. It is a common method for the ECJ to fi ll the lacunae in Union 
law by recourse to the domestic legislation, case law and doctrine of its Member 
States.6 The ECJ establishes certain principles as a part of the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States and regards these principles as part of the 
gene ral principles of Union law.7 It is therefore obvious to fi ll in the missing 
general principles of mens rea and defences by comparative law. Another reason to 
apply the comparative law method is that its goals coincide with the goals of this 
research. Amongst others, comparative law aims to aid and inform the legislative 
process and law reform, elucidate the application of foreign law in the courts and 
3 Cullen 2003, p. 314 and Delmas-Marty 1997, p. 40. See also the Resolution of 30 July 1999 on 
criminal procedure in the European Union (Corpus Juris), OJ 1999 C 219/106.
4 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935.
5 See also article 83(3) TFEU and the abovementioned Resolution, pp. 106–107.
6 Tridimas 2006, pp. 17–18.
7 See 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 and 3 May 2005, 
Case C-387/02, Criminal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR I-3565.
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contribute to the unifi cation and harmonisation of laws and international 
cooperation.8
First, I established the scope and meaning of mens rea and defences as they 
appea red in the legal systems of the Member States of the EU. Ideally, a comparative 
re search should be conducted in all relevant Member States. It was however 
im possi ble to deal with all 299 legal systems of the European Union, because of the 
lack of the necessary linguistic skills of all 23 European languages. After all, legal 
words cannot usually be translated without losing their unique meaning. Similar 
terms can have different meanings, and different terms can have a very similar 
meaning.10 In order to avoid errors, the sources of law were therefore studied in their 
original language. This meant that the researcher had to master the languages of the 
Member States under investigation, bringing about a fi rst reason to limit the number 
of States that were studied. Another reason is that it was impossible to carry out an 
in-depth study of mens rea and defences in all legal systems within the four years 
allo cated for this research.
The Member States were therefore divided into four ‘legal families’. The term 
‘legal family’ is common in comparative law and serves to designate groups of legal 
systems having similar legal features enabling one to speak of the relative unity of 
those systems.11 The following division was made: a fi rst group of States consist of 
‘Common law States’, including England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, Malta and Cyprus. A second group can be called ‘Germanic and Scandina-
vian States’. This group includes Germany, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Estonia, Portugal, Greece and Austria. A third group consists of ‘Napoleonic 
States’, which are the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy. Finally, 
a group of Eastern European States was identifi ed, including Poland, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.12
It turned out that the research had to be limited to representative states of the 
fi rst three groups. Including an Eastern European state would demand 
disproportional investments in time, costs and efforts to meet the necessary 
linguistic requirements. Moreover, it was assumed that the fourth family is highly 
infl uenced by common historical antecedents of the other three families and that 
when these States acceded to the EU, they have adapted their law to the other legal 
families.13 The risk of not incorporating relevant aspects of a specifi c domestic 
system was furthermore redu ced by a conference held on January 20–21, 2011, 
where some of the results were presented to legal experts from many different 
8 De Cruz 1999, p. 223; Nijboer 2005, p. V; Eser 1997, p. 501–504; Smits in Reimann & 
Zimmermann 2006, p. 477–512 and Pakes 2004, p. 3.
9 The United Kingdom consists of three separate jurisdictions that each have their own legislator 
and judiciary.
10 De Cruz 2002, p. 212–214 and Eser 1997, p. 513.
11 Saidov 2003, p. 110 and Zweigert & Kötz 1998, pp. 40–42.
12 Another classifi cation can be found in Nijboer 2005, pp. 33–35. A classifi cation can be neither 
right nor wrong; it is merely an intelligible summary of information, Reichel 2002, p. 24.
13 See Fletcher in Eser, Hassemer & Burkhardt 2000, p. 242 and Cullen 2003, pp. 83 and 318.
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nationalities, including experts from the Eastern European States.14 Like in the 
Corpus Juris,15 the comments made during this conference and at other points 
during the research were taken into account.16
As far as the three legal families are concerned, England was chosen to represent 
the states with a common law tradition, Germany has been chosen to represent the 
Scan di na vian and Germanic states and the Netherlands have been selected to repre-
sent the Napoleonic states. England and Germany are selected as the classic repre-
sen tatives of two very different legal traditions. The Dutch legal system was selec-
ted because of the easy access to legal sources when doing research in the 
Nether lands. Furthermore, being born and raised in Netherlands and trained in 
Dutch law, it would have been impossible to do comparative law without at least 
unconsciously compa ring the fi ndings with Dutch law. Apart from these obvious 
reasons, the Dutch legal system was selected because it forms a middle ground 
between the dogma tic German and the pragmatic English legal system. In contrast 
to the two other legal systems, it also has an open character, welcoming insights 
through comparative legal analy sis.17
Since the object of this research is normative, I also took into account books and 
articles from scholars originating from and/or residing in other countries than the 
three Member States that focused on what mens rea and defences should look like.18 
Many of those scholars originate from the US, some of whom have made impor tant 
contributions to comparative criminal law. It is warranted to draw inspiration from 
the Model Penal Code and US scholars be cause of the common law tradition that it 
shares with England.19 Moreover, the crimi nal policy of the US infl uences that of 
the EU, examples of which are the con cept of corporate criminal liability in the 
general part and the crimes of money launde ring and terrorism in the special part.20 
None the less, I have kept in mind that ‘Anglo-American’ law remains very different 
from English law, and only of secondary relevance to our general part.21
Important sources for this research are legal texts and history, doctrine and case-
law. Nonetheless, extra-legal rules were taken into account. These may be informal 
customs and practices, which operate outside strict law or various legal attitudes 
and non-legal phenomena, which ultimately infl uence the state of the law. By using 
all possible legal sources, working with foreign experts and discussing the research 
14 See Blomsma in Klip 2011.
15 Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 249.
16 See Weigend in Klip 2011.
17 It can be said that Dutch substantive law has been infl uenced, like many countries, by German 
legal doctrine, see Mevis 2006, p. 546. Nijboer 2005, p. 35 therefore puts the Netherlands 
somewhere in between the Scandinavian/Germanic family and the Napoleonic family.
18 See for example the excellent monograph on self-defence of Sangero 2006.
19 Dubber in Reimann & Zimmermann 2006, p. 1299. In earlier times, for example, the US and 
England used the same test to esta blish the defence on insanity, see Reichel 2002, p. 65.
20 Vogel 2002, p. 521.
21 De Cruz 1999, p. 224.
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on national law within an international research group of Austrian, Belgian, Dutch 
and Greek researchers, the danger of ignoring these rules was minimized.22
I started gathering the national data by studying handbooks on the domestic 
criminal justice system. I studied commentaries, articles, books and case-law and 
used its references to fi nd other literature and case-law. Besides this technique of 
snow balling, I gathered information by browsing and searching online data bases 
and catalogues. Because of the enormous amount of national case-law and litera ture 
on mens rea and defences, I made a selection based on relevancy, topica lity, status 
of authors and journal, as well as topics which required further attention.
Parliamentary pieces and proposals were studied too, although the impact on the 
gene ral part of criminal law is relatively small, given the fact that most legislators 
have left the details of the general part to practice and academia. For instance, in 
Dutch law, the scope of the different types of mens rea, like intent and negligence, 
are not laid down in the law. Legal texts generally thus give a very limited under-
standing of the scope of mens rea and defences. In England, legislative history of 
the general part is almost absent. There is no such thing as a Criminal Code. 
Traditionally, the judiciary identifi es general principles of law.
The English Law Commission deserves special attention in this regard. Its task 
is to submit proposals for reform and codifi cation of English law.23 It has drafted 
and redrafted a Criminal Code, and numerous proposals to legislate on general 
principles of criminal law in the last decades. They are used here as infl uential 
reports on what the law of England is and what it should be, according to the Law 
Commission and those scholars and practitioners consulted by it. Although the 
codifi cation project was recently dropped, some of the other proposals of the Law 
Commission have been enacted. With the enactment of proposals, its reports 
function as legislative history.
The methodology of legal interpretation thus differs from state to state, which 
required me to adapt my method to the legal system under investigation. Besides 
the diffe ring weight given to scholarly work, case-law and legislative history in 
deciding concrete cases, another example is the different roles of the domestic 
courts. For instance, Ger many has a Constitutional Court whereas in the 
Netherlands, one cannot even invoke in court that a criminal law violates the 
constitution. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which was called the 
House of Lords until 2009, decides cases on the merits, whereas the Dutch Supreme 
Court only checks whether the legal principle is stated correctly, and whether the 
lower court has substantiated its decision suffi ciently. Therefore, when it quashes a 
judgment, this generally does not im ply that the facts and circumstances of the case 
do not justify its verdict. It only means that the verdict is not properly argued for. 
Accordingly, it is more diffi cult to deduce general principles from these decisions.
Before fi nishing the study of every legal system, national experts were consulted 
to gain confi rmation of the results and to clarify any remaining questions on the 
22 Cadoppi 1996, p. 14.
23 Section 3(1) of the Law Commission Act 1965.
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sub jects and the legal system as a whole. The research on the different legal systems 
culmi na ted in country reports on mens rea and defences. The reports were 
structured in a similar way so as to facilitate a subsequent comparative cross-
reference of the basic features of every element. In this manner, I wrote a country 
report of England fi rst, followed by the Netherlands and fi nally a report on mens rea 
and defences in Germany. Sometimes, I had to take into account changes of the law, 
new insights or proposals made after the fi nalizing of a country report. For instance, 
after the report on England had been fi nalised, the English law on provocation and 
diminished responsibility changed in 2010, following a proposal by the Law 
Commission. This research takes into account all developments in law until March 
2012.
1.2. Contextual approach
In a thematic approach, one would have ordered the study in a thematic way, 
investi ga ting the different elements in all legal systems. For example, self-defence 
would be studied in the legal systems under investigation, after which duress could 
be inves ti gated. The advantage of the contrasting country-by-country approach I 
chose, is that it provided for an easy collaboration within the research group, 
making it possible to gear our activities to one another, discuss the peculiarities of 
the legal systems and identify relationships between the different elements under 
investiga tion, like actus reus and mens rea.
More importantly, by studying one legal system before moving on to the next 
one, I gained a better perspective of mens rea and defences in the legal context in 
which they operate. This context includes the broader legal framework, such as the 
special part and procedural law, but also the interrelationship between the different 
aspects of mens rea and defences. First, these elements form a coherent whole that 
can hardly be studied in isolation. Liability for being aware of side-effects of one’s 
actions can only be understood in relation to liability for intended conse quences. 
Why is foresight less culpable than intending consequences? Secon dly, mens rea 
and defences are not always easy to distinguish. Particularly in English law, the 
subjects tend to overlap. The claim that he did not intend a conse quence is some-
times interpreted as constituting a defence.
In order to grasp the correct context and interrelation of the elements of criminal 
liability, they need to be put into categories that are ordered in a logical manner. 
This is most evident regar ding defences. In order to understand defences, one must 
fi rst understand what is required to be liable for committing an offence. Before one 
can answer the question when criminal liability is lacking, one must establish when 
criminal liability is present. In the next chapter, a framework of criminal liability is 
there fore presented. In short, it consists of the offence defi nition, which can be divi-
ded into actus reus and mens rea, in a tier of wrongfulness and a tier of blame-
worthiness. The latter two elements are negated by defences.
Method
 23
Other general principles of substantive criminal law, as well as aspects of 
procedural law, sentencing and legal culture24 also infl uence this research.25 As will 
become clear, the limited scope or complete lack of certain defences in English law 
is miti ga ted by discretion in sentencing. The English solution to appropriate 
outcomes is found in a more pragmatic way, such as the executive discretion to 
secure an early release or by a decision not to prosecute. By contrast, in a criminal 
justice system where the public prosecutor as a rule has no right to waive 
prosecution, like in Germany, this will virtually be impossible. The rules on 
criminal liability need to provide for a comprehensive toolkit, enabling the decision 
maker to establish fair outcomes. By putting legal differences in such a broader 
national context, it seems that every society faces essentially the same problems, 
but they deal with it through different means, often with very similar results. It was 
therefore important to look at the function of the different concepts. If other 
concepts in substantive or procedural law perform the same function to solve 
certain legal problem as an element of mens rea or a defence, this ‘functional 
equivalent’ was investigated too.26
A contextual approach in comparative criminal law also means the researcher 
has to look at the social, cultural, historical, philosophical and political context of 
the criminal justice system under enquiry.27 A basic knowledge of this context is 
required to put the results into perspective; this does not require an investigation in 
great depth for its own sake.28 In order to grasp the broader context of the legal 
systems I was less familiar with, I started that research with consulting introductory 
textbooks on the English and German legal system.
1.3. EU Perspective: from fragments to a whole
After having investigated the concepts in national settings, I identifi ed the 
fragments of a general part in the existing European law. The European perspective 
consists of the law of the EU and the regime of the ECHR. Concerning the EU, all 
relevant legal instruments were analysed: Conventions, Joint Actions, Common 
Positions, Decisions, Directives and Framework Decisions. The analysis of these 
instruments is in most cases limited to a comparison of authentic versions only. 
Apart from the preamble, the EU legislative history does not give much information 
on the inter pre ta tion. Implementation reports and policy documents sometimes 
provide for more insights on the purpose of the drafter. Moreover, legislative 
instruments generally only refer to general principles of criminal law, whereas the 
scope and meaning of those principles is identifi ed by the ECJ. With regard to its 
24 “(…) the ideas, values, attitudes and opinions people in some society hold, with regard to law 
and the legal system.” Alldridge 1999, p. 142.
25 De Cruz 2002, p. 231.
26 Zweigert & Kötz 1998, pp. 33–47; Reitz 1998, pp. 620–623 and Zieschang 2001, pp. 263–264.
27 Reichel 2002, p. 11–13; Nijboer 2005, p. 21; Fijnaut 1999, p. 212 and de Cruz 2002, pp. 214–216.
28 De Cruz 2002, p. 227.
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case law, the considera tions of the Court itself, the Opinion of the Advocate-
General and to a lesser extent, observations by Member States and the Commission, 
as well as the writings of legal scholars provided more information.
Concerning the ECHR and its case-law, the minimum requirements of a general 
part of criminal law for the EU have been deduced to some extent from the cases 
brought against England, Germany and the Netherlands. In this part of the research, 
cases against other States have been taken into account too. Most of the 
requirements of the ECHR deal with procedural law, but from the case-law on for 
example the right to life and the presumption of innocence, conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the scope of self-defence and the principle of guilt. These 
fundamental rights are also partially included in the CFR, which are addressed to 
the bodies and institutions of the Union. Until the Union has acceded to the 
Convention, its institutions cannot be challenged before the ECtHR. I will discuss 
the weight that should be given to these requirements in the synthesis below.
1.4. Criminal law
It is diffi cult to determine what criminal law is, given the different national views 
on what the purpose and effects of criminal punishment are. In order to make a 
selection, I adopted the ECtHR approach on what criminal law is.29 Many Member 
States have outsourced the enforcement of criminal offences to admini stra tive law, 
which body of law includes fewer rights for the party concerned. In such quasi-
criminal law, proof of mens rea is usually not required and admini strative 
authorities can impose a fi ne, thus making enforcement easier, simpler and cheaper. 
Article 6 ECHR is applicable only to a criminal charge. Similarly, the ECJ has held 
that principles of criminal law like that of nulla poena sine culpa and in dubio pro 
reo are only applicable to sanctions of a criminal nature.30
If the national authorities could sideline these safeguards by labelling something 
as non-criminal, the protection by legal principles would be eroded. The character 
of the law should therefore be determined autonomous of its national label. Instead, 
it should be assessed whether or not something can be qualifi ed as a criminal 
charge, focusing on the nature of the offence and/or the severity of the (possible) 
punish ment.31 In assessing the nature of a sanction, the ECJ also looks at the 
severity, purpose and the overall context in which the penalty is situated.32 AG van 
Gerven proposed to implement the ‘criminal charge’ criteria of the ECtHR in Union 
29 See the Opinion of AG Mazák on 28 June 2007, Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council [2007] 
ECR I-9097.
30 18 November 1987, Case 137/85, Maizena [1987] ECR 4587 and 18 October 1989, Case C-374/87, 
Orkem SA v. Commission [1989] ECR I-3283.
31 Öztürk v. Germany, appl. no. 8544/79, 21 February 1984, and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, appl. 
no. 14939/03, 10 February 2009.
32 11 July 2002, Case C-210/00, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6482, §33.
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law, but the ECJ has so far managed to circumvent the question of what criminal 
law is.33
As far as Union law is concerned, this also means that competition law can be 
regar ded criminal law, even though article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 explicitly 
states that decisions in competition law are not of a criminal nature. In practice, the 
ECJ treats competition law as criminal law and applies all rights under the ECHR 
to it.34 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU operate with a prohibition system and therefore 
read like a criminal offence. They are also directly applicable by any national judge 
and are meant to serve purposes like special and general prevention.35 Competition 
law thus forms a source of law in this research, although I take into account the 
special setting of compe ti tion rules, which brings about that not all concepts are 
easily trans ferred to a less economical setting.
2. SECOND STAGE: SYNTHESIS
In a second stage of this comparative legal analysis, the descriptive results from the 
fi rst stage were brought together. I identifi ed similarities, tried to explain and put 
into perspective the differences of the legal systems and fi nally, made a choice in 
favour of one or the other approach, interpretation, concept and so on. This choice 
is based on criteria that I elaborate on below. In some cases, provided the differences 
relate to a detailed aspect of minor importance, which all lead to the same outcome 
and are not objectionable in the light of the criteria set out, I made no choice and 
limited myself to listing the differences.
I chose to report on this research in a manner that focuses on this second stage 
of the research. It is common in comparative legal analysis to fi rst describe the 
different rules, norms, con cepts and institutions of the selected legal systems. I also 
incorporated these descrip tive results in aforementioned country reports, but do not 
include these in this book. After all, that is not the main interest of this research: 
those interested in a descrip tion of the law in the States under investigation may 
consult national handbooks. The purpose of this research is to provide for a 
synthesis. I therefore focus on the com pa ri son: the similarities, the differences and 
the reasons for these differences.
Starting from a description of the common ground of the legal systems under 
investigation, which forms the basis of the synthesis, I will highlight differences 
and put them into context in an attempt to explain them. Reference will be made to 
concepts that are functionally equivalent. Next, I will argue in favour of one the 
different approaches, rejec ting other(s). It will not be explicitly stated every time 
that the legal concepts in the different legal systems correspond. This should be 
33 Opinion of AG van Gerven on 26 September 1991, Case C-273/90, Meico-Fell v. Hauptzollamt 
Darmstadt [1991] ECR I-5569.
34 Klip 2012, pp. 2–3.
35 Report on Competition Policy 2008, 23 July 2009, COM (2009) 374, p. 4.
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presumed unless the opposite is made clear and can be inferred from the references 
to sources of diffe rent legal systems. I will present the synthesis right away. Only 
the differences between national concepts will be made explicit, because in that 
context, a choice must be made. I thus report thematically on what mens rea and 
defences should look like, and only go into a national description of different 
approaches when this is necessary for a proper understanding of fundamental 
differences between Member States, like the approach to intoxicated defendants.
The terminology used for the elements in this synthesis is neutral to and 
supersedes national systems.36 The terms do not have a specifi c meaning in a 
national legal system and therefore prevent misunderstandings with equivalents in 
national law.37 Latin, the old European legal scholars’ common language with an 
independent meaning, was therefore used to differentiate the element in the 
synthesis from its domestic sources.38 When no appropriate Latin term was 
available, English terminology is used, but clearly demarcated from its domestic 
counterparts. In addition, sometimes Latin can also have national connotations, 
which also called for clear demarcation. For example, ‘mens rea’ is common in 
English law and has been given different and sometimes limited meanings. I will be 
explicit when I refer to the English concept. Finally, I generally only use the male 
form to refer to defendants and victims, but it will be obvious that this could also be 
replaced by a female defendant or victim. I will now describe the criteria that 
determine the outcome of this research.
2.1. The scope of the general part
The content of the general part is inextricably bound up with the special part of 
criminal law.39 Although general principles apply to (almost) all offences, their 
application always depends on the context in which they operate. This context is 
usually determined by the offence charged.40 Consider the fi eld of international 
criminal law, which brings about particular rules of attribution. For example, the 
role of defences in this fi eld of law is quite marginal, because it’s hard to imagine 
the exclusion of criminal liability with crimes of this nature and gravity.41 Secondly, 
the seriousness of such crimes militates against liability without proof of mens rea.
The scope of this general part thus follows and is infl uenced by the special part 
it applies to, which makes it necessary to identify that special part. One approach is 
to look at the crimes or fi elds of law on which the Union is competent to legislate 
on. Under article 83(1) TFEU, the Union can legislate on serious crime with a cross-
36 Nijboer 2005, p. 23–24; Eser 1997, p. 511 and de Cruz 2002, p. 220.
37 Delmas-Marty 2003, p. 18.
38 Ristviki 2005.
39 Ambos 2002, p. 72 and Klip 2002, p. 110.
40 A general principle need not be invariant across all crimes to qualify as such, see Tadros 2002.
41 Ambos 2002, p. 515. In other words, there will not often be proportionality between the attack or 
danger on the one hand and the international crime committed by the defendant on the other.
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border dimension. These crimes include terrorism, traffi cking in human beings, 
sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug and arms traffi cking, money 
laun de ring and so on. Under article 83(2) TFEU, the Union is also competent to 
approximate criminal law relating to areas of a much more regulatory nature, like 
road transport and environmental protection,42 provided this is essential in order to 
ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been 
subject to harmonisation.43
Third, article 325 TFEU creates a legal base for criminal law on the topic of 
fraud affecting the fi nancial interests of the Union. If the general principles 
developed here would only apply to offences that protect the fi nancial interests of 
the EU, it would look very different than if it would also apply to lethal offences. As 
mentioned above, not requiring mens rea as to each and every offence element is 
not as controversial in the ‘regulatory context’ as opposed to ‘truly criminal’ or 
serious offences. The scope of defences would also look very different, as one 
would not expect the accused to raise self-defence against a fi nancial offence.
On the one hand, such a limited application of a general part of criminal law for 
the EU may be read into article 86(1) TFEU, which enables the establishment of a 
European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce for the protection of the fi nancial interests of 
the Union. The general part in the Corpus Juris was established with a view to 
apply only to these offences. Ever since the debate on this EPPO started,44 has it 
been related to the EU’s fi nancial interests. The case for an EPPO is strongest in 
relation to offences affecting these interests. Besides the diffi culty of prosecution 
because of the often complex nature and transnational character of the crimes, the 
fi ght against these crimes is hampered by a lack of ownership. Because it is not the 
national budget that is detrimented, national authorities appear to be more reluctant 
in prosecuting offences detrimenting the EU budget than their national budget, 
especially taking into account that they have only limited capacities for 
investigation and prosecution. If there are multiple States that have jurisdiction over 
a set of offences against the EU budget, they often look at each other to take action 
or only prosecute those acts committed on their territory.
On the other hand, article 86(4) stipulates that the European Council may also 
extend the competency of the EPPO to serious crimes with a cross-border dimen-
sion. Moreover, it is not just the creation of the EPPO that warrants the identifi cation 
of a general part of European criminal law. As explained, the current technique of 
har mo ni sation requires such general principles too. In that respect, article 83(1) 
42 Commission Communication: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573, pp. 
10–11.
43 It can be questioned whether this codifi es 13 September 2005, Case C-176–03, Commission v. 
Council [2005] ECR I-7879 and 23 October 2007, Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council [2007] 
ECR I-9097, or whether these cases still constitute a separate legal basis for competence in 
criminal law.
44 See the Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the fi nancial interests of the Community and 
the establishment of a European Prosecutor, 11 December 2001, COM 2001/715.
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TFEU refers almost exclusively to serious crime. Hence, the possible scope of appli-
ca tion of a general part of criminal law for the EU is quite broad, ranging from 
crimi nal penalties for not properly documenting the number of hours one has driven 
to terrorist offences. The general principles of mens rea and defences in this 
research are therefore not established to apply merely to regulatory offences. They 
are esta blished, similar as in national law, to apply to crimes of diverging 
seriousness. The general part could be applied to the prosecution of both human 
traffi cking and viola tions of fi shing quota.45
The general part established here takes into account the different contexts in 
which it may operate. Although these principles in theory apply to all offences, 
conside ration is given to the different contexts in which it may operate. For 
example, although strict liability, which does not require proof of mens rea in 
relation to all or some offence elements, should be the exception, it is less 
controversial in the context of regulatory offences. In all Member States under 
investigation, intention is also established much easier in the regulatory context. If a 
general part of criminal law is therefore only deemed necessary for the direct 
enforcement by the Union of offences affecting the criminal interests of the EU, the 
aspects relevant for that context can be deduced easily from this synthesis.
2.2. Consistency and coherency
One of the most important criteria of the synthesis is that a general part of criminal 
law for the EU must be coherent and consistent.46 Coherency requires there can be 
no logical gaps in their construc tion. Consistent means that the elements of mens 
rea and defen ces must be in line with each other and that they should not confl ict. 
The application of a concept should lead to foreseeable, clear outcomes. Similar 
cases should be solved similarly. The synthesis that is provided for in this research 
aims to be a counterweight to the current fragmentary charac ter of European 
criminal law. The national general parts are generally assumed to be consistent and 
coherent, but the research enables us to recon sider this. After all, European criminal 
codes also “still include irrational and ana chronistic features which are usually not 
based on cultural specifi cs but on accidents of history or the casual compromises 
made by politicians in parliamentary disputes.”47
45 Of course, criminal penalties to enforce fi shing quotas should be available and imposed only as 
a last resort.
46 Articles 11(3) and 13(1) TEU; articles 7 and 334 TFEU; The Stockholm Programme – an open 
and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 4 May 2010, OJ 2010 C 115/1, under 3.3.1; 
Commission Communication: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573, p, 
3–4; EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, draft report on harmonisation 
of criminal law in the EU of 18 January 2012, no. 2010/2310 and Asp, Bitzilekis a.o. 2009.
47 Sieber 1999, p. 466.
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On a broader perspective, coherency and consistency requires that this thesis 
should be in line with the related research projects on actus reus and participation, 
jurisdiction and locus delicti and fi nally, legality. For example, the choices on mens 
rea also determine the principle of attempt, which consists of elements of actus 
reus and mens rea. I have tried to take into account these other doctrines of the 
general part in arguing what mens rea and defences should look like. For instance, 
in arguing in favour of recklessness over dolus eventualis, it is considered what the 
impact of this choice is for attempt liability and participation.
As mentioned before, several EU institutions have acknowledged that the further 
development of European criminal law should be coherent and consistent. These 
requirements can also be grounded in the obligation of Member States to enforce 
EU law under article 4(3) TEU. As explained in the introduction, the effective 
enforcement and uniform application of Union law presupposes that Union law is 
consistent. The conditions also follow from the attempt to identify a general part 
itself. A general part presupposes a logical, consistent and coherent ordering of 
legal principles. Without this, there would be no general part, no legal system. By 
identifying general principles of criminal law and separating them from the 
mistakes and anomalies that do not fi t in this whole, a logical, coherent whole can 
be construed. Such a general part can further the clarity and understanding of the 
law and make it more rational, predictable and fair.48
This also brings about that the goal of this research may be criticized as biased 
from the start. After all, the existence and use of a general part is still criticized by 
English lawyers. It could even be argued there is no such thing a general part in 
England.49 There is a traditional reluctance of Anglo-American criminal law to 
work with general concepts.50 On the continent, general principles are used as tools 
to solve a case top-down, whereas in England, the focus is on the instant case and 
the facts of that case as such, or on the offence at hand. General principles are only 
distilled bottom-up from cases when they seem to share common features.51
Only in recent decades, English scholars in general have gained an interest in 
general principles. Still, English law is very focused on facts and offences, as can 
be illustrated by most textbooks on substantive criminal law, of which one half 
usually deals with general principles, whereas the other half discusses frequent and/
or grave offences. English law is relatively less interested in general principles 
because of a perceived lack of practical relevance. Being much more pragmatic, the 
desired outcome is considered most important. For example, I will explain in this 
book that the English acknowledge that the distinction between basic and specifi c 
intent in cases of intoxication is inconsistent and unprincipled. However, that is 
taken for granted as the distinction leads to appropriate outcomes. By contrast, 
48 Elliott & de Than 2007, pp. 225–227; Smith, C. E. 2009; Cane 2007, p. 474 and MacCormick 
1990, pp. 556–558.
49 See Ashworth 2006, p. 95.
50 Erenius 1976, p. 83.
51 Alldridge 1999, pp. 144–147. See also Zweigert & Kötz 1998, p. 37.
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German legal doctrine seems to value internal consistency and coherence as one of 
the most important goals of criminal theory, even when it leads to overcomplexities, 
rigidity and absurd outcomes.52
The concept of a general part is not only fi rmly anchored in legal thinking in 
Germany; it also has a legal basis.53 The use of identifying a general part and the 
emphasis on the criteria of consistency and coherency thus appear to be quite 
German. As a result, one could fear that the legal elements of German criminal law 
will be overrepresented in the synthesis. However, consistency and coherency are in 
fact values that are considered important in all European criminal legal systems. 
The English reluctance to general principles is increasingly diminishing in recent 
decades. Secondly, these criteria are not the only ones taken into account. Legal 
coherency and consistency can be incompatible with understandable and 
foreseeable outcomes. Sometimes the criminal law must sacrifi ce its consistency in 
favour of a simple, clear and fair outcome.
2.3. Enforceability
Another important condition for the synthesis is therefore that its principles must be 
enforceable. The application of the law must remain simple enough to enable the 
effi cient prosecution of offenders, enabling the Member States to meet the 
enforcement obligation under article 4(3) TEU. The condition seeks to fi nd a 
balance between dogmatic complexity and practical application. Whereas important 
legal distinctions should be taken into account, complexities devised solely to bring 
a solution into line with other legal principles should be avoided. The outcome of a 
legal case should be as simple as possible. Simple law is clearer and better to 
predict, thus strengthening the foreseeability of what is criminal.54
After all, a great intellectual but abstract dogmatic construct is useless when 
courts and judges cannot apply it. A general part of criminal law for the EU must be 
compre hen si ble, accessible to and usable by lawyers from all legal traditions.55 
Notwith standing jury trials and lay magistrates, professionals apply the law. How-
ever, the law impacts the life of the individual defendant and also sends a message 
to the general public. This message is distorted when only few can understand the 
legal reasoning in a case.
52 Gropengiesser 2008, pp. 186–190. Nevertheless, the difference should not be exaggerated. 
Whereas English lawyers are very direct and clear about the fact that the result is most important, 
German (and Dutch) lawyers tend to hide common sense and public policy arguments in 
arguments of legal logic, see Bohlander 2009, p. 36.
53 The Criminal Code is subdivided into a general and special part, and §1 of its enactment law 
(Ein führungs gesetz Strafgesetzbuch, 2 March 1974) determines that the general part applies to 
all existing and future provisions of federal and state law.
54 See Tiedemann 2002, p. 6.
55 Ambos 2006, p. 661 and Ambos 2002, p. 54.
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2.4. Compatibility with human rights and constitutional traditions
A general part of criminal law for the Union should be founded on the principles of 
liberty, demo cracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Article 6 TEU holds that the human rights laid down in the ECtHR are 
general principles of Union law. Accordingly, a general part of criminal law for the 
Union must comply with the requirements under the ECHR. Prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty, the ECJ already declared in 1969 that human rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of law protected by the Court.56 The ECHR has always had 
special signifi cance in that regard.57 Human rights should be complied with in the 
framework of Union law.58 A violation of a human right is therefore incompa tible 
with Union law.59
The requirements under the ECHR are generally regarded as minimum criteria, 
implying a threshold that may not be crossed. It is in this context that the supremacy 
of Union law, specifi cally the require ments of the ECHR, becomes apparent. The 
principles identifi ed here may not be contrary to the ECHR. The rights guaranteed 
by the ECHR are not all absolute, but exceptions to those rights can only be made 
under the strict conditions set out by the ECtHR. A general part of criminal law for 
the EU may therefore offer more protection than required by the ECHR, but never 
less. According to its article 52(3), the CFR may provide for more extensive 
protection than the ECHR.
To a lesser extent, general principles of Union law also receive more weight in 
the synthesis than their domestic counterparts, because these principles are already 
the product of comparative legal analysis. The goal of this research is to fi ll in the 
gaps of the general part of European criminal law. The elements of mens rea and 
defences identifi ed here thus need to fi t in with the existing acquis of European 
criminal law, unless there are good reasons to deviate from that acquis.
As noted, a general part also needs to be in line with the constitutional traditions 
of the Member States. These should be interpreted as the funda men tal principles of 
crimi nal law, common to the EU Member States. These principles need not necessa-
ri ly be guaranteed by a Constitution.60 Despite the weight attributed in the TEU to 
the constitutional traditions of the Member States, they carry less weight in the 
synthe sis than Union law. First of all, legal traditions develop and change over time. 
For example, the Belgian legislator let go of its objections to criminal liability of 
legal entities in 1999.61
56 12 November 1969, Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419.
57 18 June 1991, Case 260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, §41.
58 14 May 1974, Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491.
59 13 July 1989, Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany [1989] ECR 2633, §17 and 
13 December 1979, Case 44/79, Lisotte Hauer v. Land Reinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, §15.
60 14 October 2004, Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen, [2004] ECR I-9641, §34. See also art. 67(1) 
TFEU.
61 Roef 2001, pp. 134–162.
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Secondly, the solution offered in the synthesis cannot be in line with all the 
domestic legal systems. In dealing with different legal approaches, solutions and 
rules, a choice in favour of one legal system is automatically a choice that may be at 
odds with another. If the synthesis would need to be in line with the criminal legal 
traditions of the Member States, only lowest common denominators could be 
identifi ed, consisting of the similarities of mens rea and defences between the legal 
systems under investigation. As explained before, such a general part of European 
criminal law would be incoherent. The ECJ also does not seek the lowest common 
denominator, but the most appropriate solution, with a view to the Union’s 
objectives.62
What is important for the ECJ is that a concept is popular in many national legal 
systems. If a principle is common to the law of most Member States, the ECJ will 
recognize it as a general principle of Union law. If differences between the domestic 
concepts are not inconsiderable, the ECJ is reluctant to identify something as a 
funda men tal principle of Union law.63 Nevertheless, in order for the ECJ to discover 
a general principle of Union law, it need not be recognized in all Member States. 
The scope and conditions of a Union principle may also differ in domestic law.64 
What suffi ces is that the rationales of these principles are similar in multiple 
Member States.65 I will therefore pay consi de rable attention to the rationales of 
mens rea, defences and their elements.
Although a quantitative criterion is more than a mere argument of autho rity, the 
choice in favour of national legal solutions in the synthesis is not based on the 
popularity or political feasibility of such choices, as was the case in the context of 
the Corpus Juris.66 The emergency break procedure of article 83(3) TFEU may be 
considered as an incentive not to infringe upon the fundamental aspects of a 
national criminal legal system. However, if a State would consider that this general 
part affects such an aspect, other States may still use the method of enhanced 
cooperation under the same article and continue with the adoption of the Directive. 
In other words, no political majority is required.67
This enables for instance, that even though dolus eventualis is more popular 
than the similar reckless ness, it is rejected in favour of the latter.68 As noted before, 
such political considera tions have been kept out of this research by separating the 
academic stage of establishing the general principles and the political stage of nego-
tiating and decision-making. This is a lesson learned from the efforts to construct a 
European Civil Code, which project was rescued in the end by establish ing such a 
clear distinction. The Rome Statute also illustrated that the negotiation of a general 
62 Tridimas 2006, p. 21.
63 21 September 1989, Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission [1989] ECR 2859.
64 Tridimas 2006, p. 6.
65 Tridimas 2006, p. 26.
66 Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, pp. 61 and 75.
67 Unanimity is also no longer required, as legislation under article 83 TFEU is adopted by the 
regular, co-decision, procedure.
68 See Reitz 1998, pp. 624–625.
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part by diplomats and politicians with a view to fi nd compromises that are more or 
less accep ta ble to all legal systems involved, can lead to a vague, incoherent and 
incon sis tent general part, which runs counter to the object of this research.69
2.5. Criminal legal theories
2.5.1. The object of punishment
The reasons for punishing offenders can vary. Traditionally, there are those who 
believe the defendant should be punished because this will contribute to the 
prevention of future crime and those who believe the defendant should be punished 
because he can be blamed for the offence. A focus on deterrence will lead to a 
distinctly diffe rent conception of general principles than a focus on deterrence. For 
example, insanity has been created out of the concern that if the mentally disordered 
would simply be acquitted, they would commit new crimes. By contrast, duress 
clearly aims to acquit the blameless because there should be no retribution against 
these defendants.70 On the other hand, it can also be said that duress excuses 
because the threat of punishment would not have motivated the actor to act 
differently anyway. In applying these perspectives, caution is therefore required.
It may be warranted in many contexts to categorize the English legal system as 
utilitarian, focused on prevention and the German as deontological, focusing on 
retribution. However, nowadays, every criminal justice system combines retribution 
and deterrence as goals of punishment.71 Even if prevention can be argued to be 
paramount in a society that focuses on the identifi cation and minimalization of 
risks, pleas to increase (maximum) penalties for offenders are primarily based on 
giving the defendant what he deserves. For this synthesis, it is therefore important 
that if a legal concept or condition thereof does not serve any goal of punishment, it 
is not to be included in the general part of criminal law for the EU. By identifying 
the rationales for legal principles and concepts, the different choices that can be 
made will become clear.
2.5.2. The character of criminal law
The purpose of criminal law is not only to effectively punish offenders, but also to 
guarantee the defendant’s rights. At the opposing ends of a spectrum on the 
character of criminal law, one can fi nd a repressive and a more liberal perspective, a 
69 Ambos 1999, p. 1; Bassiouni 1999, p. 460–464; Triffterer 2002, p. 389 and Dubber in Reimann 
& Zimmermann 2006, p. 1307.
70 Cane 2007, p. 471–472 and 476.
71 Dubber in Reimann & Zimmermann 2006, p. 1309; Section 142(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003; 
Ormerod 2005, p. 5; Hart 2008, p. 52; §§46 and 47 of the German Criminal Code; Krey 2002, 
pp. 108–109 and 112–113; Weigend in Sieber & Albrecht 2006, p. 50; Nieboer 1991, pp. 8–12; 
Buruma in Buruma 1999, p. 45 and Kelk 2008B, p. 31.
Chapter II
34 
crime control and a due process model, a focus on protection by or from the state, a 
perspective of criminal law as a sword or as a shield. Just like criminal theories are 
nowadays unifi ed, these apparently opposing views also need to be seen as two 
sides of the same coin.72
In other words, the purpose of criminal law is not only to protect the individual 
defendant from state power but also to protect other citizens against criminal 
perpetrators. The citizen needs to be protected against the State, but also against 
other citizens. If the defendant’s rights are not guaranteed, criminal law risks 
punishing the innocent, which serves no good. However, if the criminal law fails to 
suffi ciently protect its citizens against other citizens, he is hardly free either. His 
freedom must therefore be ensured, if necessary by criminal law. If the criminal 
law fails to maintain law and order, the system with its safeguards will not be 
accepted. As a consequence, people may take the law in their own hands, sidelining 
the protective character of the law.
Just like the Corpus Juris, this general part is therefore built on the assumption 
that “effectiveness is not incompatible with the strengthening of guarantees. (…) 
(The) objective (…) is to bring them together.”73 The double function of shield and 
sword follows from the area of freedom, security and justice. Security, as mentioned 
in article 67(3) TFEU, is associated with the autonomy of possible victims of crime 
and the repression of crime. It can be contrasted with the individual freedom of the 
defen dant that is limited by the criminal legal system. Justice means that both 
perspectives should be accounted for. As the Commission noted, effectively 
protecting the rights of both defendants and victims promotes the quality of 
justice.74
There will always remain a struggle between the competing perspectives. Like 
the perspectives on the purpose of punishment, the different views have an 
enormous impact on the scope of general principles. Bluntly put, by focusing on the 
effi cient prosecution of offences, the scope of criminal liability will become 
broader. It is thus again imperative to make explicit the underlying perspectives in 
discussing the synthesis. The general climate in the Member States tends to be 
increasingly repressive.75 In addition, the victim is getting a more prominent role in 
criminal proceedings, often to the detriment of the defendant. In the EU legal 
system, the focus always seems to have been on the effi cient repression of crime. 
This is not in the least because the Union is a victim of crime itself in the context of 
the protection of the EU’s fi nancial interests. Nevertheless, the position of the 
72 Beulke 2008, p. 2; Prittwitz 1993, p. 377; Packer 1964; Peters 1972 in Buruma 1999; de Jong, 
D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 27–30 and Remmelink (1986) in Buruma 1999, p. 105.
73 Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 33.
74 Commission Communication: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 20 September 2011 COM (2011) 573, p. 4. 
See also the Hungarian Presidency in its discussion paper for Justice Minister’s lunch- Towards 
an EU Criminal Policy, 7 June 2011, no. 11155/11.
75 Kelk 2008B.
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individual defendant has also received more attention in EU law, evident by the 
strengthening of his procedural rights in criminal proceedings.76
2.5.3. The purpose of general principles
The scope of general principles also depends on other, more specifi c goals or 
rationales of those principles. For example, the scope of self-defence differs accor-
ding to which rationale one believes to be dominant. The defence is broader under a 
rationale of autonomy of the attacked person than under a rationale that focuses on 
the legal order as a whole. Only from the broader perspective of the legal order, can 
the interests of the aggressor be taken into account, resulting in a proportionality 
requirement. It is also for that reason important to establish the underlying values of 
the different elements of mens rea and defences. These are presented under the 
heading of ‘rationale’ in the beginning of every discussion.
2.6. Fair labelling
Criminal law is all about communication. The criminal penalty refl ects social 
disapproval, which enables it to be distinguished from other penalties. The assess-
ment of criminal liability in a court is conducted through communication between 
the defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor, the judge, a witness, expert, interpreter, 
jury member and/or public. The legal judgment consists of a message to the 
defendant and the public, expressed by the label given to the defendant and his 
actions. Effective communication is essential to the goals of criminal law. Without 
it, goals of deterrence and retribution cannot be achieved. For example, because of 
the clear message in the verdict, it is clear to everyone what the norms are and what 
is criminal. In order for communication to be effective, the determination of his 
criminal liability should be correct, legitimate, clear and understandable.77
The principle of fair labelling requires that “the criminal law should articulate 
as clearly and precisely as possible the nature of the moral judgments being passed 
on citizens’ conduct.”78 This label ought to fairly represent what the perpetrator did 
wrong and why he is blamed for this. The verdict should neither understate nor 
overstate the defendant’s actions or state of mind.79 The principle underlies the 
creation of many different offences, refl ecting for example the difference in killing 
someone on purpose or negligently. The different standards of mens rea refl ect a 
different moral judgment on the defendant and his conduct. The reproach against 
76 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural 
rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ 2009 C 295/1.
77 See Bal & Ippel 1982.
78 Roberts in Simester 2005, p. 179. See also Williams 1983; Horder 1994, p. 339 and Ashworth 
2006, pp. 88–90.
79 Williams 1983.
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the intentional actor is more serious. This should be refl ected in liability and thereby 
in the range of sentences that can be imposed.
Criminal law must distinguish between different concepts of criminal law, like 
intention and negligence, justifi cation and excuse and perhaps even more fi ne-
grained distinctions that are morally signifi cant. Should intent for example 
encompass the conscious acceptance of risks or should this be considered a different 
fault element? It will be argued that if the determination of criminal liability should 
provide a fair label of what the defendant did, intent should not be given such a 
broad scope. Otherwise, the liability of the defendant risks being overstated. For 
instance, if the driver of a car ignores a stop sign and a police offi cer has to jump 
aside to escape collision with the vehicle, that driver is generally assumed to have 
intended to kill in the Netherlands. I believe that equating the driver with someone 
who shoots a fi rearm at the victim is unwarranted.
The question remains how fi ne-grained morally signifi cant distinctions in 
criminal law should be. In any case, the differentiation should be limited by the 
aforemen tioned condition of simplicity. The law should not make overly complex 
distinc tions. A general part must be conceptually rich enough to enable a judge to 
make all those distinctions that must play a role in the administration of criminal 
justice and at the same time, be simple and easy enough to apply.80 As a criterion 
for synthesis, fair labelling is only used to invalidate outcomes that clearly overstate 
the reproach that can be made to the defendant. The clear understatement of the 
defendant’s actions or state of mind in the conviction is also rejected, but less 
important given the ultimum remedium character of the criminal law and the 
principle that it is better to acquit ten guilty persons than to convict one innocent.
2.7. Conclusion
Like the other principles that are criteria for the synthesis, it is almost impossible to 
exactly pinpoint when a criterion is met or not. Some of them are more determinate 
than others. As principles however, they all constitute aspirations, ideal situations 
for the general part of criminal law. They may even confl ict with each other, as 
illustrated by consistency and simplicity. These circumstances do not invalidate the 
criteria.
In fact, the criteria need to be balanced. More importantly, this balance needs to 
be argued for, whilst clearly identifying the underlying criteria and principles. In 
order to establish a general part of criminal law of the EU, there must be a 
transparent debate about what these principles should look like and for what 
reasons. The reader may thus strike a different balance by adhering more weight to 
a criterion or its underlying interest. One may for example reach different 
conclusions based on a preference to mainly protect the rights of the individual 
defendant. The debate on what mens rea and defences should look like in European 
80 Jareborg according to Ambos 2005, p. 178, cited almost literally.
Method
 37
criminal law thus inevitably triggers a debate on what the underlying purposes of 
criminal law and punishment are. I have explained my views on these issues in this 
chapter.
By using comparative legal analysis as an important source for the creation of a 
genuine European criminal justice system and by striking a balance between 
security and freedom, this research is in line with the recommendation of the 
European Parliament to the Council that it will “establish, together with the 
Commission and with Parliament, a committee of wise persons (jurists) with the 
task of preparing a study on similarities and differences between the criminal law 
systems of all Member States and submit proposals for the development of an EU 
criminal justice area that will balance effectiveness in criminal proceedings with 
safeguarding individual rights”.81
81 EP recommendation of 7 May 2009 to the Council on development of an EU criminal justice 
area, no. 2009/2012.
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The paradigm of criminal liability consists of actus reus and mens rea. In order to 
be held liable, the defendant must not only have acted, he must also have been 
culpable in doing so. This is expressed in the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens 
sit rea. This means that “the act is not culpable under the law unless the actor is 
culpable for acting as he did,”1 or, “an act does not make a man guilty unless his 
mind is (also) guilty.”2 This combined requirement of act and concomitant state of 
mind safeguards that citizens are not held liable for mere thoughts or the causing of 
unforeseeable accidents. If the defendant thought about killing his enemy, without 
turning his thoughts into action, he cannot be held liable. In the absence of an actus 
reus, there is no crime. If the victim jumped in front of the train that the defendant 
was driving, the defendant can also not be held liable. However serious the 
consequence, he is not at fault for the victim’s death. In the absence of mens rea, 
there is no crime.
These starting points of criminal law have come under pressure however. It is 
doubted whether in all cases of criminal liability there can be said to be an actus 
reus and a mens rea. In cases of strict liability, proof of mens rea is made irrelevant, 
the defendant convicted upon mere proof of the criminal conduct. By criminalizing 
preparatory acts, innocuous conduct is criminalized, challenging the act 
requirement. This chapter aims to identify the scope and weight of mens rea as an 
essential element of criminal liability in a general part of criminal law for the EU. It 
will be investigated whether mens rea still is a fundamental pillar of criminal 
liability. Are exceptions legitimate and if so, under what conditions?
This chapter is structured as follows. I will fi rst explain what should be 
understood by the term mens rea by demarcating it from related legal concepts. 
Mens rea and defences are introduced as tiers of a coherent framework of criminal 
liability. In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at what I will call fault 
elements, like intention and negligence. It will be argued that a general part of 
criminal law for the European Union should apply three kinds of fault; dolus, 
recklessness and culpa. This brings about, most importantly, that the lower limit of 
intention, dolus eventualis, is rejected. Under the heading of correspondence, 
several principles will be discussed that determine the application of mens rea. 
Modern forms of liability, like strict liability, are positioned as exceptions to these 
principles.
1 Coke’s words according to Fletcher 1971, p. 414 and Erenius 1976, p. 80.
2 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 8 and Safferling 2008, p. 292.
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CHAPTER III
WHAT IS MENS REA?
Mens rea can literally be translated into ‘evil mind’1 or ‘guilty mind’.2 The Latin 
term is commonly used in English law to refer to the mental element required for 
conviction of the offence charged.3 Its functional equivalent in the Netherlands and 
Germany is named ‘subjective element’. I use the term mens rea in a broader 
meaning so it can serve as an analytical tool. It encompasses not only the 
‘subjective’ or ‘mental’ elements of the offence defi nition, but its related doctrines 
and principles as well. The referential principle, for example, holds that a subjective 
element like intention must relate to all objective elements of the offence defi nition.
1. ANALYTICAL TOOL
Mens rea is a collection of subjective offence elements and principles that regulate 
the application of these elements. The word ‘collection’ implies that mens rea is an 
analytical tool for both scholars and practitioners.4 The constituent elements of a 
crime are either mens rea or actus reus and categorized accordingly. The dichotomy 
is grounded in Cartesian dualism, which is the strict separation of corpus and 
animus, the body and the mind, the objective and the subjective, the material and 
the immaterial, the actus reus and mens rea. This dualism has been subject to much 
criticism, but is still dominant.5 The dichotomy of actus reus and mens rea helps to 
limit the scope of research and understand mens rea better.
The dualist perspective brings about that the defi nition of a criminal charge can 
be divided into a subjective and objective part. From Article 1(a) of Framework 
Decision 2008/913 on racism and xenophobia, we can deduce the following offence 
defi nition:6 “(Punishable is) he who intentionally publicly incites to violence or 
hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defi ned by 
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.” I have 
italicized the subjective element in this offence, which implies that the other 
elements belong to actus reus.
1 Finkel & Parrott 2006, p. 23.
2 Oxford Dictionary of Law.
3 Simester & Sullivan 2007 p. 676 and Fletcher 1971, p. 410.
4 DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] UKHL 5; Ashworth 2006, p. 95 and Smith, A.T.H. in 
Glazebrook 1978, p. 96.
5 Shapira-Ettinger 2007, pp. 2579–2582 and Robinson in Shute, Gardner, J. & Horder 1993.
6 The Framework Decision needs to be implemented in national law. It is assumed here that this is 
done in the popular fashion of copying the wording of the Framework Decision into national 
law. Often, criminalizations also include the maximum and/or minimum punishment that 
follows upon a conviction. This is not included in my use of the term ‘offence defi nition’. An 
offence defi nition only deals with the elements of criminal liability, not its consequences.
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2. FAULT ELEMENT
Mens rea is classically understood as a state of mind, a psychological disposition or 
mental element that relates to the actus reus, the objective offence element. The 
defi nition of ‘fault element’ provided by the English Law Commission in its draft 
Criminal Code, section 5(6), is enlightening;
“Fault element means an element of an offence consisting –
a) of a state of mind with which a person acts; or
b) of a failure to comply with a standard of conduct; or
c) partly of such a state of mind and partly of such a failure.”7
The Law Commission uses ‘fault element’ as a rough translation of mens rea. 
Although ‘mens rea standards’ are often referred to as states of mind or mental 
elements, certain of those standards cannot be called a state of mind. Rather, they 
can be described as an absence of a state of mind at best. For example, the negligent 
actor is not aware of a risk. Thus, negligence should be categorized most 
appropriately under b) as a failure to comply with a standard of conduct. 
Recklessness features the same failure but also a state of mind of awareness and 
thus fi ts category c) best.8 In Germany and the Netherlands, negligence and 
intention are labelled generally as subjective, mental or psychological elements of 
the offence defi nition.9 The label is also somewhat controversial, yet the debate has 
focused more on the correct dogmatic position of these elements in the framework 
of criminal liability than on the perceived linguistic imprecision of the term. I will 
turn to this issue shortly.
The term ‘fault element’ is best equipped to refer to the offence elements of 
intention, recklessness and negligence. Any reference to mens rea is problematic, 
because the lack of a state of mind characteristic to negligence has often been 
used to argue that it is no form of mens rea. Secondly, the term mens rea is used 
here as an analytical tool to cover not only the ‘standards’, but also its related 
principles. ‘Mental element’ suffers from the same shortcoming. ‘Mental’ is 
derived from the Latin mens, and the lacking function of the mind is paramount 
in negligence. ‘Subjective element’ is most popular on the continent, but also a 
quite broad term that is used there for more than merely intention and negligence, 
such as motives.
7 Law Commission 1989, p. 45.
8 Law Commission 1989, p. 190.
9 Krey 2003, pp. 26–27; Beulke 2008, p. 46; de Hullu 2009, p. 201 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, 
p. 63.
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3. DEMARCATION FROM OTHER SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
Some offence defi nitions contain more subjective elements than the fault elements 
intention, recklessness and/or negligence. These elements are excluded from the 
research, because they are not as widespread as fault elements and very much 
related to a specifi c (national) offence. Moreover, these elements usually do not 
constitute liability, but rather aggravate or mitigate it. The addition of such an 
element to a basic offence either aggravates or mitigates the reproach and thereby 
the sentencing range.
For example, premeditation is an aggravating circumstance of homicide in the 
Netherlands.10 It defi nes the most serious form of intentional killing as murder by 
adding the aggravating element of premeditation. The increase of the maximum 
punishment is based on the defendant’s weighing of contrasting motives and the 
decision to break the law, the planning, the increased degree of directing the course 
of events, implying a higher degree of free decision, control, danger and legal 
hostility. This is juxtaposed with spontaneous or impulsive killing.11 Given this 
rationale, it is not strange that premeditation has been referred to as a fault element. 
It has been called dolus premeditatus, in distinction to dolus repentinus, sudden 
intent,12 and put at one extreme end of a spectrum on fault elements.13 However, it is 
generally distinguished from fault elements because premeditation precedes the 
intentional act of killing.14 Moreover, the psychological element of refl ection is not 
only proven very objectively, it could even be said that the criterion of premeditation 
consists of the mere opportunity to refl ect.15
Homicide will often be used as an example in this book, so it is important to 
note that the defi nition of homicide differs signifi cantly in the three Member States. 
To distinguish on the basis of premeditation used to be common in Germany too.16 
At present however, murder is defi ned as intentional killing coupled with an array 
of possible motives and modi operandi, not including premeditation.17 Homicide is 
very broad in England and extends far beyond intentional killing.18 Premeditation is 
named in numerous sentencing guidelines as aggravating.
10 Article 289 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
11 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 279–281. See also de Hullu 2006, p. 241.
12 Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Opzet.
13 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 151.
14 De Hullu 2006, p. 241 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 120.
15 HR 27 June 2000, NJ 2000, 605; HR 11 June 2002, NbSr 2002, 208; Bakker, F.S. 2011; de Hullu 
2006, p. 242 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 120. See however, HR 28 February 2012, 
LJN:BR2342.
16 Joecks & Miebach 2003, note 2 on §211.
17 §211 of the German Criminal Code.
18 The common law offences of homicide have been criticized extensively and proposals have been 
made to restructure these offences, see for example Law Commission 2006.
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4. DEMARCATION FROM BLAMEWORTHINESS
In order to understand the difference between fault elements and excuses, mens rea 
must be distinguished from blameworthiness. Intention and negligence differ from 
blameworthiness.19 The latter is negated when an excuse like duress applies. The 
defendant, who was coerced to rob a bank because his family would otherwise be 
killed, has committed a criminal offence. He acted intentionally, because his direct 
purpose was to rob the bank. Therefore, on a fi rst level of assessing criminal 
liability, the defendant is liable. It is only because of his special motive to commit 
the crime that the defendant is excused for committing an intentional offence. This 
excusing occurs on another level of criminal liability, namely the level of 
blameworthiness.
The communication in this distinction is important: the defendant committed an 
offence, which is illegal and wrong(ful), but he should not be blamed for this crime, 
given exceptional circumstances recognized by law in the defence of duress. This 
will be further elaborated in the next chapter. For now, it is important to introduce 
the three-layered structure of criminal liability. This structure or framework is of 
German origin. It is an analytical tool to organize doctrines, concepts and principles 
of criminal law, and it provides the decision maker with a logical order of assessing 
these different elements of criminal liability. For example, it fi rst needs to be 
established that the defendant did in fact fulfi l the offence defi nition, before it 
makes sense to ask whether he should be excused for this crime.
The framework can therefore be seen as a ladder with three rungs that need to 
be climbed in order to reach a confi rmative judgment on criminal liability.20 The 
fi rst rung consists of the offence defi nition that encompasses objective and/or 
subjective elements, including fault elements. Bluntly put, actus reus and mens rea 
belong to this fi rst tier. When the offence elements have been proven, it is assumed 
that the two other conceptual tiers of criminal liability have been fulfi lled as well.21 
Only when a justifi cation applies, can it be said that the act was not wrongful and 
only when an excuse applies, blameworthiness is negated.22 Wrongfulness and 
blame worthi ness are thus called the ‘implied’ elements of criminal liability because 
they are assumed after proof of the charge.23
Moreover, they need not be included in the defi nition of the offence in contrast 
to the ‘express’ elements of intention, recklessness and negligence. They are an 
implied element of every crime. If the offence defi nition does not include intention 
19 Beulke 2008, p. 141. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 206.
20 Horder 2006A, pp. 99–101.
21 Kelk 2005, pp. 123–124; Roxin 2006, pp. 1105–1106; Beulke 2008, p. 49; Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 169–171.
22 Bohlander 2009, pp. 16 and 29; Krey 2003, pp. 2–3; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 154–155; 
Beulke 2008, pp. 27–28 and Naucke 1984.
23 Bosch 2008, p. 161; Machielse 1986, p. 698; Wolswijk 1998, p. 244; de Hullu 2006, pp. 65 and 
272; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 170; Krey 2003, pp. 8–9 and Beulke 2008, pp. 41–42.
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and the court also does not read this into the offence, this element does not have to 
be proven in order to hold the defendant liable. By contrast, regardless of whether 
wrongfulness and blameworthiness are included into the offence defi nition, there 
can be no criminal liability when these elements are lacking. A criminal act is thus 
commonly described as a human act, which fulfi ls the requirements of the offence 
defi nition and is both wrongful and blameworthy.24
This framework is generally accepted in all three Member States, although this 
may still be questioned as far as the English legal system is concerned. Rather than 
an ordered, three tiered structure of criminal liability, English law used to, and still 
tends to apply a ‘holistic approach’, or ‘fl at legal reasoning’, whereby the order of 
assessing the different elements of criminal liability is irrelevant. The main 
elements of the crime, actus reus and mens rea, are put on the same footing, and the 
order of assessing is considered immaterial.25 Nevertheless, it is explained below 
that English law is moving more and more towards the Germanic framework. 
European criminal law should adopt a structure or ordering of the elements of 
criminal liability, because structure is a precondition for consistency. It ensures that 
all defendants are treated the same and that the outcome of cases is foreseeable.26
A word of caution is required. The framework’s clear demarcation only applies 
to the intentional offence. When defences apply to reckless or negligent offences, 
the offence defi nition is negated. All three levels of criminal liability are centred on 
one. This is because the fault elements of recklessness and negligence are partially 
normative. These fault elements subsume the normative element of wrongfulness 
and blame worthiness with the consequence that the acceptance of a defence negates 
the offence defi nition, more specifi cally, recklessness or negligence.
Recklessness requires that the actor must be aware of a risk, which is 
unreasonable or unjustifi able. Hence, if a justifi cation like necessity applies, there is 
no reckless ness. The driver who is speeding knows this creates a risk for others and 
himself, but if he is speeding in order to get a seriously injured person to hospital, 
the risk can be deemed reasonable. As a result, there is no reckless act, and thus no 
fulfi lment of the offence defi nition. The justifi cation negates the offence defi nition 
rather than the ele ment of wrongfulness. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the affi rmative defence becomes a failure of proof defence. Accordingly, the 
language changes. Rather than stating that the actor is justifi ed in committing a 
reckless offence, it should be stated that he did not commit a reckless offence.27
Negligence is a very normative concept, since it holds in essence that a person 
could and should have acted differently. Crimes of negligence also absorb the 
24 Krey 2003, pp. 6–7; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 65; Beulke 2008, p. 27; Bosch 2008, p. 178; Kelk 2005, 
p. 50; Dolman 2006, p. 313; Koopmans 2007, p. 49 and Mevis 2006, pp. 564 and 581.
25 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 22–23 and Fletcher 1985, p. 951.
26 See Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1988, p. 22.
27 See IV.4.5.
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element of wrongfulness and are therefore negated by a justifi cation.28 In addition, 
negligence absorbs blameworthiness. As a result, in Dutch law, the effect of 
accepting an excuse to a charge of committing a negligent offence is that it negates 
the charge and results in an acquittal.29 It is accepted nonetheless, that the fault 
element negligence differs from the implied element blameworthiness. As will be 
explained later, the latter refers to any degree of blame, whereas negligence must be 
gross.30 This brings about that negligent offences require gross negligence, whereas 
strict offences only require some degree of blame.31 In other words, criminal 
liability always requires blameworthiness, even when no fault is required. The 
reproach of blameworthiness is therefore more basic than the reproach expressed by 
fault. This is just one example of the use of combining an investigation of mens rea 
and defences.
5. FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
As mentioned above, there has been an extensive debate on the correct position of 
fault elements in the framework of criminal liability. It is most fi ercely debated in 
German law where bluntly put, fault elements developed out of blameworthiness. In 
time, it was recognized that the structure of criminal liability consists not only out 
of wrongfulness and blameworthiness, but also out of an additional fi rst layer of the 
offence defi nition. The insight that intention is a fault element of the offence 
defi nition, rather than part of blameworthiness, gained infl uence due to the 
popularity of the teleological theory of conduct (‘fi nale Handlungslehre’).32 This is 
one of the main merits of a theory that has otherwise mostly been rejected.
The current prevailing theory in Germany still separates fault from 
blameworthi ness, but nonetheless believes that both negligence and intention 
include aspects of blame worthi ness. Accordingly, the two fault elements are 
positioned not only on the level of the offence defi nition, but partially on the level of 
blameworthiness too.33 The quest for a correct dogmatic framework of criminal 
liability has not been pursued with the same vigour in the Netherlands. Less 
concerned with the dogmatic frame work of criminal law, all the more with its 
practical procedural consequences, Dutch legal scholars and practitioners have 
accepted the abovementioned insights, and focused on cases where the acceptance 
of a defence brought about the negation of an offence element. The practical 
28 De Hullu 2006, pp. 251 and 257; Kelk 2005, p. 207; Roxin 2006, p. 1077 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 299, 305 and 319.
29 See IV.6.5.3. As explained below and later in more detail, German law positions the element of 
negligence that is negated by an excuse on the third tier of criminal liability.
30 See IV.6.5.1.
31 Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 114 and de Hullu 2006, p. 266.
32 Krey 2003, pp. 32–33; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 161–162 and Beulke 2008, pp. 49 and 
315–316.
33 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 209 and Beulke 2008, pp. 315–317. See IV.6.5.3.
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consequences of a defence, like duress having the effect of denying negligence 
rather than blameworthiness, have generally been accepted as a technical legal 
issue with implications for procedural aspects such as the burden of proof, the 
verdict and its grounds stated. These and other practical consequences are discussed 
in the beginning of the next part.
The correct dogmatic positioning of fault elements has never been considered 
very relevant in England. Apart from the fact that a profound interest on dogmatic 
questions is relatively young in England, this is also due to the failure to distinguish 
between blameworthiness and fault.34 As a result of this failure, the acceptance of 
duress was interpreted as to negate intention.35 Steane lived in Germany during the 
Second World War and was coerced by the Nazi’s to help them broadcast in English. 
If he continued to refuse, his family would be send to a concentration camp. He 
thus intentionally assisted the enemy, but should have been excused under duress. 
In appeal, his conviction was in fact quashed, but because his acts were not 
conducted with the intent to assist that enemy. In contrast, he did this with a view to 
save his family. This solution, although fair in outcome, is criticized for not acknow-
ledging that Steane in fact intended to help the enemy. Blameworthiness and 
intention are confused.36 “The common law world has never settled on a word to 
refer to this moral dimension negated by excuses.”37
The confusion can be explained by the oversimplifi cation of English law along 
the lines of (either) actus reus and (or) mens rea. Justifi cations used to be seen as 
part of actus reus and excuses as part of mens rea.38 There is, however, an 
increasing tendency in Anglo-American law to separate blameworthiness from 
fault and thus to create at least one additional tier of criminal liability, that of 
defences. Although one will fi nd not many references to the tiers in case-law or 
legislation, it is now widely accepted by English academia.39 The House of Lords 
has acknowledged the difference between fault elements and blameworthiness in 
the context of duress.40
In all three legal systems, there has been a similar development since the second 
half of the last century. A dualistic system based on the dichotomy of body and 
mind has evolved into a three-tiered system. The current systems are more or less 
identical and therefore constitute a framework of criminal liability for the EU. Only 
34 For example, Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 30–35 and 187. Compare Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, 
p. 137.
35 R. v. Steane [1947] KB 997.
36 See also Smith, J.C. 1989, pp. 61–71 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 236–240. Note that in Steane-
like cases that were prosecuted right after WWII in the Netherlands, necessity and duress have 
been often accepted, see de Hullu 2009, p. 294.
37 Fletcher 2007, p. 312. See also Fletcher 1978, pp. 395, 398–399 and Robinson in Dressler 2002, 
p. 995.
38 See for example Glazebrook 1972, pp. 91–92.
39 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 19–20 and Ormerod 2005, p. 40.
40 DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] UKHL 5. See also R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; 
Ormerod 2005, p. 298; Law Commission 1977, p. 3 and Fletcher 1978, pp. 395–401.
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the development of the three tiers has been very different. In England, wrongfulness 
and blameworthiness were soaked off the dichotomy of actus reus and mens rea. 
Defences were developed out of and separated from the offence defi nition. By 
contrast, in Germany, the fault elements have been soaked off the dichotomy of 
wrongfulness (Unrecht) and blameworthiness (Schuld), which are now commonly 
considered to relate to defences.
6. DEMARCATION FROM ACTUS REUS
So far, mens rea has been discussed in some detail. In order to demarcate mens rea, 
I will now turn to actus reus, which consists of (a combination of) certain conduct, 
con se quen ces and/or circum stan ces. This threefold distinction of objective elements 
is common in all Member States investigated.41 In the offence defi nition mentioned 
above of intentionally inciting violence or hatred directed against a group of persons 
defi ned by reference to race, colour and so on, we can identify all three categories. 
Inciting is a form of conduct, the feelings of hate are a consequence, and the group 
to which this hate or violence is directed is characterized by circumstances like 
race.
Like mens rea, actus reus also consists of more doctrines and concepts. In this 
sec tion, the mental or subjective elements in concepts generally categorized as 
belong ing to the actus reus will be identifi ed. In doing so, the diffi culty in drawing 
a clear bor der between actus reus and mens rea is demonstrated and the objects of 
this research are delineated.
6.1. Verbs that imply a subjective element
A fi rst illustration that a sharp distinction of objective and subjective elements is not 
always possible is found in certain verbs that operate as offence elements. By their 
nature, some of these verbs encompass a subjective element like intention or 
knowledge. For example, appropriating cannot be done inadvertently, neither can 
resisting or forcing someone, forging or even driving. The verbs imply a specifi c 
intention and therefore combine objective and subjective elements.42 If the nature 
of a verb does not indisputably imply a subjective element, this is also sometimes 
read in. Possession of for example, drugs, fi rearms or child pornography is 
41 Kadish 1989A, p. 73 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 65. German criminal theory 
distinguishes many more elements than these three categories, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 262 and 270–271; Krey 2003, pp. 134–135 and Beulke 2008, p. 84.
42 Krey 2003, pp. 106–107; Beulke 2008, p. 47; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 173; Bohlander 
2009, p. 67; Lynch 1982, pp. 128–130; de Hullu 2006, pp. 197 and 207–208; Pompe 1935, p. 73; 
van Bemmelen 1959, pp. 43–44 and Nieboer 1991, pp. 157–158.
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interpreted as requiring the subjective element of awareness.43 The subjective 
aspects of the different verbs will not be discussed in detail, but sometimes 
reference will be made to them. For example, the nature of certain verbs implies 
that they cannot be committed with anything less than intention.
6.2. Causation
Causation deals with the old and basic question of who can be labelled as the causer 
of harm. It consists of a set of principles that determines whether the causal link 
between the actor’s conduct and the result is suffi ciently strong to hold this actor 
criminally liable. Before the 18th century, there was hardly any interest in fault and 
all the more focus on the question of causation for attributing liability.44 It is 
common to view causation as belonging to the category of actus reus. After all, 
causation connects the objective element of conduct with the objective element of 
harm. For that reason, causation will not be discussed in much detail here.
Nonetheless, the categorization is put into perspective when more focus is 
placed on causation’s secondary function of connecting result to fault. The causal 
reasons for a result to occur are not only determined by the conduct of the actor but 
are also infl uenced by the concomitant fault element. It is generally recognized, for 
example, that ‘intended consequences are never too remote’, which expresses the 
principle that the causal link between conduct and consequence can easily be 
accepted if the consequence was intended. For instance, agreements that have as 
their object anti-competitiveness do not have to be tested to actual effects; these 
effects are presumed.45 Intention has a strong effect in hastening a fi nding of 
causation. Thus, even if there consequence was unlikely to occur, or occurred in a 
manner that deviated to a great extent from what the actor expected or planned, 
there is no problem of attributing the harm to the actor causally.46 The relationship 
is also apparent in the conversed case, where a strong element of causation 
facilitates a fi nding of mens rea. As a matter of evidence, close or direct 
consequences can facilitate the inference of a fault element like intention. When 
someone is shot from close range, it is easily accepted that the results caused were 
intended.
The approach here is that the collection of principles regarding causation differs 
according to the pertinent subjective element. This perspective is common in 
43 R. v. Sleep [1861–1873] All ER Rep 248; Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256; HR 10 June 1986, NJ 
1987, 85 and HR 26 January 1999, NJ 1999, 537.
44 Interview with Jeremy Horder at the Law Commission, London, on January 16, 2009.
45 As submitted in a Communication from the Commission: Notice – Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 27 April 2004, OJ 2004 C 101/97 and confi rmed as standing case-
law by 6 October 2009, Cases C-501, 513, 515 and 519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and 
others v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291.
46 Ashworth 2006, p. 124; Duff 1990, p. 66; de Hullu 2006, p. 210; de Jong, F., van Roomen & 
Sikkema 2007, pp. 950–952; de Jong F. 2009, pp. 339–340 and Bohlander 2009, p. 69.
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Germany, but also implicitly accepted in the Netherlands and England. It warrants a 
discussion of causation connected to the fault elements. For intentional offences, 
this means its peculiarities regarding causation will be discussed in the paragraph 
on the principle of contemporaneity, which requires that actus reus and mens rea 
coincide in time. Issues of causation in intentional offences are seen as both the 
origin and the possible solution to problems of contemporaneity between actus reus 
and mens rea. Suppose the actor injures the victim with the intent to kill and thinks 
he has died, after which he buries the body. In reality, the victim dies from 
suffocation after being buried alive. The problem in the context of causation is that 
the actor did not intend for the victim to die in this way. It will be explained that 
this presents problems in German law, where intention must relate to the causal 
chain of events in its essential features. Nonetheless, causation also can be used to 
rebut these problems, by arguing that the intended consequence has been realized 
or that the deviation in the causal chain of events was not substantial enough to 
negate intention.47
Special rules on the required causal relationship between conduct and result that 
relate to negligent offences are discussed in the section on negligence. In German 
law, these rules are so much intertwined with negligence that they are treated as 
belonging to the ‘objective part of negligence’. As a result, there is no negligence if 
the result would have also been caused if the actor had not been careless.48 In the 
Netherlands, it is also accepted that causation and negligence are diffi cult to 
separate.49
Accepting that rules on causation are dependent on the concomitant fault 
element does not imply that causation dogmatically belongs to mens rea. Even 
though causation and mens rea are not always easily separated, they can be 
separated, because there can be instances where there is causation, but no fault.50 
Suppose a movie actor is given a fi rearm, in order to ‘kill’ the villain in a scene of a 
movie. The villain is shot dead, because the fi rearm was in fact loaded with live 
ammunition. There is causation between the death and the shooting, but the actor 
did not intend, nor can be said to be negligent in bringing about the result. Causation 
is a test that precedes a fi nding of fault and that does not negate fault. It seems that 
only in Germany, the perspective that causation affects fault is still accepted, 
although it is diminishing in favour of the view that causal issues can negate 
liability directly.51
47 See V.3.2.
48 See IV.6.4.4.; Beulke 2008, p. 246 and 342 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 60 and 117.
49 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 85 and 127–128 and annotator Knigge in HR 1 June 2004, NJ 
2005, 252. The peculiarities relating to reckless offences will not be discussed in detail.
50 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 128; Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 40 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 247–
248.
51 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 188–189 and Krey 2003, pp. 62–63.
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6.3. Attempt, participation and more
Fault elements also play a signifi cant role in concepts that do not fall under the 
scope of this research. In attempt liability, the intention must be directed at the 
result. This form of intention differs hardly from intention to completed crimes and 
will often be referred to in the discourse on intention. Forms of participation and 
liability for omissions contain subjective elements too. For example, aiding and 
abetting requires a double intent that relates to the act itself and to its awareness of 
being able to assist. However, the subjective elements in these concepts are 
intertwined with the objective requirements of those forms of liability to an extent 
that makes it more appropriate to be discussed in that context.52
This research focuses on criminal liability of the natural person who acts 
individually. The liability of legal entities differs much from the classic view that 
only natural persons can be legal subjects. It is often argued that a legal entity does 
not have a mind. It is clear that for legal entities to be held liable, the conduct of a 
natural person must be attributed to the entity.53 This attribution is often positioned 
as a fi ction. Yet attributing conduct of someone to a legal entity or another natural 
person at least requires a subjective connection between the physical and legal 
actor. This required connection differs greatly however from the fault elements 
such as intention and will be discussed in a related research project.
Some important mental or subjective elements in concepts that are generally 
categorized as belonging to the actus reus have now been identifi ed. Defences carry 
with them subjective elements as well, which will be highlighted in the next chapter. 
The enumeration has not been exhaustive, and is only meant to illustrate that actus 
reus and mens rea cannot always be clearly differentiated. In general therefore, it 
has become clear that a strict dualistic view cannot be upheld. A clear separation of 
subjective and objective elements, of actus reus and mens rea, even of the offence 
defi nition and defences,54 is hardly possible.55 This does not, however, warrant the 
conclusion that the dichotomy is redundant. As an analytical tool, the distinction 
between actus reus and mens rea helps to understand the principles of criminal law.
Amongst others, the relationship of actus reus and mens rea has been labelled as 
one of ‘communicating vessels’.56 The theory is one of mutual interrelatedness. It 
holds that when there are hardly any subjective elements required to hold someone 
liable, more should be required from the objective elements of the offence defi nition 
to ensure that the holding liable of the defendant is warranted and vice versa. The 
two basic ingredients of an offence are made into an analogy of two vessels. A little 
52 Ashworth 2006, p. 158 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 265–271. See Keiler 2012, forthcoming. 
Exceptionally, questions relating to these concepts force themselves upon us and are important 
to answer with a view to fault elements in general, see for example IV.5.5.
53 De Hullu 2006, pp. 260–261.
54 See VII.
55 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 175; Tadros 2005, p. 12 and Ormerod 2005, p. 254.
56 Van der Wilt 2006, p. 256 and Buruma in Buruma 1999, p. 29.
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less of actus reus in relation to the normal case needs to be compensated by an 
additional degree of mens rea.57 For example, in the doctrine of preparation, the 
mere creation of conditions to further the ultimate goal must be compensated by an 
additional intention that this contributes to the completion of the crime.58 The 
abovementioned relationship between mens rea and causation also fi ts in this 
perspective.59
7. OBJECTIVISM AND SUBJECTIVISM
Another example of using the dichotomy for analytical purposes is to juxtapose 
actus reus and mens rea, or objectivism and subjectivism, as extreme approaches to 
principles, doctrines and concepts of criminal law. These are distinct perspectives 
on what is paramount for criminal liability, both in substance and procedure, and 
can have an enormous impact on the scope or proof of an element of criminal 
liability. Using this dichotomy helps to clarify views and approaches on the general 
part of criminal law that are discussed in this book. I will now introduce these 
perspectives here, as well as the appropriate approach in a general part of criminal 
law for the EU.
In short, an objectivist approach regarding substance grounds liability fi rst and 
foremost in the conduct or harm, whereas a subjectivist lays emphasis on morally 
defective choices or fault. Subjectivism gives fuller recognition to signifi cance of 
the fault element. In subjectivism, criminal liability is tied as closely as possible to 
what the defendant intended, knew or believed.60 A person should be judged on the 
facts or circumstances as he or she believed them to be at the time, rather than the 
actual facts.61 An extreme subjectivist view is that a defendant should not be 
convicted if he did not advert to the (possibility) of the consequences occurring. 
Fault that does not require awareness, such as negligence, is thus thought to be 
insuffi cient for liability.62
As far as evidence is concerned, an objectivist approach does not require that 
fault elements have to be based on the actual state of mind of an individual person. 
Fault is rather equated with or inferred from the so-called ‘reasonable person’.63 In 
a more moderate version of this approach, knowledge on the psyche is deduced 
from non-psychological factors like the conduct and circumstances of the case, as 
well as rules of general experience.64
57 Compare Law Commission 2010, p. 79.
58 Ashworth 2006, p. 423 and Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 268, no. 5, p. 19.
59 See Ashworth 2006, p. 311 and Husak in Simester 2005, p. 96.
60 Ashworth 2008A, pp. 235–236.
61 Ashworth 2006, pp. 159 and 452: ‘belief principle.’
62 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 9–10 and Ashworth 2006, p. 471.
63 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 9 and Ashworth 2006, p. 86.
64 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 234.
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If pressed to categorize the sources of synthesis, the German legal system could 
be labelled as most subjective. After all, German criminal law rejects strict liability 
and takes the most moderate objective approach to proving fault. European 
legislation in criminal matters is also characterized by a relative lack of strict 
elements, as the rule appears to be that fault must be proven as to each and every 
offence element. How ever, the manner in which fault elements are proven in, for 
example, competition law is very objective. In general, criminal law in Europe is 
becoming more objective, evidenced by the increase in the last decades of the 
number of crimes of strict liability, objective evidential inferences and reversed 
onuses.65
7.1. Proof of fault
An account of fault elements without reference to how they are proven in practice, 
is hardly useful. This will become very clear in the context of dolus eventualis. 
Rules of substantive and evidential law are often inextricably linked to each other. 
Evidential diffi culties, such as denying or silent suspects and the lack of objective 
proof and witnesses, can be solved by either modifying substantive or procedural 
law. It is possible to lower the substantive criteria of liability by striking offence 
elements, including fault, or by creating offences that are easier to prove, such as 
offences criminalizing abstract endangerment.
The proof of offence elements can be facilitated as well, by creating procedural 
inves ti ga tive measures that make the gathering of evidence easier, or by proving 
fault elements by reference to circumstances and conduct. In some cases, this 
objective inference of fault from facts is explicitly recognized in criminal statutes. 
In English and Dutch law, when a defendant is found in possession of an article 
made or adapted for use in committing a burglary shall be evidence that he had it 
with him for such use.66 The defendant needs to rebut the presumption that the 
crowbar found in his possession was meant to be used in a burglary, in order to 
negate intention. In effect, this rebuttable presumption thus reverses the burden of 
proving intention from the Prosecutor to the defendant.67
The problem of proving fault is that “substantive rules regarding the mental 
element require the actual occurrence of a subjective mental state, whereas the law 
of evidence can provide only an assumption that the required state may have 
occurred.”68 The dilemma is therefore that, on the one hand, objectifying proof of 
fault elements appears essential for an effi cient operation of criminal law but on the 
65 Roef in Vos & van Calster 2004. See V.2.3.
66 Section 25 (3) of the English Theft Act 1968; Ashworth & Blake 1996, p. 312 and HR 
28 February 1989, NJ 1989, 687.
67 See V.2.3.4.
68 Shapira-Ettinger 2007, p. 2585, my italicization. See also annotator Buruma in HR 24 April 
2007, NJ 2007, 544.
Chapter III
56 
other hand, it has the risk of inferring fault where there was none.69 In order to 
minimize this risk, an objective approach must be moderate. A general part of 
criminal law for the EU needs to be positioned somewhere in between the extremes 
of objectivism and subjectivism. The character of criminal law brings about that 
one has to strike a satisfactory balance between the interests of society and those of 
the individual defendant.
7.2. Moderate objectivism
The approach to proving fault that is commonly applied in the three Member States 
and the EU can be called moderately objective.70 Subjective awareness is proven 
objectively, it is inferred from objective circumstances, conduct and general 
knowledge. At the same time, the risks inherent in this objective approach are 
minimized by keeping the approach within ‘moderate’, that is, acceptable and safe 
limits. An example can be found in art. 1 (5) of Directive 2005/60 on money 
laundering: “Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the activities 
mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4 may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances.”71 Another example is art. 1 (4) of the 1995 Convention on the 
protection of the European Communities’ fi nancial interests: “The intentional 
nature of an act or omission as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 may be inferred 
from objective, factual circumstances.”
Shooting at close range at someone is deemed to express the intention to kill. 
This is uncontroversial. When a risk is obvious, a jury or court will also easily infer 
awareness even if the accused denies this.72 For example, the risk is obvious that 
someone dies when a house is set on fi re with someone sleeping in it. Thus, the 
defendant is assumed to have known this too. So is the fact that an item is stolen 
when the person giving it to the defendant refers to it as ‘hot’, because this is 
commonly understood as meaning that it is stolen.73 In practice, this inference of 
fault reverses the burden of proof to the defendant, as in these cases, it is up to the 
defendant to argue that he did not intend or foresee the obvious.
The moderate approach is not only accepted in practice, it is also a reliable 
manner of fi nding fault. First of all, the aspects of wanting and knowing that make 
up fault elements are not profoundly psychological. This means that they are basic 
and therefore easily established. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes jr. said that even a 
69 See de Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 181–187.
70 See Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on Culpa, referring to a similar trend (as to negligence) in 
Germany and Section 8 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1967. See also Stuckenberg 2007, 
pp. 504, 511 and 515 and Vrolijk 2004, p. 170.
71 See also article 1 of Directive 91/308 of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of fi nancial system 
for the purpose of money laundering, OJ 1991 L 166/72, which is repealed by Directive 2005/60.
72 R. v. Stephenson [1979] EWCA Crim 1.
73 Law Commission 1989, p. 156 and van Bemmelen 1959, p. 41.
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dog knows the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.74 
Intention is a basic concept because it is neutral and general: it does not relate to the 
illegality of the conduct and is more basic than a motive or end-goal. Offence 
defi nitions usually mention merely the immediate purpose of the pertinent conduct, 
such as killing. It does not require that the motive of killing, like being left an 
inheritance, is proved.75
Secondly, this basic character of fault makes it possible to pronounce upon the 
psyche of another. The knowledge on the state of mind of the other is based on the 
analogy between others and ourselves. We understand what knowledge and will 
means and we can recognize it in behaviour of others. By experience, human beings 
can interpret feelings and intentions of others; man is homo psychologicus.76 The 
judge or jury is perfectly able to interpret fault elements; there is no need to involve 
psychologists in the criminal trial. In many cases there is a relation between the 
psychological and the external manifestation, like the aimed shooting at somebody. 
In these cases it is possible – save exceptional circumstances – to judge with 
suffi cient certainty on the intention of the perpetrator.77 The external manifestation 
of certain acts can be so much directed at a certain consequence that the only 
conclusion can be that the defendant accepted the consequences, barring 
contraindication.78
Clearly, there is a limit in allowing proof of fault elements to follow from facts 
and circumstances. Research has shown that intention seems to be established 
sooner when either very serious consequences have occurred or when the actor was 
very blameworthy. This can be explained by a number of psychological biases, such 
as hindsight bias. If a serious harm occurred, people – including judges – tend to 
estimate the chance that this harm occurred higher in retrospect, because of the fact 
that the risk materialized. This objective awareness on the risk is then attributed to 
the defendant.79 From a subjectivist point of view, this is problematic because it 
signifi cantly deviates from the actual state of mind of the defendant. It risks 
equating actual awareness that is required for intention or recklessness with the 
lack of awareness of the risk where he should have been aware, that suffi ces for 
negligen ce.80 Such a normative approach to proving intent must be rejected. In 
proving awareness, a judge may therefore hold that given the objective circum-
stances and the experience and knowledge of the defendant, he must have known, 
74 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 408.
75 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 285–303 and 375. See IV.2.2.2.
76 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 280–284. The psyche of the other is private to a certain extent, but not 
fundamentally unknowable as Peters, A.A.G. argued, according to van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 240. 
See also de Hullu 2006, p. 216, Siekmann 2005, p. 170 and Stuckenberg 2007, p. 408.
77 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 272–288. See IV.3.6.2.-IV.3.6.3.
78 HR 24 February 2004, NJ 2004, 375; R. v. Stephenson [1979] EWCA Crim 1; 4 November 1988 
BGHSt 36, 1 and IV.3.6.3.
79 Prittwitz 1993, pp. 360 and 381–382; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 291–295 and AG Jörg in HR 
25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 556.
80 See IV.3.6.9.
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but he makes a major mistake if he proves this by holding that the defendant should 
have known.
There is a risk that objectivism, the application of general experience and 
objective logic to individuals might not lead to a correct result for every defendant. 
We need to take into account the serious possibility that the mind of the defendant 
differed from that of the average person. A balance is required between general 
experience and individual, concrete circumstances.81 An important limitation of the 
moderate objec tive approach should therefore be that we should be sure that 
something is in fact general experience. Examples will be provided where this 
assumption is questionable.82 Secondly, in an ‘individualized objective standard’, 
capacity-based excep tions are taken into account. The harshness of an objective 
standard is thus mitiga ted by taking into account some characteristics of the person 
involved. The reasonable ness is transferred to a person in the circumstances of the 
defendant, that is, a defendant of the same profession, experience, age and so on.83 
Be that as it may, it is important to realize that the risk inherent in objectifying 
proof of fault can be minimized, but never excluded. It remains possible that fault is 
assumed, where it was lacking.
I will now focus more in detail on fault elements. Chapter IV will present what 
these elements should look like in the criminal legal system of the EU. In chapter V, 
the principles that set out additional rules for these elements and their relationship 
to actus reus are discussed. Strict liability and presumptions of fault will be 
discussed in more detail too.
81 De Hullu 2006, p. 262 and de Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 181–182 and 
186–187.
82 See IV.3.4.3.
83 See IV.6.4.3.; Robinson in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 85–91; Ashworth 2006, p. 195; de Jong, 
D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 133–134 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 45.
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CHAPTER IV
FAULT ELEMENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Kinds of fault, refl ecting degrees of culpability
There are kinds of fault, refl ecting degrees of culpability. The distinction of fault 
elements enables a differentiation of culpability, refl ecting a difference in the 
reproach directed against the actor. The intentional actor is considered most repre-
hen sible because he wants to cause harm or is aware that he causes harm. All other 
circumstances being equal, he can therefore be punished more severely than a 
negligent actor.
By distinguishing fault in kinds, strict differences are created between the 
elements of intention and negligence. This is to be applauded from the point of view 
of legal certainty and fair labelling, which requires that fault elements should be 
mutually exclusive and not leave open any grey area.1 However, the degree of 
culpability that this difference is supposed to refl ect is not so strict. It will become 
clear that in some cases, the negligent actor may almost be as culpable as the 
intentional actor. Moreover, the intentional actor who aimed to kill is more culpable 
than the intentional actor who merely accepted the risk of death. In other words, 
whereas fault comes in kinds, culpability comes in degrees. The transition may be 
fl uent.2
Homicide can be committed intentionally or by negligen ce. Such a difference in 
culpability is often expressed in the range of punishment that can be imposed. 
Intentional homicide usually enables the judge to impose the most severe punish-
ment of a legal system. The fault element thus determines the range within which 
the judge has to determine which sentence is most appropriate. It is only in that 
stage of senten cing, that the degree of harm, motives, regrets and so on are taken 
into account.
Besides the aggravation of punishment in relation to the negligent or reckless 
offence, fault can also enable punishment. Some offences can only be committed 
intentionally. Intent thus limits liability. For example, transporting persons is a legi-
ti mate occupation. Only when the purpose of the transporter is to further 
exploitation of those persons, is he traffi cking human beings.3 This intent is 
characteristic for the offence. It is essential because without it, there can be no 
1 Weigend 1981 p. 693.
2 Compare Ormerod 2006, p. 116 and Fletcher 2007, p. 314–316.
3 See Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/36 of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating traffi cking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Framework Decision 2002/629, OJ 2011 
L 101/1.
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liability. Like the offence of theft, traffi cking human beings cannot be committed 
negligently.
As noted, this function of intent to limit liability has been greatly reduced in 
compa rison to earlier times, where intention was considered to be the paramount 
element of criminal liability, expressing criminal energy, deserving punishment 
and requiring preven tive measures. Most or all offences had to be committed inten-
tio nally for criminal liability. In time however, this picture has changed radically. 
Mens rea can no longer be equated with intent. European society is a risk society, a 
society in which the risks have increased in seriousness and number due to 
technological deve lop ment and globalization. Many persons can be severely harmed 
when risks are neglected and materialize. This warrants punishing those who fail to 
recognize danger where they should and those who fail to behave carefully, where 
appropriate. Therefore, more and more offences either require negligence or no 
proof of fault at all.
1.2. Three kinds of fault
An important conclusion of this comparative research on fault elements is that the 
most serious and the least serious fault elements are very similar in all three 
Member States under investigation. This makes a synthesis based on the traditions 
of the Member States under investigation straightforward, the common ground 
being the starting point. These similarities also facilitate an integrated discourse of 
fault elements. National differences and peculiarities will either be put into perspec-
tive or they will be highlighted as the exception. The order of discourse will follow 
culpabi lity in descending order. In other words, I will start by discussing the most 
serious fault element that entails the highest reproach and punishment, and end with 
the lower limit of fault.
I refer to the most serious fault element as dolus directus. It consists of a form of 
intention that concentrates on the will of the actor to bring about a certain result. It 
is about acting because the actor wants to bring about a result. A slightly less 
serious form of intent is dolus indirectus. Conduct is also deemed intentional if the 
actor knows it will almost certainly bring about consequences that he does not 
desire or primarily aim at. The result is not directly aimed at, but is equated as 
intended because the actor knows it will certainly occur as a side-effect. The two 
fault ele ments are both forms of the fault element dolus, suffi cing for any offence 
defi ni tion that requires intention as an offence element. Dolus usually relates to 
con se quen ces and will therefore be discussed mainly in that context. It can however 
also relate to conduct or circumstances, in which case it is common to refer to 
knowledge.
The lowest standard of fault, called negligence or culpa, is about a normative 
failure to advert to and avoid a certain risk, which in fact materialised. It 
communicates the reproach that the actor has violated a duty of care that caused 
harm, whereas he should and could have foreseen and avoided this. A lesser kind of 
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fault does not exist, but offences can also be strict. In strict liability, no fault is 
required in respect to one, more or all offence elements. Fault thus also limits 
liability in comparison to strict liability. This exception to the fault requirement, the 
principle that criminal liability should be based on a fault element, is discussed in 
the next chapter.
This short overview raises some questions. What should we do with those actors 
who did not want to further the exploitation of the people they transported, but 
knew there was such a risk? What should we do with the accused of murder who 
argues he did not want to kill, but merely injure? If it cannot be proven that the 
actor either wanted to fulfi l an offence element or knew this was almost certain to 
happen, there can be no liability for dolus directus or indirectus. If intention would 
be negated, the actor may be punished and stigmatized less severely than he 
deserves. If negligence liability does not exist, this would even mean there can be 
no liability at all.
An adequate legal protection of interests therefore demands an additional fault 
element. All Member States under investigation have adopted such an element, 
albeit in different forms. In the English legal system, recklessness is a tertium quid 
that encompasses less culpability than intention but more than negligence. Its 
functional equivalent in Germany and the Netherlands is not a separate kind of 
fault. In contrast, intent has been extended to include the conscious acceptance of 
side-effects. This lowest form of intent is quite similar in both Member States and 
will be referred to as dolus eventualis. In other words, on the continent there are 
two major categories of fault, intention and negligence, whereas in England, 
recklessness is the third kind of fault in between intention and negligence.4
In merging the different fault elements into a general part of criminal law for the 
EU, an obvious choice has to be made between recklessness and dolus eventualis. 
This choice is the most fundamental choice to be made in the context of mens rea, 
refl ecting the greatest differences between the Member States. As usual in compara-
tive legal research, the common and civil law are juxtaposed. I will fi rst discuss 
dolus eventualis in an integrated manner, dwelling on some differences in the 
Dutch and German concept, after recklessness will be presented.
In a subsequent section, the two fault elements are juxtaposed and discussed as 
possible concepts in a general part of criminal law by testing them to the 
aforementioned criteria of synthesis. I will conclude that recklessness is favoured 
over dolus eventualis. In short, the use of recklessness keeps dolus within proper 
limits. Eventualis is rejected because it distorts the meaning of intent, it is very 
different from dolus directus and indirectus and it leads to inconsistent outcomes. 
Fault should not be distinguished based on attitude, but based on awareness. This 
refl ects the difference in culpability better and is easier to prove in practice. 
Together with its explicit normative elements, recklessness is best equipped to deal 
with foreseen side-effects in this day and age.
4 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 117 and Weigend 1981, p. 692.
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1.3. Principles of fault
Fault elements are recognized as general principles of criminal law in all Member 
States under investigation. The offence defi nition can refer to a requirement of 
intention by using many different terms. For example, in England, words like ‘will’, 
‘wantonness’, ‘volition’, ‘purpose’, ‘aim’, ‘design’, ‘deliberation’, ‘means to’ and all 
conjugations of ‘to intend’ in criminal offences refl ect intention.5 This implies that 
in principle, all manifestations of fault are supposed to be covered by a kind of fault. 
The system of fault is supposed to be closed. No other fault elements exist, apart 
from subjective elements like premeditation. Whereas recognized in English legal 
system too, it is not as self-evident as on the continent. This is due to the aforemen-
tioned difference in legal culture that focuses more on the specifi c than the general.
The English legislator does not deem itself restricted to the basic range of fault 
elements. It is therefore not reluctant in creating ‘new’ fault elements in offence 
defi nitions like ‘reasonable belief’,6 or ‘awareness of a risk’7 to create a tailored 
offence defi nition. This marks an important difference with German and Dutch law, 
which as a rule selects only from the few fault elements that have been recognized 
as general principles of criminal law, like intention, awareness and negligence. In 
principle, similar elements can also have a different meaning, depending on the 
offence defi nition.
Another difference is that fault is often made objective in England by creating 
specifi c offences that criminalize a particular manifestation of intent or negligence. 
Rather than criminalizing the intentional or negligent causing of a result, the result 
is criminalized when, for example, death in traffi c is caused whilst driving 
unlicensed. Furthermore, the legislator created different modes of driving, such as 
dangerous driving, careless driving or furious driving. Mens rea and actus reus are 
intertwined and general principles therefore hard to deduce.8
Because this synthesis must be consistent, I will identify the general principles 
of mens rea, focusing on those fault elements that apply to a wide range of offences. 
The great number of fault elements in English law may be viewed as an obstacle to 
this task. Nonetheless, comparative legal research is possible, since intention, reck-
less ness and negligence are also the most common fault elements in English offence 
defi nitions. At the same time, intention and negligence are not so uniform as one 
would expect in the Netherlands and Germany either. It will become clear that in 
some contexts, these fault elements are interpreted differently.9
These fault elements have in common that they lack a legal defi nition in national 
criminal codes. As general principles of criminal law, they do not lend themselves 
5 Williams 1953, p. 31–32.
6 Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
7 Section 6(1) of the Public Order Act 1986: “(…)or is aware that his conduct may be violent.”
8 Sections 2–2B and 3ZB of the English Road Traffi c Act 1988.
9 Examples are intention in the context of HIV-infection, see IV.3.4.2. and in the context of lethal 
offences, see IV.3.6.4.
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to straightforward defi nitions.10 In Germany, drafts of intention and negligence 
were struck before the criminal code was enacted.11 The Dutch legislator also 
thought it best to leave the development of its contents to the judiciary and 
scholars.12 As a result, dolus eventualis could be developed as the lower limit of 
fault in intentional crimes. In England, the general fault elements are a product of 
judicial creation.
2. DOLUS (IN)DIRECTUS
There should be two forms of intention in EU criminal law. We can distinguish 
intention stricto sensu from its extended alternative, the foresight of certainty. 
Dolus directus concentrates on the will of the actor to bring about a certain result. 
Dolus indirectus focuses on the fact that the actor knows with almost complete 
certainty that he will bring about a consequence.13 In a next section, the lesser 
standard of dolus eventualis will be rejected as a third alternative. Dolus, or 
intention, the most serious kind of fault therefore comes in but two forms.14
Dolus consists of knowing and wanting.15 Accordingly, the elements of dolus can 
be distinguished in a cognitive part on the one hand and a volitional part on the 
other.16 Whereas it is true that both elements are required, dolus directus and 
indirectus are characterized by the fact that one of those aspects dominates. Dolus 
either has a strong cognitive or a strong volitional aspect. Dolus directus is 
characterized by a very strong volitional element. The actor shoots at the victim 
with a fi rearm because he intends to, he wants to kill him. By contrast, dolus 
indirectus is charac ter ized by a very strong cognitive aspect. A textbook example is 
the person who blows up passenger jet in order to collect the insurance money.17 
The actor does not want the passengers and crew to die, but knows this is a certain 
consequence of blowing up the jet. The person acting with dolus indirectus does not 
aim at these deaths but knows they are almost certain to occur. The volitional aspect 
of wanting is indirect, weak and balanced by the high degree of knowledge.
10 See Halpin 2004, p. 148.
11 Roxin 2006, p. 449.
12 Smidt 1881 I, p. 76 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 261.
13 See also van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 347–349.
14 Notwithstanding the fact that this second form of indirect intention is not considered a second 
‘form’ or type of intention in England, but merely evidence from which intention may be 
inferred, see IV.2.4.1.
15 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 212; Smidt 1881 I, p. 74, de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 97; de Hullu 
2006, p. 207; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 261; Beulke 2008, p. 75; Bohlander 2009, pp. 
60–61; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105 and Fahl & Winkler 2007, p. 9.
16 See Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 276; Krey 2003, pp. 110–111; Badar 2005, pp. 222–223 and 
Roxin 2006, pp. 437 and 439.
17 Law Commission 1989, p. 157 and Krey 2003, pp. 108–109.
Chapter IV
64 
2.1. Terminology
The most serious form of intention is called ‘purpose’ or ‘direct intent’, ‘Absicht’ or 
‘dolus directus ersten Grades’ and ‘doelopzet’. The second form of dolus is called 
‘indirect’ or ‘oblique intent’, ‘direkter Vorsatz’ or ‘dolus directus zweiten Grades’ 
and ‘zekerheidsopzet’.18 It appears evident to label these forms as direct and indirect 
intention respectively. However, it is necessary to distinguish fault elements in a 
general part of criminal law for the EU from those in England. An equation of both 
concepts should be avoided. Indirect intention differs from its counterpart in a 
general part of criminal law for the EU, most importantly because there is an – 
albeit decreasing – tendency in England to add moral connotations to intent. I will 
reject this in favour of a neutral concept of dolus, after I have established what its 
two forms should look like in EU criminal law.
The terms used for the two forms of intention are therefore dolus directus and 
dolus indirectus. Dolus is indirectus because the state of mind of the actor is not 
aimed directly at the result of the offence defi nition – the killing of the passengers 
and crew – but at another, further, goal that does not form part of the offence 
defi nition, such as the payment of insurance. This implies that death is an indirect 
goal of the actual purpose of payment. In comparison with this indirect form of 
intention, dolus directus is aimed directly at the result expressed in the offence 
defi nition.19
In German and international criminal law, the dichotomy is usually expressed as 
‘fi rst’ and ‘second degree direct intention’, or dolus directus in a fi rst and second 
degree.20 Dolus indirectus is not used. This can be explained because in German 
law, dolus indirectus has other connotations as well. The term dolus indirectus was 
coined in the Middle Ages for attribution of those consequences that usually follow 
from a willed act as indirectly willed, but were not foreseen.21 Secondly, it could be 
argued that in dolus indirectus, the result is also directly connected to the purpose 
of the actor, albeit to a lesser extent, because the result certainly occurs when the 
bomb explodes. Why would we label a result as indirect or as side-effects when 
they are outcomes which are so immediately and invariably connected to normally 
intended outcomes?22 Every terminology has its shortcomings,23 but the 
terminology used here has the benefi t that it avoids confusion with counterparts in 
other legal systems.
18 Krey 2003, pp. 110–111; Bohlander 2009, p. 63; Beulke 2008, p. 77; Roxin 2006, p. 436; Fischer, 
T. 2009, pp. 105–106 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 347–349, 355–356 and 360–362.
19 Kelk 2005, p. 182 and Stolwijk 2009, p. 110.
20 Badar 2007, pp. 368–372 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 133–134.
21 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 539–542 and 556–569; Jakobs 2002, p. 589; Kindhäuser in Arnold a.o. 
2005, pp. 345–346; Hsu 2007, pp. 196–197; Kelk 2005, p. 182 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, 
pp. 73–74.
22 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 127–129.
23 See IV.2.3.4.
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2.2. Dolus directus
2.2.1. Rationale
Intention stricto sensu is considered the most serious fault element in all three legal 
systems. Dolus directus refl ects the highest degree of reproach of the fault elements, 
because behaviour carried out willingly is considered to refl ect the highest possible 
degree of control and choice. The conviction that intentional acts are necessary to 
ground a reproach is a strongly rooted principle of attributing responsibility in both 
criminal law and everyday life. Consider a child who breaks something and replies 
‘I did not do it on purpose’.
Dolus directus as the highest degree of culpability is therefore in the fi rst place a 
prerequisite for liability. Traditionally, criminal offences needed to be committed 
with dolus. The intentional actor embodies the actor who typically needs to be 
punished,24 making dolus directus the paramount form of intent. In Roman law, 
dolus consisted of only this element and was limited to dolus directus.25 Currently, 
a limited number of offences can still only be committed with dolus directus. More 
often than being a prerequisite for liability, the more severe reproach warrants the 
aggravation of liability in comparison to the offence committed with a lesser fault 
element like negligence. For example, killing someone negligently can not be 
punished as severe as intentional killing. When the offence defi nition requires a 
form of dolus, it is argued that dolus directus in comparison to dolus indirectus and 
eventualis functions as an aggravating factor in sentencing. The assassin who 
wanted to kill is punished more severely than the person who took the possibility of 
death for granted.26
The highest degree of culpability is grounded in reasons of control and choice. 
The person who shoots another with a fi rearm in order to kill, has great control over 
the events and the outcome. Clearly, the shot might not be lethal or the fi rearm 
might be jammed, but it is the actor who has most infl uence on the conduct and 
outcome, which warrants the highest reproach. Even if the goal of the actor is not 
fulfi lled, this dolus directus warrants liability for either attempt or preparation. In 
other words, intentional acts are avoidable to a larger extent.27
Secondly, by being aware of what he is doing and the consequences it may have, 
an actor can fairly be said to have chosen the behaviour and its consequences. In a 
retributive perspective, the moral culpability of intent hinges on the choice for 
doing evil.28 The intentional fulfi lment of the offence defi nition provides a warning 
to the actor that he is violating a legal interest.29 By his own choice the actor can 
24 Frisch 1983, pp. 49–50.
25 Vrijheid 1918, pp. 61 and 78–81.
26 See Stuckenberg 2007, p. 279.
27 R. v. Mohan [1976] QB 1. See also Ashworth 2006, p. 175.
28 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 306–309 and Kugler 2002, pp. 83–85.
29 A legal interest is an interest, value or good recognized and protected by law.
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stay out the realms of criminal law. In deciding to direct his conduct to bring about 
a result, the actor should be reproached for his choice.30 According to mainly 
German scholars, this choice to fulfi l the offence elements refl ects hostility or 
indifference towards the pertinent legal interest and the legal order as such. 
Intention means that the norm was not relevant for the decision of the actor to act 
and therefore it expresses a greater lack of motivation to obey the norms.31
Against this, it can be argued that the defendant need not demonstrate a hostile 
disposition towards the law. By intentionally killing a man, the actor appears to be 
hostile towards the norms that are protected by the legal order, but this assumption 
can be rebutted if the victim was for example a terrorist holding a child under 
gunpoint. By applying self-defence, there are justifi ed reasons for killing, which 
imply that the actor served rather than violated the legal order. However, the lack of 
a hostile disposition does not affect intention. The police man who shot the terrorist 
is justifi ed, but he acted intentional. Therefore, in principle, dolus does not 
encompass this hostility: it is neutral. At most, it refl ects that the actor chose to 
violate the legal interest of the victim, that he was hostile to his specifi c interests.32 
Others argue that intentional conduct indicates the hostile disposition towards the 
legal order which can be rebutted, just as the fulfi lment of the offence defi nition 
merely indicates wrongfulness, which can be rebutted by a justifi cation.33
2.2.2. Criteria
Dolus directus is intention in its purest legal and linguistic meaning. It is ‘acting in 
order’ or ‘deciding or seeking’ ‘to bring about’.34 The defendant has the completion 
of the offence (element) as his purpose.35 It is ‘the will to realize’.36 The result is the 
reason for his conduct; it is what matters to the actor. As a consequence, it is 
characterized by the sense of having failed when the result is not achieved.37
30 Ashworth 2006, pp. 158–159; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269 and 351 and Arzt 1976, 
p. 657.
31 Schünemann 1985, p. 364; Kindhäuser in Arnold a.o. 2005; Roxin 2006, pp. 451–452 and Frisch 
1983, p. 301. The view is however not uncommon in other countries, see Halpin 2004, p. 146; 
Tadros in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 229 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 250.
32 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 418–421 and 429–430 and Greco 2009, pp. 813–816.
33 Beulke 2008, pp. 48–49, 149 and 356.
34 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 121–123.
35 Bohlander 2009, p. 63; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105 and Beulke 2008, p. 77.
36 Schultz in Seebode 1992; Stuckenberg 2007, p. 242 and Roxin 2006, p. 447.
37 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 122; Duff 1990, pp. 61–62; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 347; 
Stuckenberg 2007, p. 218; Krey 2003, pp. 108–109 and Roxin 2006, pp. 438–439.
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2.2.3. Goal and necessary means
A defendant “intends to cause a result if he acts with the purpose of doing so.”38 
The basic defi nition is thus ‘purpose’ or any other synonym like ‘desire’.39 It is 
important to note however that dolus directus “does not refer to the ultimate 
objective of the conduct: it refers to whether one has chosen to produce the 
prohibited consequence.”40 The use of words like purpose and desire has been 
criticised, because they could be misunderstood as to include the motive or ultimate 
reason for acting. To the contrary, intention is only required as to an immediate 
aim, like killing, and not the end-goal, like receiving an inheritance.41
Confusion can be avoided by defi ning dolus directus not as purpose, but more 
neutral as deciding or acting in order to bring about, as: “a decision to bring about 
(…), no matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not.”42 It 
is irrelevant whether the actor wished for or in fact mourns the consequence. For 
example, he might mourn the consequence of death because he killed an innocent 
person, but want it anyway to cover up his crime. The death is the means to further 
the end of covering up the crime. Not primarily desired goals that are understood as 
necessary means for the end-goal qualify as dolus directus as well.43
2.2.4. Chance of result occurring
Dolus is about knowing and wanting. Its cognitive and volitional components 
operate as communicating vessels. The volitional component is dominant in dolus 
directus, which explains why the cognitive component may be very weak.44 A weak 
cognitive aspect of foreseeing only a small chance of establishing the result is 
compensated by a strong volitional aspect of wanting the result.
It is about the actor’s subjective assessment on his chances of causing the 
intended consequence. It is not required that the actor was aware of the certainty or 
highly likelihood of occurrence of a consequence. The actor also acts with intention 
if he only perceives the desired consequence as possible.45 In fact, by focusing on 
the purpose of bringing about a consequence, it is not even a problem that the 
38 Ormerod 2005, pp. 93–94.
39 Law Commission 1993, p. 9; Williams 1953, p. 31; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 346 and Krey 2003, 
pp. 108–109.
40 Ashworth in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, p. 179.
41 Khan 2002, p. 237; Kadish 1989A, p. 74; Norrie 2006A; Stuckenberg 2007, p. 219; Krey 2003, 
pp. 108–109; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105; Beulke 2008, p. 77; Roxin 2006, pp. 439–440; HR 
18 November 1975, NJ 1976, 164 and de Hullu 2006, p. 196.
42 R. v. Mohan [1976] QB 1.
43 Ormerod 2008, pp. 101–103; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 350; 23 February 1961 BGH NJW 1961, 
1172; 6 February 1963 BGHSt 18, 246; 26 July 1967 BGH NJW 1967, 2319; Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 277 and Beulke 2008, p. 78. See IV.2.3.4.
44 Krey 2003, pp. 110–111; Badar 2005, pp. 222–223 and Roxin 2006, pp. 437 and 439.
45 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105 and Beulke 2008, p. 77.
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defendant knows there is a very small chance of a consequence occurring. For 
example, dolus directus is not absent, if the defendant wants to kill the victim, but 
shoots at him from a great distance, while he also knows he is a poor shot.46 This 
demonstrates that a weak cognitive aspect, foreseeing only a small chance of 
establishing the result, is compensated by a strong volitional aspect of wanting the 
result.
It has been established that any possibility of bringing about the wanted result 
suffi ces. However, a mere coincidence that is wanted is insuffi cient for liability. 
Consider the nephew who sends his uncle to go on a cruise, hoping the boat will 
sink and kill him, so he is left an inheritance.47 When the ship sinks due to a 
misfortune, the nephew cannot be held liable for the death of his uncle. There can 
also be no dolus directus if the defendant does not believe that he is capable of 
affecting the events to some extent. A result of which the actor thinks he had no 
control over or is impossible, can be desired and hoped, but not intended. Intention 
must be distinguished from hope. For a fi nding of dolus directus, the actor must 
believe there was a chance of fulfi lling the offence element. If the actor knows the 
victim is defi nitely beyond range, he cannot intend to hit him.48 Thus, there must at 
least be some foresight of being able to achieve what is wanted. Even dolus directus 
requires some cognitive element. Wanting, in law, presupposes knowing.
Another perspective is to exclude these cases from liability based on causation. 
The nephew cannot be said to be the cause of the result and can therefore not be 
held liable for his uncle’s death.49 Under the doctrine of objective attribution, the 
lack of control over the causal chain of events is a reason to exclude causation.50 
The perspective to exclude these cases under causation can be preferred because in 
cases such as these, it is the connection between conduct and result that is 
questionable. This negation of causation implies that the (subsequent) question of 
intention is not even raised. It would be irrelevant to assess whether the defendant 
intended a result that he did not cause.
Since the results are usually equal, there are no practical objections to treat the 
issue under either causation or dolus directus. A sharp distinction might not even be 
warranted. After all, the greater the chance of success, the easier it is to establish 
both causation and dolus directus. For example, when someone shoots a person 
dead at close range, causation as well as dolus directus are easily deduced from the 
external conduct. By contrast, there does seem to be only one correct perspective in 
46 Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Opzet; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 133; Simester 1997, pp. 
706–708; Bohlander 2009, p. 64; Krey 2003, pp. 110–111; Roxin 2006, p. 439 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 278. In contrast, van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 368 submits that the chance must 
be substantial and Ross 1979, p. 112, submits that this is merely theory and that he knows of no 
such decision in practice.
47 Strijards 1983, p. 182.
48 6 February 1963 BGHSt 18, 246; Beulke 2008, p. 78; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105; Stuckenberg 2007, 
pp. 242–243 and Duff 1990, pp. 55–58.
49 Strijards 1983, pp. 182 and 218 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 133.
50 Krey 2003, pp. 64–67 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 192.
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cases where the defendant was mistaken about his possibility to achieve the result. 
For dolus directus, the subjective perception of the actor is decisive, not whether a 
possibility to achieve the result objectively exists.51 This means that if the victim 
was hit but the actor thought he was out of range, there is causation, but no dolus 
directus. The objective possibility was not foreseen. This also implies that in the 
conversed case, where the actor mistakenly believes that the victim is within range, 
shoots and thus fails, amounts to dolus directus. The actor only thought there was a 
possibility of success. It is important to establish dolus in this case if we want to 
hold the actor liable for an attempt.52
2.3. Dolus indirectus
2.3.1. Criteria
A defendant acted with dolus indirectus with respect to a result when he is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. Acting with foresight of certainty 
that an offence element will be fulfi lled is a form of dolus too. In 1875, a man 
named Thomas had set explosions on his ship that left from the port of Bremen. His 
plan was that the freight would explode on high seas, so he could collect the 
insurance money. Clearly, Thomas must have foreseen that due to the explosion on 
high seas, at least some of the crew would almost certainly die. The explosion 
occurred in the port of Bremen however. Moreover, Thomas was killed, so a trial 
never followed. A modern textbook example is the person who plants a bomb on a 
plane in order to blow it up, after which he can collect the insurance money.53 In EU 
law, it has been held that the aim to restrict competition is also intended if it was 
foreseen as the necessary consequence of an agreement.54
The high degree of the cognitive element, knowledge of certainty, eclipses any 
volitional requirement. Thus, the result known or believed to be a condition of the 
achievement of the purpose is considered to be intended, even if it is not wanted. In 
dolus indirectus, the consequence can be wished for by the actor, but it does not 
form the (main) reason for acting. Dolus directus is about acting because of a 
consequence, not acting despite a consequence.55 This also means that by adopting 
51 Duff 1990, pp. 55–58.
52 The subjective yardstick for attempt could be limited to those beliefs that are rational, so as to 
exclude from purpose beliefs that are based on irrational grounds like superstition, see 
Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 242–243. If the nephew therefore thought the ship would sink because he 
put a curse on it, there can be no dolus directus and no attempt.
53 Law Commission 1989, pp. 51 and 157; Ashworth 2006, p. 176; Stolwijk 2009, p. 110; van Dijk, 
A.A. 2008, p. 216 and Kelk 2005, p. 182.
54 Opinon of AG Trstenjak of 4 September 2008, Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v. Beef 
Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR 
I-8637.
55 Ormerod 2005, pp. 97–98; Williams 1953, p. 35; Krey 2003, pp. 112–115, Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 106; Beulke 2008, p. 78 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 217–218 and 350–351.
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a test of failure, dolus directus and indirectus are distinguished. Thomas had dolus 
directus as to the explosion and indirectus as to the death of the crew. He would not 
have seen his plan as failed when none of the shipping crew would have died.56
2.3.2. Rationale
The indirect form of dolus was created as an extension of liability based on dolus 
directus. It should be attributed to actors when “justice may not be done unless an 
expanded understanding of intention is given.”57 Intention need not only be 
grounded in a ‘will’, but it can also be based on a high degree of knowing. This 
extension beyond the traditional will has been perceived as problematic in the past. 
For example, at the end of the 19th century, some Members of Dutch Parliament 
argued that when a purpose, specifi c intent or wish was missing, there could be no 
intention.58 Nonetheless, dolus indirectus was accepted in the Dutch and German 
criminal legal system as an alternative form of dolus. In England, indirect intent 
was not only considered, but also shaped as a public policy extension, for which 
reason it is not considered a second form of intent, but merely evidence from which 
intention may be inferred.59
Already in Roman law, consequences that were likely to occur in the ordinary 
course of events were presumed to be intended.60 In English law, it also used to be 
common to hold that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his 
acts.61 In medieval times, the ‘doctrina Bartoli’ grounded liability for the results 
that went beyond the purpose of the actor but which are very likely or common to 
follow from the defendant’s actions. As noted, the term dolus indirectus was also 
coined in those days. Thomas Aquinas departed from the classic view that the will 
is decisive for an ethical valuation of the act and its intention, and came to the 
conclusion that necessary or typical consequences of an act are very relevant too. 
Hence, he distinguished consequences that were directly wanted from those that 
were indirectly wanted.62 It can be said that the result is indirectly willed because it 
is inextricably connected to the defendant’s purpose. If the ship detonates as 
wanted, the deaths are certain to follow and therefore indirectly wanted.
As a rule, criminal liability can be established or aggravated by either of the two 
forms of dolus. There exists no legal difference. The equation in law is based on the 
56 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 349 and Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 106. See Duff 1990, pp. 61–62.
57 Law Commission 2006, pp. 58–59 and Bohlander 2009, p. 62.
58 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 216. See also Smidt 1881 I, pp. 80–82 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 
3.1 on Opzet.
59 R. v. Woollin [1998] UKHL 28; R. v. Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 455; section 18(b) draft 
Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51 and 193; Ormerod 2005, pp. 95–96 and 100 and 
Ashworth 2006, pp. 176–178.
60 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 536–537.
61 See for example DPP v. Smith [1961] AC 290. What a reasonable person could foresee, the 
defendant is presumed to have foreseen.
62 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 538–541.
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assumption that there is little if any moral difference between the two forms of 
intent.63 Both types manifest that the defendant accepted the outcome, refl ecting his 
bad character, showing that he was insuffi ciently motivated by the interests of his 
fellow citizens, and therefore deserves and needs to be punished.64 The great degree 
of knowledge, the awareness of the certainty that the result will follow, also makes 
the rationale of control and that of choice apply to dolus indirectus. Because the 
actor is aware of the certain consequences of his actions, he controls the events and 
he could choose not to violate the law.65 It is this similarity that enables dolus 
indirectus to be put on the same footing as dolus directus.66 Experience has taught 
us that unwanted side-effects can be even more harmful than intended goals.67 In 
some cases, the “(…) advertent taking of an obvious and overwhelming risk of a 
certain result” can be “considered to be just as deplorable as if it had been his or her 
primary purpose to bring about the result (…).”68
On the other hand, there may be good reason to distinguish when the harm is 
relatively trivial, because only in his direct intentions the agent shows some 
commitment to bring about a certain state of affairs.69 In dolus indirectus, the actor 
acts despite a consequence, rather than because of that consequence. This is 
recognized in offences that can only be committed with direct intent. As discussed 
later, offences of ulterior intent, like theft, often require nothing less than a direct 
intent as to the element of appropriation. Moreover, the difference between the two 
forms of dolus is usually refl ected in sentencing. A homicide that was wanted is 
generally punished more severe than one that was merely taken for granted as a 
certain side-effect. It is therefore also argued that there is in fact a moral difference 
between the two forms of dolus.
All other circumstances being equal, it is assumed that the actor who acts with 
dolus directus can be reproached more than the actor who acted with dolus 
indirectus (or eventualis). Generally, this is explained by the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’. The doctrine permits actions with a double (bad and good) effect under 
certain conditions. Most importantly, the actor must have wanted the good 
consequence and not the bad one. To illustrate this relative increase in culpability of 
dolus directus, consider ‘strategic’ and ‘terror bomber’. Terror bomber wants to 
bomb a school for terrorist purposes, whereas strategic bomber wants to bomb a 
munitions factory merely to shorten the war. However, strategic bomber knows that 
by doing so, he will also kill the children inside the school. In the perspective of the 
63 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 107 and Kessler Ferzan 2007, p. 2537.
64 Tadros 2005, pp. 88, 90, 100 and 314; Taylor, G. 2004B, p. 350 and Kugler 2002, pp. 77–80.
65 See Fletcher 2007, p. 315.
66 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 277–278.
67 Prittwitz 1993, p. 369.
68 Bohlander 2009, p. 62.
69 Tadros 2005, pp. 229–236.
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double effect doctrine, the intuitively more culpable terror bomber acts with dolus 
directus, whereas strategic bomber acts with dolus indirectus.70
It is assumed that usually the person who acts with dolus directus will be more 
culpable, because his motive was worse or because the chance that the consequence 
would occur is greater. However, the ultimate reproach depends on many factors 
such as harm, modus operandi, motive and fault. Yet the harm, modus operandi and 
‘laudable’ motive of strategic bomber do not form part of fault, of dolus, just as the 
laudable motive in the earlier mentioned example of the police man who shot the 
terrorist to save the hostage did not negate dolus directus. Shooting in self-defence 
is dolus directus. The fallacy in many examples used to demonstrate a moral 
difference is that they are not ceteris paribus. For example, the case that is supposed 
to be less culpable is modifi ed by applying a defence or by decreasing the number 
of victims. Moreover, direct intent not necessarily brings about a greater chance 
that the result will occur. As noted, terror bomber might only have a chance of fi fty 
percent in blowing up the school, whereas strategic bomber knows this is almost a 
hundred percent certain to follow. There is thus no intrinsic difference. In all forms 
of dolus, the actor has the same amount of control to avoid the consequences.71
2.3.3. Certainty
In dolus directus, it is immaterial whether the result was believed to be certain or 
almost certain to occur, as long as the purpose is proven. We have seen that even a 
small chance of bringing about the result suffi ces. In dolus indirectus, the cognitive 
element dominates, requiring a high probability of the prohibited result occurring. 
“Lack of purpose can be compensated by an excess of knowledge.”72 The actor 
must know with a high degree of certainty that his conduct will result in the 
prohibited consequences.73 Since no one can ever know that a result is certain to 
follow, certain means almost certain, virtually certain or certain, barring some 
unforeseen intervention. It requires “such a high degree of probability that common 
sense would pronounce it certain.”74 Mere foresight is insuffi cient for dolus 
indirectus and brings us in the realm of dolus eventualis and recklessness.75
70 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 350–362 and Fletcher 2007, p. 316. See also Cavanaugh 2006, pp. 114–
117 and Kugler 2002, pp. 37–38.
71 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 359–363 and Simester in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 75–77.
72 Bohlander 2009, p. 63.
73 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 347; Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Opzet; Law Commission 1989, 
p. 193; Simester 1997, pp. 706–708; Bohlander 2009, p. 64 and Beulke 2008, p. 78.
74 Citation Williams 1953, p. 37. See also Ormerod 2005, p. 97 and Ashworth 2006, p. 177.
75 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 124–126; Law Commission 1989, pp. 192–193; Law Commission 
1993, p. 10 and Williams 1953, p. 39.
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The outcome must not only be almost certain, the defendant must also believe it 
to be almost certain.76 The point of reference for assessing the certainty of the result 
occurring is subjective ex ante. It is about what the defendant thought at the time of 
acting. This might seem evident, but is important to emphasize in order to avoid 
hind sight bias. Dolus is a subjective concept, because it is says something about the 
state of mind of the specifi c actor. Even though the subjective belief is mostly 
inferred from the objective fact that the result was almost certain, the substantive 
criterion of dolus remains subjective.77 If there are good reasons to suspect the 
defen dant did not foresee this, he cannot be deemed to have acted intentionally. 
There are good reasons to argue that only the subjective perspective is relevant.78 
Consi der that the airplane the defendant sabotaged contains enough parachutes for 
all the crew. Due to this circumstance that was unknown to the defendant, all 
people on board the airplane that crashed survive. This means that objectively, there 
was no certainty of death. If this would preclude dolus, there can be no liability for 
an attempt.
2.3.4. Necessary means versus side-effects
What must be almost certain to occur? It is not the explosion on the airplane that 
must be certain to occur. The actor can have doubts whether the bomb goes off at 
all, since he made it himself. Rather, it is required that the death of the crew and 
passengers is almost certain to occur if the airplane is blown up. The defendant 
must think it will go off in the ordinary course of events as planned. The fulfi lment 
of the offence defi nition of intentional killing must be an almost certain side-effect 
of the actor’s purpose, like the causing of an explosion. The uncertain side-effects 
are inextricably linked with the purpose, so when the bomb does go off, the side-
effects will also certainly occur.79
Distinguishing dolus directus from indirectus proves to be a diffi cult task. 
However, a useful criterion is to determine whether the results are known to be a 
necessary condition of or almost certain to accompany the achievement of the 
purpose. Dolus is directus when the actor shoots someone through a window. Not 
primarily desired goals that are understood as necessary condition for the end goal 
fall under dolus directus as well. Dolus directus thus also relates to the destruction 
of the window, as “any fact that is a necessary or indispensable interim or ulterior 
76 R. v. Woollin [1998] UKHL 28; R. v. Nedrick [1986] EWCA Crim 2; Sullivan in Shute & 
Simester 2002, p. 209 and Ormerod 2005, p. 94.
77 Ormerod 2008, p. 99. See also Reijntjes in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, pp. 476–477.
78 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 130; Law Commission 2006, pp. 57–59; Tadros 2005, p. 180; Krey 
2003, pp. 112–115 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 106.
79 Law Commission 2006, p. 56; Law Commission 1993, p. 10; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 278 and Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 107. It may be intuitively diffi cult to accept dolus indirectus 
when the change that the bomb goes off is for example only ten percent. However, to demarcate 
this fault element properly from dolus eventualis and recklessness, one needs to focus on the 
statistical relationship between the primary goal and its side-effect(s).
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consequence of his primary purpose (…).”80 In situations of dolus indirectus, the 
death of the crew is not necessary for the actor’s purpose of collecting insurance to 
be achieved. It is possible that the ship, or its cargo, are destroyed and insurance 
thus collected without any fatalities. The actor knows however, that this is highly 
unlikely and fatalities almost certain.81
In other words, dolus indirectus is about almost certain side-effects and dolus 
directus deals with means or interim goals. Shooting grandmother to inherit is not a 
side-effect or incidental consequence but a means or interim goal. It is the actor’s 
purpose to kill her, and even if this is mourned, it is a wanted result, necessary for 
receiving the inheritance. In contrast, burning down grandmothers building in 
order to collect insurance money for the building, whilst knowing she is in it, makes 
her almost certain death a side-effect.82 Grandma does not need to die in order to 
collect the insurance, but it is an almost certain side-effect. The setting of fi re of the 
building is an act of dolus indirectus. This distinction corresponds with the 
aforementioned test of failure. Consider that grandma survives. If grandma should 
have died as a necessary means to inherit, the actor’s plans have failed. If grandma 
was certain to die as a side-effect of burning the building to collect insurance, the 
actor does not consider this attempt failed.
Diffi cult situations and room for debate remain.83 Fortunately, the distinction of 
directus and indirectus is usually without legal consequences. I have tried to 
identify the difference as precisely as possible, not only because sometimes only 
directus suffi ces, but also in order to capture the essence of dolus as knowing and 
wanting. The two forms of dolus are founded on different pillars, yet are considered 
to be equal in ethics and therefore also equal in law. This similarity will be used to 
juxtapose these forms of dolus with the lowest form of intent in Dutch and German 
law. The different character of this dolus eventualis militates against including it as 
a form of dolus in a general part of criminal law for the EU. First, however, I will 
explain that, as a rule, dolus is neutral.
2.4. A neutral concept
The modern concept of dolus is value-neutral and does not deal with motives.84 
Especially in England, mens rea used to encompass not only thoughts in the mind 
but also the dark motives and roiling emotions that lay beneath. In time, emotions 
and motive have been cut from the concept’s core.85 For example, because the term 
‘malice aforethought’ was held to have connotations to ‘ill will’ or ‘wickedness’, it 
80 Citation Bohlander 2009, p. 64. See also the sources in IV.2.2.3.
81 Ormerod 2008, p. 103 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 277–278.
82 Krey 2003, pp. 108–115 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 106. See also Kugler 2002, p. 6.
83 See 23 February 1961 BGH NJW 1961, 1172, discussed in IV.2.4.4-IV.2.4.5.
84 Weigend 1981, p. 662; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 120, Stephen 1890, p. 88–89 and Ormerod 
2005, p. 118.
85 Finkel & Parrott 2006, p. 23.
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was judicially disapproved.86 Nevertheless, intention is still sometimes interpreted 
as encompassing motives in English law. Be that as it may, dolus does not include 
evil motives. Intentionally killing a person refers to exactly that and not to killing 
because of an additional evil motive. Only in exceptional cases, the offence 
defi nition is drafted in a manner that intent must relate to motives or a point of law, 
but this confi rms that dolus itself is neutral.
In this section, the exceptions to this rule will be revealed as confi rmations of 
the rule. The EU concept of dolus should have no moral connotations. After 
discussing the abovementioned tendency in English law to include motive in intent, 
I will describe a class of offences that in fact seems to include the ultimate goal of 
the actor into its defi nition. Next, I will explain that dolus is also neutral from the 
perspective that it does not relate to the illegality of the conduct. The actor need not 
know he is committing a criminal offence. Sometimes, the offence defi nition is 
drafted in a manner that intent must relate to legal aspects, but this confi rms that 
dolus as such is neutral.
2.4.1. Moral enrichment of intent in England
The neutrality of dolus is put under pressure by the English concept of intent, which 
is sometimes interpreted as encompassing bad motives or the lack of an excuse or 
justifi cation. This brings about that when the defendant had good reasons to act, for 
example because he was acting under self-defence, the courts will acquit the 
defendant based on the negation of fault. This approach to ‘morally enrich’ intent 
will be explained and rejected. Intention is neutral and good motives should operate 
to either justify or excuse the intentional act or actor respectively. This is 
increasingly recognized in England too.
A fi rst feature of English law that enables the negation of intent in case of 
laudable motives is the failure to clearly distinguish fault from the ultimate 
normative question on blameworthiness. This was mentioned already in the 
introduction of the framework of criminal liability. For example, the court held that 
Steane did not intend to assist the enemy in broadcasting, because he acted under 
duress.87 As widely accepted in Dutch and German law, excuses however negate 
the assumption that the actor is blameworthy, not his intention. Although this is 
now also commonly recognized in England, some still see mens rea as 
encompassing blameworthiness, which is thus negated when an excuse applies.
Confusion and disagreement on the scope of mens rea enable more judicial 
discretion to reject intent in cases where a conviction seems inappropriate. Such 
discretion is also enabled by the so-called ‘golden rule’ of English law to leave 
86 R. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 All ER 412; Attorney-General’s Reference no. 3 of 1994 [1998] AC 
245; Finkel & Parrott 2006, p. 23; Law Commission 2004, p. 18 and Law Commission 2006, 
p. 55.
87 R. v. Steane [1947] KB 997. See also III.5.
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intention undefi ned for the jury.88 “The courts have not kept to consistent and well-
defi ned concepts of intention, recklessness, or causation, but have striven to adapt 
them in order to refl ect the necessary moral distinctions.”89 This aspect is not 
foreign to Dutch and German law, where the legislator omitted to defi ne intention, 
in order for it to be developed by scholars and practitioners.90 This brings about 
increased fl exibility for judges to decide cases in all Member States,91 but 
apparently not as much as in England.
A third aspect that grants English courts the discretion to negate intent is to 
offer only guidelines on how to infer indirect intention. As noted, English law does 
not consider indirect intention as a second form of intent, but merely evidence from 
which intention may be inferred. The rule that a man is presumed to intend the 
natural consequences of his acts has been rejected in general today, but by requiring 
a court or jury to take into account all of the evidence, this rule can still contribute 
to the inference of intention.92 The difference with the old evidential connection is 
that the current connection is framed negatively. Consequences that are almost 
certain to follow from conduct, may be deemed intentional, but need not. The jury 
is “not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless (…)”.93 Later, it was even 
held that the word ‘infer’ should be replaced by the word ‘fi nd’.94 This seemingly 
small chance of the jury direction gave even more room not to fi nd intention despite 
foresight.95
This permissive approach allows the decision maker to exclude intention when 
this is considered appropriate. It allows for ‘moral elbow-room’ when the defendant 
acted with good motives.96 Intention is enriched with motive, which brings about 
that a good motive will negate intention. For example, in Gillick, a doctor had 
prescribed contraceptives to a girl under 16, knowing that this would assist a man to 
have unlawful sexual intercourse. His motive to prevent damage to the health of the 
girl was held to negate his (indirect) intention.97 In medical contexts, the negation 
of intent (or causation) was often based on the doctrine of double effect. For 
88 R. v. Moloney [1984] UKHL 4; Simester 1997, pp. 705–706 and Law Commission 1989, p. 193. 
Most English scholars who replied to a questionnaire of the Law Commission favoured a 
defi nition of intention, whereas most judges replied that they favour the golden rule, see Law 
Commission 2006, p. 56.
89 Ashworth in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 182 and 192.
90 Smidt 1881 I, p. 76 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 261.
91 Cleiren 2007, p. 291.
92 Section 8 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1967; R. v. Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 
455; Robinson 1980, p. 845 and Williams 1953, pp. 77–78 and 81.
93 R. v. Nedrick [1986] EWCA Crim 2.
94 R. v. Woollin [1998] UKHL 28.
95 Ashworth 2006, p. 178 and Ormerod 2008, pp. 99–100.
96 Ashworth 2006, p. 180 and Ormerod 2005, p. 96.
97 Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] UKHL 7 per Lord Scarman: 
“The bona fi de exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment must be a complete negation of the 
guilty mind which is an essential ingredient of the criminal offence of aiding and abetting the 
commission of unlawful sexual intercourse.”
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example, surgery might kill the patient but it is important for his well-being. Thus, 
liability “for a bad consequence is avoided by treating the defendant’s intention in 
the light of an alternative good consequence. (…) Intentions (…) are enriched 
through moral double-effect doctrine by a substantive moral judgment of what the 
intention in its content was.”98
The approach enables the exclusion of ‘hard cases’ from criminal liability. A 
case is hard when it is felt necessary to make exceptions or strained interpretations 
to the law in order to achieve justice in that particular case. Unless a legal concept 
is altered, the defendant will be convicted. However, the extension of intention in 
these cases was unnecessary to achieve justice. In Gillick the correct approach with 
the same result would have been to accept intention, but to justify the conduct of the 
doctor under the justifi cation of necessity.99 After all, the girl’s health was most 
impor tant and secondly, the doctor could fear that unlawful sexual intercourse 
would also follow if he had not prescribed contraceptives. As already argued, 
Steane should have been excused for intentionally assisting the German enemy 
under duress.
The exclusion of motives from dolus does not necessarily lead to counter-
intuitive fi ndings of intention in diffi cult and unusual cases. An often-used example 
in this regard is the father who is trapped in an attic of a burning house with his 
children. If he throws his children out of the window, they will almost certainly die, 
but they will defi nitely die if he does not. Because the fatalities are virtually certain, 
the defendant could be convicted for (attempted) murder. It seems logical to exclude 
criminal liability in this case, because it is his purpose to prevent harm. How can 
we say that a result was intended, when it was the actor’s purpose to avoid it? It 
seems paradoxical to label behaviour as intentional when the consequence was 
exactly what the defendant was trying to avoid. For this reason, the Law 
Commission considered to add to the defi nition of intention the proviso that a 
person is not deemed to have intended any result, which it was his specifi c purpose 
to avoid.100 However, defences are the proper way to avoid conviction. The father 
may choose the almost certain death of his children over the absolute certain death 
of his children. The father is justifi ed or excused for (attempted) murder.101
In other English cases, it was held that a law-abiding motive was irrelevant in 
establishing intention: “Nobody can doubt that Needham was acting courageously 
and with the best of motives; he was trying to break a drug ring. But equally there 
can be no doubt that the method he chose and in which the police in Hong Kong 
acquiesced involved the commission of the criminal offence of traffi cking in drugs 
by exporting heroin from Hong Kong without a licence. Needham intended to 
commit that offence by carrying the heroin through the customs and on to the 
98 Norrie 2006A, pp. 499–500. See also Ashworth 2006, pp. 250–251.
99 See also Smith, J.C. 1989, pp. 61–71 and IX.4.
100 Law Commission 2005, pp. 93–110; Law Commission 1993, pp. 10–11 and Tadros 2006, p. 606.
101 See 28 July 1970 BGH JZ 1973, 173 and Tadros 2006, p. 606.
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aeroplane bound for Australia.”102 The approach is thus inconsistent. Judges adopt a 
narrower and broader meaning of intention to distinguish on public policy grounds 
between those with ‘worthy’ and those with ‘unworthy’ motives. Such an approach 
is common in English law,103 but rejected in a general part that must be consistent.
Motives should be treated in the context of defences and sentencing.104 Intention 
is a neutral fault element of basic character that is not negated by good motives. If 
these motives negate liability, a different verdict is warranted, one that expresses 
both the validity of the violated norm and the reasons of the actor. To say that the 
actor did not intend to cause harm is different than to say he was justifi ed to cause 
harm. It is the only principled approach, providing for a clear demarcation of dolus, 
wrongfulness and blameworthiness, safeguarding that the verdict in each case is 
labelled appropriately. This correct approach is clearly gaining ground in the 
English legal system too and has been accepted by the Court of Appeal in the case 
of Re v A.105 Two conjoined twins needed to be separated. It was certain that if 
nothing was done, both Mary and Jodie would die soon, whereas the surgery would 
certainly lead to the death of Jodie. Jodie’s death was thus undesired, yet certain. 
The doctrine of double effect was held not to apply and the neutral meaning of 
intention was affi rmed. The ‘murderous intent’ of the doctors was justifi ed under 
necessity.
In medical contexts in the Netherlands and Germany, the doctrine of double 
effect has also occasionally been applied but prevailing opinion now rejects any 
infl uence of good motives on the establishment of (indirect) intent. For example, 
indirect euthanasia is characterized by an unwanted but unavoidable side-effect of 
palliative treatment. Although it used to be argued in Germany, under the doctrine 
of double effect, that there is no intention on death in these cases, criminal liability 
is now considered negated because the doctor can rely on a justifi cation.106 In the 
Netherlands, the general defence of necessity can apply to those cases that are not 
already covered by the statutory defence.107 However, lower Dutch courts also still 
occasionally deny intention in cases where the defendant submitted he only gave 
the patient the fatal dose of medicine to stop the pain.108 In conclusion, the ‘moral 
102 R. v. Yip Chiu-Cheung [1994] UKPC 2. See also DPP v. Smith [1961] AC 290.
103 Compare the distinction between internal and external disorders to differentiate automatism and 
insanity and the distinction between specifi c and basic intent to distinguish between the effect of 
intoxication on intent. See respectively X.7.4.1. and V.3.5.
104 Ashworth in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 175–179.
105 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Norrie 2006A, pp. 495–499; Ormerod 2005, p. 98 and 
Ashworth 2006, pp. 250–251.
106 Either by consent or necessity, see 25 June 2010 BGH NJW 2010, 2963; 7 February 2001 BGHSt 
46, 279 and Kindhäuser note 97 on §211 in Kindhäuser, Neumann & Paeffgen 2010.
107 Article 293(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code; Kelk 2005, pp. 157–160; de Hullu 2006, pp. 291–295; 
Dolman 2006, pp. 252–308 and Rozemond 2006, pp. 83–95.
108 Rb. Breda 10 November 2004, LJN:AR5394 and Rb. Almelo 4 January 2008, LJN:BC1180.
Fault elements
 79
enrichment’ or, from my perspective, ‘moral pollution’ of intention under the 
double effect doctrine is by no means exclusive to English law.109
2.4.2. Ulterior intent
The foregoing should not be interpreted as that motives and specifi c intentions are 
only relevant in sentencing. They have an infl uence on criminal liability too. First 
of all, motives relate to wrongfulness and blameworthiness and are therefore 
refl ected through the application of justifi cations and excuses.110 For example, the 
purpose of self-defence is to defend life, limb and goods of yourself or another. It is 
inconsistent with motives of revenge. The case against Steane was presented as 
another example. He committed an offence in order to save his family from the 
Nazi’s. His reasonable motive made him blameless. Secondly, motives can help the 
decision maker in establishing whether the defendant acted intentionally, because it 
indicates the attitude of an actor towards the result.111 When a person throws 
Molotov cocktails at an asylum seekers centre, his right-wing extremist motive 
indicates he wanted or at least accepted casualties.112
Some offence defi nitions include specifi c subjective elements that aggravate or 
miti gate liability. These elements are often motives, like lust and greed, which 
makes intentional killing into the most serious form of homicide in Germany.113 
Another example is the mother who kills her child because she fears the birth will 
be disco vered. This creates a specialis and thereby a mitigation in relation to the 
generalis offences of intentional killing.114 As mentioned before how ever, these 
motives are not fault elements and should thus be distinguished from dolus.
There are also offences that seem to include the ultimate goal of the actor into its 
defi nition. I will discuss these offences here in light of the rule that dolus is neutral. 
An ulterior intent is the intent to do something that is further than, or not part of the 
actus reus.115 In other words, the goal is ulterior to the actus reus. For example, in 
theft, the intent to appropriate, to perma nen tly deprive the owner of his property 
goes beyond the mere taking away. That intent is ulterior to the offence defi nition 
and thus needs not to be fulfi lled in order to convict the defendant for the completed 
crime. It needs to be intended, not achieved. The ulterior result merely needs to be 
109 Compare also Remmelink 2001.
110 See Ashworth in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 175–179.
111 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 286; Philipps in Schünemann a.o. 2001; 8 May 2001 BGH 
NStZ 2001, 475 and 17 December 2009 BGH NStZ 2010, 571.
112 28 April 1994 BGH NStZ 1994, 483.
113 §211 of the German Criminal Code. Section 28 of the English Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
aggravates the sentence of offences committed with a racial or religious motive.
114 Articles 290 and 291 of the Dutch Criminal Code and Kelk 2005, pp. 176–177.
115 In some national legal systems and in international criminal law, the same is expressed by dolus 
specialis, special intent, specifi c intent or extended mental element.
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present at the time the defendant took away the object.116 The ulterior intent is 
expressed in offence defi nitions by terms as ‘with a view to’ or ‘with intent to’.117 
For example, the offence of theft often includes ‘taking away with a view to 
appropriate’. Directives 2005/60 on money laundering and 2011/36 on traffi cking in 
human beings use the wording ‘for the purpose of’.
2.4.3. The use of ulterior intent
From the above, it becomes clear that the use of ulterior intentions helps to 
overcome evidential problems. If a conviction of theft would require that the actor 
succeeded in depriving the owner of his property, the defendant can only be 
convicted of attempt liability if he was apprehended in fl agranto delicto. These 
offences resemble the structure of attempts, also enabling the advancement of 
criminal liability in time.118 They can be an alternative to criminalizing attempts, 
even though both have a separate justifi cation and thus an independent right of 
existence. Offences of ulterior intent are said to fi ll the gap between attempt and 
mere possession of, for example, a fi rearm, which is important for a legal system 
that does not criminalize preparation in general, like the English one.119
This also implies that when a legal system recognizes attempt and preparation 
as general principles of criminal law that apply to all (serious) offences, the 
necessity for ulterior intent offences diminishes. On the one hand, offences of 
ulterior intent are clearly defi ned and are therefore better equipped to further goals 
like foreseeability and fair warning of criminalization. On the other hand, general 
principles of attempt and preparation can make criminal law more simple and 
dogmatic, that is, further the quality of internal logic and consistency and thereby 
also further foreseeability. For example, in England, it is an offence of ulterior 
intent to possess a shotgun with the intent to endanger life but it is not a crime to 
possess a knife with the same intent. Under the general principle of preparation, 
these cases would be accessorial to a life-threatening offence.
A second reason to use ulterior intentions in offence defi nitions is that it gives 
the offence its character. The intention to permanently deprive the owner of his 
property is the most characteristic element of theft. The ulterior intent gives the 
offence its criminal character, the animus furandi.120 Without this intention, we 
would not be able to distinguish between the thief of a vehicle and the person who 
116 Section 1 of the English Theft Act 1968, article 310 of the Dutch Criminal Code; §242 of the 
German Criminal Code, see Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 132; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 213; de 
Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 101; de Hullu 2006, p. 235; Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 17–18; Badar 
2005, p. 223; Beulke 2008, p. 78 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 278.
117 In Dutch ‘met het oogmerk’ or in German ‘in der Absicht’. Directive 2005/60 on money 
laundering used the terms ‘for the purpose of.’
118 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 267.
119 Horder in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 157–158.
120 Simester 2008, pp. 10–13. See also Ormerod & Williams 2007, p. 116 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 351.
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merely wanted to use it furtum usus for a joy-ride. This nature is also very clear in 
genocide, where the actors aims to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group.121 It is this ulterior intent that is the most characteristic 
element of genocide. Without it, we would not be able to distinguish between mass-
murder and genocide.
The ulterior intent can limit offence defi nitions that would otherwise be too 
broad. As a characteristic offence element, it is an essential criterion for criminal 
liability. It distinguishes those actors worthy of punishment from those that should 
not be punished.122 An example is the offence called ‘going equipped’, that is to 
have with one an item to be used for a burglary or theft. Similarly, the offence of 
‘carrying an offensive weapon’ is to have with one an item to be used for injuring 
someone. It is the purpose that makes the innocent possession criminal.123 Without 
it, there can and should be no criminal liability. Transporting persons is legitimate, 
and a professional occupation for many. Only when the actor transports human 
beings for the purpose of labour or sexual exploitation, does this become the offence 
of traffi cking human beings.124 The reason for punishment lies in the ulterior intent.
2.4.4. Ulterior intent and motive
The existence of offences of ulterior intent may question the rule that dolus is 
neutral. However, although an ulterior intent resembles a motive in character, it is 
different. An ulterior intent constitutes merely a very general motive.125 An ulterior 
intent is not necessarily the ultimate goal of the crime. For example, one can steal 
something with a view to unlawfully appropriate, but the motive is to get money by 
selling the stolen good. The underlying motive of getting money can be a desired 
lifestyle or an expensive surgery. An end can be the means to another end and so on 
and so forth.126 The distinction between ulterior intent and motive may seem 
diffi cult, yet a sharp line can be drawn. The offence defi nition distinguishes an 
ulterior intent from other motives by labelling it as an offence element to which 
dolus directus must relate, like ‘with a view to unlawfully appropriate’. What is not 
included in the offence defi nition, like fi nancial gain, is therefore a motive and 
irrelevant to criminal liability.
121 Article 6 of the Rome Statute.
122 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 267; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 116 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, 
p. 132.
123 R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256; Ashworth 2006, p. 158; 
section 25 of the English Theft Act 1968 and section 1 of the English Prevention of Crime Act 
1953.
124 Moreover, either fraud or coercion or abuse of position and so on, must have been employed. See 
Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/36 of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating traffi cking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Framework Decision 2002/629, OJ 2011 
L 101/1.
125 Kelk 2005, p. 178.
126 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 117 and Williams 1953, p. 41.
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When multiple motivations exist, the law is also only interested in establishing 
the intent required by the offence defi nition. For example, in burglary, it does not 
matter whether the primary motive was shelter, and the ulterior intent to steal only 
secondary.127 Under article 101 TFEU, intention to restrict competition need not be 
the only or predominant purpose of an agreement.128 In a German case, the defen-
dant had not paid his fare for the train and he was charged with fraud. The ulterior 
intent of the offence is obtaining benefi t, which he denied. He argued that he had 
forgotten his ticket, did not have enough money for another and he ‘only’ wanted to 
be on time for a course. The Supreme Court held that it did not matter that the 
enrichment was only a means to an end and therefore not the primary goal.129
2.4.5. Proof of ulterior intent
An ulterior intent is a form of dolus directus.130 Direct intent must be proven, which 
can lead to evidential problems. Consider that in the abovementioned case, the 
defendant argued that the benefi t he obtained was only a certain side-effect of his 
non-criminal purpose, not a necessary means to achieving his goal. In other words, 
he had dolus indirectus, but not directus. The State Supreme Court had therefore 
acquitted the defendant. In order to establish direct intent, the Federal Supreme 
Court had to argue that he in fact wanted the benefi t too, after which it could hold 
that it was irrelevant that it was only a secondary goal.131 The awareness of a 
certain side-effect is translated into a direct intent relating to multiple goals, putting 
the distinction between the forms of dolus under pressure. There were public policy 
reasons to hold that the defendant directly intended enrichment, because everything 
short of that would lead to an acquittal and would thus present people who did not 
pay their fare with a formidable defence.
An alternative approach to secure convictions is to hold that dolus indirectus 
also suffi ces to establish an ulterior intent. The Dutch Supreme Court has argued 
that when the defendant knows that the ulterior intent is a certain side-effect of his 
conduct, he wanted this conduct. In that case, the defendant was charged with fraud. 
He had posed as someone who had to be imprisoned and thereby unlawfully 
obtained benefi t by receiving prison food. This was not his purpose, but it was 
127 Another example is laid down explicitly in section 51(5) of the English Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994.
128 20 November 2008, Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development 
Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637, §21: “Indeed, an 
agreement may be regarded as having a restrictive object even if it does not have the restriction 
of competition as its sole aim but also pursues other legitimate objectives.” See also the Opinion 
of AG Trstenjak in this case of 4 September 2008.
129 23 February 1961 BGH NJW 1961, 1172.
130 De Hullu 2006, p. 235; Nieboer 1991, pp. 157–158; Smidt 1881 I, pp. 71 and 74 and Brouns 1988, 
p. 283.
131 See Roxin 2006, pp. 440–444.
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accepted as wanted because he knew it was a certain side-effect of his deception.132 
In some German cases, indirect intent is also explicitly held to be suffi cient as an 
ulterior intent.133 Some scholars have militated against the inclusion of certain side-
effects, arguing the wording ‘with a view to’ does not allow for the extending of 
ulterior intent to more than purpose.134 This perspective is particularly strong in 
Germany, where it is prevailing opinion that nothing less than direct intent suffi ces 
for offence that uses terms like ‘Absicht’ or teleological verbs.135 The extension of 
ulterior intent to forms of fault beyond purpose is problematic if it is considered that 
this purpose is the most essential character of the offence. To convict someone of 
such an offence, the most essential element should also be proven.
In order to strike a balance, a rule in Germany is applied that if the ulterior 
intent gives the offence its specifi c character and thus distinguishes it from similar 
offences, only direct intent should suffi ce. In cases where the ulterior intent is not 
constitutive of the offence in question, indirect intent can suffi ce. For example, in 
murder as defi ned under §211 of the German criminal code, the ulterior intent gives 
the offence its specifi c character in comparison to intentional killing. The ulterior 
intent is therefore limited to purpose.136 A less principled approach is to establish 
the concrete meaning of an ulterior intent in every offence and case.137 The 
legislator would provide for most clarity on the issue by explicitly using dolus 
indirectus as an alternative ulterior intent when this is deemed legitimate. Offence 
defi nitions like these read ‘doing X with the intent to or knowingly causing Y’.
An even lesser form of intent, mere dolus eventualis, is insuffi cient for ulterior 
intent.138 Recklessness, often labelled as the common law counterpart of dolus 
eventualis, is no form of intent and therefore insuffi cient too.139 However, in many 
offences, the interpretation of other offence elements has been stretched to an 
extent that this limitation of ulterior intent is hardly noticed. The Dutch offence of 
theft, for example, covers so many cases, that only cases where the actor had or 
thought he had permission will preclude ulterior intent.140 Furthermore, sometimes 
the ulterior intent relates to multiple objective elements, of which one does not 
132 HR 5 January 1982, NJ 1982, 232. See also HR 21 April 1998, NJ 1998, 610; de Hullu 2006, 
p. 236 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 17.
133 Krey 2003, pp. 110–111.
134 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 346.
135 2 October 1953 BGHSt 5, 245; Beulke 2008, p. 82 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 277–
278 and 286–287.
136 Badar 2005, p. 224.
137 Beulke 2008, p. 78; de Hullu 2006, p. 237 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 98–99.
138 HR 25 October 1983, NJ 1984, 300; HR 21 February 1978, NJ 1978, 384; de Jong, D.H. & 
Knigge 2003, pp. 117–119; Fokkens & Machielse, note 9–10 on Opzet; Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 18 
and de Hullu 2006, p. 236. In contrast: Brouns 1988, p. 284.
139 Ormerod 2005, p. 113.
140 Article 310 of the Dutch Criminal Code; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 117–119 and Keulen 
& Otte 1999, pp. 18–19. In HR 25 October 1983, NJ 1984, 300 the conviction for theft was 
quashed, because the fi nding of ulterior intent was grounded in a reasoning that resembled dolus 
eventualis.
Chapter IV
84 
require proof of dolus directus. In the German offence of theft, the ulterior intent is 
to appropriate wrongfully. The appropriation requires dolus directus, but the fact 
that this appropriation is wrongful, can also be fulfi lled by dolus eventualis. The 
defendant for example merely needed to have been aware of the possibility that 
there was no permission and taken this for granted.141
In the criminal law of Member States, ulterior intentions are usually found in 
offences of fraud, hate crimes and terrorist offences, all of which have been the 
object of EU legislation. Surprisingly, in the context of hate crimes, Framework 
Decision 2008/913 on racism and xenophobia does not oblige the use of ulterior 
intent. Although Article 4 stipulates that Member States must ensure that racist 
and xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating circumstance,142 they 
may also choose to take racist and xenophobic motivation into consideration in 
sentencing.
It seems that the EU also did not use ulterior intent in the context of fraud 
affecting its revenue and expenditure. Whereas it is common in Member States to 
defi ne fraud by using an ulterior intent to the profi t or enrichment of oneself or loss 
to another, because it is this intent that gives fraud its (criminal) character, the EU 
seems to do away with such an ulterior intent in the 1995 Convention on the 
protection of the European Communities’ fi nancial interests. Article 1(1) defi nes 
expenditure fraud affecting the EC fi nancial interests amongst others as: “(…) any 
intentional act or omission relating to (…) the use or presentation of false, incorrect 
or incomplete statements or documents, which has as its effect the misappropriation 
or wrongful retention of funds from the general budget of the European 
Communities (…) (italicizations added).”143
Rather than framing the offence defi nition as conduct with an ulterior intent to 
prejudice the EU budget, this aspect seems to be made objective due to the wording 
‘which has as its effect’ instead of, for example, ‘with a view to’. It seems irrelevant 
whether the economic operator pursued to prejudice the budget, whether he knew 
this was almost certain to occur, or even merely possible. In other words, the 
prejudice to the budget is a strict element. It merely needs to be shown that the 
budget was prejudiced.144 Similarly, in Regulation 2988/95, ‘irregularity’ is defi ned 
in Article 1(2) as: “any infringement of a provision of Community law (…) by an 
economic operator, which has, or would have the effect of prejudicing the general 
budget of the Communities (…) (italicizations added).” This defi nition even 
encompasses actions that could, but did not prejudice the budget.
From a perspective of effi ciency of protecting the EU budget, which is the 
driving force behind this Convention, it is preferable to make any detrimental effect 
141 §242 of the German Criminal Code; Roxin 2006, p. 439 and Beulke 2008, p. 78.
142 See for example Section 28(1) of the English Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
143 Revenue fraud is defi ned similarly by reference to its effect on the illegal dimunition on the 
resources of the budget.
144 ‘Effect’ in Article 101 TFEU is also given this interpretation, contrasted with the alternative 
‘object.’
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on this budget strict. There needs to be no discussion on what the required degree of 
dolus is as to this effect – direct, indirect or less – and there can be no evidential 
problems. Defendants cannot argue they did not know the effect. However, this 
strict element is what gives the offence its character. If the defendant had no 
intention to prejudice the budget, or should not have even been aware, it is incorrect 
to argue this is fraud. The EU also recognizes this. In contrast to what one would 
expect from the terminology used in the Convention, its explanatory report states 
that intention must relate to all elements of the offence defi nition, including the 
effect.145 When a criminal charge applies and the element is essential for the 
offence, all Member States require at least intent. The detriment to the budget of the 
EU is an essential element because it demarcates this criminalization from ‘simple’ 
fraud.
2.4.6. No dolus malus
A second aspect of the neutral character of dolus is that it does not require that the 
actor wanted to violate the criminal law or knew his conduct was illegal. Fault 
elements do not relate to the fact that conduct or consequences are illegal or 
wrong.146 There is no mens mala. Dolus is therefore also not malus, but ‘neutral’.147 
In other words, a mistake of law does not affect intention.148 At best, it can negate 
blameworthiness as an excuse.
A formal explanation for this rule is that fault elements only relate to elements 
that are included in the offence defi nition. Wrongfulness or illegality is almost 
never an offence element.149 Only some offences are drafted in a way that dolus is 
required as to the illegality or wrongfulness of conduct. This is called ‘dolus 
malus’.150 In these cases, the lack of intention results in a complete acquittal based 
on the inexorable logic of not fulfi lling the required offence element.151 A mistake 
or ignorance in relation to an offence element is inconsistent with intention. It is the 
opposite of knowledge and thus negates intention. For example, dolus refers to legal 
145 Explanatory Report on the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ 
fi nancial interests, 23 June 1997 OJ 1997 C 191/1. I assume that Regulation 2988/95 requires 
intention as to the effect too, because it builds upon the Convention.
146 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 120 and 627–628; Stephen 1890, pp. 88–89 and Ormerod 2005, 
p. 118.
147 Smidt 1881 I, p. 70; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 100–101; Kelk 2005, p. 179; de Hullu 
2006, p. 208; HR 18 March 1952, NJ 1952, 314; HR 24 April 2007, NJ 2007, 544; Krey 2003, pp. 
136–137; Beulke 2008, p. 85; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 261 and 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 
194.
148 Krey 2003, pp. 136–137; Beulke 2008, p. 85; Bohlander 2009, p. 61; Badar 2005, pp. 217–218 
and Strijards 1983, pp. 105–106.
149 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 113 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 350–
351.
150 Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Opzet; Kelk 2005, p. 179; Krey 2003, pp. 138–139 and Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, p. 263.
151 Law Commission 1989, p. 158; Fletcher 1978, p. 687 and Bohlander 2009, p. 71.
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aspects when the offence defi nition requires that the defendant intended to 
appropriate wrongfully. Dolus is not fulfi lled if the accused erroneously believed he 
had a claim against someone and executed this claim by appropriating property of 
that person. The mistake operates no different from the situation in which the actor 
thought the ‘stolen’ object already belonged to him. In that case, knowledge on an 
essential element of the offence – that it belonged to someone else – is missing and 
intention negated.152
When the offence defi nes dolus as malus, a ‘mistake of law’ thus negates 
intention, just as it would have when it was a ‘mistake of fact’. Both mistakes on 
points of law and facts or circumstances can become a ‘mistake on the offence 
defi nition’ and negate intention. The legal or factual character of the mistake is less 
important than whether or not they are included in the pertinent offence defi nition. 
This leaves mistakes that are irrelevant to the offence defi nition and thereby 
intention as a ‘mistake as to the legal prohibition’. These two categories of mistake 
will be discussed in detail later.153
Dolus malus has not always been the exception. Although the common 
understanding is that mistakes as to the legal prohibition, in contrast to factual 
mistakes, have always been irrelevant to intention in Europe, mistakes of law were 
not generally precluded from negating intention under Roman law. In both Roman 
and Canon law, dolus could also be malus, encompassing awareness of wrongful-
ness.154 Of the three Member States under investigation, the approach to allow a 
mistake as to the legal prohibition to negate intention too is most visible in 
Germany. Under the ‘theory of intention’, the prosecution generally would have to 
prove that the defendant knew that he was doing was wrong.155 This theory has 
been rejected now however.156
In the Netherlands too, dolus malus has not always been unusual. In both 
countries, there existed offences that required intention on the illegality of the 
conduct, especially in the regulatory fi eld of economic crimes. In case the actor did 
not know what he did was forbidden, he could only be convicted of a negligent 
offence. A decision of the German and a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, nota 
bene on the same day in 1952, mark a clear turning point, making dolus malus the 
excep tion.157 In England, it is also recognized that dolus malus is the exception that 
follows from the drafting of specifi c offences.158 However, the absence of the 
possibility to excuse the defendant who is mistaken on the lawfulness of his conduct 
152 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 267; Christopher 1995, pp. 230 and 237; R. v. Smith [1974] QB 
354 and Law Commission 1989, p. 158.
153 See V.2.4 and X.5.
154 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 507–516.
155 Arzt 1976, p. 666. Nonetheless, the defendant had to raise the issue in order for the burden to be 
applicable in practice, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 366.
156 See however Weigend in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 412–413.
157 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194; Arzt 1976, pp. 650–653; HR 18 March 1952, NJ 1952, 314 and 
Kelk 2005, pp. 179–180.
158 Ormerod 2008, p. 318. See also Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, p. 134.
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has put this starting point under pressure. As will be explained in the next chapter, 
the unavailability of the excuse has resulted in courts interpreting offences as 
requiring dolus malus, since that would be the only way to acquit the defendant 
who made an excusable mistake.
A practical explanation for this neutral character of dolus is that inclusion of 
elements of wrongfulness and illegality makes proof of the offence defi nition more 
diffi cult. Adding elements of a legal character increases the possibilities of acquittal. 
If intention on the illegality of conduct would be a standard requirement for liability, 
a defendant could easily escape liability by arguing that he did not know what he 
did was forbidden. Courts may have diffi culty rejecting these pleas, because in 
order for a mistake to negate dolus, it need only be honest, not reasonable. The 
inclusion of dolus malus may even bring about that only the lawyer or those proven 
to have explicit knowledge of the law can be held criminally liable.159
A dogmatic explanation for the lack of wrongfulness as an offence element is 
that as a rule, wrongfulness is an implied element of criminal liability, which we 
positioned on the second rung of the ladder of liability. Conduct that fulfi ls an 
offence defi nition is assumed to be wrongful, unless a justifi cation applies. For 
example, killing someone is prima facie wrongful. It is only justifi ed, that is, 
tolerated by the legal order and therefore not illegal, if it was done in self-defence.
The supposed justifi cation for not requiring knowledge on the illegality of the 
act is that everyone is supposed to know the law. This is grounded in the belief that 
mora lity coincides with the law, which is not controversial regarding traditional 
crimes mala in se; murder is criminal in character regardless of it being 
criminalized by law. Unlike mala prohibita, it is not only a legal wrong but also an 
ethical or pre-legal wrong. The rule can also be grounded in the legality principle 
and the social contract, which creates a possibility and duty to know the law. In a 
highly regulated fi eld of law however, these foundations become weak and the 
assumption itself proble ma tic.160
The modern perspective is that knowledge of the law is a fi ctional assumption 
that is best understood as a normative duty to know the law. It is warranted to 
require from an actor that he knows or gets to know the legal rules concerning 
norms that are essential to everyone and norms that concern his life in particular. 
For example, he needs to educate himself on the rules relating to spheres in which 
he is participating professionally. It is argued that if not knowing the law would 
negate intention, legal indifference would be rewarded. It is desirable to encourage 
knowledge of the law rather than to promote ignorance of it.161
159 See Nieboer 1991, p. 156; Pompe 1935, pp. 80–81; van Verseveld 2011, p. 82; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 728; Williams 1953, p. 385; Ormerod 2005, p. 121; Beulke 2008, p. 164; 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 361 and Arzt 1976, pp. 654–659.
160 Kelk 2005, pp. 179–180; Visser in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 73–74; Kessler 2001, 
pp. 200–209; Williams 1953, p. 385 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 451–460 and 467–469.
161 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 451–460 and 467–469; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728; Ashworth 2006, 
p. 233 and Williams 1953, p. 385.
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These assumptions not only justify treating dolus as a neutral concept, but they 
also lead to another maxim, namely error iuris non excusat: a mistake as to the 
legal prohibition does not excuse. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter, 
where many arguments mentioned above return to the fore. It will be argued there, 
that a mistake of law can negate blameworthiness, if it was unavoidable. We are 
concerned here however with the question whether such a mistake can negate 
intention. In conclusion, the principal answer is negative, because intention is 
neutral and does not relate to the legal aspects. The answer however also implies 
that such a mistake can negate intention in offences where dolus is malus. To these 
cases we will now turn our attention.
2.4.7. Unless dolus relates to wrongfulness
As an exception to the rule that dolus is neutral, some offence defi nitions are 
drafted in a way that dolus is required as to the illegality or wrongfulness of 
conduct. Inter alia, this is the case when wrongfulness is included in the offence 
defi nition, either literally or by terms as ‘without right’, ‘without permission’ or 
‘misappropriation’ and intention relates to it.162 As mentioned above, wrongfulness 
is normally an implied element, a general criterion of criminal liability that need 
not be proven, that is assumed when the offence defi nition is fulfi lled and negated 
when a justifi cation applies. When wrongfulness is included in some way in the 
offence defi nition, it is an express element. The meaning can vary per offence 
defi nition, although it usually means without right or permission, rather than in 
violation of the law.163
As will be discussed in detail in the subsequent part of this book on defences, 
wrongfulness is part of the offence defi nition in behaviour that is frequently carried 
out in accordance with the law. Consider destruction of property, sexual intercourse 
and detention of persons.164 These offences are characterized by the fact that the 
conduct is wrongful. Without the inclusion of an element of wrongfulness, the 
scope of liability would be too broad. After all, consensual intercourse should not 
be labelled rape. Wrongfulness is included because it is essential to the character of 
the particular offence.165 We start our working day by accessing an information 
162 Beulke 2008, p. 86; de Hullu 2006, pp. 211–212; Fokkens & Machielse, note 13 on Opzet and de 
Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 101–102.
163 Without right is defi ned in Article 1(d) of Framework Decision 2005/222 of 24 February 2005 on 
attacks against information systems, OJ 2005 L 69/67 as: “access or interference not authorised 
by the owner, other right holder of the system or of part of it, or not permitted under national 
legislation.”
164 De Hullu 2006, pp. 180–181; Bosch 2008, p. 165; Mevis 2006, p. 591 and Fokkens & Machielse, 
note 1 on Wederrechtelijkheid. See articles 350 and 282(1) of the Dutch Criminal Code; §303 of 
the German Criminal Code and section 1 of the English Criminal Damage Act 1971.
165 See Kristen in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 51, referring to HR 27 June 1995, NJ 
1995, 662.
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system. Only when this access is unauthorized, does it become wrongful and 
criminally relevant.166
As a consequence of its essential character, dolus must also relate to 
wrongfulness. After all, the actor must at least be aware of the offence elements that 
ground the wrong. He must know the circumstances that give the offence its typical 
character; he must know the facts and understand the essential wrong of the 
offence.167 The ‘rapist’ must know the victim did not consent. The ‘hacker’ must 
know he is accessing a system without authorisation. A function of this cognitive 
component of dolus is to enable the actor to understand the meaning of his actions 
and thus incite him to stop or omit those actions. Because the actor is aware that 
what he is doing constitutes a wrong, he has the opportunity to omit the criminal 
act. Because he is aware of the essential elements of the wrong, he must know it is 
illegal. As a consequence, the circumstance that he continues increases the 
reproach.168 Conversely, the fact that the defendant does not know his conduct is 
wrongful, implies the lack of a hostile disposition against the law. It does not imply 
his convictions are in line with the norms of the legal order, but it does imply that 
he believes them do be in line with those norms.169 This is also the rationale for 
excusing the defendant who makes a mistake of law.
On the other hand, we have already seen that offences that require intention as 
to wrongfulness can give rise to evidential problems. Legal logic requires that all 
defendants who are mistaken, however unreasonable, on any issue that relates to 
wrongfulness, ranging from a non-existent permission to ignorance of the law, are 
acquitted. To prevent acquittals that are contrary to public policy, Member States 
use numerous approaches in order to mitigate this inexorable logic. They are 
discussed and assessed here for possible application in a EU criminal justice 
system.
Let us consider offences against property, where defendants holding a civil 
claim take matters into their own hands by effectuating this claim by committing a 
criminal offence. I explained that offences like fraud and theft usually require an 
ulterior intent as to the obtaining of benefi t or appropriation. In addition, the ulterior 
intent relates to the wrongfulness of that conduct. There are numerous cases in 
Germany where defendants mistakenly believed they were entitled to a sum of 
money. In order to collect this, they either stole the money, deceived or coerced the 
166 Article 2 of the abovementioned Framework Decision 2005/222 and Article 3 of the Proposal for 
a Directive on attacks against information systems and repealing Framework Decision 2005/222, 
30 September 2010, COM (2010) 517.
167 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 261–262, 266 and 270–271; Krey 2003, pp. 134–135 and 138; 
Roxin 2006, p. 503; Beulke 2008, p. 84 and art. 11(1) of the Corpus Juris in Delmas-Marty 1997, 
p. 66: “Mistake about the essential elements of the offence excludes fraud; (…).”
168 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269 and 351; Beulke 2008, p. 88 and Arzt 1976, p. 657.
169 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 442–443.
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‘debtor’ to pay. Such mistakes negate the intention as to the wrongfulness of the 
enrichment and therefore lead to an acquittal.170
Apparently, it does not matter that the defendant used clearly illegal means of 
realizing his claim. Even if the means of collecting this money is clearly illegal, the 
purpose of the appropriation does not become wrongful. Falsifying documents and 
manipulating evidence, for example, does not make a justifi ed but hard to prove 
claim wrongful.171 Even though the law does not provide for such rights to collect 
debts, the German Supreme Court argued that creditors will often not know this 
and even possibly believe that they are entitled to take away money from the person 
who owes them money.172 This reasoning can be connected to the view where dolus 
is seen as expressing hostility towards the legal order. If the mistake implies that the 
defendant thought he was acting in conformity with the norms of the legal order, 
his intention must be negated.173
However, citizens may be incited to take matters into their own hands, because 
the law does not condemn the use of extra-legal means to effectuate a claim. This 
has led the Dutch to take a more restrictive approach. A mistaken belief that one 
has a civil claim can also negate intention as to wrongfulness, but when the means 
of realizing this claim are considered illegal or even inappropriate, the intention as 
to wrongfulness is fulfi lled. Wrongfulness is interpreted broadly as ‘excessively 
exceeding what is considered decent in society’.174 Wrongfulness not only relates to 
violations of legal rules, but also to the law as a broader concept, including norms 
from other fi elds of law, even ‘decorum’ and ‘decency’. This approach allows the 
courts to reject a failure of proof defence on intention, in cases where the actors had 
a legal right, but used this in a way that is in itself unseemly, so the whole conduct 
cannot be said to stand the test of law in the broadest sense of the word.175 Taking 
justice into one’s own hands is usually not allowed. Even if the defendant had a civil 
claim, he is not allowed to set aside civil means of revindication.176 The Dutch 
interpretation of wrongfulness serves this purpose.177
For example, a defendant had tried to extort money from two persons by writing 
a threatening letter, thinking he was entitled to that money. The courts held that, 
even if he would have been entitled to the money, he must have known that he had 
grave ly exceeded what was decent in society and that he thus had acted with a view 
170 12 January 1962 BGHSt 17, 87; 26 April 1990 BGH NJW 1990, 2832; 21 February 2002 BGH 
NStZ 2002, 481; 7 August 2003 BGH NJW 2003, 3283 and Beulke 2008, p. 86.
171 17 October 1996 BGHSt 42, 268.
172 12 January 1962 BGHSt 17, 87.
173 Beulke 2008, p. 88. See IV.2.2.1.
174 De Hullu 2006, p. 212. ‘Verregaande overschrijding van de grenzen van de maatschappelijke 
betamelijkheid.’
175 Kelk 2005, p. 128.
176 Annotator van Veen in HR 16 October 1990, NJ 1991, 153.
177 Kelk 2005, pp. 132–133 submits that outside this fi eld of law, there are (only) a few decisions 
where a broad interpretation of wrongfulness was used.
Fault elements
 91
to appropriate wrongfully, making him criminally liable for theft.178 In another 
case, two persons were looking for a stolen car. When they found it in a service 
station, they asked for a test drive and drove the car to the police. They were 
convicted of fraud, despite the claim that they did not intend to act wrongful, 
because they acted by order of the original owner.179
In England, mistakes of civil law also generally negative criminal liability for 
offences like theft and fraud as in Germany. This is, however, not due to the lack of 
intention at wrongful behaviour, but due to the functionally equivalent, normative 
offence element of ‘dishonesty’ in theft and fraud. The appropriation of property 
belonging to another is not regarded as dishonest when the actor believes he has in 
law the right to deprive the other of it. The defendant may intentionally lie in order 
to reclaim property, this is not considered dishonest.180
The pragmatic Dutch approach to dolus on wrongfulness can be criticized as 
violating the principle that dolus must relate to the offence elements that are charac-
teristic for the offence. The typical element of wrongful appropriation is the circum-
stance that the actor has no right to appropriate. If the actor thinks he has a legal 
claim over the object, he has no intention on this characteristic offence element. 
How can we then say that the actor fulfi lled the offence defi nition? The offen ce is 
fulfi lled although the ‘typical’ nature of the crime is absent. Wrongfulness loses its 
typical, characteristic meaning and becomes redundant. The difference between 
offences with or without such an ulterior intent is blurred.181 As a conse quence, in 
establishing the EU concept of dolus, the Dutch approach should be rejected.
The choice in favour of the English and German approach does not necessarily 
open the fl oodgates of self-help. The intention-negating effect of mistakes of civil 
law has its limits in all three Member States. Dolus can be grounded in many other 
ways than by interpreting wrongfulness in a broad way. First of all, it is warranted 
to limit relevant mistakes by requiring that claims must be legitimate, that is, 
protected by the legal order. Drug dealers are not making a mistake of fact on the 
wrongfulness of appropriation if they try to coerce the victim to pay the money 
they owe or give back the drugs. The dealer cannot be mistaken that his claim is 
accepted by the legal order and can be enforced by civil law.182 Second, even if a 
mistake leads to the negation of an ulterior intent such as to wrongfully appropriate 
in robbery, there usually is a possibility to hold the defendant liable for an offence 
that does not require such an ulterior intent, like coercion.183
178 HR 9 February 1971, NJ 1972, 1. See also Kelk 2005, pp. 128–130.
179 HR 16 October 1990, NJ 1991, 153 and Kelk 2005, p. 130. In contrast, a similar English case 
mentioned in Ormerod & Williams 2007, p. 134 does not lead to criminal liability.
180 Sections 1–2 of the Theft Act 1986, sections 1–4 of the Fraud Act 2006; Ormerod 2005, p. 294; 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 624–625; Ormerod & Williams 2007, pp. 103–110 and 133–135.
181 Kelk 2005, pp. 85–86 and 129–131 and annotator Bronkhorst in HR 9 February 1971, NJ 1972, 1.
182 7 August 2003 BGH NJW 2003, 3283. See also 17 October 1996 BGHSt 42, 268 and 21 February 
2002, BGH NStZ 2002, 481.
183 26 February 1998 BGH NStZ-RR 1998, 235.
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Third, the intention to wrongfully appropriate can also be fulfi lled by dolus 
eventualis. This means that if the actor accepted the possibility that there exists no 
(such) claim or that it is not protected by the legal order, intention is established. In 
a case where the defendant had send people to collect with force money that was 
owed from receipts of a techno party, the German Supreme Court held that the 
awareness of wrongfulness is only absent when the actor has a clear conception on 
the grounds and height of a claim. Since he only estimated the money he was owed, 
knowing the tickets sales had been conducted all but orderly, a mistake of fact was 
rejected and he was convicted to 5 and a half years of imprisonment.184 In England, 
similar solutions can be reached by letting recklessness suffi ce. There are also 
crimes of ‘ulterior recklessness’, where recklessness goes ‘beyond’ the actus 
reus.185
Courts can also fi nd intention by specifying the claim and thereby distinguishing 
it from the object of the crime. If the defendant intends to appropriate something 
else than the thing to which he has a claim of right, it can be argued that intention 
on wrongfulness is not affected.186 A mistaken claim on money might negate the 
intention of wrongful appropriation of money, but not of jewellery.187 Consider the 
employee who ‘lends’ money from the till, with the intention to replace the money 
as soon as he can. There is no doubt that the defendant has the intent to deprive the 
employer of these particular notes.188 Courts have also argued that a defendant 
might have a right to money but not to thís money (appropriated thís way).189 Even 
in Germany, the student who argued he wanted to lend a book rather than steal it 
was convicted, based inter alia on the argument that the bookstore lost its specifi c 
value of a new book.190
The mistake on wrongfulness can also be required to be reasonable or 
unavoidable, allowing liability for intentional acts when the mistake was easy to 
avoid or unreasonable. This is a popular legislative technique in England.191 
However, an ulterior intent can dogmatically not be fulfi lled by an unreasonable 
mistake. Requiring a reasonable mistake means that one is punished for being 
negligent. The fear of hampering effective prosecution by providing defendants an 
easy defence appears unwarranted, even more when it is considered that mistakes 
need to be honest, and thus so-called ‘abuses’ of the failure of proof defence can be 
184 16 December 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1999, 6. See also 23 December 1952 BGH NJW 1953, 431; 
Bohlander 2009, p. 120; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 362; Arzt 1976, p. 665 and Keulen & 
Otte 1999, pp. 14–15.
185 Horder in Simester & Smith, A.T.H. 1996, pp. 154–155. See, for example, section 1(2) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971.
186 Ormerod & Williams 2007, p. 134.
187 21 February 2002 BGH NStZ 2002, 481.
188 Ormerod & Williams 2007, p. 108.
189 HR 29 April 1935, NJ 1936, 50. See also HR 23 March 1936, NJ 1936, 563; Kelk 2005, p. 128 
and Ormerod & Williams 2007, p. 134.
190 Arzt 1976, pp. 665–666.
191 Compare sections 1 to 4 of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003.
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rejected based on the fact and circumstances of the case. If a defendant intentionally 
deceived someone and made profi t thereby, the ulterior intent is easily proven. The 
defendant will have to have a good story in order to negate this.
The most extreme approach to limiting the scope of relevant mistakes is to dis-
connect dolus from wrongfulness altogether. One can decide to make wrongfulness 
or other normative elements strict. Mistakes as to strict elements are irrelevant, 
because intention does not relate to it. An example is the offence of resisting the 
law ful actions of a civil servant. The defendant needs to intend the resistance and 
know the person he resists is a civil servant, but he need not be aware that the 
actions are lawful. If this would be required, a mistake, however unreasonable it 
may be, would preclude liability for the offence.192 Another example is the destruc-
tion of property under article 350 of the Dutch Criminal Code. The offence requires 
wrongfulness but intention need not relate to it; the express element has been made 
strict.193 In the latter example however, the technique violates the rule that if 
wrongfulness gives the offence its typical character, intention must relate to it.194
When incorrect claims in civil law may be effectuated by clearly illegal means, 
the fear that people will take justice into one’s own hands is legitimate. We should 
however not create dogmatic inconsistencies by extending the scope of wrongful-
ness, by requiring a reasonable mistake or by making essential offence elements 
strict. The fear can be put into perspec tive, because there are other approaches to 
limit this restrictive effect of mistakes on criminal liability. These approaches strike 
a balance between on the one hand, the effi cient protection of legal interests such as 
property and on the other hand, the principle that wrongfulness is an essential 
element of such offences and that dolus must therefore relate to it.
2.4.8. Unless dolus relates to normative elements
Dolus is also not very neutral in relation to other normative offence elements like 
‘forging’ or ‘indecency’. Here, the element also refers to an intention to do the 
illegal or at least improper thing. We can identify similar strategies to reach 
convictions as mentioned in relation to wrongfulness. Another approach applied in 
this context is to merely require that the defendant knew of the factual 
circumstances that ground a normative element. If the actor is mistaken about the 
facts that ground a normative element like ‘reprehensible’, his intention can be 
192 Fokkens & Machielse, note 5 on art. 180. In R. v. Lee [2000] EWCA Crim 53, the English Court 
of Appeal held the mistake on the lawfulness of the offi cer’s actions irrelevant too, see section 
38 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861.
193 Article 350 of the Dutch Criminal Code reads “(…) intentionally and wrongfully (…)”. The 
connector ‘and’ indicates that intent does not relate to wrongfulness, see Kelk 2005, pp. 200–201 
and Pompe 1935, pp. 79–80. In the similar §303 of the German Criminal Code, wrongfulness is 
also included in the offence, but treated generally as an implied element. Moreover, the mistake 
is treated as a mistake of law, not negating intention, see Joecks & Miebach 2006, notes 61–63 
on §303.
194 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 351.
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negated, but if he knows all the facts grounding this reproach but thinks it is not 
reprehensible as such, only the excuse mistake of law might apply.195 The difference 
between a relevant mistake on the underlying facts and an irrelevant mistake 
regarding the valuation of a risk as unreasonable is also paramount in the fault 
element recklessness.196
An alternative approach that warrants particular emphasis in this context, is the 
German one of letting the layman perception of normative offence elements like 
wrongfulness suffi ce.197 The actor need not appreciate normative elements like a 
lawyer, as that would make only the latter criminally liable. Intention is not negated 
when despite a mistake, the actor appreciates the social impact of his actions, 
realizes the wrongful character of the pertinent element. This is the case, for 
example, when the actor mistakenly believes he is acting within the limits of a legal 
loophole. Intention is not negated when the person who knowingly received stolen 
goods thought he would only be criminally liable if he had paid money for the 
goods. It suffi ces that the actor knows that he is harming the legal interest of 
property, which is protected by that offence.198
The subjects of this section can be illustrated with a fi nal example. Under earlier 
mentioned EU legislation, a hacker is someone who accesses an information system 
without right. The latter element of wrongfulness gives the offence its typical 
character, which brings about that the defendant must have intended his access to 
be wrongful. Whether or not the defendant had good intentions by accessing the 
information system, is irrelevant for intention. Some experts distinguish ‘hackers’ 
as persons acting with bona fi de motives, like exposing a security risk, from 
‘crackers’ as persons accessing information systems for material gain or 
(reprehensible) ideological convictions. Motive is however irrelevant for intention 
and the offence does not include an ulterior intent as to these ultimate goals. 
Therefore at most, the motive of the hacker can be assessed within the framework 
of defences.
2.5. Knowledge
In discussing dolus, we focused on results, but dolus can also relate to conduct and 
circumstances. Intention as to a circumstance is commonly referred to as know-
195 Beulke 2008, pp. 87 and 172, Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 176–177, Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, pp. 263 and 355–356 and Roxin 2006, pp. 489–490.
196 See IV.4.5.3.
197 Krey 2003, pp. 138–147; Badar 2005, p. 237; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 116–117 and Beulke 2008, 
p. 86. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 262.
198 ‘Parallelwertung in der Laiensphäre’, see 19 May 1999 BGHSt 45, 97; Arzt 1976, pp. 664–665; 
Beulke 2008, p. 163; Bohlander 2009, pp. 62 and 72; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 262–263 
and Strijards 1987, p. 10. See V.2.4.2.
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ledge.199 Dolus indirectus applies to the actor who knows a circumstance exists. 
Dolus directus applies when the actor hopes that a circumstance exists or will exist. 
The latter is sometimes rejected, submitting that one can only want something in 
the future and as regards to what is, this can only be known, not wanted. In other 
words, wanting cannot be directed at something that the actor cannot infl uence or 
change.200 However, dolus directus can relate to circumstances, because they can 
be the grounds for the actions. The actor aims at an action in a specifi c context, 
such as conducting sexual acts with a minor. The actor can make his actions 
dependent on circumstances and manipulate these by planning. The criminally 
relevant circumstances always determine the conduct itself, because the actor wants 
a certain conduct under certain circumstances and the lack of those circumstances 
means failure to him.201
Be that as it may, the most common form of knowledge consists of awareness 
that a circumstance exists.202 Like in dolus indirectus, it is not required that the 
defendant should think a circumstance exists with provable certainty. After all, in 
the strictest sense of the word, one cannot know that something will be the case in 
the future. On the other hand, suspicion or awareness of a mere possibility is 
insuffi cient.203 There must be real and present knowledge; potential knowledge 
does not suffi ce. For example, the actor must know that he was in an accident in 
order to commit the offence of leaving the scene of an accident. It is, however, not 
required that the actor consciously or continuously refl ected about the objective 
elements. The require ments of coincidence of actus reus and mens rea are not strict, 
as a more detailed discussion in chapter V will show. The knowledge needs to be 
present at one point in time, not continuously. It is also of no avail to the actor that 
he abandoned his dolus after the fact, or that he tries to undo the consequences.204
2.5.1. Tacit and latent knowledge
Knowledge is easily accepted because it need not be very conscious or explicit. So 
called tacit (subconscious) or latent (background) knowledge suffi ces.205 There can 
be instances where the actor knew something, but was not consciously aware of it at 
199 Law Commission 1989, p. 191; Badar 2005, p. 210; Weigend 1981, p. 674; de Jong, D.H. & 
Knigge 2003, p. 124 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on Culpa.
200 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 244.
201 Law Commission 1989, p. 192; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 131 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 
244–246. See also section 2.02(2) of the Model Penal Code, American Law Institute 1985A, 
p. 225, where hope as to circumstances is also equated with purpose.
202 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 131; de Hullu 2006, pp. 238–239 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, 
p. 99.
203 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 19; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 142, Law Commission 1989, p. 192 and 
Shute in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 195–196.
204 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 266–269.
205 See Shute in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 187–190 and 199–201 and Sullivan in Shute & Simester 
2002, pp. 211–212.
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the time of commission. The denial of knowledge is not likely to be successful.206 
For example, when a person carrying a gun steals something – without the use of 
the gun – it is not necessary that he contemplated on the possession of the gun to be 
liable for aggravated theft under §244 of the German criminal code.207 ‘Non-
refl ected co consciousness’ or tacit knowledge, can be based on awareness grounded 
in facts.208
Moreover, latent knowledge can be based on knowledge that is permanently 
available to the defendant since he has internalized it. A civil servant who is 
receiving a bribe, for example, does not need to refl ect on his offi cial position.209 
The ‘problem’ is similar to that in the context of the voluntary act requirement, 
where it is argued that habitual acts like shifting while driving a car might not 
qualify as voluntary acts since they are said to be subconscious.210 The paradoxical 
character of tacit and latent knowledge is that the more someone is familiar with a 
certain type of conduct, the less likely he will actually refl ect on it. The higher the 
degree of knowledge, the more it retreats into sub-consciousness. It is therefore no 
surprise that knowledge has been ‘extended’ in this way.211
Critics of these two forms of knowledge warn that it might delude the distinction 
between real and possible knowledge, the difference between dolus and culpa, 
intention and negligence. After all, does a negligent driver also not possess the 
latent knowledge of risks in general?212 This basic difference between actual 
knowledge and ignorance where one should have known brings about that at all 
times current reproducibility without actual refl ection must be distinguished from 
what does not qualify as dolus, namely the mere possibility to reproduce knowledge 
by exercising the memory or thought.213
2.5.2. Knowledge and belief
Knowledge and belief are distinguished in English law only by the condition that 
belief must be true in order to count as knowledge.214 The belief need not be 
founded on a reliable base; a true belief based on some relevant data suffi ces.215 
206 Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on Opzet and Brady 1996, pp. 187–188 and 199.
207 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269–270. See also Schild in Dencker a.o. 1993, p. 266.
208 ‘Sachgedankliches Mitbewuβtsein’, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 364; Stuckenberg 
2007, p. 285 and Shute in Simester and Shute 2002, pp. 199–200.
209 ‘Begleitwissen’, Krey 2003, pp. 132–137; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 105; Roxin 2006, pp. 497–499; 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269 and 364 and Beulke 2008, p. 85.
210 Habitual bodily movements that often lack an express order of the mind are voluntary too 
however, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 166–167.
211 Schild in Dencker a.o. 1993.
212 Duff 1990, p. 160.
213 Krey 2003, pp. 134–135; Roxin 2006, pp. 497–501 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 270.
214 R. v. Saik [2006] UKHL 18; Shute in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 191 and 201; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 131 and Williams 1953, p. 133.
215 Shute in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 207–208, who criticizes this limited legal distinction.
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Therefore, belief in contradistinction with knowledge is only important when it 
concerns a false rather than a true belief. It seems only English law uses belief as a 
fault element, sometimes as an alternative to knowledge by including terms like 
‘which he knows or believes’.216 This implies that a defendant can also be held liable 
if he mistakenly believed that a circumstance was present.217 The lack of a clear 
idea on what belief requires in the only legal system under investigation that seems 
to apply it is problematic. Belief will therefore not be investigated or discussed in 
detail.
2.5.3. Wilful blindness
Besides knowledge and belief, many more states of minds can be distinguished in 
relation to circumstances. These are however not similar to dolus. For example, an 
offence can require ‘reckless knowledge’, which exists when the defendant knows 
there might be a risk that a prohibited circumstance is present, but refrains from 
checking it.218 For example, the defendant may suspect that the person he intends to 
have sexual intercourse with is not consenting or not of age.219 However, if the 
reason for this failure was that he was virtually certain his suspicion would be 
confi rmed, English law upgrades it to actual rather than reckless knowledge.220 
“(…a person acts) “knowingly” with respect to a circumstance not only when he is 
aware that it exists or will exist, but also when he avoids taking steps that might 
confi rm his belief that it exists or will exist.”221
The aforementioned follows from the application of the doctrine of wilful 
blindness. A person who is wilfully blind may be as culpable as the person with 
explicit knowledge. This wilful blindness is a suspicion coupled with a deliberate 
failure to use readily available and effective means that he knows of to resolve the 
suspicion, in short, suspicion and the blameworthiness of not checking.222 This 
form of actual knowledge is thus called wilful blindness, or ‘connivance’.223 When 
ignorance is based on indifference, intentional liability is warranted.224
216 See section 114(2) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and sections 2–5 of the 
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981.
217 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 615 and Sullivan in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 221–223. Liability 
can also be based on section 1(2) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, see for example R. v. 
Shivpuri [1986] UKHL 2.
218 Ashworth 2006, p. 190. In section 41(3) of the English Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990, for example, both knowledge and reckless knowledge suffi ce.
219 R. v. Khan [1990] 1 WLR 815.
220 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 144 and Williams 1953, p. 127.
221 Section 18(a) draft Criminal Code, see Law Commission 1989, p. 51. See also R. v. Stephenson 
[1979] EWCA Crim 1.
222 Sullivan in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 213–214.
223 Westminster City Council v. Croyalgrange Ltd and another [1986] 2 All ER 353; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 143, Williams 1953, p. 127 and Ashworth 2006, p. 191.
224 Jakobs 2002; Kindhäuser in Arnold a.o. 2005, pp. 345–346 and Hsu 2007, pp. 196–197. See also 
Brady 1996, pp. 192–198.
Chapter IV
98 
In continental Europe, merely knowing that a circumstance might exist is similarly 
upgraded to actual knowledge through the concept of dolus eventualis, which is the 
lowest form of dolus on the continent and alien to English law. For example, in the 
context of intentionally handling stolen goods, knowledge on the illegal origin of a 
good was said to include dolus eventualis.225 The Dutch Supreme Court deduced 
awareness on the possibility that it was illegally obtained from the circumstances 
surrounding the sale of a television, such as the price, the fact the defendant had sold 
it himself soon after buying and the fact that other persons involved were aware of 
this possibility. As will be argued later, dolus eventualis is primarily used to facilitate 
proof. If the lowest form on intent suffi ces, no one will try to establish more than this, 
even if dolus (in)directus may be evident. However, in cases of handling stolen goods, 
actual knowledge could also be inferred by inferring it from the facts and 
circumstances. The fact that the defendant was found in possession of the goods, 
under the abovementioned suspicious circumstances, leads to a prima facie case of 
knowledge. The burden to rebut this case rests upon the defendant.226
Dolus eventualis is established in cases where the defendant did not inquire into 
the fact or only conducted a clearly insuffi cient investigation, whereas there was, 
considering the circumstances, every reason to conduct such an investigation.227 
Knowing or suspecting so much that one prefers not to know can qualify as dolus 
eventualis.228 The difference with wilful blindness is however that it is not required 
that the actor remained ignorant because he looked away from the obvious. Almost 
any suspicion may suffi ce for dolus eventualis.
From this aspect, controversy follows in the Netherlands regarding the question 
whether awareness of a possibility can be equated with knowledge. It is diffi cult to 
re con cile an interpretation of knowledge that includes dolus eventualis with the 
literal wording of knowledge, which is consciousness of a reasonable degree of 
certain ty.229 From this, it follows that dolus eventualis should not suffi ce to accept 
know led ge.230 However, the Dutch Supreme Court has interpreted elements of 
know ledge in many offence defi nitions as including dolus eventualis, and although 
some scholars have tried to mitigate this by arguing that the element is interpreted 
per offence, it seems the Supreme Court has taken the approach that dolus 
eventualis suffi  ces for every form of knowledge in offence defi nitions. This is 
accepted by most scholars as consistent in a legal system that operates with three 
forms of dolus.231
225 HR 19 January 1993, NJ 1993, 491. In the context of money laundering, see Hof Amsterdam 
14 December 2010, LJN:BO9264.
226 Edwards 1954, pp. 295–298.
227 Kessler 2001, pp. 237 and 253.
228 De Hullu 2006, p. 222.
229 Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on Opzet.
230 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 19 and Nieboer 1991, p. 157.
231 See HR 30 May 2008, NJ 2008, 318; de Hullu 2006, pp. 239–241; Kelk 2005, pp. 195–197; 
annotator D.H. de Jong in HR 3 December 2002, NJ 2004, 353; Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on 
Opzet and Smidt 1881 I, p. 72.
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In contrast, most scholars in Germany seem to exclude dolus eventualis for fault 
elements that are drafted as a form of knowledge. Only when a more general term 
of intention is used in the offence defi nition, can this lower form of dolus suffi ce.232 
After all, knowledge is also sometimes used as an aggravating factor in comparison 
to the mere intention (dolus eventualis) as to a circumstance. Consider §109g of the 
German Criminal Code, where ‘knowingly’ creating a danger can be punished with 
up to fi ve years of imprisonment, whereas if the danger is brought about with 
intention or gross negligence there is a maximum penalty of only two years.
This manner of drafting offences can thus be seen as alternative strategy to 
include this latter knowledge into dolus by using dolus eventualis or wilful 
blindness. The advantage of this approach is that defendants can be held criminally 
liable in all cases and that knowledge is clearly distinguished from suspicion (and 
ignorance). Moreover, this difference is not only expressed in the verdict but also 
expressed in sentencing, as the lesser offence is punished less severely.
In conclusion, the following defi nition grasps dolus best: “(…a person acts) 
“intentionally” with respect to- i) a circumstance when he hopes or knows that it 
exists or will exist; ii) a result when he acts either in order to bring it about or being 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”233 Knowledge should 
include only a reasonable degree of certainty. Wilful blindness resembles the degree 
of certainty required in dolus indirectus, and may therefore be equated with it. By 
contrast, the suspicion that a circumstance exists should be distinguished clearly 
from knowledge. It is considered desirable to criminalize this as well, it should thus 
be expressly indicated in the offence defi nition, for example as reckless knowledge. 
Ignorance where one should have known is the counterpart of negligence. When an 
offence defi nition holds the defendant liable who ‘knew or ought reasonably to have 
known’ all kinds of fault therefore suffi ce for liability.234
3. DOLUS EVENTUALIS
The fault element discussed here equates foreseen side-effects with intended results. 
It requires that the defendant was aware of the possible side-effects of his actions 
and he decided to act nonetheless, accepting these side-effects. This fault element 
does not exist in English law. The comparable English concept of recklessness will 
therefore be discussed next, after which I will argue in favour of that concept in a 
general part of criminal law for the EU.
232 2 October 1953 BGHSt 5, 245; Beulke 2008, p. 82; Krey 2003, pp. 112–115; Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 106 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 277–279.
233 Section 18(b) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51.
234 See for example section 4(1)(b) of the English Animal Welfare Act 2006.
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3.1. Terminology
The lowest possible form of dolus will be addressed by the term dolus eventualis, or 
in short, eventualis. As elsewhere in this book, the use of Latin denotes that it is the 
product of comparative legal analysis and thereby a candidate fault element for a 
general part of criminal law for the EU. In order to distinguish this integrated 
concept from its sources, the term ‘conditional intent’ is used (only) to refer to 
charac teristics of the corresponding fault element of a specifi c Member State under 
inves ti ga tion. This is a literal translation of the commonly used terms in Germany 
and the Netherlands, respectively ‘bedingter Vorsatz’ and ‘voorwaardelijk opzet’.
Dolus eventualis has been a bone of contention since it was adopted in both 
countries.235 The controversy starts with its terminology. The term ‘conditional 
intent’ has been attributed to Frank, who tested intention by asking whether the 
defendant would also have acted, if he were certain the consequence would occur. If 
he would have gone ahead, intention could be confi rmed. The second formula holds 
that intention is given when the actor has decided that he will act in any case, 
regardless of whether the circumstances are so or so. These questions or formulae 
are however better seen as auxiliaries than the decisive test for the decision on 
whether or not the actor accepted the risk or not.236
‘Conditional intent’ is confusing, because the intent is not conditional; the 
occurren ce of the result is merely dependent (conditional) on uncertain circum-
stances. In order to hold the accused liable for a completed offence, the risk that he 
consciously accepted must occur. If the risk does not materialize, there is still 
conditional intent, which can ground attempt liability. The intent itself is 
unconditional, independent of a further condition like realization of the risk. 
Consider someone who throws another person in a cold river with a strong current, 
realizing the lethal danger beforehand but continuing anyway to teach the victim a 
lesson. The intent to kill is given when the victim is pushed off the bridge, 
regardless of whether the victim dies or survives. The actor might even mourn the 
consequence when it happens, but he acts regardless of whether the condition is 
fulfi lled, regardless of whether the risk materializes.237
When a will is literally conditional, expressing inner indecisiveness, this does 
not constitute intention. The dividing line between intention and negligence is 
whether the actor has decided to act. Every intention requires an unconditional will 
235 Smidt 1881 I, p. 80; Pols (1889) in Buruma 1999; de Hullu 2006, pp. 220–221; Nieboer 1991, pp. 
177–178; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 216–220; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 279, 282 and 286 
and Bohlander 2009, pp. 64–65. The fi rst references to this concept in Germany stem from the 
eighteenth century, but it has been given its current contours only in the late nineteenth century, 
see Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 103–105. Kelk 2005, p. 185 submits the Dutch Supreme Court used the 
term conditional intent for the fi rst time explicitly in HR 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55.
236 De Hullu 2006, p. 220; Kelk 2005, p. 183; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 139; Roxin 2006, pp. 
460–461; Badar 2005, p. 231 and Taylor, G. 2004B, pp. 357–358.
237 Kelk 2005, pp. 184–186; Krey 2003, pp. 114–115; Beulke 2008, pp. 78–79 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 279.
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to act. Intent is literally conditional in cases where the actor still has to decide what 
to do. In those cases, there has not yet been a decision to act. The actor, for example, 
takes out a gun but has not yet decided to threaten or shoot. When the gun goes off, 
he can be held merely negligent for the results caused.238 Consider also Wilhelm 
Tell, who was forced to shoot an apple from the head of his son with a crossbow. 
After succeeding, the villain landlord Geβler asked Tell why he had taken two 
arrows. Tell replied that if he had killed his son, he would have shot him with the 
second arrow. There was literal but not legal conditional intent on the death of 
Geβler.239
In these cases, the actor is still undecided and does not act with intention to kill. 
The actor remains in complete control to choose to complete his act or to abandon it 
altogether, in contrast to cases of legal conditional intent, where the actor no longer 
has control over the outcome of the case. When the defendant threw the victim in 
the cold river with a strong current, his death is not a condition on which the 
defendant could act.240 Intention is even direct, as opposed to merely conditional 
intent, when the actor is already fi rmly determined to commit the act, such as 
killing, provided that specifi c circumstances will occur. Consider the actor wants to 
kill his ex-wife if she does not want get back together. He could not infl uence this 
decision as it was the choice of his ex-wife. He had already decided to act.241 
Consider that English lawyers use the term conditio nal intent to indicate that a 
direct (ulterior) intent also exists in case of breaking and entering with a view to 
steal valuables if they are present. As accepted in all Member States, if there would 
be no valuables, he still acted with a view to steal them.242
For these reasons, many Dutch and German scholars reject the term conditional 
intent. Many German scholars prefer ‘Eventualvorsatz’ or even use its Latin coun-
ter part dolus eventualis.243 This term is used for similar concepts in other Member 
States too.244 The actor wants a consequence eventualiter when he in eventum of 
the occurrence accepts (consentit) this.245 Other alternatives could be ‘intention on 
possibility’ or ‘chance-intent’ in order to demarcate it from indirect intent.246 These 
terms must be rejected too however, as the concept is not only separated from 
238 Krey 2003, pp. 114–115; Beulke 2008, pp. 78–79; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 279; 
Stuckenberg 2007, p. 317 and Roxin 2006, p. 447.
239 Schultz in Seebode 1992.
240 Schultz in Seebode 1992.
241 2 February 1966 BGH NJW 1966, 787.
242 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 132–133; Ashworth 2006, p. 394 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 317–
318.
243 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 102. The Dutch Minister of Justice Modderman argued that ‘even if he did 
not desire death, he wanted it eventually’. Eventually means conditionally here however, see 
Smidt 1881 I, pp. 80–81 and Kelk 2005, p. 184.
244 In Belgium, the similar concept is called ‘eventueel opzet’, see Kelk 2005, p. 184. In France and 
Italy respectively, ‘dol éventuel’ and ‘dolo eventuale’, see Badar 2009, pp. 455–456.
245 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 257.
246 Nieboer 1991, p. 163; de Hullu 2006, p. 221 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 348, 370 and 410–411. 
Indirect intent is then referred to as ‘certainty-intent.’
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indirect intention by probability of the result occurring. Most importantly, it is 
characterized by an additional attitude of the defendant as to the possibility that the 
result will occur.247
3.2. Rationale
Dolus eventualis serves two interrelated purposes. First of all, it enables an 
extended interpretation of dolus, just as dolus indirectus, in order to hold that results 
have been intended even though they were not wanted. If it cannot be proven that 
the accused either wanted to fulfi l an offence element or knew this was almost 
certain, there can be no liability for dolus directus or indirectus. Without the 
extended form of dolus, this accused could not be convicted for an intentional 
offence. In legal systems that operate with only two kinds of fault, intention and 
negligence, this implies that only negligence liability is possible. A conviction for a 
negligent rather than intentional offence not only generally brings about a lower 
sentencing range; it also labels the actor’s conduct as less reprehensible in 
comparison to the same conduct or result brought about intentionally. If intention 
would not apply to foreseen side-effects, the actor may be punished and stigmatized 
less severely than he deserves. In other words, eventualis is the application of 
criminal policy to cases, where it is felt that the punishment for the offence 
committed with negligence would be too low.248
Moreover, not every intentional offence has a counterpart that criminalizes its 
negligent commission. Attempt also requires at least a conditional intent. In those 
contexts, the negation of intent would negate liability completely. By the extension 
of dolus to eventualis, the actor who was aware of a lethal risk but accepted this as 
collateral damage is put on the same footing as the actor who intended to kill. To 
justify this, it is argued that by being aware of the possible consequences his 
conduct may have, the actor is warned he may possibly cause harm and incur 
criminal liability. Since he decided to act notwithstanding the risks, the actor is 
reproached for his choice. The actor shows that he was insuffi ciently motivated not 
to violate legal interest and to act in conformity with the law.249
Secondly, eventualis plays an important role in facilitating the convictions of 
defen dants for intentional offences. In general, an offence element that resembles 
intention can be fulfi lled by either proof of dolus directus, indirectus or eventualis. 
Some elements imply that the actor at least had dolus directus or indirectus. This 
can either follow from the terminology or the nature of the element to which 
intention refers. For example, driving can hardly be imagined as done with anything 
247 Most scholars who use the term ‘chance-intent’ reject this volitional element and focus solely on 
the cognitive part of conditional intent, reducing it to acting despite awareness of a risk, see 
IV.3.6.6.
248 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 135 and Puppe in Kindhäuser, Neumann & Paeffgen 2010 notes 
14–22 on §15.
249 See IV.2.2.1.; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269 and 351 and Arzt 1976, p. 657.
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else than direct intent. Offences of ulterior intent usually imply by terms as ‘with a 
view to’ that they can only be fulfi lled by dolus directus, but it has become clear 
that in many cases, dolus eventualis also suffi ces.250 For the greater part, offences 
that require intent can therefore be fulfi lled by proof of eventualis. As a 
consequence, the prosecution generally only seeks to prove that the defendant acted 
with dolus eventualis. This is easier to prove, because its cognitive and volitional 
criteria are of a much lesser degree than in dolus (in)directus. It does not need to be 
proven that the actor knew something was almost certain to happen, merely that he 
was aware of a(ny) chance that a result would materialize. It does not need to be 
proven that the actor wanted a result to occur; merely that he accepted that this 
could happen.
Proof of intent is not only facilitated because eventualis suffi ces for almost all 
intentional charges and only requires proof of diluted manifestations of knowledge 
and wanting. This facilitation is further reinforced by the manner in which these 
criteria of eventualis are procedurally established. Of all fault elements, eventualis 
is most likely to be objectively inferred from facts and circumstances. I will demon-
strate that the awareness of a chance is often inferred from general knowledge that 
speci fi c conduct is dangerous and that the acceptance of the risk is established 
usually on the omission to stop the conduct after realizing the danger.251 In practice, 
this may go as far as holding the defendant liable for intentional homicide when a 
reaso nable person would have foreseen the risk of fatalities. I will reject such an 
objective evidential approach, after having explained the conditions of dolus 
eventualis.
3.3. Criteria
Dolus eventualis can be defi ned as the conscious acceptance of a considerable 
chance to a consequence. The actor foresees the result’s occurrence as possible and 
accepts the fact that his conduct could cause the result.252 For example, the 
defendants wanted to subdue the victim by strangling him with a leather belt. They 
knew there was a possibility that the victim might die, but wanted to put him out of 
action at all costs.253 I will generally refer to the conscious acceptance of a 
consequence, because this is usually charged and easiest to imagine. Nonetheless, 
eventualis can relate to the fulfi lment of any offence element, including conduct 
250 See IV.2.4.5.; Bohlander 2009, p. 67; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 27 and Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 105.
251 De Hullu 2006, p. 219 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 349. Framed even more negatively, dolus 
eventualis can also be regarded as a way out for the judge who did not suffi ciently investigate the 
circumstances of the case, see Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 141.
252 De Hullu 2006, p. 222; HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199; Krey 2003, pp. 118–121; Fischer, T. 
2009, p. 107 and Beulke 2008, p. 78.
253 22 April 1955 BGH NJW 1955, 1688.
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and circumstances. An example of the latter is the actor who consciously accepts 
the chance that the person he has sexual intercourse with may be of minor age.
The fault element can be distinguished as other forms of dolus into a cognitive 
and a volitional part.254 The cognitive part consists of the awareness of a 
considerable chance; the volitional part is about the attitude of the actor, about 
whether he accepted and took the risk that the offence element would be fulfi lled 
into the bargain. This second feature of eventualis enables the demarcation of dolus 
and culpa. It limits intentional criminal liability. If a person accepts that the result 
could occur he acts intentionally, but if a person is aware of this chance but trusts in 
a good outcome, the volitional element is missing and he can only be held liable 
under conscious or advertent negligence. The volitional element is therefore very 
important, but at the same time controversial. As will be explained later, many 
scholars reject such an element as a criterion of eventualis and explain the difference 
between dolus and culpa differently. Under the theory that the cognitive element is 
most or only important, it is assumed that when an actor acts, despite awareness of 
the risk, he must have wanted or at least accepted that risk. The volitional element 
need not be established separately.255
The volitional part of dolus eventualis consists of a heavily diluted form of the 
element of wanting traditionally required for proof of dolus directus.256 It does not 
need to be proven that the actor wanted a result to occur; merely that he accepted 
that this might happen. Compared to dolus indirectus, its cognitive part is just as 
diluted. It does not need to be proven that the actor knew something was almost 
certain to happen; merely that he was aware of a chance that a result would 
materialize. It is said that dolus eventualis is about knowing and wanting, but it 
could therefore just as easily be argued that eventualis is about neither knowing nor 
wanting. In other words, dolus directus and indirectus consist of a great degree of 
volition or knowledge. They either have a strong volitional or cognitive aspect, and 
this similarity allows them to be viewed as equally culpable.257 Eventualis, in 
contrast, consists only of residues of both aspects. This difference militates against 
an equation, suggesting instead a strict separation of dolus directus and indirectus 
on the one hand and eventualis on the other.
3.4. Risk
The cognitive component of dolus eventualis focuses on the knowing that there is a 
possibility a result will occur as a consequence of the defendant’s actions. Two 
aspects are distinguished, on the one hand the risk that a result will occur and on 
the other the awareness of this risk.258 The distinction is warranted because 
254 HR 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55 and 22 April 1955 BGH NJW 1955, 1688.
255 Mevis 2006, p. 593. See IV.3.6.6.
256 Roxin 2006, p. 437.
257 See IV.2.3.2.
258 De Hullu 2006, p. 222 and AG Hofstee in HR 26 October 2010, LJN:BO2514.
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although the actor must be aware of a chance subjectively, the likelihood of that 
chance is assessed mostly objective. I will now focus on the latter element.
3.4.1. Possibility versus considerable risk
There must be a chance that the result will occur. The question is exactly how likely 
this occurrence must be. In the Netherlands, it is common to refer to a considerable 
chance that a consequence occurs.259 Most German scholars also require the 
perpetrator to seriously consider the possibility.260 It could be concluded therefore 
that the risk of dolus eventualis must be considerable, but the German Supreme 
Court consistently holds that any possibility that is not entirely unlikely suffi ces.261 
In other words, there is hardly any threshold as to probability in German criminal 
law. This can be contrasted with the considerable chance in the Netherlands and is 
perhaps the most important comparative difference to be taken into account.
3.4.2. Chance of being infected with HIV
By merely requiring that the fulfi lment of the offence element is possible, it could 
be expected that the German judiciary tends to establish conditional intent in 
relatively more instances than the Dutch judiciary. This assumption is confi rmed in 
the context of having unprotected sexual intercourse whilst knowingly being HIV-
positive. These cases have resulted in defendants being charged with the intentional 
infl iction of serious bodily injury,262 and judgments on just how likely the 
consequence of infection must be in order to accept conditional intent.
The conclusion that can be drawn from Dutch case-law is that unprotected 
sexual intercourse only brings about a considerable chance under ‘certain risk-
increasing circumstances’.263 Generally considered to increase the risk are repeated 
instances of unprotected intercourse, anal rather than vaginal intercourse and being 
259 De Hullu 2006, p. 222. Kouwen & Bruinberg 2006, p. 485 translate ‘aanmerkelijk’ as 
‘considerable’. The older and lesser criterion of ‘geenszins als te verwaarlozen kans’, is 
insuffi cient now, see HR 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55; Rozemond 2006, p. 62 and Rozemond 
2007B.
260 Krey 2003, pp. 120–121, Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107 and Beulke 2008, p. 78: ‘ernstlich für möglich 
halten’. The draft German Criminal Code referred to a mere possibility, but the alternative draft 
added that this possibility should be serious, see Roxin 2006, p. 449.
261 7 July 1999 BGH NStZ 1999, 507; 12 August 2009 BGH BeckRS 2009, 25029; Krey 2003, pp. 
118–119, Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107: ‘nur möglich und nicht ganz fernliegend’. Translation from 
Badar 2005, p. 234.
262 The charge of (attempted) intentional killing is not deemed appropriate to these cases. In the 
Netherlands, this is accepted as evident, but in Germany, the question whether HIV-infection 
consitutes killing or infl icting bodily injury has been fi ercely debated. See Roxin 2006, pp. 476–
477; Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009, pp. 504–520; Schünemann in Szwarc 1996; Schünemann in 
Arnold a.o. 2005; Herzberg in Szwarc 1996 and Canestrari 2004, p. 214.
263 HR 18 January 2005, NJ 2005, 154: ‘bijzondere risicoverhogende omstandigheden’ which is 
translated as ‘certain, risk-inducing circumstances’ by Kouwen & Bruinberg 2006, p. 486.
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on the receiving end as far as penetration and ejaculation is concerned. The 
Supreme Court, nonetheless, dismissed that the chance was considerable in a case 
that included all the above-mentioned circumstances, holding that the risk was 
increased, but not in a manner that amounted to ‘certain risk-increasing circum-
stances’. This begged the question what then would qualify as such circum-
stances.264
In sharp contrast, the decision to accept conditional intent to bodily injury based 
on an empirically small chance was approved by the German Supreme Court in 
1988. The defendant had had unprotected anal sex two times, ‘but’ had used a 
condom before ejaculating.265 Many more convictions have followed since then, 
including the conviction in 2010 of singer Nadja Benaissa, who received a 
conditional sentence of two years imprisonment.266 A consideration on the degree 
of the risk is absent in these judgments, holding merely that having unprotected 
sexual intercourse can infect the victim. This seems to demonstrate that the 
threshold of the considerable risk in conditional intent is much lower in Germany. 
However, we need to be extremely careful when inferring general conclusions from 
this context.
Considering that in the Dutch case mentioned above, the considerable risk was 
empirically far greater than in many other cases where conditional intent was 
accepted,267 the express consideration in the judgment on the reluctance of the 
Minister to criminalize the (possibility of) HIV-infection can lead one to conclude 
that the Dutch Supreme Court just did not want to establish liability in these 
cases.268 In all the four times the Supreme Court was requested to decide on the 
issue, it quashed a conviction based on conditional intent. This suggests that the 
application of conditional intent to these cases was evident to the courts that 
convicted the defendants.269
The Dutch criminal policy is to avoid criminalization altogether, in contrast to 
Germany, where the liability to infl ict bodily injury has been considered as a com-
pro mise between considerations of retribution and considerations of public health, 
such as the fear that liability would prevent people from testing them selves.270 It 
264 HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313.
265 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1.
266 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 August 2010.
267 Van Asperen de Boer 2007 argues that the chance of infection of 1 in 300, has increased to 1 in 
7 when the defendant and victim had unprotected sex for 50 times.
268 Van der Wilt, C. J. 2007; Rozemond 2007A and de Jong, F., van Roomen & Sikkema 2007, pp. 
946–949 and Lensing 2008.
269 HR 25 March 2003 NJ 2003, 552; HR 24 June 2003, NJ 2003, 555; HR 18 January 2005, NJ 
2005, 154 and HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313. The cases of 25 March 2003 and 18 January 
2005 concern the same defendant and the same charges.
270 Other arguments against criminalization are the responsibility of both partners having sexual 
intercourse, the private sphere of the conduct, the diffi culty to enforce and the arbitrariness as to 
other diseases. For example, Spong & van Dijk, J-H 2007A submit that the chance to get hepatitis 
B from unprotected sexual intercourse is much higher, namely 1 in 3 or 4. For more arguments 
in favour and against criminalization see Szwarc 1996.
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therefore seems better to view this and similar decisions as decisions on HIV, rather 
than intent.271 These cases have been used nonetheless, as they most clearly 
illustrate the difference in the two versions of conditional intent.
3.4.3. The likelihood and its acceptance
It should therefore not be concluded that this lower threshold on the risk occurring 
generally leads to a fi nding of conditional intent in more cases in Germany. In fact, 
rather the opposite seems to be the case. Amongst others, this is because of the 
relationship between the degree of the risk and its acceptance. In Germany, low 
probability is often seen as an evidential indication that the actor did not accept the 
consequences occurring. The less likely a result was to occur, the more likely a 
court will decide that the defendant did not accept this possibility.272
Let us reconsider cases of HIV-infection. German scholars have criticized the 
acceptance of conditional intent because the low probability of infection could give 
rise to a justifi able argument that the defendant trusted nothing would happen. This 
means that the low probability is therefore not directly a problem relating to the 
required degree of the risk, as this is no substantial hurdle to liability in Germany. 
The degree of the risk is seen as an indirect problem to establish that the actor took 
the risk into the bargain. It is considered unlikely that someone has accepted the 
small chance that someone might get infected.273 The German Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the objective magnitude and proximity of the danger can be 
used as indications of acceptance.274 A contrario, a less than considerable chance 
should thus help the defendant in making probable he trusted in a good outcome.
It frequently occurs that a driver of a vehicle is ordered to stop by a police 
offi cer, but he refuses and continues to drive, whereby the offi cer has to jump aside 
to escape collision with the vehicle. Whereas this is generally charged and often 
accepted as attempted intentional killing in the Netherlands,275 it is not considered 
to constitute this offence in Germany. German courts have argued that the 
defendants bank on the reaction of the policeman. They accept endangering them, 
but they do not actually contemplate that they will be killed. The defendants are 
thought to have considered the chance of death as improbable, as the defendant 
trusts the offi cer expects such actions and is mentally prepared to jump, which is 
confi rmed by the fact that these situations hardly ever lead to fatal results. There is 
271 Annotator Buruma in HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313 and Tanghe 2007, p. 311.
272 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 286. See also Kwakman in Keulen, 
Knigge & Wolswijk 2007, p. 299–300.
273 Bohlander 2009, p. 66; Roxin 2006, p. 476; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107; Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, p. 286 and Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009, pp. 498–501.
274 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1 and Bohlander 2009, p. 65.
275 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 236–237; de Hullu 2006, p. 221; Peters, A.A.G. 1966, pp. 133–135 and 
for example, HR 15 January 2008, NJ 2008, 609. See also HR 6 February 1951, NJ 1951, 475.
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therefore no acceptance of death and no liability based on conditional intent.276 The 
awareness of only a small chance suggests the accused did not accept the death of 
the offi cer.
The degree of the risk will have to be given a minimum threshold, because there 
is a difference between the mere general abstract possibility of a consequence 
occurring and a concrete one: we take risks all the time.277 There must be a certain 
threshold, short of which there can be no criminal liability. After all, should 
criminal liability also follow in those HIV-cases where the defendant used a 
condom?278 In distingui shing criminally relevant from irrelevant risks, there are 
two options. We can either set the lower limit of the degree of the chance itself as in 
the Netherlands, or exclude merely possible risks through the volitional element of 
acceptance as in Germany. Either way, this implies in effect that a risk must be 
considerable in order to enable intentional liability, be it directly through the 
cognitive or indirectly through the volitional limb.
In shaping dolus eventualis, the direct solution is favoured, because the 
appropriate dogmatic positioning of the degree of the risk is in the cognitive limb, 
which is also acknowledged by most German scholars. The indirect approach 
whereby a small chance indicates non-acceptance blurs the distinction between the 
two limbs, because the awareness of a risk is assessed under both limbs of 
eventualis. Second, the volitional limb is considered most controversial. There is 
much debate on the question whether we should require a volitional component at 
all, what it requires and how this should be established. Therefore, the volitional 
element is best kept as simple as possible. The more aspects or functions are 
attributed to this limb, the more controversial it becomes, the more diffi cult it is to 
separate the different aspects of eventualis and so on.
3.4.4. The assessment of risks
A judgment on a chance can be either qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative 
chances are expressed with terms like probable, considerable and certain; 
quantitative risks can be expressed in percentages. In criminal law, a chance is 
rarely expressed quantitatively. However, in all three Member States lawyers tend 
to approach the criterion of risk in conditional intent and recklessness more and 
more empirically. Dutch courts, in contrast to German courts, have approached the 
chances of HIV-infection very quantitatively, by having experts assess the risk in 
276 Bohlander 2009, pp. 65–66; Frisch 1983, pp. 330–331 and 335; Roxin 2006, pp. 467 and 471; 
Krey 2003, pp. 128–129 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 285. For example, 21 November 
1995 BGH NStZ-RR 1996, 97. It should be noted that these drivers could be held liable for 
violating §§315b or 315c of the German Criminal Code, which is punishable by up to 10 years of 
imprisonment.
277 Morkel 1981.
278 See Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009 and Bottke in Szwarc 1996, pp. 293–301. I will argue that in the 
similar concept of recklessness, this scenario is also excluded from liability, but not by reference 
to an empirical threshold of the risk, see IV.4.5.1.
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probabilities. This trend is to be applauded in light of the principle of legal certainty. 
Additionally, it helps to make judicial decisions more understandable and well 
reasoned. The consulting of experts seems to lead to a more substantial discussion 
in court on whether the risk was considerable or not.
We must be wary again, however, of attaching too much weight on an empirical 
assessment, considering that chances can often not be established very precisely. 
Most criminal charges do not lend itself to statistical calculation of a risk. 
Assumptions underlying the use of statistical information are that the future will be 
like the past and that cases compared are comparable. This is however hardly ever 
correct.279 For example, in traffi c offences we can estimate the risk to fatal accidents 
as a result of speeding by reference to casualty statistics. This estimation does not, 
however, prove the risk of that specifi c case of speeding under those circumstances. 
What about the weather, the driver, the car, the victim? In the past, the risk of 
accidents due to speeding in bad weather conditions was greater due to the lack of 
technology like anti-lock braking system. It is often impossible to pinpoint the exact 
objective chance. Statistical or empirical research on many chances is lacking, so 
often, we are merely guessing. Nonetheless, as science conti nuous ly advances, 
objective chances may be established more and more precise.
Another problem is that we do not know what quantitative chance corresponds 
to the qualitative label ‘considerable’. By using a table that transposes qualitative 
into quantitative risks, we could argue that a ‘considerable risk’ implies a chance of 
at least fi fty percent.280 However, from case-law we can deduce that the required 
thres hold is set much lower. It is the context of a case that co-determines what 
quantita tive chance suffi ces for a qualitative label. In some contexts, such as in 
routine medical operations, small chances are perceived as considerable. When a 
range of chances varies between 0.01 and 0.50 percent, the latter chance is not 
considered as small as it seems from a mathematical point of view. By contrast, a 
chance of 1 in 200 of winning a lottery is extraordinarily great.
Some have set the lower limit of a considerable chance of a consequence 
occurring at 10 percent.281 It is argued that the Dutch Supreme Court is not as keen 
on statistics as might appear from the rulings on HIV-infection.282 This seems 
likely when we consider that in many cases, the chances of the result occurring will 
not have been as great as 10 percent. Given the abovementioned problem that 
usually there is no empi ri cal information on chances, the judiciary tends to use the 
more general criterion whether a chance is substantial according to ‘general 
experien ce’.283 General experience consists of knowledge on risks as perceived by 
society. This yardstick leaves room for many factors to be taken into account and 
provides the courts with more discretion. Whereas experts can therefore help the 
279 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 395.
280 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 399.
281 See de Hullu 2006, p. 224 and by contrast, de Hullu 2009, p. 232.
282 De Jong, F., van Roomen & Sikkema 2007, pp. 946–949.
283 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552 and HR 22 March 2011, LJN:BP2715.
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court in deciding whether a chance is considerable, in the end, it is a legal question 
and thereby decision of the court.
‘General experience’ enables the courts to hold that the risk is considerable and 
that since this is generally known, the defendant also knew this. In principle, this 
approach need not be problematic, but under the umbrella of general experience 
many risks are deemed to be considerable, which conclusion is only rarely based on 
data or expert calculation. It is for example remarkable that the chance that a police 
offi cer dies when the driver of a car does not stop is considered to be small in 
Germany, based on casualty statistics of such situations, yet is generally perceived 
to be considerable in the Netherlands. It appears that the Dutch courts overrate the 
statistical chance in order to attribute intent to the defendant. The use of general 
experience can therefore be criticized as camoufl aged normativism.
The defendant should therefore try to dispute the generality of this knowledge. 
He can rebut that something is in fact not generally known in society, or at least not 
by him. The defendant can point at the specifi c circumstances of the case that seem 
not to have been taken into account. An example deals with the situation where the 
victim lies on the ground and is kicked in the head. The defendant usually faces a 
com bi ned charge of infl icting serious bodily injury and attempting to kill.284 This is 
based on the (empirical) fact that this conduct often leads to severe injuries or death. 
More over, almost everybody recognizes the seriousness of the possi ble results and 
most people also recognize the possibility of death. At the same time, however, 
relevant facts that infl uence the risk, such as the nature of the shoes, sex, bodily 
stature and physical shape of the defendant seem to be irrelevant for the outcome.285
3.4.5. Relevant factors
What factors should then be taken into account in assessing the chance in 
eventualis? The rule under Dutch law is that the chance must be considerable based 
on general experience, depending on the circumstances of the case, such as the 
nature and circumstances of the act.286 I already gave the example of having unpro-
tec ted sexual intercourse. The nature and circumstances of that act greatly infl uence 
the chances of infection.
In theory, it is irrelevant for the chance whether it also occurred. The fact that 
the victim was infected with HIV does not make the chance considerable. What 
matters after all, is the assessment ex ante. Neither can the severity of the 
consequence be taken into account. Being infected with HIV is more serious than 
being infected with herpes, but that aspect does not affect the chance of infection.287 
This differs from risk-assessment in other contexts, where the acceptability of the 
284 12 August 2009 BGH BeckRS 2009, 25029.
285 Heinke 2010.
286 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 111.
287 HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313; de Hullu 2006, p. 223–224 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 
3.4 on Opzet.
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fulfi lment of the risk is co-determined by its expected damage, weighed against the 
costs for preventing a risk to occur.
Assessing a risk that way can be called normative. We have used the terms ‘risk’ 
and ‘chance’ interchangeably so far, but they can be distinguished accordingly. A 
chance can be small, but a risk great, such as the small chance a nuclear plant might 
explode. The question on whether a risk is great, is determined by both the chance 
of the consequence occurring and the seriousness of these consequences. Taking 
into account the seriousness of the result makes the assessment normative. Many 
scholars have argued in favour of assessing the chance normatively, where a very 
serious legal interest would lower the required empirical likelihood of the chance 
occurring.288 For example, some Dutch scholars advocated criminal liability in the 
HIV-cases by assessing the risk normatively. The fact that the chance might lead to 
serious bodily harm and that it can easily be avoided, does not infl uence the 
question of whether unprotected sexual intercourse amounts to a substantial chance 
to HIV-infection, but it does confi rm the question whether there was a considerable 
risk.289
A normative risk begs the question on the relationship of the chance, the legal 
inte rest and other factors. How do we weigh the legal interests? On a scale of 10, do 
we give a factor of 10 for the interest of human life and a factor of 2 for the interest 
of property of a bicycle? Do we use this factor as a multiplier for the empirical 
chance? This implies that the more valuable a legal interest is, the sooner a risk 
becomes considerable. This could very well lead to a disparity depending on the 
serious ness of the charges.290 In a normative concept of dolus eventualis, creating a 
small, yet lethal chance would lead to a considerable risk. As a result, drivers of 
auto mobiles would, as a rule, be held intentionally liable for any casualties they 
cause.
This can be countered by also taking into account whether the conduct has value 
or social interest.291 If conditional intent is seen as a ‘legally unacceptable 
chance’,292 normativism includes more than the legal interest involved. Driving a 
car is legal conduct that is considered to be useful, in contrast to stunting with 
fi reworks. Consider that the former conduct leads to a pedestrian being lethally 
injured due to collision and that the latter conduct leads to a spectator losing his 
sight to one eye. The empirical chances of these results occurring are equal. Now, 
the adequacy of the conduct can bring about that the death of the pedestrian is not 
considered a relevant risk, whereas the injury to the spectator does fulfi l the 
288 Kessler 2001, pp. 218–219; de Jong, D.H. & Kessler 2002; de Jong, D.H. in Groenhuijsen & 
Simmelink 2003, p. 218; AG Vellinga in HR 18 January 2005, NJ 2005, 154; Fokkens & 
Machielse, note 3.5 on Opzet and de Jong, D.H. 2004B, p. 77, referring to Nieboer and Strijards. 
See also the annotator and AG in HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552.
289 De Jong, D.H. in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 218.
290 Janssen 2003.
291 Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009, p. 503; Frisch 1983, pp. 324–325 and Canestrari 2004.
292 Strijards 1983, pp. 102–103.
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criterion of eventualis.293 Assessing risks normatively can thus both extend and 
limit liability in comparison to the empirical chance.
The normative risk can further be enriched with the question whether or not the 
risk was easy to avoid. For example, using a condom easily reduces the risk of 
infection to almost nil.294 We can then make a list of factors infl uencing the 
question on whether or not the risk is considerable: the nature and degree of the risk 
of harm, the social interest of the act, the actual goal of the actor, the probability 
that the risk occurs versus the probability that the actual goal is fulfi lled and 
precautionary measures.295 The result is a normative criterion that depends on 
many valuations. Rather than assessing whether the risk is considerable, it would be 
determined whether the risk was unreasonable.296
Although a normative risk is quite popular among scholars, the offi cial position 
of the Dutch and German judiciary is that risks are not assessed normatively. The 
law as it stands neither takes into account the nature of the legal interest, nor the 
seriousness of the consequences.297 Nonetheless, I discussed this in quite some 
detail because in practice, normative considerations do seem to play a role, which 
also demon strates the confl ict inherent in the concept. More importantly, a 
normative concept of dolus eventualis is very similar to its functional equivalent 
recklessness. The only important difference is that eventualis is not a third kind of 
fault in between dolus and culpa. It is problematic to treat the risk normative in the 
context of dolus, which is a psychological concept, yet I will argue that a normative 
assessment of the risk is not problematic when it is conducted within the scope of 
reckless ness. In the concept of recklessness, the theoretical concept and its 
applications in practice coincide.
3.5. Awareness of the risk
At the time of acting, the accused must have been aware of the possible fulfi lment 
of the offence defi nition. The legal ex post risk assessment is carried out by using 
empirical data, general experience and/or normative considerations. However, this 
objective298 chance not necessarily coincides with the subjective perception of the 
chance tempore delicti. People are generally unaware of the specifi c chances of 
293 Some argue that self-endangerment should also be taken into account in assessing the normative 
risk, see Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009, p. 503.
294 De Jong, D.H. in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 218 and Frisch in Joerden a.o. 2009, 
p. 503.
295 Canestrari 2004.
296 Frisch 1983, pp. 462–462, 474 and 495.
297 De Roos in Cleiren, de Roos & van der Woude 2006, p. 267; Fokkens & Machielse, note 3.4 on 
Opzet; de Hullu 2006, pp. 223 and 230 and annotator Buruma in HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 
313.
298 The assessment of a chance in criminal law is hardly ever truly objective like the rolling of a 
dice. It is ‘intersubjective’ as it is derived by the accumulated knowledge and information of 
society, see van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 392.
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risky behaviour. For example, people driving too fast are usually not aware of how 
this increases the risk of fatalities (in %) and people who make a habit out of this, 
sometimes tend to assess or dismiss the chances too low as result of risk habituation. 
On the contrary, people tend to assess spectacular risks like airplanes crashing as 
greater than they are in reality.
In the night of 26 to 27 October 2005, a fi re broke out in a detention centre near 
the Dutch international airport Schiphol. Eleven people lost their lives and several 
more were severely injured. A person, who was awaiting deportation from the 
Nether lands, was charged with intentionally causing this fi re, creating a lethal 
danger for others.299 The Dutch courts established that it was most likely that the 
fi re was caused by the defendant’s cigarette. He testifi ed that he had smoked a 
cigarette whilst lying on his bed. Thinking the cigarette, because it was rolled with 
rice paper, had already stopped smouldering, he did not stub it out, fl icked it in the 
direction of the foot and went to sleep. Apparently not much later, he awoke due to 
heat in the vicinity of his feet. He saw the sheets burning, and fi re rapidly spreading 
through the room.
The Dutch Court of Appeal established that the defendant must have had 
conditional intent and convicted the defendant to 18 months imprisonment. The 
Court held that it is general experience, confi rmed by tests run by experts, that the 
risk of a cigarette causing fi re in such a situation is considerable. Because the 
defendant had not stubbed out the cigarette in an ashtray or made sure it was not 
smouldering anymore, whilst knowing there was a crumpled up bed sheet and toilet 
paper in the direction where he shot the butt, the Court assumed that he consciously 
accepted the risk.300
The degree of likelihood that a fi re would be started was fi ercely debated. 
Defence had persistently requested additional statistical research on this degree in 
these specifi c circumstances. What if the defendant, in throwing away the cigarette, 
thought there was some risk to setting a fi re, but believed that this chance was 
minimal because he used rice paper to roll the cigarette, which makes the cigarette 
stop smouldering after a short while? Defence had argued that this circumstance 
was important in assessing the risk and had requested for another expert to do 
additional tests. The fact that the Court of Appeal rejected this was a reason for the 
Supreme Court to quash the conviction, especially since the decision that the chance 
was considerable was based on such research.301
The case demonstrates we can separate an objective chance from the question 
whether or not the defendant is aware that there is a possibility the offence element 
299 He was also charged with the more serious crime of intentional killing, but causation between 
the defendant’s actions and the fatalities was held to be lacking. Suspicion was confi rmed in 
2006 by the so-called Safety Board, that the extent of this disaster could be attributed amongst 
others to the poor construction of the building, the materials used, the fact that a door had been 
left open allowing the fi re to spread, the poor functioning or non-existence of safety measures 
and the fact that the fi re brigade arrived very late.
300 Hof Amsterdam 3 September 2009, LJN:BJ6879.
301 HR 14 December 2010, LJN:BO2966.
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will be fulfi lled.302 In theory, conditional intent requires that the defendant was 
subjectively aware that the chance was considerable. This implies that intentional 
liability should be negated if the defendant thought that the chance was much 
smaller.303 In practice however, it seems that this will hardly ever present diffi culties 
in fi nding conditional intent. It seems dolus eventualis requires that defendant must 
be aware of a chance. This chance must also be considerable, but this is established 
objectively: the defendant need not be aware of this.304
The practical explanation for this result is that subjective awareness is usually 
assumed from the objective chance. In theory, only the subjective perception on the 
degree of the chance is decisive, but in practice it is derived from the objective 
assessment of the chance.305 In case-law, this is evident in phrases such as ‘that the 
defendant must have known.’ Since the two perceptions are not distinguished, 
courts can implicitly infer the subjective perception from the objective chance,306 
and a difference between the two is hardly ever discussed. In the Schiphol-case, the 
Court of Appeal established that the chance of causing a fi re was considerable by 
reference to general experience and expert evidence. Without considering the 
defendant’s perception on the likelihood of the risk occurring, the question was 
asked whether the defendant took this chance into the bargain. Hence, the subjective 
awareness of the defendant was implicitly deduced from the objectively assessed 
chance.
Another practical explanation why the formal approach hardly ever presents 
diffi cul ties for conviction is that the criterion of ‘considerable’ itself is vague 
enough for courts to overcome any evidential problems in these scenarios. Since 
there is no exact threshold on what is considerable, it can be questioned whether the 
defendant did not also assess the chance similarly but attached a lesser label to it. If 
on both views, the chance was about 10 percent, why should it be decisive that the 
defendant thought this was not considerable?
I have demonstrated how in practice, the requirement of subjective awareness of 
a considerable chance is no obstacle to liability. As far as chances that are 
subjectively perceived as less than considerable, similar solutions could be reached 
in a more principled way by taking the approach of recklessness. Dolus eventualis 
could merely require that the defendant must be aware of a risk, but the valuation of 
that risk is conducted objectively. In the Schiphol-case, eventualis could then be 
302 Frisch 1983, pp. 487–494 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 392–394.
303 Fokkens & Machielse, note 3.5 on Opzet; AG Machielse in HR 14 December 2010, LJN:BO2966 
and Beulke 2008, p. 81.
304 See HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552; AG Hofstee in HR 26 October 2010, LJN:BO2514; de 
Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 111 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 392–394. The wording in HR 
19 June 2007, NJ 2008, 169 implies this too: “(…) of zij willens en wetens de naar algemene 
ervaringsregels aanmerkelijk te achten kans heeft aanvaard (…).”
305 See AG Machielse in HR 14 December 2010, LJN:BO2966, who submits the Supreme Court 
takes an objective approach, not even requiring subjective awareness of any chance.
306 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 394; Reijntjes in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 484 and 
4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1.
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accepted if the defendant was aware that a smouldering cigarette could cause a fi re. 
It would not matter that he considered this chance as less than considerable due to 
the nature of that particular cigarette. Only such an approach can theoretically 
explain the acceptance of conditional intent in cases where the subjective perception 
of the chance diverges from the objective chance.
Both fault elements should however at the very least safeguard that the defendant 
was aware of a risk. If the defendant did not think about a risk at all, he should be 
held liable for negligence at most.307 Foreseeability should not be equated with 
foresight of risks. The most severe reproach in criminal law is based on the strong 
subjective connection between the actor and the result. This foundation is lacking if 
there is no subjective awareness. There are many competing theories on conditional 
intent, but they all concur that the defendant must have been aware that his actions 
may lead to an offence being committed.308
3.6. Accepting the risk
The awareness of the risk is insuffi cient to demarcate dolus from culpa in Dutch 
and German law, because in cases of conscious negligence, the defendant is also 
aware of the risk. The distinction between dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence hinges on the question whether he accepted the risk or not.309 Dolus 
eventualis requires that the defendant accepted the possibility that the risk may 
occur. He considered the risk and decided he wanted to act nonetheless. This 
volitional element is negated when the actor believed the risk would not materialize, 
when he trusted in a good outcome.310 In case the volitional component is absent or 
cannot be proven, only conscious negligence exists. As an important consequence, 
he cannot be held liable for an intentional offence.
As the wording is concerned, it should be noted that accepting the risk is not the 
same as accepting the consequences.311 The volitional element requires acceptance 
of the possibility that the risk may materialize, that the offence element will be 
fulfi lled. Strictly speaking, the actor can also accept the risk because he trusts in a 
good outcome. In that case, there is no volition and thus, no dolus eventualis. 
Wherever I refer to the mere acceptance of the risk, I use it as an abbreviation of 
accepting that the risk may materialize.
307 Annotator Buruma in HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552 and 556 and HR 10 October 2000, NJ 
2001, 4.
308 Bohlander 2009, p. 64. Moreover, without being aware of a risk, a person cannot have either 
accepted the possibility or dismissed it as unlikely to happen.
309 Remmelink 1996, p. 206; Machielse 2004, p. 158; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 97; Keulen & 
Otte 1999, p. 22; 22 April 1955 BGH NJW 1955, 1688; 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1; 
Bohlander 2009, p. 65; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 106; Krey 2003, pp. 128–129 and Beulke 2008, p. 78.
310 Roxin 2006, pp. 457–459 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 283.
311 HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199.
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Since German law does not require that the risk must be considerable, the 
limiting function of the volitional element is more important than in the 
Netherlands. I explained that it is often assumed that the defendant did not accept 
the realization of a risk that was merely possible, whereas under Dutch law, a small 
chance has already been excluded from conditional intent under the cognitive 
limb.312 In addition, the volitional element is taken more serious in Germany, 
because the Supreme Court applies strict requirements to a fi nding of volition and 
any remaining doubt is solved to the benefi t of the defendant. As will be explained, 
all circumstances, those that indicate and those that militate against acceptance, 
must be considered explicitly. The volitional element may not be simply inferred 
from acting whilst being aware of the risk.
Although the volitional element provides for a clear theoretical demarcation 
between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence, it will be shown that in practice 
there seems to be a fl uent transition between the two,313 which puts its demarcating 
potential in perspective, if not in doubt. The contents of the volitional limb are even 
more controversial than the cognitive. Minority opinions even go as far as denying 
any volitional element at all.314
3.6.1. Acceptance of the risk
The exact extent to which the defendant must have accepted the risk is expressed in 
numerous ways. The extent ranges from a form of volition that falls short of desire 
to indifference. I encountered, amongst others, the following terms in German law: 
‘agree’,315 ‘approve’,316 and ‘accept the result and approve of it’.317 The German 
Supreme Court uses ‘approval’ or ‘taking into the bargain’ but when the 
consequence is undesired, it also uses ‘acquiescence,’318 the latter which is favoured 
by German scholars.319 In the Netherlands, there is consensus on the wordings 
‘(conscious) acceptance’320 or ‘taking the consequences into the bargain’.321
312 This also explains why in this section, relatively more reference is made to German law, whereas 
in the previous section, most of the sources mentioned in the footnotes were of Dutch origin.
313 Beulke 2008, p. 82. See also de Hullu 2006, pp. 243–244.
314 Bohlander 2009, pp. 64–65 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 279 and 282. See IV.3.6.6. 
and IV.3.6.8.
315 ‘Einverstanden sein’, see Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107.
316 ‘Billigen’, see 6 June 1952, BGHSt 3, 105.
317 ‘Billigend in Kauf nehmen’ is the common term for the BGH. See for example 12 August 2009 
BGH BeckRS 2009, 25029. For most German terms, see Krey 2003, pp. 116–121.
318 ‘Sich damit abfi nden’, see 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1; 7 July 1999 BGH NStZ 1999, 507; 
18 September 2003 BVerwG NVwZ-RR 2004, 426 and 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 475.
319 Krey 2003, pp. 120–121; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107; Beulke 2008, p. 78 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, pp. 282–284.
320 HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313; Fokkens & Machielse, note 3.2 on Opzet and Politoff & 
Koopmans 1991, pp. 138–140.
321 Compare ‘op de koop toenemen’ in HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199 with ‘billigend in Kauf 
nehmen.’
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The terms are quite similar but the nuance is different regarding the degree to 
which it is wanted. The actor must either endorse the result or at least come to terms 
with it for the sake of the desired goal.322 The terms of approval or consent seem to 
imply mental consent or a positive value judgment on the risk occurring. However, 
approval is used in a legal meaning, thus also encompassing those cases where the 
consequence was undesired and thus not ‘approved’ in the normal meaning of the 
word.323 It only means that the defendant accepts a result nevertheless in order to 
reach his or her ulterior goal. The actor decides to accept the whole package, both 
the wanted results and its possible but undesired side-effects.324 Acquiescence 
denotes this meaning better.
Therefore, the consequences can be anything from approved of to mere acquies-
cence. It has even been accepted that indifference suffi ces as a volitional element.325 
By his indifference against the legal interest, the defendant also shows his hostile 
disposition against the legal order. Acceptance, approval and indifference are all 
characterized by the fact that the actor was not deterred from acting because of the 
possible consequence.326 The different volitional elements are not exclusive. Courts 
can cherry pick the disposition that confi rms the volitional element. Acquiescence 
and the similar reconciling oneself with a result materializing are very weak forms 
of volition and therefore popular to use in judgments.
The negative of the volitional element can be described as trusting in a good 
out come. The defendant realizes the risk, but dismisses it as very unlikely. He 
trusted in the non-occurrence of the consequence, or thinks everything will be all 
right.327 Even frivolous trust only amounts to negligence.328 On the other hand, the 
German Supreme Court requires that conscious negligence can only be accepted if 
the actor sincerely and seriously trusted the consequence would not occur. Thus, a 
vague, pious or uncertain hope does not suffi ce.329 The difference between frivolous 
trust and hope is hard to draw,330 yet essential in deciding whether the defendant 
can be held liable for an intentional offence.
322 Badar 2005, pp. 232–234.
323 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 282.
324 22 April 1955 BGH NJW 1955, 1688; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 107; Badar 2005, p. 234; Beulke 2008, 
p. 80 and Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 111–112.
325 Fokkens & Machielse, note. 3.3 on Opzet; Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 22; Remmelink 1996, p. 206; 
Modderman according to van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 220; 12 August 2009 BGH BeckRS 2009, 
25029; 26 June 2003 BGH NStZ 2004, 35; Krey 2003, pp. 128–129; Jakobs 1995, pp. 862–863 
and Roxin 2006, pp. 449–450 and 454.
326 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 282–283.
327 HR 18 June 1996, NJ 1996, 750; Krey 2003, pp. 116–117; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 109; Roxin 2006, 
p. 1087 and Beulke 2008, pp. 79 and 247.
328 Krey 2003, pp. 122–123.
329 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1; 7 July 1999 BGH NStZ 1999, 507; 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 
475; Krey 2003, pp. 118–119 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 284.
330 Schünemann 1985, pp. 363–364.
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3.6.2. Proving the volitional element
The contents of the volitional element are best understood by reference to how it is 
proven. This is no surprise when we reconsider that an important function of dolus 
eventualis is to facilitate proof of dolus as the most diluted form of knowing and 
wanting. Moreover, as the dividing line between dolus and culpa, the legal debate 
often focuses on (proof of) the volitional element.
It is diffi cult to prove the volitional element because it concerns an inner 
disposition of the actor, which is therefore mostly hidden from us. Attitudes or 
dispositions are very intimate. In order to avoid dealing with such complicated 
psychological processes, courts therefore prefer to focus on the “externalization of 
the presumed will.”331 From conduct under certain circumstances and through rules 
of general experience, it is inferred what the defendant thought and wanted.332 The 
ECJ deduces the anti-competitive nature of an agreement not only “from the content 
of its causes but also from a series of factors including, precisely, the intention of 
the parties as it arises from the ‘genesis’ of the agreement and/or manifests itself in 
the ‘circumstances in which it was implemented’ and in the ‘conduct’ of the 
companies concerned.”333
The Dutch Supreme Court held that objectifi cation of the acceptance is only 
relevant when the testimonies of the defendant or witnesses do not lead to more 
insight in the state of mind of the defendant. Only then, the factual circumstances 
of the case become important, including the nature of the act and its 
circumstances.334 It should be noted however that more insight could also be 
deemed necessary regardless of these testimonies. If the accused argues that he 
trusted in a good outcome, the credibility of that submission will be tested by 
reference to objective facts and  circum stances. Eventualis is still accepted if the 
objective circumstances indicate that it is more than probable that he did accept the 
possibility that the risk would occur.335
In the next subsections, I will describe in which ways this volitional element 
tends to be proven in practice. These approaches have led scholars to conclude that 
a volitional element is irrelevant, that conditional intent is an objective or normative 
concept. I will argue however that the substantive criteria of eventualis must not be 
confused with its procedural defi nition, the manner in which it is proven.336 In line 
with the earlier developed moderate objective approach to proving fault, I will 
propose the proper limits of objectifying proof of volition.
331 Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on Opzet and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 234.
332 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552.
333 Opinon of AG Tizzano of 25 October 2005, Case C-551/03 P, General Motors v. Commission 
[2006] ECR I-3173, §78 and 8 November 1983, Cases C-96–102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82, IAZ 
and others v. Commission [1983] ECR 3369. See also III.7.2.
334 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552; de Hullu 2006, p. 223 and de Jong, F., van Roomen & 
Sikkema 2007, p. 935.
335 Bohlander 2009, p. 67.
336 Beulke 2008, p. 80 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 284.
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3.6.3. Acceptance inferred from probability
In proving eventualis, two evidential presumptions operate. If, on the fact of the 
external facts and circumstances of the case, the risk seemed considerable, it is 
presumed that the defendant was also aware of this. Secondly, from the fact that the 
defendant acted despite this knowledge, it is inferred that he also accepted the risk. 
In other words, the defendant is held to know what the normal person knows. If that 
knowledge is coupled with or about a suffi ciently high probability, it is often 
assumed that he accepted the risk. Wanting thus seems to be reduced to ‘acting 
despite knowing’.
The inference of subjective awareness from objective danger was discussed in 
the previous subsection. I will now take a closer look at the inference of volition 
from acting despite the knowledge of the risk. The approach is hardly controversial 
in cases where the probability of the risk occurring was quite considerable. If 
conduct is so serious and death can be the only consequence, acceptance of the risk 
is easily assumed. For example, the defendant threw a hatchet with full force 
through a glass door at a police offi cer standing only 5 metres away from him.337 
The fact that it is clear to anybody that this brings about a lethal risk, is enough to 
infer that the defendant knew this too, after which it is easily accepted that since he 
acted in that way, he took this risk for granted. The highly likely can hardly be 
anything but accepted.338 It is argued that the external manifestation of certain acts 
can sometimes be so much directed at a certain consequence, that the only 
conclusion can be that the defendant accepted the consequences, barring contra-
indication.339 This ‘external manifestation’ is a concept that is familiar in doctrines 
such as attempt and preparation, referring to the impression that the conduct could 
make to the reasonable citizen.340
In other words, an average person is more likely to trust in a good outcome 
because the chance of the risk materializing is small. By contrast, if the risk is 
probable, the actor generally can only hope, not trust the consequence will not 
occur.341 A claim of trusting nothing bad would happen can easily be rejected when 
the facts indicate that a deadly consequence was so likely, that only a coincidence 
337 16 July 1980 BGH NStZ 1981, 22.
338 Fokkens & Machielse, note 3.5 on Opzet; de Jong, D.H. 2004B, p. 77; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 
2003 pp. 104–107 and annotator Buruma in HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552 and HR 10 October 
2000, NJ 2001, 4. See for example HR 8 July 1992, NJ 1993, 13.
339 De Hullu 2006, p. 223; HR 24 February 2004, NJ 2004, 375; 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1; 
7 July 1999 BGH NStZ 1999, 507; 27 February 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 199; Bohlander 2009, 
p. 65 and Beulke 2008, pp. 80–81.
340 De Jong, F., van Roomen & Sikkema 2007, p. 935.
341 Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 158–160; Roxin 2006, pp. 450–451 and R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50, §9 per 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill: “Of course the mere fact that this probability was an obviously 
manifest one will be strong evidence to warrant the jury in fi nding, if they think fi t, that the 
prisoner did, in fact, thus recognise the danger and regard it with indifference.”
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could prevent it. Consider a stab of a knife in the upper body and neck.342 In most of 
these cases, it may be suspected that the defendant acted with dolus directus or 
indirectus. The lesser dolus eventualis is established because it is easier to prove 
and suffi ces to convict the defendant for an intentional offence.
The likelihood of the risk materializing thus seems to be the paramount criterion 
for eventualis. Supreme Courts now and then however quash decisions where the 
inference of acceptance follows too easily from a high probability of the risk. If the 
volitional element is fulfi lled when the accused acted despite knowing, this puts 
strain on the theoretical distinction between the awareness and the acceptance of 
the risk. After all, the accused could have also acted despite knowledge, because he 
trusted in a good outcome. It has been made clear that knowledge of a risk in itself 
is insuffi cient to conclude this risk was accepted, thereby strengthening the 
volitional requirement.343 Particularly if the facts also allow the possibility of 
conscious negligence, the verdict requires careful consideration of all the 
circumstances of the case.344 In other words, in order to infer eventualis from 
factual circumstances, those facts must clearly point in no other direction than the 
materialized risk.345
3.6.4. Acceptance of lethal results
Although the likelihood is great, the volitional element can thus be negated when 
circumstances indicate that the defendant did not accept the consequences.346 An 
example of a so-called contra-indication in Dutch case-law is the danger to the actor 
himself. In a case where the defendant had driven very dangerously in a Porsche, 
which resulted in a lethal accident, it was held that íf he had accepted the 
consequences of causing a collision, he would also have accepted the possibility of 
being killed himself. This was held to be unlikely, the more because the defendant 
had aborted some of the dangerous overtaking manoeuvres before causing the fatal 
one.347 In other cases of dangerous driving, conditional intent has been accepted in 
the absence of conduct that indicated the will to avoid a collision, like aborting 
overtaking manoeuvres.348 The assumption that the accused does not accept a 
conse quence if it can also cause his own death is to no avail to the driver of a car 
that collides with weaker participants in traffi c, like bicyclists.349
342 14 December 2004 BGH BeckRS 2005, 00267 and Beulke 2008, p. 81.
343 HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552; HR 5 December 2006, NJ 2006, 663 and 23 June 1983 BGH 
NStZ 1984, 19. See also IV.3.6.6.
344 4 August 1987 BGH NJW 1988, 79.
345 Annotator Mevis in HR 2 April 2002, NJ 2002, 421.
346 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 284.
347 HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199.
348 HR 5 December 2006, NJ 2006, 663; HR 23 January 2000, NJ 2001, 327 and HR 10 February 
2009, NJ 2009, 111.
349 HR 17 February 2004, NJ 2004, 323. This implies that the defendant is assumed to have accepted 
a collision with bicyclists but not with other cars, buses and so on.
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Recalling the fi re in the detention facilities of Schiphol, this criterion could 
therefore also be used to negate the assumption that the defendant accepted the risk. 
For if he did, this brings about that he also accepted the possibility of his own death 
or serious injury. He was locked in the cell in which the fi re was started. However, 
this was rejected by the Court of fi rst instance and on appeal.350 It can be argued 
that the taking serious of acceptance by considering the possibility of personal 
harm to the actor himself is limited to the context of dangerous driving. It seems 
less problematic to negate eventualis in those cases, because of the relatively severe 
maximum penalty for causing accidents with (conscious) negligence and the 
possibility to increase that maximum punishment when negligence was serious.351
German courts also operate with a contra-indication of the volitional element 
related to fatal conse quen ces. However, this relates to the death of the victims, not 
to the possibility that the defendant might also die himself.352 If a risk materialized 
into lethal consequences, there is a presumption that the defendant did not take 
these fatalities for granted, based on the assumed aversion of humans against killing 
other humans. It also operates in cases where the defendant infl icted serious injuries 
upon the victim and is charged with attempting to kill the victim.
Hence, a distinction can be made between lethal and non-lethal offences. In the 
context of non-lethal offences, intent can easily be inferred from the knowledge of 
an objectively high risk, like in the Netherlands. On the contrary, in charges 
concerning lethal offences, the volitional element must be considered with more 
caution. Although the German Supreme Court acknow led ges that intent is obvious 
with extremely violent acts, only in cases of really extre me ly violent acts, will it 
allow an inference of intent to kill from these dangerous acts.353 Extreme violent 
acts may, but must not lead to an inference of conditional intent to kill.354
This careful consideration is based on the assumption that there exists a natural 
instinctive threshold for all against killing other people. This duty does not apply to 
acts of omissions, because no comparable psychological threshold is said to operate 
in these cases. The assumption is that the passive act of letting someone die is 
emotionally easier to fulfi l.355 This so-called ‘Hemmschwelle’ against active killing 
requires courts to consider the possibility of conscious negligence in lethal acts, 
regardless of whether the facts indicate this possi bility.356 The evidential 
requirement limits the inference or attribution of intention from external 
350 Rb. Haarlem 15 June 2007, LJN:BA7326 and Hof Amsterdam 3 September 2009, LJN:BJ6879.
351 Article 175 of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994; Kelk 2005, p. 192 and de Jong, F., van Roomen 
& Sikkema 2007, p. 936.
352 22 August 1996 BGHSt 42, 235. Gatzweiler 2008, p. 149 does argue that the possibility to 
seriously hurt or even kill oneself usually militates against taking something for granted, but I 
did not fi nd any such explicit reasoning in German case-law.
353 Like in 12 August 2009 BGH BeckRS 2009, 25029 and 25 March 2010 BGH NStZ 2010, 515.
354 13 March 2007 BGH BeckRS 2007, 06625; 15 April 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 233 and 
Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 172–173.
355 7 November 1991 BGH NStZ 1992, 125 and Gatzweiler 2008, p. 136.
356 22 November 1990 BGH NStZ 1991, 126.
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circumstances. The inference of acceptance may not follow directly from objective 
circumstances in lethal offences. The grounds stated in the judgment should refl ect 
consideration of all circumstances that might cast doubt on conditional intent.357 In 
cases that straddle the borders of conditional intent and conscious negligence, the 
defendant is thus more likely to succeed in his defence that he trusted nothing 
would happen when he is charged with a lethal offence.358 It has been submitted 
that the approach of German courts to proving less serious offences is more 
objective.359
The threshold especially applies to cases of dangerous acts of violence where a 
motive to kill is not evident.360 Although no criterion for dolus, motive appears 
important in proving conditional intent. For example, the German Supreme Court 
considered that the defendant who had manipulated the sockets in his house so the 
next user would be sure to get an electric shock, probably did this not to directly 
injure or even kill the next user, but to indirectly harm his landlord, with whom he 
had an argument.361 Motive is thus related to the relationship between accused and 
victim. An even higher threshold is applied when a mother kills her child.362 
Conversely, the extremist right-wing convictions of a defendant can also be seen 
as a motive that confi rms he accepted the possibility of killing asylum seekers.363
As a result of the threshold, lower courts sometimes seem reluctant to prove 
that the defendant accepted the possibility of death. However, the German 
Supreme Court not only quashes decisions that hold that the defendant accepted 
the possibility of death; it also quashes decisions where this is rejected despite 
extreme violent behaviour. Consider the case in which the victim, for the purpose 
of sexual gratifi ca tion, had requested to be tied to a bed, have gasoline poured over 
him and asked the accused to kindle a lighter. At a given time, the gasoline caught 
on fi re and the victim burned to death. The District Court was not convinced that 
the volitional element was fulfi lled but was remanded for requiring too much. The 
Supreme Court held that this was already fulfi lled by the statement of the 
defendant that she was happy that nothing happened the fi rst times she ignited the 
lighter. If the actor acts despite knowing the great risk, extremely dangerous 
conduct makes it obvious that he took the occurrence of the result into the bargain, 
357 13 March 2007 BGH BeckRS 2007, 06625; 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 475 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 285.
358 Gatzweiler 2008, p. 178.
359 Gritter 2003, pp. 190–191 and Seitz in König & Seitz 2006, note 14 on §66 OWiG.
360 7 November 1991 BGH NStZ 1992, 125. The threshold assumes the defendant had no motive to 
kill.
361 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 475; 27 February 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 199 and 2 July 1996 
BGH NStZ-RR 1996, 355.
362 1 June 2007 BGH BeckRS 2007, 10549.
363 28 April 1994 BGH NStZ 1994, 483, see also IV.2.4.2.
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leaving the outcome to chance. The mere hope nothing would happen cannot 
negate the reconciliation to the result.364
This decision strengthens the argument that the likelihood that the result will 
occur is paramount. If the risk is probable, no threshold whatsoever stands in the 
way of a fi nding of conditional intent. The threshold therefore applies especially to 
those cases where the violence was not so extreme as to leave open the possibility 
of trusting in a non-lethal outcome.365 The distinction between the two categories of 
cases is not always easy to make, which explains the importance of the specifi c 
circum stances of each case.366 For example, strangling the victim can, but need not 
be suffi ciently serious to objectively ground a fi nding of conditional intent. It 
depends on the circumstances such as the manner of strangulation.367
When the doctrine of the threshold applies, the judge is required in particular to 
make sure that the actor accepted that risk would occur. He has to take into account 
all circumstances and show that he has weighed them all. These circumstances are 
also relevant in assessing the volitional element of eventualis in the context non-
lethal charges, but are given special evidential consideration when the defendant is 
charged with intentionally causing death. I already mentioned goal and motive of 
the act and the dangerousness inherent in the act as relevant circumstances.
What also needs to be taken into account is the defendant’s psychological 
condition or personality.368 We can think of intoxica tion, rage, despair, impulsive 
behaviour and general immatureness.369 In contrast to killing after contemplation 
in a long-lasting confl ict situation, it is more diffi cult to establish intention when the 
act was impulsive, emotional and/or conducted under the infl uence of alcohol or 
drugs.370 Consider the case where the defendant had killed the victim by hitting 
him several times on the head with a shovel. The German Supreme Court upheld 
the mere conviction for negligent bodily harm occasioning death, pointing at 
364 20 June 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 583. The fact that the accused herself also got severely burned 
was therefore to no avail to her. See also 15 December 2010 BGH NStZ 2011, 210 and 22 March 
2012 BGH BeckRS 2012, 07957.
365 Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 143–144.
366 Consider that in 6 March 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 04800, a police offi cer had shot a fl eeing 
burglar in the back at a range of 3 metres. Despite the extreme risk of death, the volitional 
element was rejected.
367 Compare 7 July 1992 BGH NStZ 1995, 587 and 2 July 1996 BGH NStZ-RR 1996, 355 with 
27 February 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 199.
368 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 475; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 286 and Gatzweiler 2008, 
p. 141.
369 11 December 2001 BGH NStZ 2002, 315; Bohlander 2009, p. 66 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, p. 285. In 8 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 475, even the fact that the defendant recently had 
brain surgery to remove a tumour was held to be relevant.
370 23 June 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 629; Bohlander 2009, p. 66 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 285 and Gatzweiler 2008, p. 144. See also 22 April 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 503 and 7 July 
1992 BGH NStZ 1995, 587.
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circumstances that might militate against intention such as the trivial occasion for 
the attack and the high level of alcohol in the defendant’s blood.371
When we consider this case and cases where ‘bar-fi ghts’ end up in fatalities, a 
distinct difference with Dutch courts becomes apparent. The Dutch (and English) 
judiciary hardly ever let these circumstances operate to the defendant’s benefi t. 
This is very clear in the context of voluntary intoxication, to be discussed later. The 
possibility that fault may be lacking tempore delicti is rejected because intentional 
conduct is very basic. Emotional states of mind are generally just as irrelevant to 
establish conditional intent in the Netherlands. Some German scholars also criticize 
the rejection of the volitional element based on such factors. They argue it is unclear 
how these factors must ground the serious trust in non-occurrence of the result. 
Perhaps intoxication and state of mind can affect the awareness of the danger, but in 
the context of acceptance, it is more likely that the actor became unrestrained 
through such a state or was at least indifferent to the result.372 The German 
Supreme Court has confi rmed the latter in a more recent decision.373
More in general, German scholars also criticize decisions where despite the fact 
that the actor recognizes a great mortal danger, it is still held to be possible that he 
seriously trusted in the victim’s survival.374 If the probability of the risk occurring 
comes close to being almost certain, the negation of intent based on the volitional 
requirement is hard to accept. I believe this criticism is warranted in some instances, 
although one needs to be careful to draw strong conclusions from verdicts of 
Supreme Courts alone. After all, a Supreme Court generally only scrutinizes the 
reasoning of the lower court and its verdicts only provide for a limited amount of 
information on the case.
Let us consider a striking case, in which the intoxicated and short-statured 
defendant had been scaring people by faking telephone calls to a fi ctional sniper, 
describing which of the people on the street should be shot. In an attempt to stop the 
accused, the victim attacked him, and when this did not help, pushed him to the 
ground and started beating him in the face. The defendant then took a knife and 
stabbed the victim thrice in the region of the heart and kidney. Notwithstanding 
such extreme violent behaviour, the victim survived and only suffered one deep cut 
and two superfi cial cuts. However, the German Supreme Court held that the 
defendant did not attempt to kill the victim.
The District Court explained this fortunate outcome by the fact that the blade 
must have bounced of the breastbone and ribs of the victim, yet the Supreme Court 
rejected this and held that the explanation must be that the stabbing was directed 
more parallel with the body rather than aimed to enter the body. I think this is 
questionable because one wound was six centimetres deep. As a second step, the 
371 15 April 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 233.
372 Roxin 2006, pp. 474–475 and Miebach & Sander 2003, note 50 on §212. See V.3.5. and Philipps 
in Schünemann a.o. 2001.
373 24 February 2010 BGH NStZ-RR 2010, 214.
374 Krey 2003, pp. 120–121.
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Supreme Court argued that the defendant could not freely choose where he would 
stab as he was lying on the ground, defending himself. Finally, it held that a referral 
was unnecessary as far as the question of conditional intent was concerned, because 
a new trial would not indicate the existence of intent. Therefore, the verdict was 
changed into the dangerous infl iction of bodily injury.375
I believe that many Dutch cases are criticized for inappropriately stretching the 
concept of conditional intent whereas in Germany, most criticism is directed at the 
denial of this fault element when lethal offences are charged. It seems that in 
general, Dutch courts are less reluctant in holding a defendant liable for conditional 
intent than a German court. An important reason for this difference lies in the 
doctrine of the Hemmschwelle that requires German courts to be extra careful in 
accepting the volitional element in the context of lethal offences. This threshold 
amounts to an additional threshold to criminal liability in comparison to Dutch law.
A second explanation, which also applies to non-lethal offences, is that the 
principle of in dubio pro reo is taken very seriously and therefore applied stricter 
than in Dutch (or English) case-law, in which references to this principle in the 
context of conditional intent are rare. In fact, Dutch judges are more likely to reject 
the credibility of the defendant’s statement when it is not in line with other evidence 
or when his testimony lacks credibility in general. In contrast, German courts take 
the sequence of events that is most favourable to the defendant when this cannot be 
ascertained with certainty.376
Third, the dogmatic legal thinking common in Germany precludes courts and 
scholars from making exceptions to principles based on considerations of public 
policy. A pragmatic approach is followed in the Netherlands, which explains why 
intoxication and emotional states of mind (almost) never lead to a negation of intent. 
In the next paragraph, it will be made clear that intent, including conditional intent, 
is less likely to be negated when the fault element is kept general. In Germany, by 
contrast, intent often must relate to elements not included in the offence defi nition, 
such as the specifi c identity of the victim and the way the result was achieved.
A fi nal note needs to be made regarding lethal offences. The absence of 
conditional intent is mitigated in English law, because the most serious form of 
homicide, murder, is not only fulfi lled when the defendant had direct or indirect 
intent as to the death of the victim, but also when this intention related to grievous 
bodily harm and the victim died as a result thereof. Just like dolus eventualis is 
criticized for equating dolus with the foreseeing of side effects, the English offence 
of murder is criticized for also labelling the defendant who only wanted to injure a 
murderer. It has been suggested the offence should be redrafted to make the 
distinction, but so far, this has been without success.377
375 17 September 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 21295.
376 See 17 April 1962 BGHSt 17, 210; 18 August 1983 BGHSt 32, 48; 17 October 1996 BGHSt 42, 
268; 25 March 1999 BGH JR 2000, 297; 12 December 2001, BGH NJW 2002, 1057; Roxin 2006, 
pp. 1091–1092 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 350.
377 Law Commission 2006. See also X.3.6.
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3.6.5. Acceptance inferred from possibility
In some cases, the chance that the risk might materialize can be less than probable. 
When the risk is not very likely to occur, the volitional element may not be inferred 
solely from the subjective awareness of a risk. The inference should be conducted 
with scrutiny and by taking into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of 
the case, just as in the context of lethal charges in Germany. This careful 
consideration should not be based on a supposed threshold against killing people. It 
should apply to all charges, and is grounded in the fact that dolus eventualis and 
conscious negligence are closely positioned next to each other on a spectrum of 
fault elements.378 The line between dolus and culpa is small, yet the consequences 
of what type of fault is established are great. Moreover, knowing and wanting are 
interrelated elements. With the decrease in likelihood that the risk will materialize, 
its acceptance becomes less plausible to infer.379
In assessing dolus eventualis to any intentional charge, circumstances such as 
motive of the act, the dangerousness inherent in the act, including the manner of 
execution, behaviour before and after the offence and the defendant’s personality 
should be taken into account. Other features that should be taken into account are 
risk habituation, prior experience with a good and bad outcome, the actor’s control 
over the outcome, efforts made to avoid the result, the possibility of the victim to 
protect himself, and the degree to which the victim causes his own harm. Finally, 
the degree to which the consequence is undesirable to the defendant is relevant, 
which is evident in case the risk (also) presents a danger to the defendant himself or 
someone close to him.380 Some of these features have been advocated by scholars as 
the decisive criterion of conditional intent,381 but their correct place is in a 
framework of features that can either confi rm or negate conditional intent.382
3.6.6. Cognitive theories on intent
It was submitted above that every now and then, the Supreme Courts reveal 
themselves as guardians of a subjective interpretation of conditional intent, 
quashing a decision for insuffi ciently taking this into account. If the judgment 
implies that conditional intent is established on the awareness of danger alone 
without any reference to the acceptance of it, it is quashed because it leaves open 
378 5 March 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 05898 and 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1.
379 Recall that results that are foreseen as practically certain side-effects of intended results are 
simply considered to be indirectly wanted too. The volitional limb in dolus indirectus is minimal 
because of the overwhelming cognitive limb.
380 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 286.
381 See for example, Herzberg in Szwarc 1996, p. 73. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 459–460 and 465–
467.
382 Philipps in Schünemann a.o. 2001; Krey 2003, pp. 126–127; Roxin 2006, pp. 468–472; Weigend 
1981, p. 667 and Beulke 2008, pp. 80 and 82.
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the possibility of conscious negligence.383 In other words, the volitional element 
must be proven explicitly and not based solely on the fact that the defendant was 
aware of a risk. However, the effect of judgments like these must not be overstated. 
The evidential approach used in the majority of cases is still very objective. 
Moreover, both Supreme Courts focus on the reasoning, not the facts. When all the 
facts of the case are taken into account and fi tted into the juridical formulations 
developed by the Supreme Courts, the decision is likely to stand the test of 
cassation, even if it is very possible that another court would have come to an 
opposite conclusion.
As a consequence, the volitional element is often inferred from the cognitive 
element and thus seems to be superfl uous. Some scholars explain this practice by 
arguing that conditional intent focuses primarily or exclusively on knowledge.384 
As proponents of so-called cognitive theories on intent, they argue that intention 
exists when the defendant continues to act despite the fact that he foresees the 
possible consequences. In short, conditional intent is acting despite knowledge.385 
More specifi cally, wanting is deduced from the acting with awareness. When one 
realizes the possible consequences and continues anyway, he must have wanted and 
thus intended the result. The sum is that knowing and continuing equals wanting to 
do.386 Accordingly, they submit terms like ‘accepting’ and ‘taking into the bargain, 
do not imply wanting, but knowing.387 Proponents of cognitive theories on dolus 
eventualis reject a volitional element, either in an attempt to theorize case-law or as 
a theory of what intent should look like.388
They argue that the difference between conditional intent and conscious 
negligence hinges not on the attitude of the actor, but on the awareness of the 
considerable risk. From this perspective, it follows that the actor who is consciously 
negligent is actually unaware. When the actor trusts a possible consequence will 
not occur, he is not aware of the risk tempore delicti.389 Actual knowledge is 
supposedly suppressed. Arguably, it is therefore better to talk about seemingly 
conscious negligence, because when the actor trusts in a good outcome, he is no 
longer aware of the danger.390 The proponents of this theory can be said to 
‘translate’ the attitude of the actor into awareness. By ‘translating’ this trust into 
383 20 February 2008 BGH NStZ 2008, 392 and HR 18 January 2011, LJN:BO6365. See IV.3.6.3.
384 Nieboer 1991, pp. 154–155; Otte 2001; van Dijk, A.A. 2008; Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 79 and 
Strijards 1983, pp. 71–76.
385 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 107–108 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 217–218, 413 and 426.
386 Krey 2003, pp. 126–127, Weigend 1981, p. 665; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 217–221, 224 and 253; 
de Hullu 2006, pp. 218–219; Smidt 1881 I, pp. 80–81 and Strijards 1983, pp. 73–75 and 118.
387 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 427.
388 Strijards 1996, p. 118 clearly positions his theory as an explanation of the outcomes in practice. 
However, most scholars are not clear whether their theory concerns ‘is’ or ‘ought’, see also 
IV.3.6.8.
389 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 224–226; Strijards 1987, p. 9; Frisch 1983, p. 322–323 and Krey 2003, 
pp. 122–125.
390 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 279–280 and Morkel 1981.
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inadvertence, the volitional element becomes relevant through the backdoor. This 
explains why the outcomes that follow from the application of this theory hardly 
ever differ from those of prevailing opinion.391 Clearly, these scholars themselves 
would argue that it is prevailing opinion who ‘translate’ cognitive criteria into 
volitional terms.
In my opinion, this approach is a fi ction.392 Trust in a good outcome does not 
negate awareness; it rather enforces it. If the accused trusted in a good outcome 
because he thought it would be unlikely that the harm would materialize, he is still 
aware of a risk. The decision on the risk demonstrates that he was aware of the risk. 
This view is also taken in an English case on recklessness. The (intoxicated) 
defendant wanted to show off his martial arts skills to his friends, boasting that he 
could kick at a window but just miss breaking the glass. The Court held that the 
defendant trusted in a good outcome. He had tried to minimize the risk by keeping 
a greater margin and apparently overestimated his capacities. However, he still 
must have been aware of a risk of breaking the window.393
3.6.7. Acceptance inferred from foreseeability
The cognitive theory is right however to signal that the practical approach to 
proving conditional intent can go far. In a lot of cases, the only aspect of conditional 
intent that is truly proven or argued for is the objective awareness of the risk, in 
other words, the foreseeability of the result. Not only is it inferred through the 
simple establishment that he acted anyway, that the defendant must have accepted 
this risk; preceding this, the defendant is presumed to be aware of this risk given 
the objective degree of the risk that implies that the average or reasonable person 
would have been aware. For example, it is merely proven that there was a risk of 
infection with HIV, which apparently warrants the assumption that the defendant 
knew this and since he had unprotected sexual intercourse anyway, he must have 
accepted the possibility of infection.394 The manner in which it is proven leads to 
serious doubt on whether the individual subjective state of mind of the defendant is 
taken into account. It can be questioned whether intention is established or 
attributed to the defendant.395
391 Roxin 2006, pp. 455–456 and 468–470; Bohlander 2009, pp. 64–65; Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 152–
156; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 257–258 and Kelk 2005, p. 182.
392 See also Beulke 2008, p. 79.
393 Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v. Shimmen (1986) 84 Cr App R 7. 
Recklessness was accepted. Admitted, since Dutch law requires awareness of a considerable 
risk, this criticism is mitigated. In that perspective, the defendant who thought it was unlikely 
the harm would materialize can be said to have been aware only of a non-considerable risk.
394 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1; Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 172–173; HR 18 January 2005, NJ 2005, 
154; HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 394; Kelk 2005, p. 173 and 
Reijntjes in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 484.
395 Reijntjes in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 475 and de Jong, D.H. & Kessler 1999.
Fault elements
 129
More examples of this approach can be seen in the context of drug offences. The 
intent to import drugs is established on the rule that everyone who is driving a 
vehicle by himself that contains a lot of drugs, tends to know that this vehicle con-
tains drugs.396 Similarly, a person living in a house must have known about the pre-
sen ce of large quantities of drugs there,397 and an airplane passenger who carries a 
suit case with a large quantity of drugs, tends to know of this presence.398 If the 
defen dant knew the package was sent to him from Colombia, this presupposes 
know ledge that it might contain drugs. From this assumed knowledge, the 
acceptance automatically follows from the acting itself.399
The evidential presumption in these cases can be formulated as follows: it is 
general ex pe rience that drugs are imported from certain countries. When a 
defendant fl ies from these countries, the presumption is that he is aware of this risk. 
The circum stance that he transported an item of someone else without checking it, 
means that he accepted this risk.400 This can be seen as a form of liability by 
Garantenstellung, that is, extended responsibility based on the knowledge of a 
normal airline passenger.401 A related perspective in England is that the possible 
ignorance of possessing some thing is compensated by the control of the defendant 
over what he possesses. If the defendant had control over his luggage and thereby 
the opportunity to discover the possession, he is more likely to have been aware of 
the (risk of) possession.402 This approach is also taken in Dutch cases on the 
possession of child porn. A person who is fa mi liar with computers has more control 
over what data is stored on his computer and thus it is easier to accept that he 
subjectively was aware of the (risk of) possession.403
On the one hand, it can be argued that there is an apparent risk in bringing 
something along for an acquaintance, especially from certain destinations,404 and if 
it would be accepted, it would provide ‘professionals’ with a formidable defence. 
On the other hand, an approach based on responsibility may prove to be problematic 
in some cases. Control is often assumed in cases where on closer inspection, this is 
not true. When luggage is checked in, the defendant no longer can control what is 
put into it. Does this mean that passengers are not only under a duty not to transport 
anything for others and leave luggage unattended, but also that they have to seal 
their luggage? The violation of these duties apparently brings about a fi nding of 
intent of im- or exporting any illegal item found in their possession. Intent in these 
396 HR 25 November 1986, NJ 1987, 493 and HR 3 November 1998, LJN:AV1127.
397 HR 15 December 1998, NJ 1999, 203.
398 As the Court of Appeal held, preceding HR 2 October 2007, NJ 2007, 645.
399 HR 3 June 2003, NbSr 2003, 240.
400 De Jong, D.H. & Kessler 1999, p. 385. See for example HR 22 October 1985, NJ 1986, 346 and 
HR 5 July 2011, NJ 2011, 327.
401 Kelk 2005, p. 188 and de Hullu 2006, p. 228.
402 Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256; Ashworth 2006, p. 108; Walsh 2005, p. 780 and Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, pp. 153–155 and 617–618.
403 HR 28 February 2006, NJ 2006, 179.
404 HR 2 October 2007, NJ 2007, 645.
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contexts can thus be qualifi ed as carelessness of not checking what is in your car or 
bag or taking insuffi cient precautions to avoid the risk.405 The attribution of intent 
based on the foreseeability of the risk or the violation of a duty of care, risks that the 
specifi c defendant is convicted for the most serious form of committing criminal 
conduct, whereas he was only negligent.
3.6.8. Normative theories
Although the Supreme Courts consistently hold that the judiciary needs to carefully 
assess all circumstances of the case, in practice, proof of the objective danger seems 
decisive. All other circumstances of factors identifi ed earlier thus seem superfl uous. 
If conditional intent can be fulfi lled by proof of ‘acting despite foreseeability’, both 
the requirement of knowing and wanting seem to become illusory. This is why 
proponents of so-called normative theories argue that intent is attributed 
normative ly. Intent is no psychological concept, but a legal fi ction that is used to 
label the defendant. The psyche of the other is fundamentally unknowable. 
Knowledge on the psyche is deduced from non-psychological factors, such as the 
nature of conduct, its external manifestation and its circumstances. It is therefore 
not about a state of mind, but about the outcome of a process of attribution.406
Like cognitive theories, a normative theory of intent provides for an explanation 
of the application of the law in practice that lacks proof of the cognitive and 
volitional element.407 Other scholars present their views not exclusively as an 
explanation, but also or predominantly as a theory of what intent should look 
like.408 Explanatory theories are inclined to treat substance and evidence integrated, 
as if they are inextricably linked to each other.409 Whereas the doctrine of intent 
can hardly be assessed separately from the rules of evidence concerning it, and in 
practice, psychological elements easily fade into the background, the fact that 
conditional intent is established in a certain way does not make the concept 
normative.410 The substantive criteria of dolus eventualis and the way in which they 
are proven should be distinguished.
405 See de Jong, F., van Roomen & Sikkema 2007, pp. 941–942 and annotator ’t Hart in HR 
19 November 1991, NJ 1992, 250. Kelk 2005, p. 188 therefore uses the term ‘intent of vigilance’. 
This can be identifi ed in HR 17 January 2012, LJN:BU4211 as well.
406 Frisch 1983 and Peters, A.A.G. 1966. See de Hullu 2006, p. 218; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 234 
and 240; annotator Buruma in HR 24 April 2007, NJ 2007, 544 and Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 164 
and 169–171.
407 See for example de Jong, F. 2009, p. 357.
408 See de Hullu 2006, pp. 27 and 216–218, de Jong, D.H. 2004A and de Jong, D.H. 2004B, p. 78. 
Often, it is unclear whether proponents aim to explain practice or believe a normative concept is 
most appropriate. Gatzweiler 2008, p. 186 concludes from his legal comparison of intent that the 
trend is that normative approaches become more infl uential.
409 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 236; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 281 and Gatzweiler 2008, p. 158. 
See, for example, de Jong, D.H. 2004A, pp. 1054–1055.
410 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 235–239 and Reijntjes 2004.
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3.6.9. Moderate objective approach
The criteria of conditional intent may be assumed to a great extent, they remain 
subjective in substance. As noted, the presumptions of the cognitive and volitional 
limb of eventualis are based on the reasoning that a normal person, acting as the 
defendant did, would have intent, and since the defendant is a normal human being, 
he acted intentional too. The defendant therefore often needs to draw the court’s 
attention to facts and circumstances that operate as contra-indications to the 
presumptions based on external evidence.
Proof of intent may be objective, but this does not make the concept normative. 
The conduct of the defendant is not measured against normative standards of due 
care, but against general experience, against what a normal person would do.411 
The inference of intent from external circumstances only becomes normative when 
the actor is supposed to possess the knowledge of the general public, regardless of 
whether this knowledge was actually present.412 In this vein, a distinction has been 
made between an ‘intersubjective’ and a ‘fi nal’ approach to proving fault.413 In the 
fi nal approach, the step of referring to the state of mind of the actor is skipped and 
the intent is directly proven from external facts. The act itself demonstrates the 
intent so clearly that it suffi ces to ground intent. For example, conditional intent to 
kill someone is given by shooting a fi rearm in a crowded bar. In an intersubjective 
approach, which I equate with the earlier mentioned moderate objective approach to 
proving fault,414 the objective circumstances are used as a tool to construct the 
actual state of mind. The latter is therefore objective, not normative.415
Usually the evidential assumptions will be correct and therefore effi cient. In 
some cases, the act cannot be interpreted in any other way than that the result was 
foreseen and accepted. However, the application of general experience and objective 
logic to individuals might not lead to a correct result for every defendant. The 
individual defendant is possibly not a reasonable citizen.416 An intersubjective 
approach needs to be taken. A balance needs to be struck between general 
experience and individual, concrete circumstances, recognizing that the state of 
mind of the individual defendant is not necessarily that of the reasonable person.417 
411 De Hullu 2006, p. 217.
412 Kwakman in Keulen, Knigge & Wolswijk 2007, p. 292.
413 Annotator Buruma in and HR 10 October 2000, NJ 2001, 4 and HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 
552; annotator Mevis in HR 2 April 2002, NJ 2002, 421 and AG Jörg in HR 25 March 2003, NJ 
2003, 556.
414 See III.7.2.
415 Kwakman in Keulen, Knigge & Wolswijk 2007, pp. 305–307; Robroek 2010, p. 35 and de Jong, 
F. 2009, pp. 403 and 432.
416 Reijntjes 2004, p. 80.
417 De Hullu 2006, p. 262 and de Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 181–187. The 
English cases R. v. Stephenson [1979] EWCA Crim 1 and Elliot v. C [1983] 1 WLR 939 were 
criticized for equating a schizophrenic tramp and a subnormal young girl with a reasonable 
person.
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Criminal liability after all, should be based on an individual culpability. Dolus 
should not relate to averages or statistical categories, but to individual actors in 
distinct criminal cases.418 An acquittal for the intentional charge must follow if the 
court is not sure this particular defendant realized or accepted the risk. Intent 
should never be attributed normatively, the defendant held liable despite knowing or 
accepting the risk. The severe reproach and punishment made possible by 
intentional liability is only warranted due to the subjective connection between act 
and actor, that expresses a great degree of control and choice. A normative 
attribution of intent blurs the distinction between intent and negligence and thereby 
obstructs the functions of distinguishing in fault elements.
The correct evidential approach to dolus eventualis requires moderation in using 
objective evidence and requires the judiciary to be more reluctant in applying the 
assumptions based on objective awareness. First of all, this approach has only 
arisen from problems of evidence. Evidential problems can lead to the acquittal of 
those who intended a result, but given the fact that it is better to acquit 10 guilty 
than to convict one innocent, these problems must be accepted over the injustice of 
convicting persons who were unaware of the risk or did not accept it. Secondly, it is 
diffi cult for the defendant to rebut presumptions that arise from general experience 
and objective circumstances. Given the general rule that the prosecutor is supposed 
to prove all offence elements, the burden on the defendant should therefore be set 
low. If there is any doubt that the assumption may not be correct in a specifi c case, 
the court should carefully consider all the facts and circumstances. If this does not 
resolve the doubt, the defendant should be acquitted.
Furthermore, facts or general experience are not always known or true.419 When 
there are reasons to question the assumptions that are made in proving eventualis, 
these doubts should be addressed by reference to all the facts and circumstances of 
the case. By requiring courts to clearly substantiate their reasoning, logic and 
inferences in judgments, the Supreme Courts can safeguard this moderate objective 
approach to proving eventualis.420 Finally, even if the average citizen knows 
something, this does not necessarily mean that this defendant also realized this 
when he committed the offence. The inference of subjective knowledge from 
general experience requires the courts to be more cautious of the risk of attributing 
awareness.
Proving fault by reference to objective facts and circumstances is possible and 
unavoidable, but in order to make reliable conclusions on the defendant’s individual 
culpability, this needs to be conducted with moderation and care. The careful 
consideration of all the facts of the case, the taking into account of individual, 
418 Annotator ’t Hart in HR 23 January 1996, NJ 1996, 400.
419 De Jong, D.H. & Kessler 1999 and Kwakman in Keulen, Knigge & Wolswijk 2007, pp. 309–312. 
See for example, HR 6 March 2012, LJN:BU3606.
420 See Kwakman in Keulen, Knigge & Wolswijk 2007, pp. 299–300. This argument militates 
against a fi nding of fault by juries unless they also have to substantiate the reasons for their 
judgment.
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concrete circumstances, should not be seen as an ineffi cient blockade to convicting 
perpetrators.
Consider the case where the defendant was found in Schiphol in possession of 
23 kilograms of cocaine. He had argued the Peruvian government had set him up. 
He wanted to have the tape with which the drugs were packed tested for fi ngerprints, 
but everything had been destroyed already. The Dutch Court of Appeal held that 
even if it were to be established that the defendant’s fi ngerprints were not on the 
packets of drugs, this not necessarily means he was unaware of the drugs in his 
suitcase. The Supreme Court approved this reasoning and upheld the conviction.421 
The ECtHR also did not fi nd this reasoning unreasonable or arbitrary.422 It 
recognized the evidential approach for what it is; rebuttable presumptions of fact 
based on external circumstances and general experience.423 These presumptions 
were allowed because they could be rebutted and the Court of Appeal had relied on 
other evidence and factors, such as the fact that the defendant used a diplomatic 
passport, possibly to avoid detection.424 These and other facts of the case warrant a 
presumption of conditional intent, and in order to reliably ground his fault, the 
Court considered all the facts and circumstances, both of an incriminating and 
exculpating nature.
A moderate objective approach will also lead to an acquittal of the accused 
when appropriate. Consider the defendant who was found at Schiphol in possession 
of more than 1 kilogram of cocaine. The Dutch Court held that despite the fact that 
drugs were smuggled from notorious Aruba and that the suitcase was from a friend, 
the defendant was reasonably mistaken about the presence of drugs, as it was very 
diffi cult to notice the drugs in the suitcase – as confi rmed by customs – and the 
suitcase was borrowed from a colleague marine and friend.425
This evidential approach should apply to all offences and to all fault elements. It 
was explained that German and Dutch law adapts its evidential approach according 
to the type of offence that is charged. The Hemmschwelle applies only to lethal 
offences, and in the Netherlands, much more is required to prove conditional intent 
in the context of road traffi c offences than regarding drug offences. However, 
consistency requires that a careful evidential approach to eventualis is applied in 
the context of all intentional offences.
For that matter, a moderate objective approach should apply to other fault 
elements too, such as dolus directus and recklessness. I elaborated on this approach 
in the context of eventualis, because the intimate relationship of substance and 
421 HR 3 November 1998, LJN:AV1127. See also de Jong, D.H. & Kessler 1999.
422 Luis de Arriz Porras v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 49266/99, 18 January 2000. See also August 
Frederik Stuart v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 31716/96, 6 July 1999.
423 See Fokkens & Machielse, note 5 on Opzet.
424 Moreover, the police records showed that the tape used to pack the drugs was the same tape used 
to seal the suitcase, which militates against the defendant’s story.
425 Rb. Arnhem 2 February 2009, LJN:BH2293. Not only was the charge of intent negated, the strict 
offence that was charged alternatively was also negated, because the defendant could not even 
be reproached at all. The excuse of ‘absence of all blameworthiness’ applied, see IV.6.5.
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procedure is particularly evident here. Moreover, if the proposal to exclude dolus 
eventualis in a general part of criminal law for the EU is not adopted, a moderate 
objective approach to this fault element is a second best option, as it helps to keep 
the contents and proof of this concept within appropriate limits. I have the 
impression this approach is gaining popularity in Dutch case-law.
4. RECKLESSNESS
In English law, recklessness is the conscious taking of an unreasonable risk. It 
straddles the borders of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence and has therefore 
often been compared with these continental fault elements. However, it is a concept 
of its own and the pertinent differences will be discussed. Most importantly, 
recklessness differs from eventualis, because it is not a lowest form of dolus but an 
independent kind of fault. Second, recklessness has no volitional requirement and 
fi nally, it is a partially normative concept.
4.1. Rationale
Recklessness has a similar function as dolus eventualis. As a middle ground of fault 
in between intent and negligence, it enables a more serious kind of criminal liability 
in cases that would otherwise be labelled as mere negligence. The reasoning behind 
the creation of this middle ground is the realization that foreseeing side-effects is 
more culpable than negligence. Awareness of risks grounds the increased reproach.
However, an important difference is that recklessness constitutes a separate 
form of fault, whereas eventualis is merely seen as the lowest degree of dolus. The 
English legal system operates with three kinds of fault: intent, recklessness and 
negligence, whereas on the continent only intent and negligence are applied. Since 
recklessness is not a type of dolus, it does not serve the purpose of facilitating the 
proof of intentional offences. The lack of dolus eventualis in English law leads to a 
stricter concept of intent and thereby stricter concepts of attempt, participation and 
so on. Nevertheless, recklessness is also often used in offences as an alternative 
fault element to intent, performing a similar function as eventualis.426
4.2. Terminology
In England, recklessness is often perceived as a high degree of negligence.427 In 
comparative legal analyses, recklessness has often been labelled an equivalent of 
luxuria, the most serious form of conscious or advertent negligence in Germany 
(‘Leichtfertigkeit’) and in the Netherlands (‘roekeloosheid’). Roekeloosheid is an 
426 See for example section 28(2) of the English Identity Cards Act 2006.
427 Ashworth 2006, p. 181 and Weigend 1981, p. 676.
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exact translation of recklessness. The Oxford English Dictionary refers to its 
cognate terms in (old) Dutch and German.428 The verb ‘reck’ – in Dutch: ‘roeken’ – 
means to take care, to be concerned about something. It can also mean to regard 
and to take notice, but its use as being aware of something is now used only rarely. 
‘Reckless’ means the lack of consideration, being careless, heedless or indifferent. 
From an etymological perspective, the comparison to negligence seems warranted. 
Like negligence, its core consists of carelessness.
In England however, the legal concept of recklessness requires awareness. 
Awareness strictly demarcates recklessness from negligence. The problem is that 
the negligent actor in Germany and the Netherlands can be aware or unaware of the 
risk. As explained before, foreseeing a risk but trusting in a good outcome leads to 
advertent negligence. Luxuria can (theoretically) also encom pass cases of 
inadvertent negligence.
4.3. Criteria
Recklessness can be defi ned as follows: “(…a person acts) “recklessly” with respect 
to- i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; ii) a result 
when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to 
him, unreasonable to take the risk.”429 In short, recklessness denotes the conscious 
taking of an unjustifi ed risk.430 Reckless knowledge has already been discussed 
briefl y; the focus here is on recklessness as to consequences.
Recklessness was held to mean “that the accused has foreseen that the particular 
kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it.”431 This 
resembles a cognitive version of dolus eventualis, where the volitional element is 
established by the mere fact that the accused has acted despite knowledge. However, 
in contrast to eventualis, recklessness does not require that the actor must have 
accepted the possibility that the risk would materialize. Although there are old 
references in which it was argued that the defendant must have also been reckless or 
indifferent as to whether the risk occurred, recklessness in its current form includes 
no volitional element.432
In other words, dolus eventualis focuses on the actor’s attitude towards the risk 
whereas recklessness focuses on awareness.433 In distinguishing dolus eventualis 
from negligence, the volitional element is decisive. If the actor was aware of the risk 
but he did not reconcile himself to that risk, there can (only) be advertent negligence. 
By contrast, the difference between recklessness and negligence is based on 
428 See also the Dutch ‘van Dale’ dictionary.
429 Section 18(c) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51.
430 Smith, A.T.H. in Glazebrook 1978, p. 101.
431 R. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 All ER 412; Ashworth 2006, p. 182; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 135 
and Ormerod 2005, p. 103.
432 See IV.5.1.1.
433 Fletcher 1978, p. 447.
Chapter IV
136 
awareness. In English law, the negligent actor is unaware of the risk. He cannot be 
acquitted of recklessness by arguing he trusted everything would be all right. The 
awareness of the risk is decisive, not whether he accepted it or not. Recklessness 
therefore subsumes cases that in Dutch and German criminal law are covered by 
dolus eventualis and advertent negligence.434
4.4. Awareness
The dominant type of recklessness applied in England is called subjective or 
advertent recklessness or by reference to its leading case: Cunningham 
recklessness.435 A second inadvertent type or ‘objective’ recklessness is named 
after another case. This so-called Caldwell recklessness has however been rejected 
and will be discussed in another subsection. In the case where this objective form of 
recklessness was rejected, the two defendants, aged 11 and 12, set fi re to some 
newspapers and then put a large wheelie-bin over it. They did not contemplate the 
bin would catch fi re and eventually lead to the burning down of a shop. The lack of 
awareness negated the charge of recklessly damaging property.436 The rationale of 
requiring awareness for recklessness is that risky action is only morally signifi cant 
if the defendant acted, knowing the risk.437 Lack of background knowledge, 
ignorance, stupidity and gullibility are not the type of vices that can ground 
recklessness.438
Like the requirement of awareness in dolus eventualis, this requirement of 
recklessness hardly presents evidential diffi culties in practice, since it can be 
inferred from objective facts and circumstances. In restoring the subjective 
character of recklessness, the House of Lords dismissed any fear that subjective 
recklessness would prevent convicting those who deserved punishment. Subjective 
recklessness would not preclude convicting the defendant when he asserts he never 
thought of a certain risk when everything showed that he did or must have done.439 
I will return to the manner in which awareness can be proven in the next section.
4.5. Unreasonable risk
The defendant needs to be aware of a risk, which is in the circumstances known to 
him, unreasonable to take. In short, this requires that the defendant needs to be 
aware of any degree of risk. In addition however, this risk objectively needs to be 
434 Bohlander 2009, p. 63.
435 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 135; Ormerod 2005, p. 102 and R. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 All ER 
412.
436 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50.
437 Tadros in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 228 and Duff 1990, pp. 142 and 153.
438 Compare Tadros 2005, pp. 250–255.
439 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 107–108.
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unreasonable. The defendant need not be aware that the risk is unreasonable, yet he 
does need to be aware of the essential facts underlying the valuation of the risk as 
unreasonable.440
4.5.1. Unreasonable
The risks that are relevant for recklessness are assessed normatively. As explained 
in the context of eventualis, this means that the relevance of a risk is not only judged 
according to the likelihood of its occurrence, but also to the social utility of the act 
relative to the nature and extent of the harm that is caused when the risk occurs. In 
other words, a small chance of great harm can be a relevant risk.441 The more 
valuable a legal interest is, the sooner a risk becomes relevant. The mentioned 
scenarios of HIV-infection lead to liability for recklessness in England.442 Even if 
the chance of infection is small, the harm caused is very serious and the risk taken 
therefore unreasonable. Moreover, there is no social utility in having unprotected 
instead of protected sexual intercourse.
The taking into account of these normative factors explains why there is no need 
for a threshold of probability.443 The chance of infecting someone with HIV need 
not be considerable to infer recklessness, when the risk is established normatively. 
In order to hold the defendant liable for infecting the victim under conditional 
intent, Dutch scholars therefore have proposed to take this approach too. A small 
chance can be unreasonable if it has no social utility. Recall the aforementioned 
case where the defendant was showing off his martial arts skills near a window. He 
broke the window because of an exaggerated belief in his own capacities. This 
means he thought there was only a minimal risk, but in light of the absence of social 
utility, this slight risk suffi ced.444
The opposite is also true. The risk can be reasonable if the actor furthers a good 
cause. We take risks all the time, often even professionally. Driving a vehicle or 
operating an industrial machine in compliance with the pertinent rules may cause 
unwanted side-effects, but when they occur, this does not make us reckless.445 The 
risk can also be reasonable if the actor took precautions. The use of condoms does 
not negate any risk to HIV-infection, but it is no longer a risk a reasonable person 
440 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 134; Duff 1990, pp. 143 and 152; Norrie 2006B, p. 79 and section 
18(c) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51, which has been judicially approved in 
R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50.
441 Ashworth 2006, p. 182; Kessler Ferzan 2007, p. 2538; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 134; 
Ormerod 2008, pp. 107–110 and Ormerod 2005, p. 102. See IV.3.4.5.
442 R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103.
443 Ormerod 2008, p. 108. In R. v. Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413, the plea that the risk should be 
obvious and signifi cant was rejected.
444 Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v. Shimmen (1986) 84 Cr App R 7. See 
also Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 134–135; Duff 1990, pp. 147–148 and IV.3.6.6.
445 See Williams 1953, p. 55. Compare Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 164: even a pessismist, constantly 
paranoid of all that could go wrong, would not be reckless for causing a reasonable risk.
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would not take.446 Even a considerable chance of a small risk does not necessarily 
constitute recklessness. If we consider the likelihood that this book bores its reader 
is probable, the harm that is infl icted is arguably still trivial. The action that 
produces this unwanted side-effect has social utility. After all, I explained how 
rethinking fault elements is useful on both a European and national level. In 
balancing the scales, the risk can therefore hardly be called unreasonable.
Finally, Weigend raises the question whether a person, who has a cold, 
repeatedly sneezes in a bus, being aware there may be a 95% chance of infecting 
another passenger with the fl u virus, is reckless as to the bodily injury.447 As 
Spencer pointed out, “it is not reckless for a person who is suffering from an illness 
that is curable and minor, like a cold, or ordinary fl u, or even mumps or measles, to 
run the risk of transmitting it to others if it would seriously disrupt the affairs of 
himself or other people to avoid it.”448 The aspect of unreasonableness thus also 
excludes trivial risks and harm from liability and thereby helps to prevent over-
criminalization.
4.5.2. Unjustifi ed
As an alternative to being reasonable, risks that are justifi ed are also excluded from 
recklessness. A considerable chance of some harm occurring can be justifi ed when 
a defence like necessity applies. The test of proportionality applied in justifi cations 
is similar to the test of reasonableness applied in recklessness. For example, the 
defendant needs to get his wife to hospital immediately. If necessity applies, the 
danger to traffi c he caused as a side-effect is not only justifi ed, it operates as a 
failure of proof defence to recklessness, resulting in an acquittal. Because 
recklessness is partly normative, good motives are relevant to this fault element. In 
contrast, if necessity would apply to an intentional act, the act would remain 
intentional. The application of the defence does not affect the neutral concept of 
intent; it justifi es the act by negating its wrongfulness.
4.5.3. Valuation
In the context of dolus eventualis, the question was already raised what the 
consequence is of a difference between the subjective and objective perception of 
the risk. In practice, the defendant is unlikely to be successful in negating eventualis 
by arguing he thought the risk was possible but not considerable. What is exactly 
considerable is vague enough for courts to confi rm it and often, a subjective 
perception is not even distinguished next to the objective chance. This practical 
446 See Spencer 2004, p. 385.
447 Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 162.
448 Spencer 2004A, p. 385.
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approach to proving eventualis is similar to what is actually required by 
recklessness.
In recklessness, the awareness of the defendant must relate to the fact that there 
is a chance and secondly, to the essential circumstances that ground the conclusion 
that the risk is unreasonable.449 It need not relate to the unreasonableness of the 
risk. Whether this risk is in fact unreasonable is assessed objectively, independent 
of the valuation of the defendant. The question is whether a reasonable man having 
such foresight would have proceeded with his conduct notwithstanding the risk.450
This usually means that the defendant must at least know the legal interest that 
is possibly harmed. He need not have made the same valuation as is normatively 
made. If the defendant, for example, incorrectly thought that it was reasonable to 
risk the bodily integrity of the victim given the small chance of HIV infection, the 
risk is still unreasonable. In other words, the defendant can raise his subjective 
perception of the facts, but not his subjective value position.451 On the one hand, the 
defendant should be judged according to the circumstances as he believes them to 
be.452 On the other hand, what is reasonable is a normative criterion, established 
independently of the defendant’s beliefs.
The fact that the defendant only needs to be aware of any degree of risk, which 
is in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take also means that if a 
person rejects the possibility that a risk will occur, because he believes that chance 
to be very small, he can still be convicted for recklessness. The driver, approaching 
a road block of police offi cers, may expect those offi cers to have been trained to get 
out of the way, but this does not make the risk reasonable. He is aware of a residual 
chance, which is unreasonable to take. In my opinion, there is no mistake on the 
factual circum stances.453 Provided there is at least some awareness, the assessment 
of the risk only takes into account the actual chance of hitting the police offi cer, not 
the subjective chance. Even if the driver believed the chance to be 5% and it is in 
reality 15%, the risk could be considered unreasonable under the subjective chance 
too. After all, the nature of the possible consequence is very serious, and it is 
unlikely the driver furthered a good cause.
4.6. Caldwell recklessness
The House of Lords only applies a subjective concept of recklessness, requiring 
awareness. In a decision of 2003,454 the House overruled the interpretation of 
449 See section 18(c) of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51, which has been 
judicially approved in R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50.
450 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 134.
451 Norrie 2006B, p. 79.
452 Ashworth 2006, p. 159.
453 In contrast to Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 164. Note that attempt liability is impossible in this 
situations, as recklessness is insuffi cient for attempt, see R. v. Mohan [1976] QB 1.
454 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50.
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recklessness as objective or inadvertent recklessness, which was dominant since the 
Caldwell case of 1982.455 This type of recklessness will be discussed in short here 
in order to be comprehensive, because it helps to understand fault in general and 
recklessness in particular, because it has similarities with conscious negligence and 
because it can help explain why dolus eventualis and recklessness have often –
incorrectly- been equated.
Under objective recklessness, the defi nition of recklessness extended not only to 
aware ness of the risk but also to failure to foresee an obvious risk.456 The defendant 
“either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or 
has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do 
it.”457 Because objective recklessness embraced gross negligence, the border with 
negligence was blurred.458 The reason behind criminalizing inadvertent 
recklessness was similar to the rationale of punishing negligence. It has been argued 
that those who fail to advert, such as the thoughtless or inconsiderate, are usually 
no less blameworthy than those who do advert. It can be called a duty or 
responsibility of citizenship to advert to and investigate the relevant risks when 
actively engaging in certain conduct.459
As is the case in negligence, the determination of whether or not the defendant 
ought to have realized the risks proved problematic. The test was to compare the 
defendant with a reasonable man, without any room to take into account any 
personal characteristics that might preclude the defendant from being able to advert. 
In the absence of a capacity-based exception, this created an objective standard of 
foreseeability that not everyone could meet.460 This has led to some controversial 
convictions on the basis of recklessness, for example of children or defendants with 
limited mental capacities.461 Some authors have therefore argued in the years 
preceding the 2003 decision, that the test should be adapted to include a capacity 
exception.462 The defendant should be compared to an individual with similar 
characteristics, but which characteristics should be taken into account remained 
uncertain.463 The House of Lords dismissed this middle ground, as they were 
confi dent that subjective recklessness would not preclude convicting the defendant 
who deserved punishment.464
Under Caldwell recklessness, there were two situations in which an actor could 
be found reckless; if the actor was aware of a risk and if the actor failed to be aware 
455 R. v. Caldwell [1982] 1 All ER 961.
456 Ashworth 2006, p. 185.
457 R. v. Caldwell [1982] 1 All ER 961. See Halpin 2004, pp. 78–79.
458 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 136.
459 Ashworth 2006, p. 185 and Amirthalingam 2004, p. 500.
460 Ashworth 2006, p. 186 and Ormerod 2005, p. 105.
461 Elliot v. C [1983] 1 WLR 939; R. v. Coles [1994] Crim LR 820 and R. v. Gemmell and Richards 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1992.
462 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 138.
463 Tadros in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 228 and Tadros 2005, p. 260.
464 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 107–108.
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of an obvious risk. The situation where the actor had given thought to the matter of 
risk and wrongly concluded there was no risk, did not qualify as any of these two 
situations and was thus considered as a loophole of criminal liability under Caldwell 
recklessness. In such a situation, the defendant was deemed to be negligent.465 
Consider the person who builds a campfi re and notices that the fi re might spread to 
a nearby tent if he does not remove some loose dry grass next to the fi re. He takes 
the necessary precautions and removes the grass, but inadvertently falls short of 
what was required: not all of the grass is removed and later, the fi re does spread, 
burning down the tent.466 The loophole was criticized for excluding from 
recklessness the person who stupidly rejects a risk, whereas including the person 
who stupidly never thinks about it.
This loophole implies the common law also knows a concept such as ‘conscious 
negligence’ since in the given example the accused would be negligent although he 
was aware of the risk. The comparison with cognitive theories of intent forces itself 
upon us.467 I described how some scholars argue that trust in a good outcome 
negates the awareness of dolus eventualis tempore delicti. A similar reasoning 
applies here that someone can be aware of a risk at one point in time, but later 
rejects the possibility of the risk occurring for whatever reason.468 As argued 
before, trusting in a good outcome does not negate, but confi rms the awareness of 
the risk.469
Whereas the House of Lords only explicitly abolished inadvertent recklessness 
in the context of criminal damage, a 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeal implied 
that advertent recklessness applies to all charges.470 The application of Caldwell 
reck less ness to other offences is very rare to say the least.471 Recklessness thus has 
one general interpretation for each offence, furthering coherency, simplicity and 
clarity. In making clear that recklessness requires awareness, the demarcation with 
negligence is very clear again. Recklessness and culpa both revolve around the 
taking of unreasonable risks.472 The reckless actor was aware of the risk he has 
taken, whereas the negligent actor was unaware of the risk he created, whilst he 
should have and could have known. Awareness is the clear dividing line; there is no 
room for concepts as conscious negligence.473 Recklessness thus brings about a 
narrower concept of culpa, namely inadvertent negligence.
465 R. v. Reid [1992] 95 Cr App R. 391; Ormerod 2005, p. 129 and Brady 1996, pp. 185–186.
466 Winslade 1972, p. 32.
467 See IV.3.6.6. and Erenius, p. 78.
468 Brady 1980, p. 384 thus argues he is no longer aware of any continued risk.
469 I could accept that awareness is negated if the defendant, believing that the precautions he took 
were suffi cient, thinks there is no longer any residual risk.
470 R. v. Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125.
471 Ormerod 2008, p. 114 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 137. One exception remains today, 
namely that recklessness to some charges can be based on inadvertence, if the defendant did not 
contemplate a risk of causing harm because he was voluntarily intoxicated, see V.3.5.
472 Weigend 1981, pp. 676–677 and Weigend in Klip 2011, pp. 164–165.
473 Weigend 1981, pp. 692–693.
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5. DOLUS EVENTUALIS VERSUS RECKLESSNESS
After having discussed the two fault elements that concentrate on liability for being 
aware of risks, I will juxtapose the two elements in more detail here. I will argue 
that in a general part of criminal law for the EU, the defendant who foresees that his 
actions may lead to a side-effect should not be held liable for intending to bring this 
about. Instead, we should hold him liable for recklessly causing side-effects.474
5.1. Differences
For a proper understanding, I will reiterate the major differences between the fault 
elements. This repetition appears to be necessary because in numerous legal 
discussions, recklessness and eventualis are equated.475
5.1.1. Volitional element
Recklessness and dolus eventualis seem very similar as they both deal with foreseen 
side-effects. Both concepts therefore deal with the awareness of risks, but eventualis 
additionally requires that the actor must have accepted the possibility that the risk 
would materialize. I have called this a volitional element and explained that 
recklessness requires no such volitional element.476 Accordingly, the demarcation 
with negligence either revolves around a volitional or a cognitive element. In distin-
guishing eventualis from negligence, the volitional element is decisive, whereas the 
difference between recklessness and negligence is based on awareness. 
Recklessness subsumes cases that in Dutch and German criminal law are covered 
by dolus eventualis and advertent negligence. Because recklessness focuses on the 
awareness of the risk without looking into the attitude of the defendant, it has been 
equated with mere advertent negligence.477 However, recklessness also covers cases 
where the actor did accept the risk, which would be eventualis on the continent. The 
defendant’s disposition is just irrelevant to prove recklessness.
By contrast, it has been argued that recklessness does include a volitional 
element, enabling the equation of the two fault elements.478 The reading in of a 
volitional element into recklessness can be done in different ways. First and 
foremost, a direct appeal could be made to references of the House of Lords, in 
which Lord Bingham cites passages that can be read as referring to a volitional 
474 See also Blomsma in Klip 2011.
475 Cassese 2007, p. 111; Arnold 2003, pp. 130–139 and Werle & Jessberger 2005. See also Fletcher 
& Ohlin 2005, p. 554.
476 Wirth 2003, p. 155; Ambos 1999, p. 21 and Taylor, G. 2004A & 2004B.
477 Fletcher & Ohlin 2005, p. 554.
478 See, for example, Safferling 2008, pp. 367–368, 479 and 483; Pedain 2003, pp. 589–593 and the 
ICTY, which uses the elements interchangeably, including an element of acceptance in 
recklessness, according to Badar 2006, p. 347.
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element like indifference: “(…) should have recognised the probability of its taking 
fi re and have been reckless as to whether or not it did so. (…) recognise the danger 
and regard it with indifference. (…) ‘reckless’ only requires foresight of possible 
consequences coupled with an unreasonable willingness to risk them.”479
The italicized words seem to indicate a volitional element in recklessness 
although it is unclear whether or not the authors intended to convey this. In other 
sources, one can discern a clear, explicit purpose to refer to recklessness as an 
attitude.480 Nonetheless, since prevailing opinion in England does not include a 
volitional element, no further-reaching conclusion must be drawn from these 
references. Reckless ness may express, but does not require proof of indifference.481 
With the overruling of objective, Caldwell recklessness, it is clear again that the 
distinction between recklessness and negligence is based on awareness. The 
previous existence of objective recklessness that was diffi cult to demarcate from 
negligence can explain why a distinguishing feature was sought in volition.
Another manner to equate the concept is to argue that when the actor acted 
despite realizing the risk, he must have accepted the risk that the result would 
materialize.482 This reasoning, familiar amongst proponents of cognitive theories 
on intent, is however erroneous. It can be said that awareness of a risk must lead in 
some way to taking a position.483 However, the fact that the defendant acted despite 
knowledge can also mean he trusted the risk would not materialize. The reasoning 
excludes this possibility.
5.1.2. Normative risk
Recklessness requires no volitional element, but it does limit the relevant risks 
normatively, by requiring that the risk must be unreasonable. The relevance of a 
risk is not only determined by the likelihood of its occurrence, but also by the 
nature and extent of the harm that is caused when the risk occurs related to the 
social utility of the act. The doctor is not reckless in carrying out a surgery. This is 
not because he does not take into the bargain that his patient might die, but because 
the risk he takes is reasonable. Whereas the concept of risk in eventualis is also 
exposed to normative infl uences in practice, there is no room to take into account 
the nature of and harm to the legal interests involved. The scope of the risk in 
recklessness is thus both broader and narrower than that in eventualis. The risk is 
479 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50, §§9 and 16. See also DPP v. Morgan [1976] AC 182: “recklessly not 
caring”. My italicizations.
480 See for example, White 1961, pp. 594–595 and Edwards 1954, pp. 303–304 and the sources 
mentioned there.
481 Fitzgerald 1962, p. 55; Williams 1962, p. 57; Winslade 1970, pp. 137–140 and Brady 1980, p. 390.
482 Lareau 2001. Badar 2006, p. 335 notes that the ICTY applies this reasoning in ICTR Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95–14-A, A. Ch., 29 July 2004.
483 Weigend 1981, p. 669; Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 116–118 and Taylor, G. 2004B, p. 350. That is, if we 
exclude that in spur of the moment crimes, the defendant does not always have the time to form 
an attitude, see Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 221.
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broader because a small chance of a great harm can also be a relevant risk, whereas 
the risk in eventualis must be considerable. The scope of the risk in recklessness is 
narrower because it must also be unreasonable and is negated when a justifi cation is 
accepted.484
5.1.3. Tertium quid
Finally, recklessness constitutes a separate form of fault in between intention and 
negligence, whereas eventualis is seen as the lowest degree of dolus. This refl ects a 
fundamental difference in perspective on the relative culpability of foreseen side-
effects. The separation of foreseen from intended results in England implies that 
they are perceived as less culpable, whereas the equation as a form of intent in the 
Netherlands and Germany, implies that foreseen results are perceived as just as 
culpable.
The dichotomy of dolus and culpa can be juxtaposed with a tripartite system of 
fault that positions recklessness as a separate kind of fault in between intent and 
negligence. I will argue that such a tripartite system is to be preferred, because 
foreseen results should be clearly distinguished from wanted ones. After that, I will 
argue that the demarcation of fault elements should focus on awareness rather than 
volition. Finally, I will demonstrate that taking into account normative aspects has 
many advantages, especially in this day and age. Only the concept of recklessness 
can incorporate these aspects.
5.2. Three instead of two
5.2.1. Intended versus foreseen results
A EU general part should use a tripartite system of fault instead of merely 
distinguishing dolus from culpa. If we consider the continental dichotomy of fault 
by examples, it becomes apparent that the true distinctions in culpability, the degree 
of the reproach directed towards the defendant, are not two- but threefold. Cases of 
dolus directus and indirectus are so similar in culpability that they can be closely 
positioned alongside each other on the aforementioned spectrum. Consider the 
defendant who blew up an aeroplane. We do not distinguish the reproach, depending 
on whether he wanted to kill the pilot (directus) or whether he knew that the pilot 
would also die, even if he merely wanted to blow up the plane in order to collect the 
insurance (indirectus). Dolus indirectus is equated with dolus directus and in 
England, indirectus is not even seen as a separate form of intent.
Dolus eventualis and conscious negligence are also very similar in culpability. 
They both deal with the foresight of risks and only separated by a thin line of 
484 In recklessness under section 2.02(c) of the Model Penal Code, American Law Institute 1985A, 
p. 226, the risk must be substantial as well as unjustifi able.
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volition.485 This explains why they can be positioned so close to each other on the 
spectrum and can be considered a pair, just like dolus directus and indirectus. For 
instance, if the accused blows up a building because it needs to make way for new 
housing, he knows there is a risk that tramps are sleeping or children playing in the 
building. By blowing up the building, he will kill anybody inside. If the actor 
accepts this risk and it occurs, he will be liable for eventualis, but if he trusts 
nobody will be killed, there can be only advertent negligence. The Dutch and 
German bifurcation of fault draws a strict line between these two cases, but in my 
opinion, this strict line is not appropriately based on a strict difference in culpability.
These pairs, directus and indirectus on the one hand, and eventualis and 
advertent negligence on the other, are thus very different from each other.486 There 
exists a fundamental difference between intending harm and foreseeing risks: the 
former is morally worse than the latter.487 Moreover, given the fact that they both 
deal with foreseen side-effects, advertent negligence is related closer to dolus 
eventualis than to inadvertent negligence, which is about unreasonable ignorance.488 
Therefore, in terms of mens rea denoting the different levels of culpability, not just 
two, but three kinds of fault should be distinguished.
This is acknowledged in English law, where a distinction is made between 
intent, recklessness and negligence. Occasionally, this is also acknowledged on the 
conti nent. For example, the German legislator has enabled a punishment of up to 
fi ve years for creating a certain danger to the Federal Republic of Germany with 
direct or indirect intent, whereas it enables a maximum penalty of only two years 
when the danger is brought about with dolus eventualis or serious negligence.489 
The equation of the maximum punishment for an act committed with either the 
lowest form of intent or the most serious form of negligence is evidence that the 
culpability is perceived as similar.
5.2.2. Dolus eventualis distorts intent
Secondly, dolus eventualis distorts intent in both a legal and linguistic manner. I 
explained that dolus indirectus already is an extension of dolus directus. Given the 
fact that there is hardly any reason to distinguish in culpability between direct and 
indirectly willed consequences, this extension is not controversial in any of the 
Member States under investigation. However, eventualis does increase the strain on 
intent as acting in order to bring about. The core of intent either focuses on a very 
high degree of wanting (directus) or on a very high degree of knowledge, namely 
that a risk will certainly occur (indirectus), yet these elements of knowing and 
wanting are only present in a very diluted form in eventualis.
485 5 March 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 05898 and 4 November 1988 BGHSt 36, 1. See IV.5.3.
486 Weigend 1981, p. 660–661 and Schünemann 1985, pp. 363–364.
487 Tadros 2005, p. 277. Compare Clark 2008, p. 525.
488 Peters, A.A.G. 1966, pp. 44–45 and Robroek 2010, p. 16.
489 §109g(1) and (4) of the German Criminal Code.
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In general, continental lawyers are trapped in the dichotomy, engraved in stone 
by codifi cation, that fault must be either dolus or culpa.490 Since there can be no 
middle form, an extension of dolus was the obvious choice to ensure adequate 
protection of legal interests and aggravation of liability for those actors that are 
more culpable than negligent ones. For example, with a few exceptions, the Dutch 
criminal code until 2006 only punished negligent offences with a maximum of nine 
months of imprisonment, even it the perpetrator caused death negligently.491 The 
criteria of eventualis, awareness and acceptance, may be rooted in knowing and 
wanting to ground it as a form of dolus, but they are very different from it. At most, 
they are diluted forms of knowing and wanting. The rationales of punishing dolus 
directus and indirectus, like the great degree of control over and choice for the 
outcome are also only present to a small extent in eventualis. Defendants do not 
have the same amount of control over foreseen side-effects as they have over 
intended results. The side-effects of my actions may be manifold, and my actions 
are not directed at them. Whether they occur or not, is often a matter of 
circumstances beyond my control.
One unifi ed rationale has been advanced to capture all forms of dolus including 
eventualis. Continental scholars have submitted that the defendant is insuffi ciently 
motivated by the legal interests of others not only when he knows for certain that 
the result will occur or wants it to occur but also when he consciously reconciles 
himself with that possibility.492 However, this is such a diluted rationale that it can 
be said to apply to any fault element. After all, is the negligent actor, who fails to 
advert to the possible harming of other people’s legal interest, not also insuffi ciently 
motivated by the legal interests of others? This rationale is therefore appropriate as 
a unitary reason for the fault requirement in offences – actus reum non facit nisi 
mens sit rea – but it is insuffi cient to explain the difference in culpability between 
dolus and culpa. All attempts to come up with a sound unifi ed rationale for dolus 
that includes eventualis are doomed to fail, evidenced by the lack of consensus on a 
unifi ed theory of dolus to this day.
In using eventualis to prove the defendant intended the damage he caused, we in 
fact prove far less than what we blame him for. We prove that the defendant 
consciously accepted that the risk might materialize, but we hold that he intended to 
harm the pertinent legal interest. He might have been aware of and reconciled 
himself with a lethal danger, but he is held to have intended death. This discrepancy 
of proof and label is unfair to the defendant.493 The defendant who foresaw a risk is 
equated with the intentional actor as far as stigma and legal consequences are 
490 The ECJ apparently also only distinguishes between intention and (forms of) negligence in 
26 May 1981, Case 157/80, Criminal proceedings against Siegfried Ewald Rinkau [1981] ECR 
1395, §15.
491 See Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, nr. 3. In the Road Traffi c Act of 1994, maximum 
sentences for negligent offences had already been raised substantially.
492 Roxin 2006, p. 446 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 269, 281–283 and 351. See also 
Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 111.
493 See Weigend 1981, p. 692.
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concerned. As to the legal consequences, the difference between the two defendants 
can be taken into account in sentencing, but this is impossible when sentencing is 
mandatory.
Eventualis can be equated with dolus indirectus as to the creation of a danger. 
By being aware of a risk and continuing, the actor knows for certain he created an 
abstract or concrete danger. Whereas culpable, the intentional creation of danger 
should be punished less severely than the intentional violation of a legal interest. In 
the special part, this difference in the appropriate reproach is acknowled ged. 
Generally, there exists a considerable lesser maximum punishment for offences of 
endangering a legal interest in comparison with violating the same legal interest. 
Creating a danger to life can never lead to life imprisonment, whereas murder 
can.494
The distinction between intention and foresight also helps the law to motivate 
actors to infl ict less damage to legally protected interests. Consider the hypothetical 
case where Witness is going to testify against Gangster. W’s testimony is crucial for 
the prose cution to prove the charges made against G. The latter thus wants to make 
sure that W is not able to testify at his trial. He contemplates that he has two options 
of enabling this. First, he could kill W, which would be a certain way to prevent him 
from testifying against him. However, he could also have W incarcerated for a few 
days in a solitary spot. This brings about a risk that W might die, because he needs 
medical attention on a regular basis. Only if the law distinguishes between 
intending and foreseeing harm, can G be motivated by that law to choose the less 
violent course.495
A close match must be maintained between the perception of a legal concept of 
those who interpret it and those who are governed by it. The legal world may not 
deviate too much from the actual world.496 As far as normal language is concerned, 
eventualis is not properly labelled as intent. Arguably, the principle of legality may 
be invoked to restrict the scope of intent.497 Eventualis distorts what in normal 
language, philosophy and psychology is understood as intention.498 Such a broad 
concept of intent loses sight of the colloquial meaning of intent and the basic 
distinction of doing something purpose or not. This distinction is rooted very 
strongly in nature and society. If a child breaks something, he expects not to be 
punished if it was an accident: ‘I did not do it on purpose.’ The distinction in ethics 
is also one of the pillars on which our criminal law is build. At the heart of fault lies 
a true purpose to harm an interest that is protected by the law, which denotes the 
evilness of the actor.
494 See Weigend 1981, pp. 689–692; Stuckenberg 2007, p. 317 and Duff 2007, pp. 149–153.
495 Example derived from Simester in Simester & Shute 1996, pp. 74–75. He however rejects this 
argument of ‘marginal deterrence.’
496 See Horder 2006A, p. 16 and de Jong, F. 2009, pp. 311–313.
497 See de Jong, F. 2009, pp. 434–435.
498 R. v. Pearman (1985) 80 Cr App R 259: “It is offensive to common sense to suppose that simply 
because he could foresee it, he would be intending the offence to come about.”
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When eventualis is used, one cannot only object to the extensive meaning of 
intent, but also to the concept of advertent negligence. This concept implies that 
negligence is not only about not foreseeing a risk where one should and could have, 
but also about foreseeing that risk. We can only explain why a concept encompasses 
two contrasting meanings by reference to its legal use. Thus, intention ought to bear 
the meaning it ports in ordinary usage.499 A restrictive interpretation of intent 
should be completed with a fault element of recklessness. A tripartite system of 
fault allows dolus and culpa to retain its contours. The least serious type of the 
former and most serious type of the latter are included in recklessness.500 Moreover, 
with three kinds of fault, there are more possibilities to distinguish the appropriate 
stigma and punishment.501
5.3. Awareness over volition
It could be argued that the demand for a system tripartite system of fault can also be 
met by disconnecting eventualis from dolus and labelling it as an independent 
tertium quid. Consider that in France, the similar concept of ‘dol éventuèl’ was not 
considered a form of intent but rather of negligence. In the 1994 Penal Code, the 
concept was transformed into an independent fault element of ‘deliberately putting 
someone in danger’.502 This approach would meet the abovementioned objections 
against an extensive concept of intent. However, eventualis would remain 
problematic in use, as other objections remain.
5.3.1. Dolus eventualis is controversial
A general part of criminal law for the EU should be consistent. This means that the 
application of a concept should lead to foreseeable, clear outcomes. Similar cases 
should be solved similarly. I just argued that an extended meaning of intent is hardly 
foreseeable for laymen. In addition, I demonstrated that the outcome of applying 
eventualis to foreseen side-effects is also diffi cult to predict for lawyers. Since the 
application of eventualis leads to inconsistent results, the concept is disqualifi ed 
from being used in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
It was explained that the concept has been controversial ever since it has been 
developed. Academic consensus is not to be expected any time soon, even though 
courts do agree on the scope and criteria of eventualis. The controversy is fuelled 
because its application varies according to the context. In the context of importing 
drugs, for example, the criteria of eventualis are very easily fulfi lled, whereas its 
application is assessed with far more scrutiny in cases of fatalities (in traffi c). 
499 Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 117 and 123. See also Brady 1980, p. 383.
500 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 117 and Weigend 1981, pp. 687–692.
501 Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 168–169 and Weigend 1981, pp. 697–699.
502 Elliott 2001; Spencer & Pedain in Simester 2005, p. 257 and Spencer in Horder 2007, p. 43.
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Nonetheless, even in cases with similar charges, facts and circumstances, 
intentional liability is accepted in one case but rejected in another. For example, in 
two cases, the defendant hit a person in the head with a fi rearm. Consequently, it 
fi red and killed the victim. The Dutch Supreme Court quashed the conviction based 
on intent in one case, but upheld the conviction in another.503 It can be rebutted that 
eventualis is dependent on the precise circumstances of the case and the manner in 
which a court motivates its decision, but it can also be argued that dolus eventualis 
is prone to judicial whim.
I illustrated that dolus eventualis is connected more closely to culpa than to the 
other forms of dolus. It is therefore no surprise that similar cases are solved as 
eventualis in one and as conscious negligence in another case. Dolus and culpa 
bring about distinctly different consequences but are only distinguished by the 
volitional element. Most of the controversy and inconsistency surrounding 
eventualis therefore originates from its thin demarcating line with culpa. This 
element of taking into the bargain, approving of, accepting, being indifferent to or 
reconciling oneself to the risk materializing is diffi cult to grasp. It is hard to make 
concrete what constitutes acceptance and what is suffi cient to negate this. I also 
demonstrated that its proof is contentious to the extent that many scholars have 
denied the existence of such a volitional element.504
5.3.2. Controversy due to volition
The existence of the volitional element in eventualis can be explained by the fact 
that fault in Germany and the Netherlands must always be either dolus or culpa. As 
mentioned before, continental lawyers seem trapped in the dichotomy of intent and 
negligence, unable to recognize a tertium quid. Although the fi rst references to 
dolus eventualis in Germany do not refer to a volitional element, this has been 
included in time as a corollary of being a form of dolus. The core of fault, direct 
intent, focuses on a will. Other forms of dolus have therefore also been positioned 
in this evil will.505 Moreover, the dogma is that intent consists of knowing and 
wanting.506 Therefore, any form of intent must include some degree of wanting. In 
eventualis, it is a very watered down form of weighing all the risks and reconciling 
oneself to the possible side-effects.
Accepting the risk is negated when the defendant trusted in a good outcome. 
This trust is juxtaposed with the mere hope in a good outcome, which is insuffi cient 
503 HR 9 June 1998, NJ 1998, 731 and HR 24 February 2004, NJ 2004, 375 respectively. In 
2 February 1960 BGH NJW 1960, 683, the situation was similar, but the defendant a police 
offi cer. Only negligence was established, just like in Hof Leeuwarden 11 August 2011 
LJN:BR4891.
504 Prittwitz 1993, p. 355. See IV.3.6.6. and IV.3.6.8.
505 Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 103–105 and 110–111 and Weigend in Klip 2011, pp. 169–170.
506 Smidt 1881 I, p. 74; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 97; de Hullu 2006, p. 207; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 261 and Beulke 2008, p. 75.
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to negate the volitional element. Yet where do we strike the line between trust and 
hope? What is reconciling oneself with the possibility of the risk materializing? The 
concept is vague and hard to defi ne in abstracto and even more diffi cult to grasp 
when applied in concreto.507 Intent is distinguished from negligence by the 
volitional element, but this does not provide for clear, foreseeable outcomes. Like 
many Dutch and German scholars have argued for on a national level, I will now 
argue that a volitional element should be rejected on the EU level too. Later, I will 
argue in favour of making awareness the lynchpin of fault.
5.3.3. Proving fault from awareness or objective danger
In proving fault, triers of fact can and should not always rely on what defendants 
tell them. In some cases, the defendant might remain silent. Even when he testifi es, 
it is not always sensible nor allowed to rely solely on this statement. For these 
reasons, courts also infer fault from objective facts and circumstances, a practice 
familiar in EU law too.508
The inference of fault is based on the capacity to understand and recognize 
mental states of defendants. From conduct under certain circumstances and through 
rules of general experience, it can be inferred what the defendant thought and 
wanted. A precondition of this pronouncing upon the psyche of another is that these 
elements are basic in character and not profoundly psychological. For example, 
what somebody wanted can be inferred relatively easy, since underlying motives or 
end-goals of these wanted results are irrelevant.509 In contrast, I argued that the 
volitional element of eventualis, the diluted form of wanting, is hard to understand 
and therefore also hard to infer. Attitudes or dispositions are very intimate and they 
are hardly ever expressed through external acts.
The evidential diffi culties became clear by taking a closer look at two of the 
most popular evidential approaches of the volitional element. A fi rst is to reduce 
proof of eventualis to the mere awareness of the considerable chance that the 
offence element will be fulfi lled. The degree of danger is directly associated with 
the question of whether or not the defendant accepted that risk. The more likely a 
risk was to materialize, the more likely it is accepted that the defendant has 
reconciled himself with that possibility. The more likely a risk was to materialize, 
the less likely a defendant will succeed in negating this aspect by arguing he trusted 
in a good outcome.510 This approach is popular in practice. It implies that the 
cognitive elements of eventualis, the likelihood of the risk materializing and its 
awareness by the defendant, are decisive in establishing eventualis. In other words, 
507 Schünemann 1985, pp. 363–364; Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 123–125 and Taylor, G. 2004B, p. 374. 
See also Stuckenberg 2007, p. 316 and Weigend 1981, pp. 660–661.
508 See III.7.2. and IV.3.6.2.
509 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 240, 280–285, 289–290, 296–299, 302–303 and 375.
510 See IV.3.6.3.
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the volitional element follows from the cognitive and thus appears superfl uous. It 
adds nothing to the threshold of criminal liability.
5.3.4. Proof of volition by rules of general experience
Secondly, in establishing the defendant’s attitude to a risk of which he is aware, 
triers of fact attempt to reconstruct his attitude by drawing conclusions on the 
basis of rules of general experience.511 They try to assess what the disposition of a 
normal person in the shoes of the defendant would have been, given his behaviour 
and all other facts and circumstances of the case. This approach may be necessary 
in trying to establish the defendant’s attitude, yet risks that the subjective attitude 
of the defendant is equated with the objective attitude of the reasonable person. In 
addition, applying general experience to infer attitudes leads to different solutions, 
which begs the question of how reliable such an approach is.
As a fi rst example, consider that in Germany, a rule of general experience 
operates as a threshold of establishing the volitional element in lethal offences, 
namely the assumption called ‘Hemmschwelle’ that there exists a natural 
instinctive threshold for all against killing other people. This threshold does not 
exist in the Netherlands. In that Member State, another threshold operates as to 
conduct that creates serious risks to life and limb, namely the question whether the 
defendant also accepted the possibility he could die himself.512
As another example, consider the scenario that a driver of a vehicle is ordered to 
stop by a police offi cer for a check, but he wants to avoid this check as he has 
outstanding fi nes or is intoxicated. He therefore continues to drive and the offi cer 
has to jump aside to escape collision with the vehicle. The question then is whether 
the driver can be convicted for the attempt to kill the offi cer. This scenario was 
mentioned before in the context of how likely it is that the risk of hitting the police 
offi cer will occur. Here, the question is whether the driver also accepted the 
possibility of killing the offi cer. German courts consider that the defendant banks 
on the reaction of the police offi cer. They take as a rule that the defendant trusts the 
offi cer expects such actions and is mentally prepared to jump. This assumption is 
strengthened by the fact that these situations hardly ever lead to fatal results. There 
is therefore no acceptance of death and no liability based on dolus eventualis. In 
contrast, the rule of experience employed by Dutch courts in these cases seems to 
be opposite to that employed by German courts. After all, when we consider that in 
the Netherlands, the defendants in such cases are, as a rule, convicted for attempted 
killing, the rule of experience applied must be that the defendant does not count on 
a good outcome.513
511 This approach is also common in EU competition law to prove ‘offence’ elements, see Opinion 
of AG Kokott on 19 February 2009, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR 
I-4529.
512 See IV.3.6.4.
513 See IV.3.4.3.
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The application of these rules is thus unreliable, not only because the defendant’s 
attitude is equated with the attitude of a reasonable person in his shoes,514 but also 
because of two contrasting rules, at most one can be correct. If such a rule of 
general expe rien ce is not true or does not apply to a specifi c case, the proof of intent 
becomes invalid.515 To some extent, the problems in these evidential approaches 
can be remedied. For example, I proposed that courts can be more explicit in 
assumptions based on common experience, be more critical of their application, or 
be very sensitive to those circumstances of the case that might indicate that the 
defendant deviated from the objectifi ed person. However, these evidential 
approaches and its problems are inevitably connected to the use of the volitional 
element. As will be explained below, a legal concept that focuses on consciousness 
of risks avoids most of these evidential problems and is therefore the better option 
in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
5.3.5. Is it warranted to distinguish by volition?
Another objection to the use of a volitional element follows from its supposed 
justifi cation. The volitional element as a requirement for dolus eventualis is 
grounded in the belief that an intentionally committed wrong can only be present 
when the actions of the perpetrator express his decision against the legal interest. 
By reconciling himself with the possibility of fulfi lling the offence defi nition, by 
his indifference to the outcome, he has expressed his contempt for the legal interests 
of others and thereby also a hostile disposition to the legal order.516
If in contrast, the defendant thought everything would turn out alright, it is 
argued he did not act with this contempt. It is implicitly assumed that he would not 
have acted if he thought the risk would materialize, and he is therefore considered 
less culpable than the person who accepted the risk.517 However, this is speculation 
since we do not know what the actor would have done if he did not trust in a good 
outcome. His trust does not have to be based on his respect for the legal interest of 
others; it can also be based on the fact that he overestimates his own capacities to 
avoid, for example, a collision.
I question the supposed difference in culpability between dolus eventualis and 
conscious negligence, which should be considerable to legitimize the differences in 
legal consequences. Let us juxtapose a scrupulous, paranoid defendant with a 
frivolous one. Recall the example of the persons who have been contracted to blow 
up a building in order to clear the premises for a new building. Actor A has taken 
precautions to avoid the risk, such as fencing off the premises and conducting a 
check of the building just before detonating it. Nonetheless, he is very anxious that 
514 Reijntjes 2004, p. 80.
515 De Jong, D.H. & Kessler 1999.
516 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 281–283 and Roxin 2006, p. 446.
517 Roxin 2006, pp. 447 and 1087.
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a person might die. He knows that a risk will always remain, and given his paranoid 
disposition, he merely hopes for the best. He has to accept the remaining possibility, 
since the job has to be done if money is to be earned. In contrast, actor B has 
ordered not even half of these precautions to be taken and frivolously trusts 
everything will be alright. Under Dutch and German law, the irrationally optimistic 
B cannot be convicted for intentional conduct when collateral damage in fact 
occurs, but the overly anxious pessimist A could.518
Considered from the perspective of a difference in culpability or concern for the 
legal interests of others, a contrary outcome would be expected. B is more culpable 
than A and has less concern for the wellbeing of potential victims, yet he cannot be 
held liable for intent, whereas A can. The conscientious actor is punished more 
severely for being pessimistic, whilst he is more likely to take precautionary 
measures and avoid risks altogether. If actor A was indifferent to the possibility of 
people dying in the explosion this would have shown contempt for the legal interests 
of others. But when the volitional element is merely fulfi lled due to a reluctant 
acceptance on behalf of the defendant, this does not show a similar degree of 
contempt towards the legal interests of others. The frivolous actor is rewarded for 
his optimism, whilst his frivolous trust might even be understood as being 
insuffi ciently motivated by the interests of others. After all, would he have also 
trusted everything would be all right so easily if there were a possibility his son was 
in the building? To me, it is evident that the defendant would have considered the 
risk with more care and might not come to that frivolous conclusion so easily.
Thus, in some cases, less contempt and thereby culpability is expressed by 
fulfi lment of the volitional element than its rejection. The distinction of culpability 
does not always coincide with that of the volitional element. If the deviation is 
serious, like in the example given above, the judiciary will circumvent the 
theoretical straightjacket. In such cases, it will apply volition normatively, with a 
view to the desired solution of the case. The frivolous actor is not acquitted of the 
intentional charges made against him, because trust in a good outcome is only 
accepted if it is reasonable and objectively understandable.519 The pessimist actor is 
considered not to deserve harsh punishment and is therefore deemed to have trusted 
in a good outcome, which can be read into the precautions he took to avoid the 
danger.520
Many continental lawyers and practitioners welcome the uncertainty in using 
the volitional criterion. This element allows the triers of fact for discretion in 
attributing intentional liability where it seems warranted.521 The pessimist actor 
518 Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 150–151 and 163 and Jakobs 1995, p. 862.
519 Gatzweiler 2008, pp. 174–179 and 186, who draws the attention to other Germano-Romanic 
legal systems with similar trends.
520 Compare the theory of ‘nicht betätigten Vermeidungswillen’ (Kaufmann) that makes decisive 
the omission of the actor to avoid the risk materializing, and the comparable theory of 
‘abgeschirmten Gefahr’ (Herzberg), mentioned in Roxin 2006, pp. 459–460 and 465–467.
521 See AG Röling in HR 6 February 1951, NJ 1951, 475. For example, it enables the acquittal of the 
police offi cer who shot a fl eeing burglar in the back at a range of three metres, see 6 March 2008 
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would be acquitted because he is considered a ‘basically decent’ person.522 It is 
clear however, that this risks uncertainty and lack of foreseeability, inequality and 
liability based on character. Moreover, dolus becomes normative, whereas it 
expresses a reproach for a subjective relationship between act and actor. By 
attributing intention, the question on whether the defendant really had intention is 
surpassed and cases of negligence are included in the scope of intent.523
Finally, it can be doubted whether every defendant always takes a position on 
the occurrence of the risk. It is argued that awareness of the risk implies that the 
actor must have taken a position on it, but if we know that it is not always evident 
that someone has considered all the possible side-effects of his actions,524 then how 
can we accept that – in the heat of the moment – he has made the valuation and 
decided to act nonetheless?525 In many impulsive acts, the defendant will not have 
had the opportunity to make a decision. Many cases seem to imply no disposition at 
all. This does not mean that the defendant relied on a good outcome, but neither 
does it imply he must have accepted the risk. Nonetheless, the volitional element 
suggests that a decision is always made. The actor either accepted the risk or trusted 
in a good outcome. This explains that courts are forced to take a stand on a position 
that might be lacking. As a result, a fi ctional disposition is attributed to the 
defendant.526
5.3.6. Awareness is the better dividing line
Whereas the border drawn by volition is uncertain and therefore diffi cult to apply, 
the border drawn by awareness is clearer and the different fault elements are 
therefore easier to apply. As noted, I propose a tripartite system of fault that uses 
recklessness as a middle category.527 The distinction of eventualis and advertent 
negligence is no longer relevant, since recklessness covers both fault elements. All 
these elements deal with side-effects that were foreseen by the actor.528
By rejecting the relevance of attitudes as to this risk, the contours of culpa 
become clear again. Culpa is limited to those cases where the defendant is unaware 
of the risk. This enables us to distinguish between the wicked and the stupid.529 “It 
is clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and signifi cant risk of causing injury to 
BGH BeckRS 2008, 04800 and the similar case 25 March 1999 BGH JR 2000, 297.
522 Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 170.
523 See van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 239–240 and 319–323 and Kwakman in Keulen, Knigge & 
Wolswijk 2007, pp. 309–312.
524 Ashworth 2008A, pp. 237–238: “(…) some or many people who use violence may have little 
appreciation of the extent of the harm or injury they will cause.”
525 Taylor, G. 2004B, pp. 359–360.
526 Taylor, G. 2004A, pp. 121–122.
527 See also annotator Keijzer in HR 29 September 2009, NJ 2010, 117.
528 The most serious form of culpa, which is luxuria: ‘Leichtfertigkeit’ and ‘roekeloosheid’, is 
subsumed by recklessness as well, see IV.6.7.
529 Weigend 1981, p. 677.
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another. But it is not clearly blameworthy to do something involving a risk of injury 
to another if (…) one genuinely does not perceive the risk. Such a person may fairly 
be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those failings should 
expose him to conviction of serious crime or the risk of punishment.”530 Even 
though it is accepted in this general part that inadvertent negligence may be 
punished, it is important to distinguish the wicked from the stupid. The difference 
in culpability between the two is an argument to clearly separate recklessness, 
based on advertence, from culpa, based on inadvertence.
5.3.7. Easier to prove
An important function of dolus eventualis is to facilitate proof. In general, an 
offence element that requires intention can be fulfi lled by either proof of dolus 
directus, indirectus or eventualis. As a consequence, the prosecution generally only 
seeks to prove that the defendant acted with eventualis. This is easier to prove and 
explain by judges in their verdicts, because its cognitive and volitional aspects are 
very diluted in comparison to dolus (in)directus. It does not need to be proven that 
the actor knew something was almost certain to happen, merely that he was aware 
it was possible that a result could materialize. It also does not need to be proven that 
the actor wanted a result to occur; only that he accepted that this could happen.
The rejection of eventualis clearly limits the scope of dolus. Paradigm cases of 
eventualis can only amount to reckless liability and eventualis no longer suffi ces as 
proof for dolus directus or indirectus. This brings about that the two most serious 
forms of dolus need to be actually proven. On the one hand, this increases the 
burden of proof and may make just convictions more diffi cult. On the other hand, 
we should limit the label of liability to what is actually proven. If the accused is 
charged with intending to damage something, this should not be accepted upon 
proof of the conscious creation of a danger.
Moreover, the objective evidential approach that facilitates proof of fault can 
also be applied to dolus (in)directus. The prosecution often merely seeks to prove 
eventualis since he is not required to prove more. It is an economic decision. 
However, this does not mean the prosecutor would be unable to prove more serious 
forms of dolus by inferring purpose or knowledge from conduct, circumstances and 
so on. English criminal law restricts dolus to directus and indirectus too, yet is very 
able to prove these fault elements by reference to facts and circumstances.531 In the 
Netherlands, proof of dolus directus and indirectus is also easily inferred. For 
example, the ulterior intent of disposing over goods without paying for it (in full) 
530 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50, §32 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.
531 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 616 and Williams 1953, p. 142 submit that the claim of a defendant 
that he made a mistake or was ignorant as to an offence element is often seen as a general 
defence, like self-defence, because usually fault is established quite easily from the facts.
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was inferred from the general experience that someone who is in the fi nancial 
situation of the defendant must have known he would not be able to pay.532
Recall as an example of an objective approach the judicial formula that the 
external manifestation of the act is so much directed at a certain consequence, that 
the only conclusion can be that the defendant accepted the consequences, barring 
contraindication. This formula is hardly controversial as it leads to the acceptance 
of eventualis in cases where the actor infl icted very serious violence upon somebody 
and then argued he did not intend this serious injury. For example, the defendant 
shot at the victim with a fi rearm, yet argued he only wanted to injure him, not kill 
him. We should not merely hold that the defendant consciously accepted the lethal 
risk, when we believe that he wanted to kill the victim. Eventualis is used too often, 
only because it suffi ces.533
In England, it is also common to infer knowledge and intent from the external 
manifestation of the act, after which it is up to the defendant to rebut the prima 
facie case against him. When consequences are very likely to follow from conduct, 
this may be used to infer intent, but other circumstances of the case can also be 
used to fi nd knowledge or intent, such as that you are buying stolen goods when the 
price is ridiculously low and the location strange.534 There is no need to resort to 
eventualis to hold the accused liable for such an offence. A similar approach is 
conducted in the context of possessing drugs. The offence was interpreted as 
requiring knowledge on the drugs, but at the same time, the required knowledge is 
limited. It need not be specifi c, and could be presumed when found in possession of 
drugs. For the presumption to be rebutted the defendant not only has to make 
probable he was ignorant, but also that he had no reason to suspect he was 
possessing controlled substances.535
Not all cases that qualify under eventualis can be proven by reference to dolus 
directus or indirectus. Cases that are not merely proven by reference to eventualis 
for pragmatic reasons can be punished under recklessness. Proving recklessness is 
much more straightforward than proving eventualis as only the subjective 
awareness of any risk needs to be proven. The diffi culties in proving that the 
defendant accepted the risk do not apply to recklessness. Awareness is much more 
basic in character, less profound and less intimate than the volitional element. As a 
consequence, it is much easier to be reliably proven from facts and circumstances.536 
The use of eventualis and advertent negligence implies this too, because the 
establishment of awareness necessarily precedes the question of attitude.
Secondly, proof of awareness does not require much. Awareness is fulfi lled if 
the defendant knew the risk might occur. He need not continuously or even at the 
532 HR 17 September 1990, NJ 1991, 58.
533 Weigend 1981, pp. 691–692.
534 Edwards 1954, pp. 295–298. See IV.2.5.3.
535 Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256. Codifi ed as a defence in section 28(3) of the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971, see R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37.
536 Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 78; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 285, 288–290 and 375.
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time of acting think about the risk. If the person knows something is dangerous like 
anyone else, it is no problem that at the moment of the crime he did not consciously 
refl ect on the risk. Consider that the more evident knowledge is for someone, the 
less conscious he thinks about it. Awareness does not have to be explicit or 
conscious, as general awareness or background knowledge suffi ces.537 Awareness 
at one point in time suffi ces. When a defendant acts impulsively or in a bad temper, 
the state of mind is assessed at an earlier and calmer time in order to prevent 
acquittal. When the defendant closes his mind to the obvious, he can still be 
reckless.538
Extending the interpretation of dolus to eventualis is not the only way to upgrade 
liability for the causing of more harm than intended. If desired, this can be 
accomplished through the special part as well. The offence can be defi ned in a way 
that it not only covers the intentional causing of a serious harm but also the intent to 
cause a lesser harm which led to the more serious harm. For example, the English 
offence murder not only covers the intent to kill but also the intent to cause gross 
bodily harm, which results in death.539
When we consider that the English prosecutor only needs to prove the lesser 
intent, the lack of dolus eventualis to the most serious form of homicide is put into 
perspective. When the conduct was objectively very dangerous and the defendant 
pleads he did not want to kill the victim, there is no need to use eventualis: it can be 
inferred reliably he wanted to infl ict gross bodily harm.540 This technique is also 
used in other Member States in so-called result-based offences, where intent need 
not relate to the (more serious) result. The fault element as to this more serious 
harm, such as death during a robbery, can be either negligence, and in Dutch law 
even strict. Other ways of facilitating proof of liability for foreseen side-effects is to 
create offences of endangerment. Certain knowledge on a danger is the same as 
537 Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on Opzet; Brady 1996, pp. 187–188 and 199; Ashworth 2006, pp. 
183–185 and R. v. Stephenson [1979] EWCA Crim 1: “Proof of the requisite knowledge in the 
mind of the defendant will in most cases present little diffi culty. The fact that the risk of some 
damage would have been obvious to anyone in his right mind in the position of the defendant is 
not conclusive proof of the defendant’s knowledge, but it may well be and in many cases 
doubtless will be a matter which will drive the jury to the conclusion that the defendant himself 
must have appreciated the risk.”
538 R. v. Stephenson [1979] EWCA Crim 1: “We wish to make it clear that the test remains 
subjective, that the knowledge or appreciation of risk of some damage must have entered the 
defendant’s mind even though he may have suppressed it or driven it out.” See also IV.2.5; R. v. 
Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600; Edwards 1954, pp. 301–303; Ormerod 2005, p. 103; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, pp. 135–136 and Ashworth 2006, pp. 183–185.
539 Ashworth 2006, p. 256.
540 This does not refute the argument on the moral and legal distinction between dolus (in)directus 
and eventualis. The broad scope of murder in England as including both the person who wanted 
to kill and the person who intented to infl ict severe injuries has been criticized in England for 
decades and even given rise to a Law Commission proposal to restrure homicide offences. Even 
Public Prosecutors have expressed concern that juries tend to acquit defendants altogether 
because they feel the conviction and mandatory punishment for someone who ‘only’ intended to 
injure is inappropriate.
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knowing there is a possibility of harm.541 The evidential facilitation is that the 
actual risk need not have materialized.
A criminal legal justice system that respects both its functions of shield and 
sword should operate with a general part that is enforceable. This means that fault 
elements should be “simple and easy to apply and at the same time conceptually 
rich enough to enable a judge to make all those distinctions that must play a role in 
the administration of criminal justice.”542 Recklessness is able to strike this delicate 
balance. It is simple enough to apply and makes dolus more comprehensible too, 
whereas it meets the need of differentiating between those defendants that intend 
harm and those that merely foresee harm. On the one hand, recklessness extends 
liability in comparison to eventualis but on the other, being convicted of a reckless 
offence does not bring about the same severe legal consequences as being convicted 
of an intentional crime. Moreover, dolus is neither distorted in substance nor by 
procedure.
5.4. Normative aspects
The third category of arguments in favour of using recklessness for a general part of 
criminal law for the EU deals with the advantage of taking into account normative 
aspects. First, let us clear up again how this normative approach works. Reckless-
ness requires actual awareness of any degree of risk, which is unreasonable. 
Whether a risk is reasonable is judged according to the social utility of the act rela-
tive to the nature of the activity and the degree of risk. This is why any risk suffi ces 
and there is no need for a threshold of probability. A small chance can be 
unreasonable if it has no social utility and presents the possibility of great harm. 
The more valuable a legal interest is, the sooner a risk becomes relevant. I already 
gave the example of having unprotected sexual intercourse. The chance of HIV-
infection might be small, but the consequence very serious.
The risk can also be reasonable if the actor furthers a good cause that necessarily 
brings about a small chance of minimal harm. We take risks all day, often even 
professionally. Driving a vehicle or operating an industrial machine in compliance 
with the pertinent rules may cause unwanted side-effects, but when they occur, this 
does not make us recklessly liable. Recklessness thus protects paranoid actors with 
a vivid and pessimist imagination, as in the example above, against liability. The 
actor might have considered all possible effects of his actions, but liability not 
automatically follows when unlikely side-effects occur.543
A great chance of a small risk does not necessarily constitute recklessness either. 
I gave the example of the high likelihood that this book bores its reader, as a side-
541 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 316–317. Offences of endangerment and result-based offences are also 
discussed in V.2.3.
542 Jareborg according to Ambos 2005, p. 178.
543 See Prittwitz 1993, pp. 351–352.
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effect of purpose to design a general part of criminal law for the EU. This does not 
amount to an unreasonable risk. I argued that the aspect of unreasonableness 
excludes trivial harm from liability and thus helps to prevent over-criminalization. 
Such a safety valve is missing in the neutral concept of dolus. In principle any harm 
can be committed intentionally, unless aspects extrinsic to dolus, like the harm 
principle and justifi cations, preclude this.
The normative criterion of reasonableness thus enables both the extension and 
restriction of relevant risks. We take risks all day and that many of them are 
inevitable. Criminal liability should therefore be limited to the taking of risks, 
which are unreasonable, given the goal of the conduct and the nature and extent of 
the possible harm. Whereas the concept of dolus eventualis cannot provide for such 
a limitation, recklessness can. In the proposed tripartite system, recklessness and 
culpa both revolve around the taking of unreasonable risks.544 If a risk is objectively 
reasonable, there can be no liability, accept when the offence is strict. The 
difference between the two is that the reckless actor was aware of a risk inherent in 
his conduct. The negligent actor was unaware of the risk he created, whilst he 
should and could have known. Awareness is thus the clear dividing line. There is no 
room for confusing concepts as conscious negligence. Using recklessness brings 
about that culpa consists only of inadvertent negligence.
Whereas in eventualis, the attitude of the defendant is often irrelevant in 
practice, in recklessness, it is always irrelevant. If a person has taken an obvious or 
unreasonable risk, dolus eventualis is likely to be inferred, even if the defendant 
claims he trusted everything would be alright. When the risk and the possible harm 
were great, lay people do not attach much weight to the question of whether the 
defendant trusted in a good outcome. In practice, neither do continental lawyers. 
The reproach focuses on the conscious creation of an unreasonable risk. It is 
therefore logical, many continental scholars have tried to either explain the practical 
applications of dolus eventualis by reference to a normative concept or even 
advocated the use of such a concept. In many aspects, a normative concept of 
eventualis as for example Frisch has advocated, resembles recklessness.545 He 
argued that intention is acting while being aware of a concrete danger that is 
normatively relevant.546 Both eventualis and recklessness give primacy to the 
objective assessment of risks. However, only the concept of recklessness is straight 
forward about this. In eventualis, the defendant’s plea is rejected or circumvented 
by evidential approaches whereas in recklessness, the concept itself clearly 
determines that neither attitude, nor mistakes on the degree of the risk are relevant.
Since recklessness is distinguished from intent, the objections that can be made 
to making dolus a more normative concept do not apply. Dolus retains its purity by 
544 Weigend 1981, pp. 676–677 and Weigend in Klip 2011, pp. 164–165.
545 Frisch 1983, in particular pp. 301, 322–323, 462–462, 474, 487–495 and 500. See also Strijards 
1983, pp. 102–103, who argues dolus eventualis is about a legally inacceptable chance, see 
IV.3.4.5. and IV.3.6.8.
546 Frisch 1983, pp. 487–494. See IV.3.4.5.
Chapter IV
160 
dealing with normative issues in recklessness. The meaning of intent is not 
stretched to forms that lead to suspicion of normative infl uences. The tripartite 
system of fault elements provides us with a subjective or psychological concept of 
dolus and a predominantly objective concept of culpa. In between those two 
elements, recklessness is positioned, which is both subjective and objective in 
nature. It is subjective because it requires actual, personal awareness of the 
defendant that he takes any risk, but whether this risk is in fact unreasonable is 
assessed objectively, independent of the valuation of the defendant.547
This approach can be compared to the manner in which mistakes on normative 
elements infl uence dolus: if the defendant knows all the facts that are relevant for 
the assessment of the risk, the fact that he made a different valuation, for example, 
whether acting based on certain facts was unacceptable or indecent, does not negate 
dolus.548 Normative valuations are made by the legal order. These valuations prevail 
over individual considerations, since any other approach would make the scope of 
the law dependent on the will of the individual and thereby risk inequality and 
uncertainty to everyone. In EU competition law, a similar approach exists as to the 
facts and valuation underlying the anti-competitive nature of an agreement and the 
transnational character of its anti-competitive effect.549
Consider that a motor company accepts a risk of fatalities because it has calculated 
that a recall of all vehicles would cost more than what they expect to be convicted for 
in civil law as compensation.550 The fact that the company accepts the risk does not 
make this risk reasonable under criminal law. As a result, the company could be held 
liable for recklessness. This example demonstrates that the reproach in recklessness is 
not based solely on the awareness of the facts grounding a risk, but also on the fact 
that by acting, the defendant made a different valuation of this risk that the law 
prescribes. By favouring profi t over human lives, the company’ defi nition of with is 
reasonable differed grossly from what the legal order fi nds reasonable.
5.5. Fault in attempt and participation
This proposal has consequences to other important doctrines of criminal liability, 
such as attempt and participation. Both doctrines are not part of this particular 
547 It is clear again how much this resembles a normative concept of dolus eventualis. De Jong, D.H. 
2004B, p. 76 argues eventualis has both a psychological and normative part and Frisch 1983, pp. 
487–494 distinguishes the knowledge of the risk (Vorsatzbegriff) from the normative appraisal 
of the risk (Vorsatzgegenstand). Frisch 1983 also argues on pp. 462–462, 474 and 495 that 
justifi cations therefore make risks reasonable, negating the objective part of dolus.
548 See IV.2.4.8.
549 7 June 1983, Cases 100–103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Française [1983] ECR 1825; Opinion of 
AG Mazák on 22 April 2010, Case 280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom, not yet reported, and 
14 December 2006, Cases T-259–264 and 271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich, [2006] 
ECR II-5169.
550 I left out additional issues such as the loss of reputation by recalling vehicles on the one hand 
and by being convicted, both in criminal and civil law, on the other hand.
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research and are therefore not discussed in detail.551 However, many of the 
examples and cases in this book deal with attempt, which warrants a brief 
discussion of the question what fault element should be required in that context. In 
addition, the case in favour of using recklessness can be strengthened by pointing 
out the advantages it has in the context of participation.
5.5.1. Attempt
Coherency requires that fault should bear the same meaning in attempt as in 
completed offences. The rejection of dolus eventualis in completed offences thus 
brings about that this fault element should not suffi ce for attempt liability either. A 
subsequent question is whether attempt could instead be committed recklessly.552 
Since recklessness also covers cases of conscious negligence, this would be an 
extension of attempt liability from a Dutch and German perspective.553 It would 
also be an extension from an English perspective, as recklessness does not suffi ce 
for attempt in English law.554
I see no reason to deviate from the existing English approach. This has proven 
to work in practice and is coherent with fault in completed crimes, committed by 
one actor. This means that only dolus directus and indirectus suffi ce for attempt 
and participation.555 In other words, an actor can only be punished for being aware 
a risk may materialize when it facts does materialize. This more limited approach 
to fault in attempt also prevents the distortion of the concept. Linguistically and 
conceptually, attempt is strained if it can be committed by merely foreseeing side-
effects. Attempt is connected to a purpose, the only difference with a completed 
crime being that the actor failed to achieve his purpose. The defendant does not 
‘attempt’ to bring about side-effects which he does not seek, except for those side-
effects which are certain to occur. Though dolus indirectus may also linguistically 
strain the concept of attempt, good reasons have been given to equate it with dolus 
directus, such as the certainty of the result and the lack of a moral difference 
between the two.
Consider the case where the accused wants to set fi re to a house in order to kill 
the inha bi tant, his arch enemy. He contemplates and accepts the possibility that 
fi remen will die in the line of duty as well as that the fi re might spread to 
neighbouring buildings resul ting in even more fatalities. His plan does not work out 
as planned: his enemy succeeds in getting out of the house and the fi re is 
extinguished before it can spread to the adjacent buildings. No one would deny that 
551 See Keiler 2012, forthcoming.
552 See Weigend 1981, p. 699.
553 Beulke 2008, p. 247 and Bosch 2008, p. 174.
554 Weigend 1981, pp. 676 and 679.
555 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 108. Some English authors argue that indirect intent does not suffi ce for 
attempt, like Ormerod 2008, p. 381. This issue has not been the object of much debate in 
Germany and the Netherlands since the lesser dolus eventualis also suffi ces.
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the defendant can be convic ted of attempting to kill his enemy. But should he be 
held liable for attempting to kill the fi remen and people living in the vicinity too? If 
attempt merely required dolus eventualis or recklessness, this would be possible. 
But where should one draw the line? Should he be held liable for attempting to kill 
all the fi remen who rushed to the fi re, all the inhabitants in a radius of half a mile? 
It seems more appropriate to convict the defendant for attempting to kill the person 
he wanted to kill.
By choosing this manner of killing his enemy, he also showed contempt for the 
interest of the fi remen and neighbours because he consciously took the risk of 
killing them too. If this should be punished in addition to the attempt, convicting 
him of an offence of endangerment can also enable this. It is common for Member 
States to have an offence of exposing others to a risk to their life or limb by creating 
a fi re.556 It follows that an important reason to criminalize recklessness in England 
is the fact that the risk materialized. This creates a signifi cant contrast with its 
functional equivalent dolus eventualis, which is often used to ground an attempt.
Attempt should therefore be limited to dolus, with one fi nal exception, namely 
when recklessness would have also suffi ced for the complete offence. If the offence 
defi nition requires recklessness as to some elements, proof of recklessness as to 
those elements should also suffi ce for attempt liability. Some offence defi nitions 
require intention as to conduct and recklessness as to a circumstance. The offence 
of (statutory) rape can for example require intent as to the intercourse and 
recklessness as to the circumstance of age or consent. As recognized in English 
law, it would be absurd if the completed crime lets recklessness as to the consent or 
age suffi ce, but would require intent as to such a circumstance if the actor failed to 
penetrate.557 By contrast, in order to hold attempt liability, intention must relate to 
the penetration, but nothing more than recklessness would be required in relation to 
the circumstance of age or consent. It is very diffi cult to give a principled criterion 
for the excep tion.558 In general, it can be said that the exception only applies to 
offences that require recklessness as to a circumstantial element and intention as to 
another. In Dutch law, a similar rule exists. If negligence suffi ces as to an 
accompanying circumstance of an otherwise intentional offence, such as that the 
556 See article 157 of the Dutch Criminal Code, §§306a-c of the German Criminal Code and section 
3 of the English Criminal Damage Act 1971. The offences of endangerment in traffi c in §315 and 
following of the German Criminal Code can also be explained by reference to the aforementioned 
example that not stopping one’s vehicle for a police offi cer who has to jump aside in order to 
avoid a collision, generally does not suffi ce to accept conditional intent as required for attempt 
liability.
557 R. v. Khan [1990] 1 WLR 815; Attorney-General’s Reference no. 3 of 1992 [1994] 2 All ER 121; 
section 49(2) Draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 64 and Safferling 2008, pp. 413–
415. The offences of (statutory) rape in England currently however no longer require proof of 
fault as to the age or consent. Just like in Dutch law, the intent of an attempted statutory rape 
should thus relate only to the having sexual intercourse, not the age of the victim, see Mols & 
Wöretshofer 1994, p. 16.
558 Duff 1995 makes an attempt, which did not however convince me.
Fault elements
 163
object was stolen, nothing more than negligence is required in relation to this 
circumstance for attempt liability.559
Restricting the scope of attempt and preparation560 to dolus (in)directus may be 
criticized as attaching too much weight to moral luck. After all, in such an 
approach, the liability of the defendant will hinge to an important extent on whether 
the risk materialized or not. The person who knows he is HIV-positive, could not be 
held liable for an attempted infection when having unprotected sexual intercourse. 
However, if we focus on the harm principle, the distinction in liability according to 
the outcome is legitimate. Alternatively, if criminal liability is considered 
appropriate, the legislator could choose to criminalize the creation of the risk itself.
5.5.2. Participation
In the context of participating in a crime, by for example, aiding the principal, it can 
also be asked what kind of fault element should suffi ce. The basic rule is that the 
intent of the participant must also relate to the specifi c offence that is committed by 
the principal.561 That rule can come under pressure in cases where the defendant, 
did not want to participate in an offence, but contributed to the offence by an 
innocuous act. It is also relevant in cases where the perpetrator commits a more 
serious or different offence than was agreed upon by the participant. It is tempting 
to hold all participants liable for these ‘collateral offences’ based on foreseeability, 
or on the idea that the more serious offence was of the same type or not entirely 
different from what was intended. However, every single participant can only be 
held liable for those offences he intended or at least foresaw.
As a lower limit, dolus eventualis is a popular concept in holding the participant 
liable for actions of the perpetrator. For example, this fault element as to death is 
easily established upon knowledge that the perpetrator took a fi rearm to a 
confrontation.562 The advantage of using recklessness as the lower limit here 
becomes obvious if we consider that under eventualis, the scope of aiding and 
abetting is too broad. One could imagine a cashier in a garden centre with a vivid 
imagination, who believes that some of his clients are terrorists. If the manure he 
sold is in fact used to make a bomb, he could be held liable for participation too.
Eventualis does not exclude the cashier from liability, leaving him to the whims 
of prosecutorial discretion. Recklessness would provide for an appropriate threshold 
to liability, because it also limits liability normatively. The degree of likelihood of 
the risk occurring and the nature of the risk are weighed against the social utility of 
the act that gives rise to the risk. The fact that selling manure is a legitimate act can 
559 Intention must relate to the other offence elements, like selling, see HR 6 February 1990, NJ 
1990, 417. In contrast to prevailing opinion, Mols & Wöretshofer 1994, pp. 21–22 argue in favour 
of attempting other negligent offences too, like negligent killing.
560 See de Hullu 2009, pp. 404 and 418.
561 Hamdorf 2007, p. 215.
562 HR 8 May 2001, NJ 2001, 480.
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offset the small chance that it will be used to make a bomb. The risk might become 
less acceptable if there are circumstances surrounding the sale that must have raised 
suspicion.563 Still, this suspicion must have entered the defendant’s mind through 
facts known to him. The paranoid actor is thereby excluded from liability.
If it cannot be proven that what the defendant argued was a deviation from what 
was agreed upon, was foreseen by him, he can still be punished based on other 
forms of liability than participation. An alternative would be to convict him for 
(assisting in) the result based offence of robbery resulting in death. It suffi ces to 
prove that the defendant intended to assist the robbery, and the reasonable person 
would have foreseen this could lead to fatalities given the circumstances. These 
result-based offences are quite common, requiring negligence or even no fault at all 
as to the fatality and thereby reducing the strain to legal principles such as 
participation.564
5.6. Concluding remarks
For all these reasons, a general part of criminal law for the EU should use three 
kinds of fault. Dolus encompasses those results that were wanted or known to occur 
with almost absolute certainty. Reckless is the actor who was aware of unreasonable 
risks and negligent is the actor who was unaware of unreasonable risks. This latter 
element, culpa, will be discussed in the next paragraph.
My proposal largely follows the English distinction in fault elements. Thus, 
consistency is ensured as the English legal system has proven to be enforceable. 
Other continental scholars, like Thomas Weigend565 and Bernd Schünemann,566 
have also argued in favour of third fault element in between dolus and culpa.567 
Referring to a possible general part of criminal law for the EU, Australian scholar 
Greg Taylor came to a very similar proposal.568 Finally, the Corpus Juris projects 
are in line with this proposal.569 The popularity of this tripartite system of fault 
may be seen as an argument of authority.
As for its higher limit, recklessness is distinguished from dolus by probability. 
In 1979, Danish scholar Ross wrote that he believed that the trend of scholars to 
‘free themselves from the empty formulas on volition’, would evolve into a sole 
focus on probability.570 The lower limit of dolus – dolus indirectus – labels side-
effects which are almost certain to follow from the wanted consequences as 
563 Compare HR 30 June 2009, NJ 2009, 481.
564 Compare 27 January 2011 BeckRS 2011, 03958.
565 Weigend 1981. See also Weigend in Klip 2011.
566 Schünemann 1985, pp. 363–364.
567 Robroek 2010, pp. 18 and 29 refers to the Dutch Scholars Langemeijer and Wijnaendts Francken, 
who made similar proposals.
568 Taylor, G. 2004A and 2004B.
569 Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 192.
570 Ross 1979.
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(indirectly) intended outcomes too. The probability is decisive in limiting dolus 
indirectus, as the defen dant must know with a high degree of certainty that his 
conduct will result in the prohibited consequences. Since no one can ever know that 
a result is certain to follow, certain means almost certain or certain, barring some 
unforeseen inter vention.571 Anything below this threshold is insuffi cient for dolus 
indirectus and brings us in the realm of recklessness.572
Being asked to criticize the proposal, Weigend raises some doubts as to the 
demarcation of dolus indirectus with recklessness by means of the degree of likeli-
hood.573 First of all, such a quantitative demarcation would require us to second-
guess as to what went on in the defendant’s mind at a certain point in the past. This 
is correct, but can also be raised as a general problem in regard to proving fault. 
Moreover, the qualitative demarcation of volition leads to more problems. Using 
probability as the distinguishing feature is the lesser evil: inferring awareness is 
much easier and more reliable than volition. The attitude of a defendant is much 
harder to assess than subjective probability.
Secondly, Weigend argues that there exists no rational basis for placing the 
lower limit of certainty required for dolus indirectus at 99, 95, 90 or 89 percent 
certainty. Whereas it is indeed somewhat arbitrary to quantify a chance that is 
expressed qualitatively, I also explained that this is general problem of fault 
elements, which is most serious in the context of dolus eventualis.574 After all, it is 
much more diffi cult to reach consensus on what chance is ‘considerable’ than to 
agree on what almost certain is, expressed in a percentage. If pressed to put a 
number on almost certain, barring some unforeseen intervention, 99 percent to me 
seems most accura te. Only such a high degree of probability warrants the extension 
of dolus. Only in such a case, is it legitimate to equate the foresight of causing harm 
with the purpose to bring it about.575
Third, Weigend raises the question of whether or not the chance of dolus 
indirectus should also be assessed in a normative way. Should both quality and 
quantity of the risk matter? Should the nature of the possible harm be taken into 
account, just as in recklessness? He gives the example of a person having 
unprotected sexual inter course whilst knowingly being infected with HIV. Could 
we imagine the normative risk to qualify as almost certain, given the seriousness of 
the possible consequen ces?576 The answer to this question must surely be negative: 
we should not claim that this defendant intended to infect the victim. This would 
run contrary to the nature of dolus, and dolus indirectus in particular. First of all, as 
571 Ashworth 2006, p. 177; Williams 1953, p. 37; Ormerod 2005, p. 97; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 347; 
Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Opzet; Bohlander 2009, p. 64 and Beulke 2008, p. 78. This can 
be equated with the ‘ordinary course of events’ used in article 30 of the Rome Statute.
572 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 124–126; Law Commission 1989, pp. 192–193; Law Commission 
1993, p. 10 and Williams 1953, p. 39.
573 Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 162.
574 See IV.3.4.4.
575 See IV.2.3.2.
576 Weigend in Klip 2011, p. 162.
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reiterated above, dolus indirectus is legitimized by the high degree of empirical 
probability, verging on certainty. Secondly, there is no room for normative aspects 
in dolus. In fact, by setting aside dolus eventualis, we enable dolus to retain or, 
depending on the pertinent legal system, reclaim its psychological character.
Finally, as far as demarcation is concerned, it could be argued that the concept 
of normative risks brings about an additional layer of assessment and thereby 
possibly an additional layer of problems. The practice in England has however not 
shown this to be a legitimate concern. I admit that problems of demarcation will 
remain to some extent, not so much because a tripartite system brings about an 
additional distinc tion, but because any categorization of fault elements and any 
criterion sparks legal debate. Discussion will remain as long as there is something 
to demarcate.577
None the less, I have argued that in distinguishing fault by awareness rather than 
volition, the problems of demarcation will signifi cantly decrease. Legal systems 
that apply a threefold distinction as opposed to a dichotomy of fault elements are 
less sensitive to differences in legal consequences and problems of demarcation.578 
This implies that less pressure is put on the concepts of intent and negligence to in- 
or exclude certain cases.579 The less pressure is put on it, the better the law becomes.
6. CULPA
Culpa denotes a culpable failure to be aware of the unreasonable risk entailed in 
one’s conduct.580 The actor did not understand the possible consequences of his 
actions. Culpa therefore consists of a lack of knowledge or care, a psychological 
fl aw. It is grounded in inadvertence.581 This lack of awareness is what separates 
culpa from recklessness. In a general part of criminal law for the EU, only 
inadvertent negligence should exist.
In addition, the inadvertence must be culpable, that is, reproachable. This means 
that a defendant is negligent when a reasonable person in the same circumstances 
would have been aware of the risks and would not have run those risks.582 Culpa 
can therefore also be seen as punishment for the ability to do otherwise, the ability 
to behave carefully or in such a way to prevent the result.583 The intentional actor 
used his capacities in an incorrect manner, whereas the negligent actor did not use 
his capacities when he should have used them.584
577 Weigend in Klip 2011, pp. 161 and 170.
578 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 315.
579 Weigend 1981, p. 687.
580 Smith A.T.H. in Glazebrook 1978, p. 101 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 113.
581 De Hullu 2006, p. 243 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 125.
582 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 145 and 148.
583 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 54–55 and 61–62; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 30 and 69 and Krey 
2002, pp. 142–143.
584 Smidt 1881 I, p. 78.
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6.1. Terminology
The fault element culpa may be applied in EU criminal law to cover cases where 
the defendant negligently caused the fulfi lment of a criminal offence. The perhaps 
more precise Latin translation, neglegentia, is not used because the juxtaposition of 
dolus and culpa is already quite common in many Member States.585 The term 
negligence will be used to refer to national concepts. By way of exception, this term 
is some times used for stylistic reasons, such as when culpa is referred to as an 
adjective. It will be made clear by the context whether it refers to the EU or national 
concept.
Culpa can be expressed in many different ways. Terms as ‘carelessness’, and 
‘lack of due’ or ‘reasonable care’ all indicate that culpa is required.586 Culpa usually 
relates to consequences and is discussed mostly in this context, also by me. Culpa 
hardly ever relates to conduct,587 and the criteria developed in the context of conse-
quen ces cannot be directly applied to conduct-based negligent offences.588 Amongst 
others, since the violation of a duty of care need not have caused harm, the breach 
of duty itself triggers liability. Issues of causation therefore hardly play a role.589
If culpa is required as to circumstances, the objective suspicion that a 
circumstance is or would be fulfi lled, like the criminal origin of goods, suffi ces for 
liability.590 This is apparent in phrases like ‘reasonable ground to suspect’,591 ‘ought 
to know’,592 or ‘as he reasonably should suspect’.593 In many offences, intent relates 
to some elements whereas other elements only require negligence.594 It is not 
unusual that a circumstance can be fulfi lled either by intent or negligence, evident 
in phrases like ‘he knows or ought to know’.595 Dolus to circumstances is called 
585 For example, negligence in the Netherlands is also called culpa, see de Hullu 2006, p. 243. Kelk 
2005, pp. 168 and 171–172. See also Austin 1911, p. 432.
586 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 124–125; Smidt 1881 I, p. 78; Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 37 and 
Williams 1953, p. 98.
587 De Hullu 2006, pp. 247–248 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 124–125 implicitly reject 
this possibility.
588 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 294.
589 Beulke 2008, p. 248 argues that the requirement of causation must be replaced by one of 
recognisability of realization of the offence defi nition.
590 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 124; Nieboer 1991, p. 168; Pompe 1935, p. 73 and Visser in 
Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 68.
591 R. v. Forsyth [1997] EWCA Crim 751; Shute in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 192–194 and Keulen 
& Otte 1999, p. 24.
592 See sections 1, 1A and 4 of the English Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
593 See for example articles 132 and 417bis of the Dutch Criminal Code.
594 ‘Pro parte doleus, pro parte culpoos’ or ‘Vorsatz-Fahrlässigkeits-Kombination’, see de Hullu 
2006, p. 249; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 145–146; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 125 and 
Beulke 2008, p. 261.
595 See articles 98 and 225 of the Dutch Criminal Code; article 7 of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 
1994; section 4(1)(b) of the English Animal Welfare Act 2006; Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 24–25 
and Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on Culpa. Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 41 submit most of the 
offences that that relate to circumstances are formulated this way.
Chapter IV
168 
knowledge; the culpable lack of knowledge is a form of culpa. This lack of 
knowledge often consists of an unreasonable mistake or ignorance. As will be 
discussed in greater detail later, if the mistake had been reasonable, the reasonable 
person would have made it as well. The defendant therefore did not deviate from 
this standard and is not negligent.
In the beginning of the chapter, I explained the difference between the fault 
element of culpa and the implied element of every crime that is blameworthiness. 
The fault element is assessed on the fi rst rung of criminal liability; the implied 
element on the third and fi nal rung. I also argued that the implied element merely 
requires some degree of blame whereas in culpa, negligence must be gross. 
Blameworthiness operates as the minimum requirement of the principle of guilt, 
requiring a minimum amount of subjective blame in offences of strict liability, 
which do not require proof of any fault element.596 When fault is included in the 
offence defi nition, but it does not relate to all elements, the element as to which fault 
does not relate is called a ‘strict element’.
In the Netherlands and Germany, this difference is linguistically diffi cult to 
make, as the terms ‘Schuld/schuld’ are often used for both meanings. For example, 
‘dood door schuld’ refers to the offence of negligent killing, but ‘afwezigheid van 
alle schuld’ refers to an excuse that negates the blameworthiness of the actor. 
Finally, a terminological diffi culty is that ‘schuld(ig)’ and ‘guilt(y)’ are also used to 
indicate factual guilt, which denotes that the defendant was the perpetrator.
6.2. Rationale
Culpa can be grounded in inadvertence and the ability to prevent the result. The 
actor is punished because he should and could have foreseen the consequences of 
his actions or omissions.597 The rationale in short can be dubbed ‘failure despite 
capacity’. The negligent actor is not punished merely because he should have acted 
differently but because he also could.598 This implies that the particular defendant 
had the opportunity to conform to the required standard. He is not punished for 
being unaware but because he could have been aware. The result was foreseeable. 
In order to satisfy concerns based on control and choice, individualised 
characteristics are taken into account.599
6.2.1. A balanced approach
By limiting culpa in this way, a balance is struck. On the one hand, legal interests 
must be adequately protected. Grounding liability on culpa affi rms the norms, and 
596 See V.2.3.5.
597 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 47–48 and 55 and de Hullu 2006, p. 246.
598 See Fletcher 1971, p. 423.
599 Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1003.
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gives satisfaction to victims and their relatives.600 Some scholars argue crimes of 
negligence do not deter, because deterrence presupposes refl ection. However, by 
criminalizing culpa, actors are motivated to exercise more care and are deterred 
from violating legal interests. It alerts people to their duties and the need to take 
special care in certain circumstances.601 It is therefore perfectly appropriate to 
require a legal subject to be careful under threat of punishment. Punishment is 
infl icted if the defendant failed to meet the standard, so this defendant and others 
will adapt their behaviour to the pertinent norms in the future.
On the other hand, a retributive perspective on punishment requires blame-
worthiness. From this point of view, the actor should be held liable for culpa only if 
subjective reproach can be directed against him.602 In this light, culpa is deemed to 
be problematic due to lack of awareness and consequently, a lack of suffi cient con-
trol or choice.603 These objections have predominantly been fuelled by eight eenth 
and nineteenth century thinking on criminal law. In Cartesian dualism, the mind 
was separated from the body as subjective, requiring awareness.604 Fault needed to 
be based on a will605 or located in the psyche of the actor.606 Negligent offences 
were therefore seen as confl icting with these principles.607 Just like omission 
liability had to be reconciled with the traditional act requirement, there has been 
resistance to extending fault beyond will and awareness. As will be explained 
below, this resistance still lingers on in England and Germany.
In contrast, it is submitted that culpa does not derogate from subjectivist 
principles of liability.608 The reproach for the failure to advert is in fact grounded in 
the subject and his subjective capacities.609 The actor is not punished for being 
unaware but because he could have been aware. By being able to advert, the actor 
could have foreseen the harm. He is reproached for his ignorance because he has 
the power not to be ignorant. The negligent actor is not punished merely because he 
should have acted differently but because he also could. By being able to act 
otherwise, the actor could have avoided the act.610 The negligent actor is culpable 
600 Robroek 2010, pp. 91–92, 121 and 167–169. See also Kelk 2005, p. 211.
601 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 135; Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, p. 8; Ashworth 
2006, p. 194; Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 156–157; Erenius 1976, p. 119 and Kadish 1989A, 
p.75.
602 See Robroek 2010, pp. 125–127 and 156–169 and Duff 1990, p. 155.
603 Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1002; Kadish 1989A, p. 75; Finkelstein 2000; Erenius 1976, p. 117; 
Duff 1990, p. 153; Green in Simester 2005 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 170–171 and 249.
604 Erenius 1976, p. 126.
605 Koch 1998, pp. 54–55. See also Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), p. 133.
606 De Jong, D.H. 2007, pp. 10–11; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 124; Erenius 1976, p. 126 and 
Fletcher 1971, p. 407.
607 Visser in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 72.
608 Compare Fletcher 1971, p. 417.
609 Fletcher 2002.
610 Kristen, Borgers & Koopmans in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 11–12; van Dijk, A.A. 
2008, pp. 54–55 and 61–62; Fletcher 1971, p. 415; Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 149–151; Duff 
1990, p. 156 and Roxin 2006, p. 1088.
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because he has failed to take reasonable precautions when he has the capacity to do 
so. He has unreasonably, inexcusably fallen short of what is required from him, 
whereas he could have exercised his rational capacities. Therefore, he may be 
punished.611 By taking into account the individual capacities of the defendant and 
to make sure that the defendant is acquitted when he is not blameworthy, retributive 
concerns are met.
A rejection of fault based on inadvertence would offend basic sensibilities of 
justice, especially in cases of insensitive and arrogant (mis)perceptions of legal 
duties.612 I already submitted that the negligent actor, who fails to advert to the 
possible harming of other people’s legal interests, can be just as insuffi ciently 
motivated by the legal interests of others as the intentional actor. After all, if he had 
cared for those interests, would he not have considered the danger he created to 
these interests?613 There may even be instances where inadvertence expresses more 
culpability. Consider the actor who thought about, but misjudged the risks of his 
actions and the actor who never thought about the risks, while he should have.614 
Inadvertence is especially reprehensible in professional contexts, where the actor is 
supposed to know since he bears responsibility and can cause great harm.615
In Roman law, a distinction was made between dolus and casus.616 A distinction 
between harm caused wilfully and accidentally was made in the common law as 
well.617 Culpa could be located somewhere in between the two elements,618 but was 
not identifi ed as relevant for criminal law. In the middle ages, however, criminal 
liability based on culpa became common, even if it remained controversial.619 The 
objections to negligence have quieted down in modern times, due to developments 
in our society that brought about different needs and shifting perceptions of the role 
of the state.
First of all, a classic liberal attitude on criminal law and the state no longer 
applies. In general, the focus of criminal law has moved towards victims of crime. 
From that perspective, negligence liability is important, because there are probably 
more victims of negligent than intentional crimes. Harm infl icted negligently also 
does not have to be less severe than harm infl icted intentionally. In fact, negligent 
conduct can cause great disasters.620 In a society where risks have increased in 
number and seriousness, great harm to many persons can occur when risks are 
611 Ashworth 2006, pp. 192–193 and Kadish 1989A, p. 75. See also Robroek 2010, pp. 153 and 164.
612 Fletcher 1971, pp. 417–422.
613 See Duff 1990, pp. 161–163; Norrie 2006B, pp. 70–76; Brady 1980, p. 391; Brady 1996, pp. 192–
198; De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 135 and Arzt in Stree a.o. 1978, p. 128.
614 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 135, Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 115–116, Nieboer 1991, p. 165 
and Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Culpa. See IV.5.3.5.
615 See Kelk 2005, p. 210 and Kessler Ferzan 2007, p. 2541–2542.
616 Koch 1998, p. 48 and Vrijheid 1918, pp. 75–76.
617 Robinson 1980, p. 843.
618 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 123 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 37.
619 Koch 1998, pp. 48–53.
620 Roxin 2006, p. 1062; Kelk 2005, pp. 209–211 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 148 and 152.
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neglected. This warrants punishing those who fail to recognize danger where they 
should and fail to behave carefully, where appropriate. At the end of the 19th 
century, when the Dutch discussed their criminal code in Parliament, it was already 
acknowledged that this code should also counter, and thus punish, apart from 
intentional wrongdoing, conduct which leads to great danger for the safety of 
persons and goods or cause great and irreversible harm because of the lack of due 
care,621 even though the seriousness of negligent offences was only relatively 
recently expressed by a signifi cant increase in maximum penalties of negligent 
offences.622
When serious consequences have occurred, society wants to hold someone 
liable for this.623 Citizens require their government to prevent them from becoming 
the victims of other people’s negligence. Criminal law is used in the expectation 
that its subjects will exercise more care and attempt to minimize risks.624 In the 
Dutch and German legal system, intentional offences have a negligent counterpart 
when the pertinent legal interest is considered important or when the legislator 
wanted to have a solution for evidential problems.625 Like all lesser forms of fault 
than intention, negligence too functions as a facilitator of proof to ensure a criminal 
conviction when important legal interests are infringed. When intention cannot be 
proven, usually a negligent offence is available to function as a safety net.626
On the other hand, the scope of liability must not extend so far that it infects 
action altogether and thereby cripples society. This is furthered by requiring that 
the carelessness must be gross.627 Culpa is thereby distinguished from casus, as not 
all inadvertent acts are culpable.628 The act or omission of the defendant must fall 
considerably short of what is expected from a reasonable person in order to incur 
liability. In conclusion, as required by the criteria of synthesis set out in chapter 
two, a balance is struck between the different perspectives by taking the individual 
subjective capacities as the basis for the attribution and by making sure that only 
serious violations of duties of due care incur criminal liability. Punishment is only 
621 Smidt 1881 I, p. 77.
622 In contrast to the maximum penalty of nine monts imprisonment, the negligent exposure to 
radiation leading to death was punished by legislator with a maximum of two years of 
imprisonment in 1970. In 1989, the same maximum was applied to negligently contaminating 
surface water, leading to death, see Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, pp. 7–8. As 
mentioned before, the maximum penalties for negligent offences in the context of road traffi c 
offences was raised in 1998, followed in 2006 by a more general increase of maximum penalties 
for negligent offences.
623 Buruma in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 4; Kelk 2008B, pp. 26–27; de Jong 2007, pp. 
10–11; Prittwitz 1993, pp. 314–321 and 379–380 and Spencer & Brajeux 2010, pp. 10 and 18.
624 Although this effect is not proven by statistics, governments seem to keep believing in it.
625 Nieboer 1991, pp. 166–167.
626 Compare article 5 of Regulation 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities fi nancial interests, OJ 1995 L 312/1.
627 See Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1003.
628 Finkelstein 2000, p. 914.
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appropriate when the harm is great, the risk is obvious and the defendant has the 
capacity to take the required precautions.629
6.2.2. Popularity
In conducting comparative legal research on negligence, one of the things that 
struck me was the difference in popularity of this fault element in the Member 
States under investigation. In short, negligence is a fault element in many criminal 
offences in Germany, whereas in English offences, negligence is relatively hardly 
ever required. There are multiple explanations for this. First of all, negligence is 
much more popular in Germany and the Netherlands because these legal systems 
only operate with two kinds of fault. If intent cannot be proven, negligence operates 
as a safety net. Most intentional offences therefore have a negligent counterpart.
In England, there is less need for negligence liability due to the concept of 
recklessness, which can operate as a safety net. Recklessness also covers cases that 
are labelled as conscious negligence on the continent. Negligence in England is 
limited to inadvertent negligence. Moreover, Caldwell recklessness was applied for 
some decades in English criminal law, allowing the defendant who had been 
unaware of the risk, to be convicted as reckless. Accordingly, in that time period 
there was even less need for negligent offences.
In comparison to the Netherlands, the greater popularity of negligence in 
Germany can be explained by the strict adherence to the principle of guilt, which, 
from a German perspective, precludes strict liability in criminal law. Crimes that 
do not require proof of fault are taboo in German criminal law. German criminal 
lawyers interpret this principle in a way that criminal liability should always require 
some fault, leaving them only with negligence to facilitate convictions. By contrast, 
strict liability is allowed in Dutch criminal law and also very popular in England.630 
For example, the safety net offence to intentional killing is assault occasioning 
death. Negli gence is required as to death in German law, whereas the causing of 
death is a strict element in the Dutch Criminal Code.631 Rather than creating a 
negligent offen ce alongside the intentional one, the safety net offence in Dutch law 
is often a strict offence, which sidelines the need to introduce an additional 
negligent offence.632
The interpretation of the principle of guilt in Germany is so rigid that even 
negligence has and is still claimed to violate it.633 The general rule is that all offence 
elements require intention, liability based on negligence can only be provided by 
629 Ashworth 2006, p. 194.
630 In those legal systems, the principle is no punishment without blameworthiness, rather than no 
punishment without negligence; an approach legitimized by the ECtHR and favoured here, see 
V.2.3.
631 §227 of the German Criminal Code and Articles 301–302 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
632 De Hullu 2009, p. 276.
633 Koch 1998, pp. 29, 54–55 and 113–122.
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specifi c statutory prohibition.634 Nevertheless, an expansion of negligent liability is 
visible since the seventies. When criminal offences are created outside the criminal 
code, at least half of them criminalize negligence.635 In the Netherlands, a similar 
trend is visible. Traditionally, felonies were said to require intention and some could 
also, by way of exception, be committed with negligence.636 That picture has 
completely been reversed. The rule is now that felonies require intent or 
negligence.637 It even seems more felonies can be committed negligently than 
intentional.638 The self-evident nature of liability by negligence in Dutch criminal 
law can be illustrated by the relatively severe maximum penalties for offences 
committed with negligence.639
In contrast, English criminal lawyers also still seem uneasy with negligence. 
Research has shown that not even 5 percent of all offences triable in the Crown 
Court are crimes of negligence.640 The Law Commission did not include a defi nition 
of negligence in its draft Criminal Code, because it was unnecessary given the lack 
of crimes of negligence in the accompanying special part of the Code.641 An 
infl uential explanation for this unpopularity is the traditional view that negligence 
is not a form of mens rea.642 Negligence in England is inadvertent negligence. As 
noted, negligence is no mens rea from the perspective that it cannot be called a 
cognitive state of mind. It is rather a failure to comply with a standard of conduct.643 
The traditional view has even led to negligence being seen as strict liability.644 A 
related reason is that negligence incorporates normative elements, which have no 
place in mens rea. This rigid perspective however fails to recognise that in ‘state of 
minds’ like recklessness, normative questions also play an important role.645
In the debate on whether or not strict liability is appropriate, we see similar 
arguments that can be made in the context of negligence. In the classic perspective, 
negligence can be termed a ‘halfway house’ between mens rea and strict liability.646 
634 §15 of the German Criminal Code and §10 of the German Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
635 Koch 1998, pp. 40–41 and 77–78; Roxin 2006, p. 1062; König in König & Seitz 2006, note 1 on 
§10 OwiG and Hörster 2009, pp. 168–171.
636 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 113 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 213–215. Compare Edwards 
1954, p. 311 who also argued that negligence is appropriate for misdemeanours, whereas felonies 
require intention or knowledge.
637 Kessler 2001, pp. 185–186; Mevis 2006, pp. 592–593 and de Hullu 2006, p. 198.
638 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 143–144.
639 De Hullu 2006, p. 256 and Robroek 2010, pp. 55–58. Again, it should be noted however that the 
most serious penalties are reserved for cases that would qualify as recklessness in English law.
640 Ashworth & Blake 1996, p. 308.
641 Law Commission 1989, p. 191.
642 Ashworth 2006, p. 181; Williams 1953, p. 29; Halpin 2004, pp. 106–107 and Ormerod 2005, 
p. 91.
643 Williams 1953, pp. 85 and 88; Fletcher 1971, pp. 407–409 and 434–435; Fletcher 2007, pp. 102 
and 312 and Halpin 2004, pp. 104–105.
644 Attorney-General’s Reference no. 2 of 1999 [2000] EWCA Crim 91.
645 Huigens 2004, pp. 804–809 and Fletcher 2007, p. 102.
646 Williams according to Fletcher 2007, p. 102.
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It certainly is the lowest fault element available, and thereby a halfway house 
between more serious kinds of fault that require a will or awareness and strict 
liability. The concerns to negligence are remarkable, compared to the wide 
acceptance and use of strict liability in English law.647 Nonetheless, many scholars 
have paved the way for recognizing negligence as a fault element.648 Like in other 
Member States, the reluctance to negligent liability has therefore declined,649 even 
though it is still not as accepted as in Germany or the Netherlands.
6.3. Criteria
Negligence in all Member States is primarily based on a violation of a duty of care. 
The simplest set of criteria is found in England, where the breach of the duty must 
have caused the consequence and the degree of negligence must be such that it can 
be characterized as gross.650 The criteria in Dutch and German law are not different 
but more elaborate. They are best viewed as attempts to specify the general criteria 
mentioned above.
In Germany, negligence consists of a breach of a duty of care that led to an inter-
fe ren ce with or endangerment of the legal interest it protects, which was objectively 
fore seeable and the actor also subjectively, that is to his knowledge and abilities, 
could have foreseen and avoided.651 In a similar way, the ECJ has held that the 
defen dant behaves negligently when he breaches his duty of care which he should 
have and could have complied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities 
and individual situation. The Court held that ‘serious negligence’ requires that the 
breach of duty must be patent. ‘Regular’ negligence thus requires a simple breach of 
duty.652
In Germany and the Netherlands, negligence is distinguished into an objective 
and a subjective part. Besides the violation of the duty of care that is causal for a 
consequence, the actor objectively should and subjectively could have foreseen and 
avoided this.653 The objective part includes the breach and its causal connection to 
the consequence. The subjective part is therefore better seen as an exceptional 
criterion that can negate culpa if it appears that this particular defendant, given his 
capacities, could not meet the standard expected from a reasonable person.
647 Bohlander 2009, p. 56.
648 See for example Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 136–157 and Robinson 1980.
649 For example, negligence is now the fault element in most English motoring offences, according 
to Ashworth 2006, p. 331. See also Spencer & Brajeux 2010, pp. 20–21.
650 R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6.
651 20 November 2008 BGH NJW 2009, 1155; Beulke 2008, pp. 245–246 and Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 108.
652 3 June 2008, Case C-308/06, Intertanko a.o. v. Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR 
I-4057, §§75–77.
653 Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on Culpa; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 39; de Hullu 2006, p. 245 and 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 162 and 296 and Beulke 2008, p. 246.
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In the Netherlands, the objective part is also called the normative or avoidable 
part and the subjective part dubbed blameworthy.654 Culpa can thus be defi ned as 
blameworthy considerable carelessness.655 The dichotomies of objective and 
subjective, could and should, avoidable and blameworthy, are useful for analytical 
purposes. They should not be considered absolute. The issues are usually merged in 
evidence, and, as will be discussed below, the subjective part is almost always 
simply assumed when the objective part is established.656
6.4. Objective part
The objective part of culpa is assessed fi rst. For analytical purposes, I will use the 
phrasing that the fulfi lment of this part leads to ‘(considerable) carelessness’. It 
consists of many aspects, of which the violation of a duty of care is most important 
in practice. If it is established that the actor breached this duty, he is generally 
considered to have been careless. The careless actor can only be held liable for 
culpa if the subjective part is also fulfi lled.657 However, in general, culpa is 
accepted upon proof of carelessness. If a causal connection with the consequence 
can be made, the subjective part of culpa is hardly ever an obstacle to liability. 
Consider the defendant who exceeded the allowed amount of a certain substance in 
his produce. As a result of this breach of duty, he caused injuries to consumers that 
are attributed to him under negligence. The subjective part is only absent by 
exception and therefore generally assumed. In order to escape liability the defendant 
himself will have to make probable that he did everything that could be reasonably 
expected of him.
When taking a closer look at the objective part, one can identify other criteria 
besides causation and the violation of a duty, such as foreseeability and avoidability. 
Both elements follow from the requirement that the inadvertence must be culpable. 
The inadvertence is culpable if the result was foreseeable. The defendant should 
have been aware of the risk, because the reasonable person would have been aware. 
The inadvertence is also culpable if the defendant was able to do otherwise, to avoid 
the result.658 Many Dutch scholars treat the violation of the duty and foreseeability 
as two separate criteria that should both positively be proven.659 German scholars 
however treat foreseeability and avoidability as possible negations of the interim 
654 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 36, Kelk 2005, p. 206 and de Hullu 2006, p. 245.
655 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 131 and de Hullu 2006, p. 245.
656 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 71 and 83–84; de Hullu 2006, p. 245 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 36.
657 This distinction follows the Dutch approach of culpa as considerable carelessness, which is 
blameworthy. The former is the objective, the latter the subjective part. See de Hullu 2006, 
p. 245; Fokkens & Machielse, note 15 on Culpa and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 130–135.
658 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 54–55 and 61–62 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 69 focus on the 
avoidability of the result. I also relate this aspect to the requirements of causation.
659 Kelk 2005, p. 206; Nieboer 1991, pp. 166 and 170 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 131.
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conclusion of carelessness based on a violation of a duty,660 or see the violation of 
the duty of care as a specialis of the broader concept of foreseeability.661 I also 
believe that the criteria are so much related to each other that they cannot be 
assessed independently.662 They are so interconnected, that many scholars not even 
attempt to distinguish them. In the end, these differences are not important because 
they do not change the outcome.
Nevertheless, I submit there exists in principle a proper relationship between the 
different criteria of the objective part of culpa and their order of assessment. The 
objective part centres on the question of carelessness. Each criterion mentioned 
above can contribute to this question. As a fi rst step, a violation of a duty of care 
normally brings about that the actor has been careless. Since the actor violated his 
duty, he could foresee that the consequence would follow. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. Foreseeability is thus treated as a possible negation of the 
interim conclusion of carelessness. In a subsequent step of assessing the objective 
part of culpa, one could say that what the actor foresaw, he could have avoided,663 
but this assumption can be negated by considerations of causation. Finally, the 
defendant is compared to the objective standard and it is assessed whether he fell 
considerable short of this standard. This order is followed in the subsequent 
discussion.
6.4.1. Violation of a duty of care
The breach of a duty of care can be inferred from the violation of norms. A violation 
of a norm does not necessitate a violation of a duty of care; the violation of a norm 
functions as an indication with different degrees of weight for a fi nding of a 
violation of duty of care.664 In this regard, norms can be distinguished into three 
types.
First of all, there are special norms that are laid down or grounded in law, such 
as speed limits in traffi c. The legal status of a norm typically, but not necessarily 
brings about a breach of duty.665 More and more of these norms originate from the 
EU. For example, the violation of a duty of care in negligent killing can be based on 
exceeding the norm that sets the maximum hours a person is allowed to drive a 
truck each day.666 Through the breach of a duty of diligence, the violation of a norm 
that is supposed to protect a legal interest implies that the harm to that interest was 
660 Roxin 2006, pp. 1067–1068; Beulke 2008, p. 251 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 298.
661 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 317–318 and Duttge 2006, p. 268.
662 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 43; Roxin 2006, p. 1066 and Beulke 2006, p. 249.
663 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 131 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on Culpa.
664 Roxin 2006, p. 1081.
665 5 January 1922 RGSt 56, 343; 23 April 1953 BGHSt 4, 182 and Schröder 2006, p. 670.
666 Regulation 561/2006 of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating 
to road transport and amending Regulations 3821/85 and 2135/98 and repealing Regulation 
3820/85, OJ 2006 L 102/1. See Schröder 2006, pp. 670–673.
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foreseeable.667 For example, if a driver of a truck exceeds the hours he is allowed to 
drive and falls asleep behind the wheel as a consequence, it was foreseeable that 
injuries or death could follow from this breach of a duty.
A second type of norms is not legally binding but nonetheless generally accepted 
within a certain environment, such as rules of the International Ski Federation on 
winter sports. Third and most controversial are the (unwritten) rules that are based 
on a general norm of due care under the rationale that interests of others should not 
be infringed upon.668 This third type can be established by reference to what a 
sensible and conscientious person in the environment and concrete situation of the 
actor would have foreseen. In that case, the violation of the duty and the general 
question of foreseeability cannot be separated.669 Whereas the violation of the fi rst 
group of legal norms generally makes the actor careless, this second and third type 
of norms can merely indicate the objective part of negligence.670
In general, violating norms can facilitate but not necessitate foreseeability of the 
consequence. The defendant can be held to have violated a norm, but there is no 
negligence liability if it was not foreseeable.671 The opposite is also true, as 
compliance with norms does not preclude the fi nding that the consequence was 
foreseeable.672 Everything depends on the type of the norm, whether the violated 
interest was meant to be protected by the norm, the probability and nature of the 
harm and the other circumstances of the case.673 Nevertheless, practice shows that 
carelessness is often substantiated by proof of the violation of a norm. The mere 
violation of such a norm usually implies negligence, because other aspects of the 
objective part and the subjective aspects of negligence are assumed. Requirements 
of careful behaviour are increasingly formulated in detailed codes of conduct and 
safety regulations. The standard of care does not have to be established by reference 
to a reasonable person when specifi c legal norms are available. The emphasis is 
thus shifted from the question of foreseeability to the question as to whether the 
defendant obeyed the rules.674
I will demonstrate this by reference to fatalities in traffi c in Dutch law. In a 
highly regulated fi eld of law with many safety regulations, such as road traffi c law, 
the violation of a norm can lead to a fi nding of negligence for the accident and 
concomitant consequences. Foreseeability of the accident is held to follow from the 
violation of the rule.675 An infringement of traffi c rules operates as a steppingstone 
667 Duttge 2006, p. 268. See also Beulke 2008, pp. 248–249.
668 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 109–110 and Kudlich 2005, p. 848. See also van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 43 and 
Fokkens & Machielse, note 10 on Culpa.
669 Beulke 2008, pp. 249–251 and Nieboer 1991, p. 172.
670 Schröder 2006, p. 670.
671 See for example HR 29 June 2010, NJ 2010, 674.
672 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 110 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1068–1069, who submits that only in exceptional 
cases though, liability will follow.
673 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 317–318 and Kudlich 2005.
674 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 134; Nieboer 1991, p. 173 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 61–65.
675 Otte 2001, p. 2–3; Krabbe in Krabbe & Harteveld 1999, p. 132 and van Kempen 2004, p. 1003.
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to carelessness and blameworthiness, resulting in negligence liability.676 A fi nding 
of negligently causing death is moreover facilitated by the fact that the pertinent 
offence does not require foreseeability of death, only the accident.677
The danger of this shift to obedience of rules is that negligence liability can 
become strict liability, not requiring any fault of the defendant as to the result. The 
mere non-compliance with a norm makes a person liable for all results that follow. 
On the one hand, speeding is considered to carry low stigma. Many people do not 
see the harm in it and speed regularly, but on the other hand, an accident is held to 
be foreseeable when it occurs. The difference can be justifi ed from a victim’s 
perspective or by the doctrine of versari in re illicita, which holds that the results 
that generally follow from conduct are appropriately attributed to the defendant.678 
However, in order to take negligence seriously, it must be taken into account that 
the defendant who vio lated his duty not necessarily could foresee all the results that 
would follow from it.
The debate in the Netherlands thus focuses on the question which violations of 
norms allow for an inference of foreseeability. Specifi cally, there has been 
considerable debate on the question whether the mere violation of one traffi c rule is 
suffi cient to establish negligence. On the one hand, traffi c rules are legal rules, 
created to prevent accidents from happening. On the other hand, this does not 
simply bring about that exceeding the speed limit slightly makes a lethal accident 
foreseeable. Some lawyers therefore argue that negligence should require the 
violation of multiple traffi c rules or at least one very serious violation, like driving 
intoxicated and irresponsible speeding.679 This is issue is connected to the question 
on the required degree of carelessness, which is answered later.
The Dutch Supreme Court has held that it cannot be said that the mere violation 
of a rule must lead to a conclusion of (the objective part of) negligence, and that the 
circumstances of the case should be taken into account.680 It therefore did nothing 
more than confi rm the general rule mentioned above, that the violation of a norm is 
an indication for a fi nding of carelessness. One violation may or may not be enough: 
the circumstances are decisive. Somewhat later, the Supreme Court approved a 
conviction of negligence based on a single violation of a traffi c rule. The fact that 
the defendant drove a motor vehicle and the victim was a young child on a bicycle 
676 Simmelink 2006, pp. 596–597 and de Jong, D.H. 2007, pp. 12–16.
677 Article 6 of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994. See Krabbe in Krabbe & Harteveld 1999, pp. 131–
143. A mere causal connection between the accident and the (strict element of) death suffi ces. 
By contrast, see van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 37.
678 See V.2.3.3. A more rigid version of the maxim holds that once a person has crossed a signifi cant 
moral threshold, there is good reason to impose liability for any consequence that follows.
679 Annotator Keijzer in HR 24 June 2008, NJ 2008, 442; AG Vellinga in HR 1 June 2004, NJ 2005, 
252 and Krabbe in Krabbe & Harteveld 1999, p. 134.
680 HR 1 June 2004, NJ 2005, 252.
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was important.681 In other cases where the defendant also did not yield because he 
did not see the victim, this single violation did not suffi ce.682
It can be argued that the Supreme Court has not given us much to go on, that 
there is inequality before the courts in cases of similar violations, that the criterion 
of the circumstances of the case provide for too much discretion, but in the end, it is 
the only proper approach. No general rules can be given on which rules when 
violated would suffi ce and how serious the violations must be. Speeding does not 
have to be careless, but an accident can become foreseeable when the weather 
conditions are poor.683 Only in very gross violations will the result be foreseeable, 
in all other cases, the circumstances and the context are important. This is discussed 
in more detail, after two fi nal comments relating to the violation of norms.
In England, conduct which resulted in unforeseen side-effects is not often 
criminalized by negligence. Some reasons and explanations for this have already 
been given. In this context, it can be added that the English legislator tends to rely 
far less on general principles like intent and negligence. Fault is also made objective 
by creating specifi c offences that criminalize the violation of norms that lead to 
harm. Rather than to suffi ce with one offence that criminalizes the negligent 
causing of death in traffi c,684 the result of killing someone is criminalized separately 
when it is caused by, for example, driving unlicensed, whilst disqualifi ed or whilst 
uninsured.685 Offences like this criminalize the violation of specifi c norms directly 
without the use of negligence.686
6.4.2. Contra-indications
So far, it has been explained that the decision of carelessness depends on the type of 
the norm, the scope of protection of the norm and the other circumstances of the 
case. Even if the violated norm is of the type that is laid down in a criminal statute 
and the result caused falls under the scope of protection of this norm, there may be 
circumstances negating the foreseeability of the risk or what should have been 
expected of the defendant in that particular situation. For example, it is evident that 
a risk of fi re is smaller when it rains. Hence, circumstances can operate as contra-
indications of a fi nding of carelessness based on the violation of a legal norm.
The standard of careful conduct is established by a weighing of all the interests 
concerned. This consideration is normative, which is clear by the determination of 
this standard by reference to the legal interest involved. For instance, to risk the 
681 HR 17 January 2006, NJ 2006, 303. See also HR 24 June 2008, NJ 2008, 442.
682 HR 27 May 2008, NJ 2008, 441 and HR 29 April 2008, NJ 2008, 440.
683 See den Harder 2006, pp. 126–129.
684 Section 1 of the English Road Traffi c Act 1988.
685 Section 3ZB of the English Road Traffi c Act 1988.
686 Compare Robroek 2010, pp. 169–193 who proposed to substitute negligent offences by offences 
that criminalize the violation of norms, which must be clearly described, whereby the harm 
caused is strict and aggravates the reproach.
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wellbeing of other human beings is unlikely to be permissible, however small the 
chance. This is evident in practice, where the seriousness of the consequence often 
infl uences the outcome. If the harm was serious, negligence liability is accepted 
easier. However, if the risk was hardly foreseeable, for example because the chance 
that the risk would materialize was very small, the fact that serious consequences 
occurred may not lead to a fi nding of negligence. The severity of the consequence 
and the legal interest involved are very important, but a fi nding of culpa may not 
predominantly, let alone exclusively, be based on these aspects.687 If it would, culpa 
would resemble risk liability.
Even if the risk was foreseeable, this does not necessarily imply that the 
defendant violated his duty of care. Culpa is about the taking of unacceptable risks: 
a risk that was foreseeable can still be socially acceptable, a reasonable person may 
have foreseen the risk, but still be allowed to act. Risks that are normally deemed 
unacceptable, such as exceeding the speeding limit, can be acceptable under certain 
circumstances.688 Consider the doctor who needs to get to hospital and the taxi 
driver who needs to get a pregnant woman to hospital. The risk inherent in speeding 
can however also be deemed acceptable in order to get away from a driver who 
leaves no distance or to signal another of the danger of losing their load.689 Justifi ed 
or reasonable risks are not careless.690 More specifi cally, if the risk is acceptable, it 
remains foreseeable, but there no longer is a duty to behave differently.691 Offences 
of culpa thus have in common with offences of recklessness, that they are about the 
taking of unreasonable risks and therefore subsume all justifi cations.
The context is also important in establishing the standard. In cases of regulated 
sports and games, a duty of care is less likely to be violated. More is allowed, 
because the sport or game can provoke conduct which participants can expect and 
inevitably includes mistakes from time to time.692 Participants take into account 
violations of the rules of the game based on eagerness, excitement, absence of 
consideration, imperfect game technique and so on.693 It is ‘all in the game’.694 
Non-serious violations of the norms are unavoidable and accepted. The risk only 
becomes unacceptable when the norms are grossly violated. In general, offences 
that lead to exclusion of the game, also amount to a violation of the duty of due care. 
Abuse of the margin of allowed risk to enact revenge-fouls generally leads to 
liability.695
687 HR 1 June 2004, NJ 2005, 252; van Kempen 2004, p. 1007 and den Harder 2006, pp. 138–139.
688 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 132.
689 Burmann a.o. 2010, note 128 on §3 StVO.
690 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 179; Beulke 2008, p. 99; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 131 
and Pompe 1935, p. 90.
691 Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 46–47.
692 HR 20 February 2004, LJN:AO1239 and HR 22 April 2008, NJ 2008, 375.
693 Berkl 2007, pp. 115–117 and 3 August 1961 BayObLGSt 1961, 180.
694 Kelk 2005, p. 153.
695 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 338.
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In contrast, negligence is more likely to follow when similar acts have been 
committed outside such situations. For example, students used a heavy table in a 
dangerous way to play a game, severely wounding one student. The game was part 
of the students’ tradition but lacked clear rules. The students were convicted of 
negligently infl icting serious bodily harm.696 The greater margin of what is allowed 
in the context of sports is framed here as an issue of culpa, but it can also be seen as 
an issue as to what the participants have consented to. The effect to a charge of 
negligence is the same, because if the result was justifi ed due to consent, it cannot 
be negligent.697
A so-called ‘principle of trust’698 functions as an additional limitation to the 
scope of duties imposed on legal subjects. It implies that the actor does not have to 
take into account all possible errors of others, and that he, unless there are 
circumstances that indicate otherwise, may rely and adapt his conduct to the 
assumption that others in the fi eld of conduct will behave carefully.699 The actor 
cannot be negligent for not fulfi lling a duty that he is not required to perform. For 
example, an automobile driver may expect other participants in traffi c to obey the 
traffi c rules. A driver does not have to take into account that a pedestrian may just 
walk on the street.700 The principle also applies to business transactions, surgeries 
and so on.701
The principle is not absolute. As noted, circumstances may raise suspicions, 
giving rise to a duty. In addition, it does not apply in regard to children and impaired 
adults.702 The participant in traffi c has to adapt his behaviour to errors of other 
participants that are evident or common and therefore to be expected. He is also 
required to take caution of technical defects and strange traffi c situations.703 Finally, 
the principle is also precluded when the defendant violates a duty of care himself. If 
the motorist grossly exceeds the speed limit on a major road, he can no longer trust 
that other participants will yield to him or clear the crossing in time.704
The principle can also be found in EU law. Rules on the placing on the market of 
products have been harmonized in order to facilitate free movement of these goods 
within the EU. This harmonization is believed to bring about mutual trust. As a 
696 HR 31 October 2006, NJ 2007, 79.
697 See also Annotator Keijzer in HR 22 April 2008, NJ 2008, 375.
698 2 March 1982 BGH NJW 1982, 1756 and HR 25 May 2004, LJN:AO6452.
699 17 September 1958 BGHSt 12, 81.
700 12 July 1954 BGH VGS 1, 54 and Roxin 2006, p. 1070.
701 Beulke 2008, p. 251; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 306 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1071–1072. In 
19 November 1997 BGHSt 43, 306, it was objectively clear that the colleague doctor had made 
many errors.
702 Beulke 2008, pp. 255–256; 24 March 2006 OLG Jena BeckRS 2006, 06007; §3(2a) of the 
German Road Traffi c Regulation (StVO); Fokkens & Machielse, note 12 on Culpa and Kelk 
2005, p. 214.
703 17 September 1958 BGHSt 12, 81 and Krabbe in Krabbe & Harteveld 1999, p. 134.
704 HR 17 June 1980, NJ 1980, 580; HR 25 May 2004, LJN:AO6452; 10 December 1965 BGHSt 20, 
135; Beulke 2008, pp. 250–251; Roxin 2006, pp. 1070–1071 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
pp. 327–329.
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result, the importer of goods that have been declared safe by the exporter in another 
Member State may trust that this declaration is correct. This is only negated in case 
he possesses specifi c knowledge that leads to serious doubts on this safety.705 The 
principle is arguably even stronger in EU law: the importer of a machine that caused 
serious injuries cannot be held liable for negligently causing these injuries, not just 
because he was not required to carry out additional checks, but even because he 
was not allowed to preform such a duty. Such additional checks would after all, 
restrict the free movement of goods.
Let us consider the case where someone walked by an apartment building. When 
he peeked through the opened front door, he saw that the hallway was full of 
combustible material. He decided to light the material, which led to a fi re in the 
building, resulting in many deaths. We are not concerned with the liability of the 
person who lit the fi re, but with the liability of the landlord who had been charged 
with negligently causing these deaths. The Prosecutor argued that he had been 
responsible for stacking the hallway full of material that originated from 
renovations. Moreover, the landlord had broken the state rules that required him to 
make sure the staircase, entrance and exit of the building were freely accessible and 
that these could be safely used in case of fi re. Finally, the door was open because 
the lock was broken.
However, liability was rejected. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the 
landlord had not acted socially inappropriate, because he was allowed to trust that 
other persons would not abuse the source of danger created by him for criminal 
purposes. The Court distinguished three categories of possible sources of danger. If 
it concerns items that according to general experience bring about dangers to 
others, like weapons, there exists such a special duty on the keeper of the items. For 
example, if one does not properly ensure that a weapon is safeguarded against 
unauthorized handling, and a third one uses it for murder, the owner can be held 
liable for negligent killing. Secondly, there are also items, such as chemicals, that 
can be used in a socially appropriate manner without danger, but become dangerous 
in the hands of inexperienced persons. The duty to prevent possible abuse is then 
restricted to preventing abuse by inexperienced persons, for example by making 
sure children cannot reach them. The building material falls into yet another 
category because almost no danger arises from this. It was held that it cannot 
spontaneously combust and the risk that children would light it can be disregarded 
too. The landlord was not required to ensure that third parties would not set fi re to 
the material. The result was not foreseeable as it falls so far outside the scope of 
what can be generally expected.706
In order for the defendant to be held liable for assisting the perpetrator, he must 
have intended to further the commission of the crime, which under dolus eventualis 
705 8 September 2005, Case C-40/04, Criminal proceedings against Yonemoto [2005] ECR I-7755. 
See also 11 May 1989, Case 25/88, Criminal proceedings against Wurmser and others [1989] 
ECR 1105.
706 21 November 1996 OLG Stuttgart NStZ 1997, 190.
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or recklessness at least requires awareness of the risk.707 When the defendant was 
un aware or this awareness cannot be proven, the question can still be asked whether 
the assistan ce to the perpetrator was foreseeable. In the absence of liability for 
aiding and abetting, negli gence liability can follow if the defen dant is held to have 
been able to acknowledge the inclination to act of the intentional perpetrator. After 
all, the above mentioned landlord was charged with negligent killing. The doctors 
who allowed a very violent patient to have unsupervised leave could also be 
convicted of negligent killing. That mental patient killed two and wounded eight 
persons.708 If the risk was reasonable, such as the cashier who sold manure at the 
garden centre, in the absence of circumstances that should raise suspicion it might 
be used to create a bomb, the fact that it was used to make a bomb that killed 
people, was not foreseeable. Reasonable risks are not punished, regardless of 
whether the defendant was aware of it.
6.4.3. Reasonable person
The objective part of negligence, often expressed by the required nature and degree 
of care that the defendant should have taken, is established by reference to what can 
be expected from a sensible and conscientious person in the assessment of the 
danger ex ante, taking into account the concrete circumstances and the social role 
of the actor.709 The yardstick of the reasonable person, the successor of the bonus 
pater familias,710 has led to considerable debate on what individual characteristics 
should be taken into account. These characteristics can operate as to lower or 
heighten our expectations of a person.711
Individualised features that are taken into account to determine what degree of 
diligence could be expected from the defendant are amongst others his professional 
position, role, education and age.712 A professional is judged according to what a 
general person in that profession would do. For example, what could be expected 
from a reasonable doctor, building inspector or constructor?713 When the actor 
enters into special situations, accepts a function or takes part in traffi c or sports, he 
must abide by the applicable rules and is considered to be competent to carry out 
the activity. He gives guarantees, on which others may rely. This ‘Garantenstellung’ 
concretizes the standard person to which the defendant is compared. A similar 
707 I rejected dolus eventualis in this context too, see IV.5.5.2.
708 13 November 2003 BGHSt 49, 1 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1072–1075. The Supreme Court quashed 
the acquittal.
709 1 February 2005 BGH NStZ 2005, 446; Beulke 2008, p. 249; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 300. See also Fletcher 1971, pp. 417–425.
710 Erenius 1976, p. 154.
711 Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on Culpa.
712 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 43.
713 De Hullu 2006, p. 246 and 10 December 1965 BGHSt 20, 135 and 15 August 2002 OLG 
Karlsruhe BeckRS 2003, 06332.
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rationale for expecting more from a specifi c defendant is his prior experience with 
certain situations: forewarned, forearmed.714
The reasonable person is altered to have some individual characteristics. In 
other words, some subjective factors provide for a check on a basically objective 
test.715 The practical importance of this modifi cation must not be exaggerated, as 
usually the question of negligence is answered by reference to the outward 
appearance of conduct.716 As mentioned, the mere violation of a norm usually 
suffi ces to ground liability. Moreover, the taking into account of individual 
characteristics is applied more often with a view to attribute negligence to a 
defendant than to acquit. Everyone is required to do what he can, so additional 
knowledge or capacities can ground carelessness. For example, if a person knows 
that a certain crossing is dangerous, he is required to adapt his behaviour to an even 
greater degree of carefulness.717
The individual features enumerated above should be distinguished from ‘truly’ 
individual characteristics that are only taken into account under the subjective part 
of culpa.718 If the reasonable participant in traffi c could have foreseen the danger, 
the fact that this particular defendant could not meet this standard does not affect 
the question of carelessness. The test here is still objective. The lack of the 
capacities that a normal person would have can at most negate culpa under its fi nal 
subjective assessment. The exact demarcation of what characteristics are to be 
taken into account at what stage is diffi cult. This is even more so in English law, 
that does not generally recognize a subjective part.719 Let us fi rst consider some 
examples of characteristics that are taken into account in the objective part.
A classic example of raising the bar of carefulness based on professional conduct 
is the case where a nurse prepared a syringe with a wrong substance. The patient 
was injected with this substance, as a result of which he died. The nurse was held 
negligently liable for this death, despite her claims that she had been overworked 
and less familiar with the surroundings, which were disorderedly moreover. A 
nurse of her education and experience should have been more careful, taking into 
account that she knew the importance of her job and that her work was not 
checked.720 In a similar case, an intern at a pharmacy and had incorrectly prepared 
a prescription. She was also convicted of negligently causing death and serious 
714 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 133–134; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 300 and Simester 
& Sullivan 2007, p. 151.
715 Bohlander 2009, p. 32; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 45 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on Culpa.
716 Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on Culpa with reference to a similar trend in Germany.
717 Beulke 2008, pp. 249–250; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 303–304 and Roxin 2006, pp. 
1084–86.
718 Bohlander 2009, pp. 55–56.
719 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 151. As a consequence, many scholars have advocated of taking 
into account more individual features in the standard of the reasonable person, see Hart 2008 
(reprint 1967), pp. 152–157; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 147–150 and Westen 2008B.
720 HR 19 February 1963, NJ 1963, 512.
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bodily harm.721 Apparently, the fact that she was under supervision and clearly did 
not have a lot of experience was to no avail of her. As will be discussed shortly, 
when a person accepts a certain role, he is deemed to have the knowledge and 
competencies of a reasonable person in that role. He cannot claim that he does not 
meet the standard of the reasonable person.
First however, an important tendency in Dutch case-law should be noted. 
Increasingly, not the actor who is causally closest to the harm, but the employer, 
manager or legal entity behind this actor is held liable for negligently causing 
results. In the cases above, both defendants had claimed that their employer was 
co-responsible for the violation of the duty of care, but to no avail. However, in a 
case of 2002, a lower court acquitted a doctor for negligently causing death, based 
on considerations that the death could be attributed to a larger extent to the 
carelessness internal organization of the hospital then to the carelessness of the 
defendant, who did not check whether the syringe was correct. The defendant was 
fairly inexperienced, insuffi ciently instructed and under huge pressure of work.722
In more recent cases that attracted a lot of public attention, the trend is visible 
too. In the fi rst that will be discussed, a group of colleagues went on a day-trip to do 
some rafting. The activity however resulted in fatalities. An important reason for 
the fatalities was held to be the insuffi cient instruction of the supervisors. The fi rm 
and its director were therefore prosecuted and convicted, rather than the 
inexperienced actual supervisor of the fatal trip.723 It has been argued that if the 
1963 case of the mistaken nurse would be tried today, the liability of the hospital 
would be assessed too.724 Enabling criminal liability of directors and legal entities 
protects the individual employee from becoming the fall-guy. From a perspective of 
prevention, more is to be expected when the company is (also) convicted. It is the 
company or its (direct) manager that created the conditions in which the defendant 
breached his duty. If (only) the employee would be convicted, it is to be expected 
that another employee will violate a duty of care in the future.
A legal presumption operates in the context of specialized and/or dangerous 
activities. The maxim ‘imperitia culpae adnumeratur’ entails that when a defendant 
takes on a task to which he is unqualifi ed, he shall be deemed negligent.725 If people 
take up a specifi c role, more is expected from them regardless of whether they can 
personally meet the standard of care that is normal in that role. When someone 
undertakes conduct to which he is not up to due to a lack of expertise or capacities, 
the violation of a duty of care can already be grounded in that act. The reproach is 
721 HR 14 November 2000, NJ 2001, 37.
722 Rb. Den Haag 19 December 2002, LJN:AF2320. In the similar Rb. Leeuwarden 23 December 
1987, NJ 1988, 981, the hospital was convicted for negligent killing. Criminal liability of legal 
entities and their employees is not mutually exclusive, but generally, the Public Prosecutor will 
only bring charges against either one or the other, as is evident in the case mentioned below.
723 Hof Arnhem 20 July 2009, LJN:BJ3107.
724 Kelk 2005, p. 220. See also Strikwerda 2008.
725 Williams 1953, p. 83; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 320–321; Roxin 2006, pp. 1082 and 
1105.
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transferred to the moment where the actor ventured onto thin ice. Dangerous 
conduct is either undertaken under suffi cient precautionary measures or not 
undertaken at all. When someone cannot assess the risk properly, he has to gain 
information and knowledge and when that is impossible, he has to abstain from the 
conduct.726
An example is when a driver gets behind the wheel, knowing that he is prone to 
epileptic seizures.727 Another example is the doctor who carries out a surgery for 
which he is not qualifi ed.728 The actor is required to put himself in a position to be 
able to act with diligence. If we take the example of the defendant who inadvertently 
causes injuries to another due to improper use of industrial equipment, two 
situations can therefore be distinguished, both of which lead to negligence liability. 
The professional is equated with the reasonable person, who would have foreseen 
the risk. The amateur is held liable for negligently causing the injuries too, because 
he took up a task for which he is not qualifi ed.729
6.4.4. Causation
The requirement that the breach of a duty caused the consequence is considered an 
aspect of culpa rather than a specifi c independent doctrine. This is only evident in 
some judgments.730 For example, major and highly unusual deviations from what 
could be expected to happen and results that lie beyond all life experience are not 
foreseeable.731 Courts usually do not make explicit whether the defendant is 
acquitted due to a lack of causation or due to a lack of negligence, based on causal 
considerations. Partly due to this, the dogmatic positioning of causation can be 
debated. I already noted that causal questions are always closely connected to the 
fault element. In negligent offences, they are inextricably linked to each other.732 
The concepts have moved towards each other. On the one hand, causation has 
moved towards culpa by becoming more of a normative concept, focusing less on 
the physical aspect only. On the other hand, culpa has moved towards causation. In 
726 R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6; 8 February 1957 BGHSt 10, 133; Beulke 2008, p. 249; Fischer, 
T. 2009, p. 110; Duttge 2006, p. 270; Roxin 2006, pp. 1076–1077 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 
2003, p. 134.
727 17 November 1994 BGHSt 40, 341 and Roxin 2006, p. 1077. See also van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 
68–70.
728 See 27 September 1983 BGHZ 88, 248.
729 However, if a consequence was not foreseeable to experts, the defendant was also not able to 
foresee it, see HR 29 June 2010, NJ 2010, 674.
730 R. v. Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App R 67 and R. v. Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552.
731 6 June 1967 BGH GA 1969, 246; Bohlander 2009, p. 118 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 
317 and 320.
732 Annotator Knigge in HR 1 June 2004, NJ 2005, 252 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 89 
and 127–129. See III.6.2.
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assessing culpa in relation to a consequence, this is objectifi ed by referring to the 
carelessness of the behaviour.733
In offences where the result is objectifi ed, made strict, this means no fault needs 
to relate to the result. In the context of (partially) strict offences, causation thus 
plays a more independent role. Causal requirements are not taken into account in 
the fault element, because fault is not an offence element. Liability for the strict 
result is not limited by culpa, but it is limited by the rules on causation.734 When 
the result is strict, it is only attributed as causal to the actions of the defendant if it 
was foreseeable. Foreseeability does not only constitute the overarching question of 
carelessness, it is also an element of causation. From a causal perspective, a result is 
easily accepted as foreseeable. By contrast, as an overarching criterion of culpa, 
there is more room for subjective elements in foreseeability, like the role and 
position of that particular actor.735 The actor can be held to have caused a result, but 
not held liable for negligently causing the result because it was not foreseeable.
For example, the defendant and his friends who had locked a mentally impaired 
juvenile in a sea container, without telling him when they would be back, were held 
to have caused his death. When they returned about two hours later, the victim had 
started a fi re in the container and died due to carbon monoxide poisoning. It was 
foreseeable that the victim, who was a smoker, would either light a cigarette or try 
to make a fi re to illuminate the pitch-black container. As a result, they were liable 
for the strict result of causing death in the course of wrongful deprivation of liberty. 
Negligent killing was however rejected. The fact that the defendant was underage at 
the time, led the Dutch Court of Appeal to believe that the result was not foreseeable 
to him.736
To determine whether the breach of duty caused the consequence requires both 
a factual, objective and normative undertaking. After it has been assessed that 
careless behaviour is metaphysically a cause of the effect, a conditio sine qua non, 
normative considerations are taken into account to assess whether this behaviour 
should also be seen as the legal cause of the consequence. The question of normative 
attribution operates just as in intentional offences as a modifi cation to factual 
causation. Nonetheless, the judiciary generally treats these issues as a one staged 
question of causation, whereby the question of attribution is answered 
normatively.737
Some principles of causal attribution are most relevant for negligent offences.738 
First of all, the duty of care that was violated must serve to protect the legal interest 
that has been infringed. In traffi c law, most rules aim to protect the safety of 
733 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 85 and 127–128.
734 Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 40.
735 De Hullu 2006, pp. 247–248.
736 Hof Arnhem 21 October 2010, LJN:BO1426.
737 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 77; Puppe 2004; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 188–189; Ormerod 2008, 
pp. 75–76 and Remmelink 1996, pp. 175–183.
738 See Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 195.
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participants, which brings about that this criterion is usually fulfi lled by not 
complying with the traffi c regulations.739 The breach of duty must also be a direct 
consequence of the result, which excludes that speeding in Munich is causal for the 
accident in Berlin.740 The principle of own responsibility excludes liability when 
the victim under his own responsibility wanted or at least took into account the 
possibility of death, harm or endangerment. It focuses on the question who 
controlled the events, the victim or the defendant.741
This is not the place to discuss causation comprehensively.742 I will only 
elaborate on one of the most discussed criteria of reasonable attribution in the 
context of negligent offences, which requires that the breach of duty must be the 
cause of the result. In other words, the result must have been avoidable by duty 
conform conduct.743 This criterion excludes causation when it is almost certain that 
the result would have also occurred when the defendant would not have violated 
this duty of care.744 This can be called a test of ‘lawful alternative behaviour’.745
This test of lawful alternative behaviour can be found as an exception to the 
presumption of (factual) causation in case-law of all legal systems under 
investigation. It even appears implicitly in a decision of the ECJ on Union 
liability.746 On this basis, in a German case where a drunken cyclist got under the 
wheels of a truck, causation was denied. The truck driver had not made sure there 
was enough space between the truck and the cyclist when overtaking. He had kept a 
distance of only 75cm. However, it was accepted that the cyclist would have also 
gotten under the wheels if the driver had kept a correct distance of 1 to 1,5 
meters.747 The case resembles an old case in English law, where the driver of a 
horse cart did not hold the reins. A three-year-old child ran into the road, was struck 
by one of the cartwheels and killed. The driver was acquitted because it was held 
that he could not have prevented the child’s death by using the reins.748 In a Dutch 
case, it was held that the defendant would have probably also not been able to see 
the little children on the street and thus avoid hitting them with his car, if he had sat 
739 Beulke 2008, pp. 252–253 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 299 and 307.
740 Beulke 2008, pp. 252–253 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 81–82.
741 14 February 1984 BGHSt 32, 262; 20 November 2008 BGH NJW 2009, 1155; Schünemann in 
Szwarc 1996, pp. 12–15; Duttge 2006, p. 271 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 44–46. Carelessness 
is not simply negated by the fact that the victims agreed to participate in a criminal offence, see 
R. v. Wacker [2002] EWCA Crim 1944, where the defendant was held liable for causing the 
suffocation of 60 illegal aliens, whilst being transported in his lorry to England.
742 See Keiler 2012, forthcoming.
743 Beulke 2008, pp. 254–256 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1066–1067.
744 HR 18 May 2004, NJ 2004, 512; R v Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App R 67; Ormerod 2008, p. 77; 
25 September 1957 BGHSt 11, 1; Beulke 2008, pp. 253–255 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
pp. 186 and 315.
745 Schönke & Schröder 2010, notes 99–99a vor 13ff and Joecks & Miebach 2003, note 159 on §15.
746 7 April 1992, Case C-358/90, Compagnia Italiana Alcool Sas di Mario Mariano & Co v. 
Commission [1992] ECR I-2457, §47.
747 25 September 1957 BGHSt 11, 1.
748 R. v. Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273, mentioned by Ormerod 2008, p. 77.
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more upright behind the wheel.749 The test is applied everywhere when a fi nding of 
causation would affront common sense. However, in Germany, this test seems to be 
conducted much more often and with more success for the defendant.
In almost all cases, there is a theoretical possibility that the result would have 
happened anyway. For this reason, prevailing opinion in Germany requires that 
there must be a great degree of certainty that the result would have also happened 
without the violation of the norm.750 However and to the benefi t of the accused, 
some German decisions imply that it must merely not be improbable that the result 
would have also occurred in order to acquit the defendant.751 Causation is often 
negated because in dubio pro reo is applied to this test. If there is doubt that the 
consequence would have also occurred, and this is based on more than merely 
theoretical circum stances,752 the doubt is settled in favour of the defendant.753
From a victim-oriented perspective, it can be argued that this creates an inappro-
priate and almost insurmountable burden to hold defendants liable.754 For example, 
consider the case where a 7-year-old walked on the side of the road in a dangerous 
way. When the driver of a car overtook him, he hit the child, killing him. The court 
did not attribute negligent killing. It held that even if the driver had already braked 
and moved to the middle of the road when he saw the child walking dangerously, 
the collision would have been unavoidable, even though if he had done that, the 
chance of death was estimated to be at most 15 percent. The court argued that this 
chance does not preclude – read: make it improbable – that the result would have 
also occurred in case of the lawful alternative behaviour.755
Hence, criminal policy concerns against the test have led to it being ignored in 
special statutes.756 It also led to a wider acceptance of Roxin’s theory of increased 
risk which would already confi rm the causal relationship if the actor’s conduct 
considerably increased the risk of the result occurring.757 Roxin found it unaccep-
table that the lawful alternative allowed a person to endanger an object that was 
already endangered without having to fear attribution for its harming. Therefore, if 
it can be established that careful conduct would have increased the chances of avoi-
749 Rb. Groningen 21 March 2011, LJN:BP8488 and Hof Leeuwarden 31 March 2012, LJN:BV8650.
750 25 September 1957 BGHSt 11, 1; 12 January 2010 BGH NJW 2010, 1087 and Duttge 2006, 
p. 272.
751 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 316–317.
752 Beulke 2008, p. 258–259 and Remmelink 1996, pp. 187–188. For example, the doctors who 
violated their duty of care by letting a very violent individual have unsupervised leave cannot 
argue he could have also left the institution by using an unsecured window, see 13 November 
2003 BGHSt 49, 1.
753 30 August 2000 BGH NStZ 2001, 29 and 20 November 1988 OLG Karlsruhe NStZ 1985, 225.
754 Puppe in Schünemann a.o. 2001, pp. 291–292 and 297–301 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 195.
755 24 March 2006 OLG Jena BeckRS 2006, 06007.
756 Schünemann 1985, p. 355.
757 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 195 and Roxin 2006, p. 1081.
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ding the harm, the violation has increased the risk to the harm and is causal for 
it.758
From cases decided before Dutch courts, it can also be inferred there must be 
more certain ty that the result would have also occurred without the violation of the 
duty. In a case, both the defendant and the victim returned at night from a fair and 
were intoxi cated. The victim, wearing dark clothes, had sat down partially on an 
unlit public road when the defendant ran him over with his car. He submitted he had 
not seen the victim. Moreover, counsel argued he could impossibly have avoided 
the acci dent. Like the AG agreed, it can be questioned whether the defendant would 
have been able to avoid the accident if he would have been sober, yet this was an 
argu ment the court used to convict him of negligent killing.759 The lawful 
alternative is less likely to acquit the defendant because that violation need not be 
the only cause of the result.760 Moreover, both Dutch and English courts are 
reluctant to apply in dubio pro reo as strict as in Germany.
In England, the lawful alternative test is often sidelined by the aforementioned 
offences that criminalize the causing of a result whilst violating a norm. For 
example, when a person driving a vehicle kills someone, he can be held criminally 
liable without reference to negligence if he drove the car whilst disqualifi ed or 
whilst uninsured. No fault or causation applies to this aggravating circumstance, 
precluding any lawful alternative test. Even if it is almost certain that the accident 
would have also happened if he had a licence or was insured, the defendant is 
convicted.761 A similar aggravation exists when a person has taken away a vehicle 
without permission of the owner. The causing of an accident with that vehicle 
aggravates liability, without requiring any fault for that accident. Liability is 
attributed, even if it was established that he could not have avoided the accident.762
In the Netherlands, the test is also sidelined by formulating broad duties of care. 
In traffi c, it is forbidden to do anything that may cause a danger to others.763 This 
for example brings about that the defendant cannot argue he would have also run 
over the victim if he had adhered to the proper side clearance when overtaking. 
This side clearance may be provided in abstracto, but if the victim was intoxicated 
or a child, the proper side clearance is extended: the concrete duty is to observe 
suffi cient clearance or not overtake at all, if you see the other participant in traffi c is 
intoxicated or a child. Clearly, the child who was walking dangerously along the 
road would have never been killed if the defendant took the care that would have 
prevented the accident.
758 Puppe in Schünemann a.o. 2001, pp. 288 and 295.
759 HR 29 April 2008, NJ 2008, 439. In HR 18 May 2004, NJ 2004, 512, the Court of Appeal applied 
the yardstick that it must be probable that the result also had occurred without the breach of 
duty. Based on expert evidence, this was held to be probable and negligence negated.
760 HR 21 September 2010, LJN:BM9407.
761 R. v. Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 and sections 3ZB of the Road Traffi c Act 1988.
762 R. v. Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App R 67 and section 12A(1) of the Theft Act 1968.
763 Article 5 of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994 (WVW).
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The proper approach is to treat the lawful alternative as an extraordinary 
exception to a fi nding of culpa. Only in exceptional cases, where it is very likely 
that the result would have also occurred, had the defendant not violated the norm, 
causation and thereby culpa should be negated. However, given the fact that 
causation is a normative concept and situations very diverse, it should perhaps not 
be attempted to construct a general criterion with too much precision.
6.4.5. Gross carelessness
After it has been established what the conduct of the defendant should have done or 
omitted, this is compared with the behaviour of the defendant. If the defendant’s 
conduct met the requirements of due care, there is no culpa. He can only be held 
criminally liable if he falls below the standard. However, a mere failure to meet the 
proper standard of care incumbent upon him does not suffi ce. It is required that the 
defendant fell short of the standard by a considerable margin.764 In other words, the 
carelessness must be considerable765 or gross.766 Culpa must be lata.767
Culpa lata is contrasted with mere culpa levis,768 with is suffi cient for civil but 
insuffi cient for criminal liability.769 Requiring mere culpa levis implies that any 
shortcoming of the accused is suffi cient. The actor would then be compared to the 
most able, thoughtful, careful person.770 In contrast, the defendant is compared to 
the reasonable or normal person modifi ed by the concrete circumstances and the 
social role of the actor.771 Culpa should be limited to prevent fears expressed 
towards negligence liability from being realized, such as that negligence liability 
can be imposed to all, even the law-abiding citizen and secondly, that can be 
imposed on everyone at least once. Human faults are inevitable, but gross 
carelessness not.772
Culpa must be of such a degree “that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence 
of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and 
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime 
against the State and conduct deserving punishment.”773 In other words, the 
requirement of lata denotes the contempt for the legal interests of others. This 
description has been admitted to be somewhat circular: if the conduct is seen as 
764 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 124; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 146 and Weigend 1981, 
p. 674–676.
765 HR 17 September 2002, NJ 2002, 549 and de Hullu 2006, p. 245.
766 R. v. Bateman (1927) 19 Cr App R 8.
767 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 136.
768 Austin 1911, p. 434 and Koch 1998, pp. 49–53.
769 De Jong, D.H. 2007, p. 3; R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6; Tadros 2005, p. 245, Erenius 1976, pp. 
44 and 113; Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), p. 137 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 323–324.
770 R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6; de Hullu 2006, p. 244 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 136.
771 Smidt 1881 I, p. 78.
772 Koch 1998 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 323.
773 R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6.
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criminal, it must be labelled as gross negligence. It is certainly very open, yet this is 
almost unavoidable and welcomed by courts because of its inherent discretion and 
duty to take into account all the circumstances in which the defendant was 
placed.774 It provides the discretion to exclude liability in cases where the actor 
clearly violated a norm which caused a consequence. Consider the case in which a 
police offi cer was in pursuit to arrest an alien. When he fi red a warning shot –
against the applicable rules- he tripped and hit the alien, who was fatally wounded. 
The carelessness is evident but it was held not the be gross enough to accept 
negligence, taking into account that the defendant in his fi ve year experience had 
never been in a similar situation and that he had not been suffi ciently instructed in 
the practical use of a fi rearm.775
German criminal law in theory lets any degree of negligence suffi ce.776 
Nonetheless, the scope of liability is limited to a similar extent, because it is also 
accepted that the degree of carefulness should not be overstrained, especially when 
reasonable and socially accepted risks are taken to serve important social interests, 
as doctors do. It is therefore argued that only in extreme cases when they have made 
a gross error of assessment in the context of their broad margin of appreciation, can 
criminal liability be considered.777 German law uses numerous ways to come to 
similar solutions as requiring a gross deviation from the required standard of 
care.778
A consequence of the fact that negligence itself does not need to be gross, is that 
German lawyers tend to equate gross negligence with luxuria, called 
‘Leichtfertigkeit’ in German law.779 This luxuria, discussed below, requires a more 
serious deviation from the standard of care, but this exceeds the margin that 
qualifi es in the Netherlands and England as ‘gross negligence’. Luxuria also exists 
in the Netherlands where it is distinguished as serious negligence from ‘regular’ 
gross negligence. Culpa (lata) and the more serious luxuria should therefore be 
distinguished.780
774 Idem and Kadish 1989A, p. 76: “In the end it is a judgment call whether the negligence is so 
egregious that punishment and not merely civil liability is appropriate.”
775 Hof Den Haag 23 June 1981, NJ 1981, 560.
776 Bohlander 2009, pp. 55 and 59–60 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 322–324. See also 
Arzt in Stree a.o. 1978, pp. 131–143.
777 Beulke 2008, p. 250.
778 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 322–323 and Koch 1998, pp. 112–171. See also Roxin 2006, 
pp. 1077–1081.
779 15 May 1992 BGHSt 38, 295; 9 November 1984 BGHSt 33, 66; Krey 2002, pp. 138–139, Roxin 
2006, pp. 1092–1093 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 294 and 324. In part, this is due to 
the fact that ‘Leichtfertigkeit’ was said to resemble the civil law concept of gross negligence: 
‘grobe Fahrlässigkeit.’
780 See article 4(1) of Directive 2009/123 of 21 October 2009 amending Directive 2005/35 on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ 2009 L 280/52: “(…)
wenn sie auf Vorsätzlichkeit, Leichtfertigkeit oder grobe Fahrlässigkeit zurückzuführen sind.”
Fault elements
 193
6.5. Subjective part
If culpa would include an advertent form of negligence, as in Germany and the 
Netherlands, it could be argued that this awareness is the subjective part of 
advertent negligence.781 However, culpa is about inadvertence only. The subjective 
part of it is not about awareness; it is about personal aspects of the reproach of 
culpa. This can be called subjective foreseeability and avoidability,782 which in turn 
is a question of blameworthiness.783 It is about the question whether the defendant 
can be reproached for violating the duty of care and causing the result, whether he 
could have obeyed the norm, whether he could foresee and prevent the consequences 
from occurring, whether he could have acted differently, given his individual 
capacities, skills, experience and knowledge, intelligence, age, education and 
physical condition.784 The defendant might not be able to exercise his diligence to 
the appropriate level – either permanently or only temporarily – because of 
intellectual or physical defect, lack of experience or capacity to react, sudden 
unexpected tiredness or feeling sick, being surprised or frightened and so on.785
6.5.1. Assumed with the objective part
As argued, these individual characteristics that are relevant in the subjective part 
should be distinguished from those that are already taken into account under the 
objective part of culpa. If the reasonable participant in traffi c could have foreseen 
the danger, the circumstance that the particular defendant could not meet this 
standard does not affect the question of carelessness. The test here is still objective. 
The lack of the capacities that a normal person would have can at most negate culpa 
under its fi nal subjective assessment. To illustrate this, consider that when an 
epileptic person drove a car, this constituted a violation of a duty of care, and it was 
objectively foreseeable that serious accidents could occur. A doctor had even 
warned him. However, his conviction was quashed because the court had dealt with 
the subjective part insuffi ciently. The Supreme Court held that this might be 
diffi cult to establish as the defendant was held to possess only a very limited degree 
of insight of his disease and its consequences. Moreover, he had driven for many 
years without problems and his own general practitioner had never warned him.786
781 Roxin 2006, pp. 1089–1090; Bohlander 2009, p. 117 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 111.
782 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 321 and Roxin 2006, p. 1104.
783 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 317.
784 Roxin 2006, p. 1106; Hettinger 1988, p. 56 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 46, 54–55, 61–63 and 
196 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 69.
785 Bohlander 2009, p. 118; Beulke 2008, p. 260 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 320.
786 17 November 1994 BGHSt 40, 341. In HR 24 November 1964, NJ 1965, 142, the driver had been 
assured by doctors he could drive safely. When he became unconscious while driving as a 
consequence of a diabetic attack, he was excused due to the absence of all blameworthiness.
Chapter IV
194 
Which individual circumstances should be taken into account and to what extent 
is up for debate.787 There must be a limit as it would be unacceptable to measure 
every person to its own standards.788 In practice, such fears appear unwarranted. 
The subjective part is best seen as a highly unusual exception that is meant to make 
sure that defendants who cannot be blamed for their careless behaviour are not held 
criminally liable. After all, the subjective part of culpa is assumed after establishing 
the objective part. What is generally foreseeable to the average person is assumed 
to be also foreseeable to the individual defendant. Therefore, the establishment of 
the subjective part is usually fulfi lled and hardly presents diffi culties of proof.789 In 
theory, the judge may not automatically infer the blameworthiness from the 
carelessness,790 since this would render the criterion void, but practice tends 
towards this nonetheless. Like causation, it is usually discussed only by way of 
exception, for example, if the facts of the case indicate that this aspect might be 
lacking.
The subjective part is only absent in exceptional situations, where 
blameworthiness was lacking. In order to fulfi l this element, any degree of 
blameworthiness suffi ces. In contrast to the objective part, the subjective part need 
not meet a certain threshold. The subjective part or blameworthiness refers to any 
degree of blame, whereas negligence must be gross.791 The assumption that the 
defendant was blameworthy must therefore be completely negated: every 
(relevant)792 degree of blame must be excluded.793 For example, in traffi c, the driver 
is also required to act diligently on unexpected events. Only in extreme situations, 
liability does not follow. Cases where the subjective part is negated have in common 
that there is an enormous pressure on the defendant, similar as in excuses like 
duress.794
This low threshold can be explained by the fact that the objective component 
already requires a substantial deviation from the standard of care. The components 
are inextricably linked to each other and operate as communicating vessels. 
Because the degree of carelessness must be serious, the subjective element is rarely 
denied.795 Similarly, individual elements have already been taken into account in 
787 Westen 2008B. There is also debate on the question whether some forms of incapacity, as in the 
example above, are not better dealt with by an excuse of insanity, see Momsen 2006, pp. 450–
454.
788 Fletcher 1971, p. 426 and Alexander & Kessler Ferzan 2007.
789 Roxin 2006, pp. 1105–1106; Bohlander 2009, p. 118; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 317 and 
321–322; Fokkens & Machielse, note 17 on Culpa; Otte 2007, p. 301; de Hullu 2006, pp. 247, 
252–253 and 256 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 54.
790 Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 49–50 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 322.
791 AG Remmelink in HR 26 April 1977, NJ 1978, 200; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 38 and 197–203 
and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 110–112 and 141–143.
792 See VIII.3.4.
793 Roxin 2006, pp. 1105–1106; annotator Knigge in HR 1 June 2004, NJ 2005, 252; de Jong, D.H. 
& Knigge 2003, p. 137; de Jong, D.H. 2007, p. 5 and Otte 2001, pp. 18–22.
794 Koch 1998, pp. 138–140.
795 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 191. See also Kelk 2005, p. 219.
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the standard of the reasonable person. When someone else with the same function 
would not have made this error, there is not much room left for the defendant to 
make probable he was not able to avoid this error.796
6.5.2. Negated by an excuse
The subjective part is negated if it is assumed that the defendant could reasonably 
not have acted differently.797 Consider that a man is ironing clothes when he is 
called with news that his wife has had a serious accident at work. He rushes over to 
the hospital, forgetting to turn off the iron. Consequently, the house catches fi re. It 
can be argued that the husband should not be blamed for his carelessness, because 
in this understandable situation of pressure, one does not think about the 
endangerment anymore.798
An excuse also expresses that the actor could not reasonably behave differently. 
The subjective part is therefore typically negated by the application of an excuse.799 
Consider the Dutch case where a defendant, a police offi cer, drove as fast as possible 
to get to the scene of serious accident. Unfortunately, by driving so fast, she caused 
another accident. The behaviour was careless by reference to a reasonable police 
offi cer, but in this case, her lack of experience and training in driving in emergency 
situations was taken into account. This amounted to the application of an extralegal 
excuse called ‘absence of all blameworthiness’.800
A similar excuse seems to be available in Germany.801 This general excuse 
operates as a safety net for all situations in which the defendant could not be 
required behave differently. Blameworthiness is an express element of negligence 
but also an implied element of every criminal charge. It is the lowest limit of guilt 
and required for any form of punishment: no punishment without guilt, either for an 
intentional, negligent or strict offence. The availability of this general excuse 
enables that this principle is safeguarded.
The Dutch and German cases in which the defence was developed are very 
similar. Both cases are situated around the turn of the previous century. The 
defendants were ordered to perform a task by their employer, which at the time was 
diffi cult to refuse for an employee.802 In the Dutch case, the defendant was told to 
deliver milk, which was diluted with water. He did not know the milk was diluted, 
but held liable anyway since the offence was strict. However, this conviction was 
quashed because he lacked blameworthiness. He did not know and he should not 
796 De Hullu 2006, p. 256 and Otte 2001, pp. 18–22.
797 Kelk 2005, p. 206.
798 See Koch 1998, p. 137 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1107–1108.
799 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 132; Fokkens & Machielse, note 15 on Culpa; Keulen & Otte 
1999, p. 37 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 251 and 253.
800 ‘Afwezigheid van alle schuld’, see V.2.3. The case is mentioned in den Harder 2006, p. 134.
801 ‘Unzutmutbarkeit normgemäβen Verhaltens.’
802 Since the position of employees has changed, the scope of the excuse is nowadays smaller.
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have investigated the matter, given his subordinate position.803 In the German case, 
the defendant had to drive a horse-cart for his employer, but both knew that one of 
the horses was very hard, if not impossible to handle. One day, the horse got out of 
control again, causing all the horses to go wild. As a result, the cart ran over a 
passer-by who suffered a broken leg. The defendant was not convicted of negligently 
causing bodily harm. Although he could foresee the result, he could not be expected 
to disobey the instructions of his boss, since that could risk losing his livelihood.804
There is controversy in Germany on whether or not such an extralegal general 
defence exists. In the 1920’s, it was widely accepted as an extralegal defence, but 
rejected by the Supreme Court in 1932 after which scholars followed.805 Some 
scholars explicitly explain the abovementioned case in light of the application of an 
excuse and/or conclude that negligence requires an element of ‘Zumutbarkeit’, 
which corresponds with blameworthiness. In contrast, others deny the application 
and existence of such a defence by arguing, amongst others, that this case had been 
solved by negating the objective part of negligence.806 In any event, it is at least 
accepted in Germany that the lack of blameworthiness should preclude liability for 
culpa.807 Culpa positively requires proof of blame worthiness, as follows from the 
requirement of subjective foreseeability and avoidability. The judiciary therefore 
seems to view this element as an order to the judge to carefully test the subjective 
part of negligence to the special circum stances.808
To make it abundantly clear, the possibility to raise absence of blame in order to 
escape liability should not distract from the general rule that negligence is generally 
established upon proof of violating a norm. As long as the judges motivate their 
decisions extensively with reference to the facts of the case, grounding their 
judgment in identifi ed violations, these decisions will usually hold up in appeal or 
cassation.809 This implies that in a lot of cases, negligence is reduced to the 
objective violation of a norm, and thus does not differ from strict liability offences. 
After all, the absence of blame can also be raised successfully against a strict 
charge.
This practical application of negligence and the lack of a subjective part in 
England could also be used to argue against a specifi c subjective part of culpa. 
Moreover, even without a subjective part, the defendant cannot be convicted if he 
lacked any degree of blameworthiness due to the application of an excuse. However, 
even if a subjective part is established easily in practice, this does not mean that it is 
super fl uous. It rather indicates that it is usually given, and only negated 
803 HR 14 February 1916, NJ 1916, p. 681.
804 23 March 1897 RGSt 30, 25. See also Bohlander 2009, pp. 118–119.
805 11 November 1932 RGSt 66, 397 and Koch 1998, pp. 133–135.
806 Koch 1998, pp. 136–138; Bohlander 2009, p. 118; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 324; Beulke 
2008, pp. 158 and 261; Roxin 2006, p. 1109 and Momsen 2006, pp. 447–448 and 455.
807 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 714 and Momsen 2006, pp. 447–449.
808 9 May 1940 RGSt 74, 195 and Koch 1998, pp. 140–141.
809 Otte in a meeting on 22 April 2009.
Fault elements
 197
exceptionally. This is logical, if we consider that most persons can meet the 
standards required by the law.
The reproach of culpa is based on the fi nding that the defendant could have 
foreseen and avoided the result. It is a personal reproach against an individual. It is 
not assessed whether the act was performed careless, but whether the defendant was 
careless. The defendant should be aware of only what he can be aware of, which 
brings about that the law must not hold those defendants liable whose individual 
traits preclude them from being able to perceive risks.810 The lack of a subjective 
part in the English concept of negligence makes it diffi cult to ground an exception 
to negligent liability in the defi cient capacities of the particular defendant.811 As a 
consequence, the English defendant that cannot meet the reasonable standard 
depends on the availability of defences.812 Defences are no satisfactory alternative 
to the subjective part, as they do not cover all the different forms and degrees of 
incapacity such as blindness or stupidity.
6.5.3. Position in the framework of criminal liability
In Germany, the subjective part of negligence is positioned in blameworthiness, the 
third rung on the ladder of criminal liability. It has been separated from the 
objective part of negligence, which is included in the level of the offence defi nition. 
Negligence is thus positioned on two levels of criminal liability.813 In Dutch law, 
negligence subsumes blameworthiness, which implies that the aspect of 
blameworthiness is assessed on the fi rst rung of liability. Only a minority in 
Germany also treats the subjective individual capacities within the framework of 
the offence defi nition.814
The result of the negation of the subjective part in Dutch law is therefore an 
acquittal based on the failure of proof, not the lack of blameworthiness. If the 
accused could reasonably act differently, the offence defi nition is not fulfi lled, even 
if that is due to the application of an excuse like duress or insanity.815 In England, 
neither a relationship between negligence and blameworthiness, nor a subjective 
part is clearly identifi ed. As a result, not fulfi lling any criterion of negligence only 
leads to a failure of proof.
The difference does not lead to very different results. In all Member States, the 
actor who is not blameworthy cannot be punished. The German approach is 
favoured, because it has the advantage that it allows for the taking of measures 
against defendants who are acquitted from a negligent charge due to the negation of 
810 Westen 2008B, p. 147 and Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 152–157.
811 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 151.
812 Since English law lacks a general defence of lacking blameworthiness, he depends on the 
existence of a similar statutory defence that applies to a single offence or statute.
813 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 162 and 296 and Beulke 2008, p. 246.
814 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 297 and Beulke 2008, p. 246.
815 HR 19 February 1963, NJ 1963, 512 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 50.
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the subjective part, like the epileptic driver above. Like a person found insane, he 
fulfi lled the offence defi nition and is only excused, which precludes punishment but 
enables measures being ordered against him. If insanity would negate the negligent 
charge, this simple acquittal would imply no measures could be ordered.816
6.6. Minus or aliud
It has been questioned whether negligence relates to intent (and recklessness) as a 
minus or an aliud. As a minus, negligence is encompassed by intention. When inten-
tion or recklessness is proven, negligence may be proven too.817 When negli gen ce is 
seen as an aliud, it cannot be established by proof of a more serious fault element. 
They are seen as mutually exclusive fault elements, since a person cannot be aware 
and unaware of a risk at the same time.818 The latter perspective has been challen-
ged because it holds that culpa dolo exonerate. Proof of negligence negates the 
inten tional charge, which would provide defendants with an unaccepta ble 
defence.819 Fault elements have been placed on a continuum to indicate a relation-
ship of differing degrees of culpability. This also implies that culpa is the minus of 
dolus.820
The perspective of culpa as minus is currently most popular in the Netherlands, 
and apparently also in England. Whereas the English concept of negligence is 
limited to inadvertence, it can also be fulfi lled by foresight. Recklessness brings 
about that the defendant may be more readily found to be negligent.821 In England, 
the lesser standard always incorporates the greater. Reckless ness is also satisfi ed by 
know ledge or intention.822 By contrast, in Germany, the plus-minus perspective is 
rejected even though the continuum of culpability is accepted.823 Paragraph 18 of 
the Criminal Code implies by the wording ‘at least negligent’ that intent should be 
included as well, but the Supreme Court has held that intent and negligence are 
mutually exclusive.824 The practical relevance of this difference is minimal 
816 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 300. See VII.7.1. for more reasons in favour or this approach 
and X.7.2. on the ordering of measures against the insane.
817 De Hullu 2006, pp. 263–265. See also Kelk 2005, p. 208 and Pompe 1935, p. 89.
818 22 September 1953 BGHSt 4, 340; Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on Culpa and Strijards 1983, 
p. 315.
819 De Hullu 2006, p. 263 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 39–40. See also Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 137.
820 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 314–315; de Hullu 2006, pp. 263–265 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 151. 
See also Kelk 2005, p. 208 and Pompe 1935, p. 89.
821 R. v. Adomako [1994] UKHL 6; Atttorney-General’s Reference No. 2 of 1999 [2000] EWCA 
Crim 91 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 145.
822 Section 19(2) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 52. This also has the procedural 
conse quen ce that an allegation of knowledge or intention includes an allegation of recklessness; 
see section 19(1).
823 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 109–110; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 257–258 and Joecks & Miebach 
2006, notes 100–103 on §15.
824 15 July 1975 BGH NJW 1975, 1893 and 22 September 1953 BGHSt 4, 340.
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however. Almost all negligent offences in Germany have an intentional 
counterpart.825 If both offences are charged, the defendant does not benefi t from 
making intent probable. Moreover, the mere suspicion that the actor intended the 
result generally does not preclude a fi nding of negligence.826
6.7. Luxuria
A distinct, aggravated form of negligence exists in Germany and the Netherlands, 
called ‘Leichtfertigkeit’ and ‘roekeloosheid’ respectively.827 The Dutch concept 
only entered into force in 2006, operating as a fault element that increases the 
maximum penalty of negligent offences.828 Before that date, it was also already 
charged in order to increase the stigma and to infl uence the sentencing decision. 
The Dutch government therefore argued they did not introduce a new concept.829 
‘Leichtfertigkeit’ was already included in the 1962 draft of the German Criminal 
Code. The use of these fault elements is increasing in both countries.830 When the 
offence defi nition requires nothing less than this serious negligence as to the result, 
it functions as a limitation of liability in comparison to simple negligence. These 
national concepts are quite similar and will be discussed as a candidate for the 
general part of European criminal law under the Latin term luxuria.831 On the 
contrary, this concept is absent in England, to which I will return later.
Some defendants are considered to be more culpable than the normal negligent 
actor. In some contexts, the defendant can have created such an obvious danger or 
great harm that he must be punished more severely.832 Recall the defendant who 
drove dangerously with a Porsche and caused a fatal accident. He was acquitted of 
intending to kill the victims. It was held that he did not accept this risk, as this 
would have implied he took into the bargain his own death too.833 In cases like this, 
where the actor is frivolous and can therefore not be held to have intended the 
fatalities he caused, the more severe penalty of luxuria has proven to be a good 
alternative for the intentional offence. Luxuria should be seen as compensation for 
825 Bohlander 2009, p. 59.
826 18 August 1983 BGHSt 32, 48; 17 April 1962 BGHSt 17, 210 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1091–1092.
827 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, pp. 12 and 24; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 151 and 
Roxin 2006, p. 1092.
828 Law of 22 December 2005, Stb. 2006, 11. See articles 307 and 308 of the Dutch Criminal Code 
and art. 175 Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994. In this research, case-law until March 2012 has been 
taken into account. Until then, the Dutch Supreme Court had not ruled on the concept.
829 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 7, p. 19.
830 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 127; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 324 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 54–55. 
See §§109g(4), 138(3), 176b, 178, 218(2), 239a(3), 251, 261(5), 264(4), 306c, 307(3), 308(3), 309(4), 
316a, 316c(3) and 345 of the German Criminal Code.
831 See Vrijheid 1918, pp. 64–65 and 75, who notes that this term in Roman law was used in similar 
contexts as culpa lata.
832 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, pp. 10–12.
833 HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199. See IV.3.6.4.
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the gap that is created by having merely two and not three kinds of fault in the 
Continental Member States under investigation. It can be seen as a middle ground 
in between eventualis and negligence, even though it is generally treated as a 
qualifi ed form of negligence. As such, luxuria also helps to prevent the further 
enlargement of dolus eventualis.834
6.7.1. Criteria
Luxuria applies under the same conditions as negligence, but these must be fulfi lled 
to a higher degree. Luxuria requires a gross violation of the objective standard of 
care that exceeds the criterion of ‘gross carelessness’ required for simple negligen-
ce.835 The conduct is so careless, that the danger of the result to occur must have 
been obvious.836 Examples of luxuria as to death are excessive speeding, dangerous 
overtaking and/or racing on the public road.837 This high degree of carelessness can 
be established by reference to the nature of the duty or the legal interest involved, 
such as the violation of a particularly important duty. It can also be determined in 
relation to the enlarged danger that is created when compared to the basic offence. 
Consider a brutal act of violence during a robbery.838
In other words, luxuria requires an increased degree of objective foreseeability 
of the result. The higher degree of carelessness enables a quantitative distinction 
with simple negligence. Nevertheless, there remains widespread concern about the 
proper demarcation of luxuria.839 After all, the question of what duties must be 
violated to amount to simple negligence is already controversial, let alone what 
degree of carelessness amounts to luxuria. Preceding the adoption of luxuria in the 
Netherlands, there had been criticism in Parliament that charging luxuria would 
lead to more problems and that therefore the maximum penalties of certain 
negligent offences should have been simply raised.840 On the other hand, the 
inherent vagueness in this criterion can be welcomed too, if it is recalled that the 
concept was created to aggravate the punishment of certain negligent actors. The 
vagueness enables a functional attribution of fault: luxuria is present when the 
defendant should be punished more severely than the negligent actor.
In both Germany and the Netherlands, the concept is described as that the 
possibility of fulfi lling the offence forces itself upon the actor, but he frivolously 
834 Reijntjes in Groenhuijsen & Simmelink 2003, p. 482 and Klip 2007B, p. 838.
835 Beulke 2008, p. 247; Koch 1998, pp. 227–231; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 137 and 
Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, p. 10 and no. 7, p. 19.
836 Krey 2002, pp. 144–145 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 112.
837 Klip 2007B and Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 43, p. 5.
838 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 325.
839 Roxin 2006, pp. 1093–1095; Koch 1998, pp. 227–231; Arzt in Stree a.o. 1978; Fokkens & 
Machielse, note 8 on Culpa; de Jong, D.H., Kessler, Otte & Wolswijk 2003, p. 272; de Hullu 
2009, p. 259; Kelk 2005, pp. 211–212 and Klip 2007B, p. 842.
840 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 7, pp. 15–16; no. 34, pp. 4 and 8.
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disregards it.841 Recall that the defendant who acted with dolus eventualis did not 
care at all about that risk. The attitude of the defendant thus enables a qualitative 
distinction with eventualis. If the risk was obvious, and the defendant acted anyway, 
it can be assumed that if he trusted the result would not materialize, this must at 
least have been very frivolous.
Luxuria is thus regarded as the most serious form of conscious negligence.842 
Some German scholars leave open the possibility that serious negligence can be 
fulfi lled when the actor was unaware of the obvious risk.843 However, I doubt that 
any court would believe the defendant was ignorant of an obvious risk. After all, in 
dolus eventualis, awareness (and acceptance) of the risk is also simply inferred from 
its probability. Awareness can also be inferred under the doctrine of wilful 
blindness, when the defendant shuts his eyes to the obvious.844 By leaving open the 
possibility that the actor may have been unaware of something that was very 
obvious to anyone, German scholars avoid such approaches. In any event, it needs 
to be stressed that awareness is not a criterion of luxuria anywhere. It need not be 
proven that the defendant was aware of the risk and frivolously rejected it.
6.7.2. Functional equivalents
As noted, luxuria does not exist in English law. However, the comparison does not 
stop here. In England, causing death by ‘careless driving’ resembles negligence.845 
A more serious punishment can be imposed if death was caused by ‘dangerous 
driving’.846 Like luxuria, dangerous driving exist when “the way he drives falls far 
below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and (…) it would 
be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be 
dangerous.”847 The use of the aggravating element ‘dangerous’ in this context 
comes as no surprise. In the Netherlands, luxuria was also introduced in the context 
of causing fatalities in traffi c in order to aggravate punishment for ‘reckless 
(roekeloos) driving’, conduct which usually falls short of intention.848 The Dutch 
841 9 November 1984 BGHSt 33, 66; Roxin 2006, p. 1093; Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, p. 128; 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 324–325; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 185; de Hullu 2006, p. 244 
and Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on Culpa.
842 Kelk 2005, pp. 211–212; de Jong, D.H., Kessler, Otte & Wolswijk 2003, p. 273; Otte 2007, p. 299 
and Kristen, Borgers & Koopmans in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 17.
843 Schönke & Schröder 2010, note 205 on §15; Joecks & Miebach 2003, note 187 on §15; König & 
Seitz 2006, note 20 on §10 OwiG and Arzt in Stree a.o. 1978, p. 128. Luxuria thus exists when 
the defendant was either unaware of something that was very obvious to anyone or frivolously 
rejected the possibility that the risk would materialize.
844 See IV.3.4.3. and IV.2.5.3.
845 Sections 2(b) and 3(za) of the Road Traffi c Act 1988.
846 Section 1 of the Road Traffi c Act 1988.
847 Section 2(a) of the Road Traffi c Act 1988.
848 Article 175(1) and (2) of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994.
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government explicitly mentioned ‘notoriously dangerous conduct in traffi c’ as the 
category of careless conduct that qualifi ed as luxuria.849
More importantly, the English legal system already has recklessness to fi ll the 
gap between dolus and culpa. Recklessness is a functional equivalent of luxuria. It 
is a broader concept, covering dolus eventualis, luxuria and lesser forms of 
conscious negligence. Therefore, it cannot be equated or translated by luxuria. 
However, this is implied when ‘Leichtfertigkeit’ is translated as recklessness,850 or 
vice versa.851 In EU law, recklessness is often translated into a form of luxuria like 
‘Leichtfertigkeit’. For example, the Directive on ship-source pollution refers to 
recklessness, next to intention and serious negligence.852 It has been explained that 
‘simple’ negligence always must be ‘gross’ or ‘serious’ in the legal systems under 
investigation. The Directive thus simply enumerates all fault elements used in 
English law. Based on the English version, Member States were obliged to 
criminalize the discharge of polluting substances into any of the designated areas if 
done with intent, recklessness or (gross) negligence.
The Directive apparently aims to criminalize this whole spectrum of fault. The 
Dutch and German version of the Directive could therefore have suffi ced by listing 
the two kinds of fault applied in those legal systems: ‘opzettelijk of nalatig’ and 
‘Vorsatzlich oder Fahrlässig’. Recklessness under English law would be covered by 
these Dutch and German fault elements; the scope of liability would be more or less 
the same in all versions. However, the difference between the English legal system 
that operates with three kinds of fault and its continental counterparts that know 
only two kinds has apparently been overlooked when all three fault elements were 
translated. In the Dutch version of the Directive, recklessness was translated as a 
national manifestation of luxuria called ‘roekeloosheid’.853 Similarly, in the German 
version, the term ‘Leichtfertigkeit’ was used.
849 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 43, p. 5.
850 Krey 2002, pp. 12–13 and Jescheck in Thaman 2002, p. lvii (§178). See also the Opinion of AG 
Kokott of 20 November 2007, Case C-308/06, Intertanko a.o. v. Secretary of State for Transport 
[2008] ECR I-4057, §141. The opinion was originally delivered in German. It thus reads in the 
English translation that “the standard of recklessness does exist in German criminal law,” which 
is obviously incorrect.  This can however also be explained by the possibility that these 
articles were translated by others from German. Weigend 1981, p. 688 also uses this translation, 
but only by want of a better one.
851 Opinion of AG Kokott in 3 June 2008, Case C-308/06, Intertanko a.o. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport [2008] ECR I-4057, explicitly in footnote 8 and R. v. Reid [1992] 95 Cr App R 391.
852 Article 4(1) of Directive 2009/123 of 21 October 2009 amending Directive 2005/35 on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements OJ 2009 L 280/52. See 
also article 5(2b) of Framework Decision 2004/68 of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ 2004 L 13/44.
853 Roekeloosheid is a literal translation of recklessness, see IV.4.5. Serious negligence was 
translated as ‘ernstige nalatigheid’, which resembles simple negligence under Dutch law.
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6.7.3. Reconsidering recklessness
In deciding on the fault element in between dolus and culpa, I have argued in favour 
of recklessness. I rejected dolus eventualis, but did not yet consider luxuria in 
detail. Luxuria can be seen as compensation to the all or nothing approach of the 
conti nen tal dichotomy. Because it allows for the aggravation of punishment of the 
negligent actor who was particularly careless or frivolous, luxuria could also be 
seen as a third category of fault in between dolus and culpa,854 even though the 
Dutch legislator explicitly rejected this and positioned it as a qualifi ed form of 
negligen ce.855 After all, recklessness also used to be seen as an aggravated form of 
negligen ce.856
Moreover, it has been created to provide for a middle ground of culpability in 
between intent and negligence, which is refl ected in a range of punishment that also 
stands midway between intent and negligence. This observation confi rms the belief 
that a dichotomy of fault is unsatisfactory, that it is too coarse to provide for a 
legitimate attribution of liability in all cases and that a tertium quid like recklessness 
is desirable. The adoption of luxuria can even be seen as the acknowledgment of 
this by the Dutch and German legislator.857 These legislators have increased the 
maxi mum punishment for negligent offences, either by qualifying it as luxuria or 
by a general increase of the negligent offence, in order to refl ect the degree of 
culpability in consciously taking risks. By bringing the punishment of conscious 
negligence and dolus eventualis closer together, the legislator also undermines the 
supposed difference in culpability and strengthens my argument of combining the 
two fault elements under one fault element of recklessness.858
However, luxuria could also play this role of tertium quid. Luxuria relieves the 
tension of dolus eventualis and so mitigates an important set of arguments raised 
against it. It also takes away most of the tension in comparing the pessimist with the 
frivolous actor. Nonetheless, luxuria only mitigates the problems that recklessness 
solves. Despite the possibility of holding someone liable under luxuria, the 
distinction based on volition still applies and so does its controversy. The 
quantitative distinction to separate luxuria from advertent negligence based on how 
gross the carelessness was leads to uncertainty and inequality. Research of case-law 
concludes that the judgments vary considerably.859 Recklessness in contrast, draws 
a clear qualitative line with culpa by requiring awareness.
854 See Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, p. 141.
855 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 7, pp. 14–15.
856 Edwards 1954, p. 304 footnote 60 and Williams 1953, p. 52.
857 At the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch legislator struggled with the question of whether 
or not there should be a middle ground in between intent and negligence, but decided against it. 
See Smidt 1881 I, pp. 79–80 and Otte 2001, p. 3.
858 See IV.5.2.1.
859 Peters, M. 2010.
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Recklessness thus covers the following scenarios. In all of them, the actor is 
aware of a risk, that for example something will catch fi re or someone may be hurt 
or killed. The Dutch-German fault categorization of these cases has been put in 
brackets. In the fi rst scenario, the actor does not care at all whether the risk 
materializes (eventualis). In the second, he takes into the bargain the possibility that 
the result occurs, because he wants to bring about another result at all cost 
(eventualis). In the third, he hopes the result will not occur (conscious negligence). 
In the fourth case, this hope seems unreasonable given the obvious degree and 
nature of the risk (luxuria). In a fi fth case, he incorrectly concludes the risk is 
justifi ed (eventualis).860
The different degrees of culpability that are inherent in these cases, manifested 
by the attitude and/or belief, are insuffi cient to warrant another distinction of fault. 
All these cases are rightly seen as cases of recklessness, whereby the culpable 
attitude of the defendant can be taken into account in sentencing. One might argue 
that the issue of volition is thereby relocated to sentencing,861 but this volition is 
taken into account in sentencing after establishing dolus eventualis too. In 
eventualis, volition is an issue of liability, but the particular degree of volition needs 
to be assessed in sentencing again as the defendant who approved of the result is 
more culpable than the one who merely acquiesced.
In a general part for criminal law, there exists no advertent negligence. 
Awareness demarcates recklessness from culpa. From this it follows, that the fault 
elements I propose for a general part of criminal law for the EU, largely follow 
English law. There are however some differences. For example, I argued against 
moral connotations in dolus, which are increasingly exceptional in England too. 
Further more, I argued in favour of including a subjective part in culpa, whereas 
this is de lege ferenda in England. Foreseeability of a prohibited circumstance or 
consequence is the lowest common denominator of fault, suffi cient for criminal 
liability. Below this standard, there can be only room for liability by making 
exceptions to the fault requirement. It is to this issue I will now turn.
860 Even if the risk would be justifi ed, it would not affect dolus eventualis. The offence would be 
justifi ed.
861 Weigend 1981, p. 697.
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CHAPTER V
PRINCIPLES OF MENS REA
1. INTRODUCTION
Mens rea is more than dolus, recklessness and culpa. It also includes those 
principles that determine the application of these fault elements. So far, it has been 
explained what the rationale and criteria of the specifi c fault elements are. Yet 
questions remain to be answered. For example, to which offence elements does fault 
apply? What is the effect of mistakes on fault? The answers to these questions 
follow from the general principles of mens rea. Under the headings of 
correspondence and contemporaneity, the most important principles of mens rea 
will be discussed. The former encompasses the fault requirement and the rule that 
fault should apply to all offence elements. The latter principle requires that the fault 
element and its related objective offence elements also coincide in time.
This chapter also focuses on the extension of criminal liability beyond paradigm 
cases. By their nature, principles state the basic rule, to which exceptions can be 
made, but these specifi c exceptions are nonetheless at odds with these principles. In 
order to release some of this pressure, doctrines and approaches have been advanced 
to justify and ground the extension of mens rea. For example, the fault requirement 
appears to be violated when an offence defi nition requires no fault at all. 
Nonetheless, so-called offences of strict liability have been considered necessary in 
modern criminal law, which has fuelled a reinterpretation of the fault requirement 
and the related principle of no punishment without guilt. Secondly, the principle of 
correspondence brings about that any mistake negates fault, which has given rise to 
fears of perpetrators escaping ‘just’ convictions. To overcome this, different 
strategies have been adopted, such as to demand that the mistake be reasonable for 
it to negate fault. Finally, the doctrine of actio libera in causa can be seen as an 
interpretation, modifi cation or even exception to the principle of contemporaneity. 
It enables a fi nding of liability based on an act preceding the criminal conduct, 
despite the fact that the defendant did not intend to fulfi l the objective offence 
elements at the time he committed the actus reus.
This chapter therefore deals with the ambit of mens rea. Well-known doctrines 
of criminal law are (re)considered. In this way, a more precise picture of mens rea 
will be provided. These doctrines can be seen exceptions to the rule or as 
interpretations or modifi cation of the two principles. The decisive question is what 
amount of deviation from principle is allowed. In the language of human rights, 
when is the exception no longer a mere infringement, but also a violation of the 
principle? The structure of this chapter is as follows: I will fi rst discuss a principle 
and its aspects, stating the normal rules. Subsequently, doctrines of criminal law 
that can be seen as manifestations or exceptions to the principle will be described. 
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After having discussed the principle of correspondence in this way, the same 
approach will be taken to discuss the scope of the principle of contemporaneity. In a 
fi nal paragraph, I will draw some general conclusions.
2. CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE
The correspondence principle can be divided into at least two aspects. It 
encompasses the maxim of ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which has been 
dubbed the fault requirement. Also included is the ‘referential principle’, which 
holds that the fault elements of an offence defi nition should correspond or relate to 
the objective elements of the offence defi nition. In other words, mens rea must 
correspond with actus reus.1
2.1. Fault requirement
The fault requirement has been discussed already in detail in the previous chapter. 
It instructs the legislator to include fault elements into criminal offences and, under 
cir cum stances, allows the judge to read in these elements. The principle gives less 
gui dance on the question of what specifi c fault element is required as to which part 
of the offence, but some general principles were identifi ed. For example, if an 
offence element is typical for the offence, or if it is an essential element because it is 
the distinguishing feature with another offence, dolus should principally relate to it.
The most signifi cant aspect of the fault requirement is the instruction to the 
legislator to include fault elements into an offence. This requirement is not met 
when an offence defi nition lacks any fault element. This ‘strict liability’ will be 
discussed in a third section. The additional question is whether courts are allowed 
to read in fault elements into these strict offences. In England, a ‘presumption of 
mens rea’ applies that fault is an element of every statutory offence.2 If an English 
statutory offence does not include any fault element, fault will be read in, unless 
Parliament has clearly indicated otherwise.3 Even when an offence was made 
strict explicitly, English courts can read in a fault element in offences of a ‘truly 
criminal’ character with severe penalties.4 The converse is also true, as the 
presumption can easily be displaced when the offence is regulatory, deals with 
1 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 187.
2 There are also common law offences, identifi ed by the Courts over the centuries. Fault elements 
have already been defi ned in these offences, implying that the presumption of mens rea is not 
necessary here.
3 Sweet v. Parsley [1969] UKHL 1; B. v. DPP [2000] UKHL 13; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 168; 
Law Commission 1989, p. 195 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 111 and 142.
4 Gammon v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1984] 2 All ER 503 and Ashworth 2006, p. 173.
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specialist or economic activity, aims to prevent public danger and there is low 
stigma in conviction.5 There is however no consistent approach.6
In the Netherlands, this presumption could be inferred from the basic rule that 
felonies require either intent or negligence.7 When the felony does not contain a 
fault element, the Dutch Supreme Court has been known to read in such element, 
based on this general rule. Examples are the possession of a fi rearm or child 
pornography. Possession was interpreted as to require knowledge.8 In Union law 
too, it is made explicit that in order to be liable for obtaining access to child 
pornography, the person must both intend to enter a site where this pornography is 
available and know that such images can be found there. Inadvertence is dismissed 
as an insuffi cient basis for criminal liability.9 It is obvious that otherwise the scope 
of criminal liability would be inappropriately wide.
The Dutch approach to distinguish felonies from and misdemeanours is 
comparable to the English one, since the presumption of mens rea depends on the 
seriousness of the offence. Regarding misdemeanours, no presumption of mens rea 
applies. The judge can read in fault when the wording of an offence suggests this, 
but he is not allowed to run counter to the clear purpose of Parliament to create 
strict liability.10 Like in England, the purpose of the legislator can be inferred from 
the context of the offence, such as the fact that its counterpart requires fault or 
because a due diligence defence has been included.11
The German legal system applies the strongest presumption of mens rea, namely 
that intent should always be required unless the offence lets negligence suffi ces.12 
With a few exceptions, strict liability is out of the question. This allows for a 
completely different way of drafting legislation in comparison to England and the 
Netherlands. German offences do not mention intent, because it is presumed. The 
absence of fault elements in the offence defi nition does not imply they are strict.
No clear picture emerges from the case-law of the ECJ. A presumption of mens 
rea has not been identifi ed and strict liability is not in itself incompatible with 
5 Manchester 2006, p. 227; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 171–173 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 148–
156.
6 Williams 1953, p. 271, Ashworth 2006, p. 174, Virgo 2002, p. 13 and Ormerod 2005, p. 144.
7 The offence that requires fault is a felony and its counterpart that requires no fault is a 
misdemeanor, see Blom 2008, p. 122. Felonies used to require intent, see IV.6.2.1. Pompe 1935, 
p. 78 submitted that if intent is not included in a felony, it should be read in, unless a contrary 
indication is given.
8 HR 10 June 1986, NJ 1987, 85; HR 26 January 1999, NJ 1999, 537; HR 28 February 2006, NJ 
2006, 179; de Hullu 2006, pp. 198–199 and Kessler 2001, pp. 184–186.
9 Recital 18 of the preamble of Directive 2011/93 of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual 
absue and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Framework 
Decision 2004/68, OJ 2011 L 335/1. It leaves open the question whether Member States are 
nevertheless free to adopt stricter measures, including the criminalization of negligent access.
10 Van Bemmelen 1959, pp. 43–44.
11 Kessler 2001, pp. 193 and 251–252; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 176–177; Glazebrook 2001, 
p. 26 and Manchester 2006, pp. 218–219 and 223.
12 §15 of the Criminal Code and §10 of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
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Union law.13 However, in most Union instruments that deal with subject-matters that 
are considered as part of criminal law by most of its Member States, fault elements 
are included and relate to all objective elements. In some cases however, the Union 
legislator explicitly made clear that fault should not relate to all offence elements. 
For example, in the context of insider dealing, it used to be required that the 
‘accused’ intended to use his inside knowledge to make profi t or minimize loss. 
This led to many evidential diffi culties, prompting an explicit request of the EU 
Parliament to strike this fault element in the Directive on insider dealing and market 
manipulation. The wording of insider dealing was changed from ‘taking advantage 
(with full knowledge of the facts)’ to ‘using’. The subject must still know or should 
have known he was in possession of inside information, but his actions need not be 
driven by a fraudulent intention.14
The ECJ confi rmed this objective phrasing of the prohibited result based on a 
teleological interpretation of the Directive that focuses on effi cient enforce ment. It 
held that the “Community legislature opted for a preventative mechanism and for 
administrative sanctions for insider dealing, the effectiveness of which would be 
weakened if made subject to a systematic analysis of the existence of a mental 
element.” It justifi ed the doing away with the intent to abuse insider knowledge, 
based on the presumption that the professional capacity of the addressee of the 
norm and the context of insider dealing generally preclude the possibility that the 
subject did not know of the unfair advantage.15 It can be concluded that the fault 
requirement is also the rule in the EU, bringing about a presumption of mens rea. 
Nevertheless, like in most Member States, this does not rule out strict liability.
2.2. Referential principle
The referential principle holds that fault elements must relate to the objective 
elements of the offence defi nition.16 Fault is not assessed in a vacuum but in relation 
to objective offence elements of conduct, circumstances or results.17 The referential 
principle raises the question as to what objective elements fault must relate. For 
example, must intent in an offence defi nition relate to all the objective elements of 
that offence,18 or only to those offence elements that follow after the fault element?19 
13 See 10 July 1990, Case C-326/88, Anklagemyndigheden v. Hansen and Søn I/S [1990] ECR 
I-2930; 2 October 1991, Case C-7/90, Criminal proceedings against Paul Vandevenne and others 
[1991] ECR I-4371, §12 and 27 February 1997, Case C-177/95, Ebony Maritime [1997] ECR 
I-1111, §36.
14 AG Kokott on 10 September 2009, Case C-45/08, Spector Photogroup NV [2009] ECR I-12073 
and Directive 2003/6 of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse), OJ 2003 L 96/16.
15 23 December 2009, Case C-45/08, Spector Photogroup NV [2009] ECR I-12073.
16 Compare Ashworth 2006, p. 197.
17 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 66 and de Hullu 2006, p. 196.
18 See Manchester 2006, p. 222 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 188.
19 This is the approach in the Netherlands, see Smidt 1881 I, p. 72 and Kelk 2005, p. 199.
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In Union law, the rule appears to be that intention should relate to all subsequent 
elements of the provision.20
On a rigid interpretation, the principle is also violated if fault does not 
correspond to each an every single offence element. It emphasizes the importance 
of the fault require ment and gives it extra signifi cance, by not merely requiring that 
fault should be included in the offence, but to require that it should in principle 
relate to all offence elements. However, partial as opposed to full correspondence 
seems to be accep ted in all Member States under investigation,21 and as illustrated 
above, in the EU. The exact ambit of the principle will become obvious in the 
discussion on strict liability below.
Strict liability is the most signifi cant infringement of the correspondence 
principle and will be discussed fi rst. Subsequently, I will demonstrate that the 
correspondence principle brings about that mistakes negate dolus and recklessness. 
In particular, I will show how this strict application of correspondence is mitigated 
by other legal concepts and doctrines. Related is the aspect of how specifi c the 
correspondence between the fault of the defendant and the objective elements 
should be. For example, must the defendant have intended to kill this particular 
individual or does a general intent to kill suffi ce? Must intention also relate to legal 
aspects? It will be determined what degree of dissonance between subjective 
perception and objective reality can still lead to criminal liability.
2.3. Strict liability
If liability is strict, no fault needs to be proven. The defendant’s state of mind is 
irrelevant, although it can be taken into account in the decision to prosecute, the 
application of excuses and in sentencing.22 This strict liability is an exception to the 
fault requirement. However, the term also covers cases where fault needs to be 
proven, but not in relation to each and every single offence element. This form of 
strict liability is an exception to a rigid referential principle that fault needs to relate 
to all offence elements.
Strict liability is just one legislative technique to make criminal law applicable 
and enforceable, in other words, to avoid heavy demands of proof.23 In this section, 
similar techniques will be discussed, such as a presumption of fault. If fault is 
presumed, the prosecutor need not prove it. Provided the presumption can be 
rebutted, the defendant bears the burden of disproving it.
20 Explanatory Report on the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ 
fi nancial interests, 23 June 1997 OJ 1997 C 191/1 and Report of 30 April 2004 from the 
Commission of the Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of 
non-cash means of payment, COM (2004) 346 under 2.1.
21 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 209. See also Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 187–188.
22 De Hullu 2006, p. 221.
23 See de Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 181 and Nijboer 1989, pp. 366–368.
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Because strict liability is at odds with the aforementioned principles, it should 
be avoided. Alternatives may provide for almost the same practical benefi ts, with a 
lower cost to principles of mens rea. Nonetheless, I will explain that some 
alternatives even cast the net of criminal liability wider than necessary. Moreover, 
there remain legitimate reasons to use to strict liability in certain cases. I will 
demarcate this exceptional area.
2.3.1. Terminology
Since the term ‘strict liability’ is quite controversial,24 it is important to be clear 
about its meaning. Strict liability requires no proof of whatever kind of fault. 
Crimes of negligence are not strict liability. When fault is included in the offence 
defi nition, but it does not relate to all elements, the element as to which fault does 
not relate is a ‘strict’ or ‘objectifi ed element’. A common example is the consequence 
in a result-based offence. The actor must have intended an action, but he need not 
have foreseen or be able to foresee the consequence that followed. As will be 
explained in detail shortly, the German legal system rejects strict liability. 
Consequently, at least negligence is required as to the consequence.
Strict liability should also be distinguished from ‘absolute liability’, which 
means that a person can be convicted for an offence without proof of fault or proof 
of conduct. Absolute liability is therefore correctly used to refer to offences that 
criminalize state of affairs,25 or offences committed involuntarily.26 However, the 
term absolute liability is also used to express that all offence elements are strict,27 or 
express that in addition, it is to no avail for the defendant to prove that he lacked 
any degree of blame,28 or raise another defence.29 The ECtHR has used the term 
strict liability for this extreme form of liability, when no defence can be raised 
against the charge.30 In contrast, the meaning of ‘strict liability’ used here does not 
preclude the availability of defences. It merely refers to the lack of fault elements in 
the offence. As will be discussed later, the principle of guilt and the presumption of 
innocence do not allow holding the blameless defendant criminally liable. The 
principle of guilt consists of an absolute core, a minimum threshold of 
blameworthiness.31
24 Ashworth 2006, p. 164; Green in Simester 2005, pp. 1–20 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 448–450.
25 Like in R. v. Larsonneur [1933] 24 Cr App Rep 74.
26 Roberts in Simester 2005, pp. 152 and 171.
27 See Green in Simester 2005, p. 3; Duff in Simester 2005, p.125 and Ormerod 208, p. 152.
28 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 185. See also Dolman 2006, p. 63 on the doctrine of ‘le fait 
matériel.’
29 Green in Simester 2005, p. 4 and Ormerod 208, p. 152.
30 O’Halloran and Francis v. the UK, appl. nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007, §59.
31 The ECtHR also holds that dispensing with proof of fault may be legitimate, but not when it is 
coupled with a complete absence of the possibility for the defendant to escape liability by raising 
a defence. In that case, liability is ‘strict’ and violates article 6 of the ECHR.
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It is commonly assumed, that in Germanic law, the mere causing of a prohibited 
fact suffi ced for criminal liability.32 This can be called ‘Erfolgshaftung’33 and in 
Napoleonic systems, reference was made to the doctrine of ‘le fait matériel’.34 It was 
replaced by ‘Schuldhaftung’, which in addition to causing harm, requires fault for 
criminal liability. Without the presence of fault, the consequence is a coincidence, 
or as it was called in Roman law, casus.35 In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
the fault requirement was accepted as a cornerstone of criminal law, only to be put 
under pressure again with the emergence of the Industrial Revolution and 
subsequently, the Risk Society.
2.3.2. Rationale
Strict liability has been justifi ed as far as it is used in regulatory offences. These 
crimes have been created since the end of the 19th century as a means of dealing 
with rapidly changing social and industrial practices.36 The burden of criminal 
penalties is seen as a form of production expense for those who voluntarily initiate 
risk-creating activities. Some companies operate in spheres of such potential danger 
and wield such power, that it is not socially unfair to hold them to higher standards, 
as long a fair warning is given. Individuals can also be held to higher standards 
when maximum safety is an issue, such as in road traffi c offences.37
However, this does not explain why this higher standard should go beyond the 
fault element of negligence. There is no evidence that strict liability offences are 
more deterrent than offences that require fault.38 A negligence standard has the 
advan tage of communicating what level of precaution is required to secure 
immunity from conviction. Strict liability might lead actors to take more than 
reasonable precautions, but there is no evidence of this. In contrast, it is argued this 
is very unlikely as it is to be expected (corporate) actors will weigh the costs of 
precautions against the expected liability costs. Thus, persons are deterred from 
risk-taking altogether or are prepared to gamble. The real culprits are not deterred.39
In addition, strict liability arguably goes too far because it criminalises accidents 
and reasonable conduct. While it is perfectly understandable to focus on persons 
causally responsible for injurious outcomes in the law of torts, the stigma of 
criminal conviction demands something more to be imposed; actus non facit reum 
32 However, see Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 79 and Koch 1998, pp. 54–55.
33 Kelk 2005, p. 175.
34 De Hullu 2006, p. 199 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Schuld.
35 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 43 and 123.
36 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 167.
37 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 182, Ormerod 2005, pp. 150–151 and Ashworth 2006, p. 167.
38 In Gammon v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1984] 2 All ER 503, Lord Scarman held that 
strict liability is only legitimate when it “can also be shown that the creation of strict liability 
will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent 
the commission of the prohibited act.”
39 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 30, 33, 183 and 188 and Williams 1953, pp. 258 and 269.
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nisi mens sit rea.40 A person is convicted without being found culpable, whereas 
fault is one of the cornerstones of criminal liability.41
In an attempt to counter the controversy, it is argued that a conviction for 
regulatory offences is deemed to involve only a small sanction and hardly any 
stigma.42 Yet practice has shown the penalties for committing regulatory offences 
can be big, including prison sentences, and the stigma of the criminal procedure 
and conviction should not be underestimated.43 When a classic criminal principle 
like the fault requirement is abandoned and the offences in question are not criminal 
in character, the question of the ultimum remedium character of the criminal law 
comes up. Why should criminal law be applied and not civil liability?44 Do we not in 
fact want to stigmatize?
On the other hand, it has been argued that branding people without fault as 
criminals may lessen the respect for the law and the social condemnation of those 
who break it,45 but this does not seem to have happened yet.46 The general public 
does not experience strict liability as unfair because it is used mostly in a regulatory 
context. Therefore, in most cases it is legitimized by a presumption of fault. It needs 
not be proven that the driver knew he was driving too fast, because he is presumed 
to have known. He was trained to drive and know the rules relating to this activity, 
which imply that he was at least could and should have known he drove too fast.47
An important set of additional justifi cations is of a pragmatic character. Strict 
liability is more effi cient as it strengthens the regulators hand of ensuring 
compliance and therefore prevention. By eliminating the need to prove fault, 
defendants can be held liable easier, reducing the costs of the enforcement 
procedure.48 A vast amount of offences can be committed strict, which brings about 
that it creates a substantial relieve for enforcement agencies.49 Strict liability 
prevents defendants from making easy claims of mistake like ‘I did not know’, that 
are hard for the prosecution to disprove. Given the specialist activities that are dealt 
with by regulatory offences, this ease of enforcement is a very welcome convenience 
for the prosecution.50 It can be rebutted however that for the more serious offences, 
evidence of fault is needed at the sentencing stage in any case, requiring proof at 
40 Sullivan in Simester 2005, pp. 183 and 198–201 and Ashworth 2006, p. 166.
41 R. v. G [2003] UKHL 50 and Sweet v Parsley [1969] UKHL 1.
42 Ashworth 2006, p. 169 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 181.
43 Williams 1953, p. 267.
44 Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1004.
45 Tadros 2005, p. 73; Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1005; Williams 1953, p. 269 and Simester in 
Simester 2005, p. 41, who also state that “Thor’s hammer was not meant for driving nails.”
46 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 181.
47 Compare also 23 December 2009, Case C-45/08, Spector Photogroup NV [2009] ECR I-12073, 
§36.
48 Simester in Simester 2005, p. 26. This applies to the investigation, the administrative decision 
and/or the procedure before a Court.
49 A popular legislative technique is to create fall-back offences that are strict, see Kessler 2001, 
p. 186 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 199–200.
50 Ashworth 2006, p. 168 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 182.
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that point.51 In EU competition law, no fault needs to be proven in order to hold the 
undertaking concerned liable under articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but it is needed to 
impose fi nes.52
Moreover, it is unjust to use issues of procedural convenience as a reason to 
change substantive law, an ineffective if deterrence does not increase. The 
facilitation of prosecution could also be reached through the less far-reaching 
method of reversing the burden of proof of negligent offences.53 This middle ground 
does away with the need for strict liability and would in fact meet the arguments of 
those who favour strict liability. After all, negligence does help to deter the 
indifferent and careless,54 and the defendant can explain himself by making probable 
reasonable conduct. I will consider this alternative to strict liability below in detail.
2.3.3. Popularity
The dogmatic criticism raised to strict liability is by large irrefutable. Nonetheless, 
strict liability is an accepted form of liability, because it is applied in regulatory 
contexts. In this context, the interest of an effective administration of offences is 
considered more important than dogmatic objections. This form of liability is very 
common in EU law and popular in English and Dutch criminal law.
Strict liability is not in itself incompatible with Union law. Concerns of 
effi ciency are decisive. The ECJ seems more concerned that the implementation 
and enforce ment of Union law is just as strict as similar national law. Penalties must 
be propor tio nate, but above all, effective and dissuasive.55 For example, in EU 
competition law, the elements of anti-competitiveness in article 101 TFEU and that 
of abuse of a dominant market position in article 102 TFEU do not require proof of 
fault. Under takings cannot argue they did not know the effect or were incorrectly 
advised.56
Secondly, as explained in the introduction, the technique of minimum 
harmonization in the context of criminalizations implies that States are free to use 
51 Ormerod 2005, p. 158; Wootton 1981, pp. 47–48 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 447–448.
52 Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003; article 14 of Regulation 139/2004; 25 March 1996, Order in 
Case C-137/95 P, SPO and others v. Commission [1996] ECR I-1611. This is also required under 
German and English Competition law, whereas in the Netherlands no fault is required, see 
Gritter 2003, pp. 137–138, 170–171 and 195.
53 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 184 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 448–450. Compare Hörster 2009, 
pp. 69–90.
54 Ormerod 2005, pp. 159–161; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 179 and 185 and Williams 1953, 
p. 272.
55 10 July 1990, Case C-326/88, Hansen & Søn [1990] ECR I-2930, §§12 and 17 and 27 February 
1997 Case C-177/95, Ebony Maritime [1997] ECR I-1111, §§36–37.
56 Eijsbouts a.o. 2010, pp. 164 and 175. The Commission has argued, in contrast, that there is no 
strict liability in competition law, because the “Commission’s decisions do not impute liability 
to companies without its proof being established.” See 10 September 2009, Case C-97/08 P, Akzo 
Nobel [2009] ECR I-8237. However, this does not seem to preclude liability for offences with 
strict elements.
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wider offences defi nitions, including offence defi nitions that do not require fault as 
to each and every element. By contrast, implementation law is not supposed to 
require additional indications of intent.57 In other words, although EU legal 
instruments on substantive criminal law almost all require intention to each and 
every single offence element, Member States still fulfi l their obligations by enacting 
new legislation of referring to existing legislation in which some elements are strict. 
Frame work Decisions and Directives are the product of political negotiations, 
resulting in a minimum level on what parties could agree on in the Council (and 
Parlia ment).58 Whereas States agreed that the intentional offence should be 
criminalized, there may still have been considerable support to allow for some 
degree of strict liability, especially when this is already part of existing domestic 
law on the subject.
Nonetheless, the discretion of Member States to go further than the Union 
instrument is also limited by general principles of Union law. For example, Union 
law limits the discretion of Member States to create strict offences if they constitute 
an unjustifi ed restriction to a fundamental freedom.59 In addition, some support can 
be found for requiring nothing less than intention as to an element that is essential 
to the offence.60
Strict liability is very common in the English legal system. Most of the 
approximately 8000 offences in England are strict liability offences with relatively 
low penalties and almost half of the more serious offences contain a strict element.61 
Whereas many English scholars have criticized strict liability, the English 
legislature has much less regard for subjective orthodoxy. The effect of strict 
liability mitigated through due diligence and special defences, and its use is 
diminished through the increase of negligent offences. Nonetheless, it is unlikely 
that this concept will be dismissed since it is so rooted in English law and to the 
satisfaction of many.62 In the Netherlands, strict liability or strict elements are also 
common in misdemeanours.63 By contrast, in German criminal law, strict liability is 
rejected altogether, even if it concerns regulatory law. However, there are a few 
exceptions to this rule, apparent in strict elements in German offences, which will 
57 Second report from the Commission on the implementation of the Convention on the Protec tion 
of the European Communities’ fi nancial interests and its protocols, 14 February 2008, 
COM(2008) 77.
58 Although the effect is mitigated with the entroy into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that made the 
ordinary legislative procedure with qualifi ed majority voting also applicable to criminal 
Directives, the need for consensus still reinforces the minimal character of Union legislation.
59 30 November 1977, Case C-52/77, Leonce Cayrol v. Giovanni Rivoira & Figli [1977] ECR 2261.
60 See the aforementioned examples of recital 18 of the preamble of Directive 2011/93 that states 
that penalties should only be applied to intentionally accessing a website containing child 
pornography and secondly, the intention to defraud the EU budget, mentioned in the explanatory 
Report on the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ fi nancial interests, 
23 June 1997, OJ 1997 C 191/1, see IV.2.4.5.
61 Ashworth 2006, pp. 20, 158 and 170 and Ashworth & Blake 1996.
62 Hörster 2009, pp. 92–113.
63 De Hullu 2006, p. 243 and Blom 2008, p. 122.
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be discussed below. First, I will try to explain the extreme difference in 
perspectives.
Spencer, Pedain and Hörster have tried to explain the widespread use of strict 
liability in England, compared to Germany and France.64 First of all, they point at 
the doctrinal emphasis on the principle of guilt, which has constitutional status.65 
This principle is interpreted very strict in Germany as no punishment without 
fault.66 Accordingly, strict liability is said to violate the principle of guilt.67 As argued 
below, a modern interpretation of this principle however merely requires that the 
person, who is held criminally liable, should be blameworthy.
They also explain the difference from the procedural point of view that on the 
continent, the fault of the defendant is established much easier. Since fault is 
established more diffi cult in England, it is much more tempting to do away with it 
altogether. They submit that the right to remain silent is respected more in England, 
because the defendant is only questioned after the prosecution evidence has been 
heard. Secondly, English tribunals of fact are not allowed to know about previous 
convictions of the defendant.68 Clearly, tribunals on the continent are not allowed to 
make evidential inferences out of this, but it will in practice infl uence the 
assessment of evidence. Moreover, it is possible to establish that a defendant 
probably did know that an item is a prohibited substance if he has been convicted 
previously of selling such substances. Finally, strict liability is deemed better for 
trials that juries and lay judges have to decide, as it is believed they might be easier 
fooled. By eliminating fault from the trial, they cannot be fooled on that respect.
Hörster adds that the differences must be sought in the predominantly utilitarian 
legal thinking and legal culture aimed at pragmatic goals of England, contrasted 
with the focus of German legal science on the limitation of criminal law and the 
countering of pragmatic goals. Finally, the low popularity of negligent offences in 
England must be mentioned.69 Some dispute that this fault element is mens rea. If 
negligence is not available as an offence element, the gap between strict liability 
and recklessness is great, resulting generally in favour of criminalizing strict.
It is generally argued that any idea of strict liability is rejected in German 
criminal law. The principle of guilt brings about that fault is always required, which 
is also laid down in §§15 and 18 of the Criminal Code.70 Others argue that strict 
elements are not precluded by the aforementioned.71 In fact, German criminal law 
64 Spencer & Pedain in Simester 2005, pp. 269–275 and Hörster 2009, pp. 29–44.
65 The German Constitutional Court deduces such a constitutional right from the interplay of 
paragraphs 1 and 2(I) of the Basic Law, as well as the principle of the Rechtstaat, see 19 February 
2003 BVerfG NJW 2003, 1504.
66 See also Bohlander 2009, p. 31.
67 See also Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 71–72 and Nijboer 1989, p. 364.
68 See also Spencer in Tiedemann 2002, p. 439.
69 Hörster 2009, pp. 29–44. See IV.6.2.
70 Bohlander 2009, p. 60. See also §10 of the German Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
71 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 104.
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does include some strict elements.72 Examples are the non-provability of the 
dishonourable fact in slander, the commitment of an unlawful act fulfi lling the 
offence elements with the offence of intoxication and death or serious bodily injury 
in the context of participating in a brawl.73
The rationale for requiring no fault as to these elements is that they have the 
character of risk elements. When someone takes a risk that is foreseeable to 
everyone that a serious consequence occurs, he can be punished for this, without 
requiring that his will is directed to this element.74 The attribution of consequences 
is not coincidental; the principle of guilt not violated. They are foreseeable 
realizations of the disallowed danger, which the defendant has intentionally or 
carelessly created. The actor has ‘dem Zufall das Feld bereitet’.75 Very similar 
reasoning can be found in England to extend liability to more serious consequences 
and in the Netherlands to legitimize strict liability in result based offences. Strict 
liability is a popular device in these contexts, which will be discussed now.
The maxim of versari in re illicita is a derivative of the canonical rule ‘versanti 
in re illicita imputantur omnia quae sequuntur ex delicto’, which means that the 
person who commits a forbidden act, will be attributed everything that is a 
consequence of this act. Even unforeseen consequences that arise out of a trifl e 
violation will be attributed to the actor.76 An infl uential example in English law is 
the so-called ‘felony-murder rule’ which was abolished in 1957,77 but lives on in the 
crime of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act. Required for conviction 
is that the accused committed a crime, which a reasonable person would realize 
presents a risk of some harm to another and it in fact caused death.78
In the English legal system, this maxim, labelled as the ‘thin ice’79 or ‘malice 
principle’80 allows for what is called ‘constructive liability’. Once a person has 
crossed a signifi cant moral threshold, such as intending to infl ict serious bodily 
injury to a person, there is good reason to impose liability for consequences that are 
not too remote. The fault element as to a minor offence is coupled with the major 
harm caused in order to construct liability for a serious offence. For example, a 
person can also be found guilty of murder when the defendant only intended to 
infl ict gross bodily harm but the defendant died.
Constructive liability is a functional equivalent of dolus eventualis in extending 
fault to unwanted, more serious consequences. On the continent, it would be argued 
72 ‘Objektive Bedingungen der Strafbarkeit’ or ‘der Ahndbarkeit’. See Beulke 2008, pp. 50–51; 
Krey 2003, pp. 100–101 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 211.
73 §§186, 323a and 231 of the Criminal Code respectively. Other examples mentioned by Bohlander 
2009, p. 60; Roxin 2006, p. 1037 and Weigend in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 1393.
74 Beulke 2008, p. 51.
75 Compare Koch 1998, pp. 93–95.
76 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 71–72 and Stuckenberg 2007. pp. 517–520.
77 Section 1 of the Homicide Act 1957, see also Stuckenberg 2007 p. 518.
78 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 187–188, Ashworth 2006, pp. 87–88 and 160.
79 Husak in Simester 2005, pp. 98–99.
80 Ashworth 2006, pp. 87 and 160.
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that the defendant consciously accepted the risk of death when he intentionally 
infl icted serious bodily injury. In England, the offence of murder itself is drafted in 
a way to include the same cases without reference to an extended concept of dolus. 
Therefore, the lack of dolus eventualis in England does not bring about a more 
limited scope of murder.
Constructive liability clearly focuses on the (great) harm of the offence. Such an 
objective approach to liability becomes problematic when the difference between 
the intended result and the actual, more serious outcome is great. In order to 
reconcile it with subjective concerns, versari in re illicita has been watered down to 
attribute those consequences that are not too remote. For example, when the 
defendant foresaw to infl ict some harm, this fault can be enough for a conviction of 
maliciously infl icting grievous bodily harm.81 The defendant is not liable for 
whatever consequences ensue, but only for those that are foreseeable.82 English, 
Dutch and German scholars express this condition in different ways. It can be said 
that the attributed consequence must be not that different in nature and degree from 
the intended harm,83 or that it must be typical for the danger that was created.84 In 
other words, some behaviour, like an armed robbery or dangerous driving, brings 
about an ‘intrinsic risk’ that can be attributed to the defendant.85
The abovementioned is also advanced to justify that the result is strict in some 
result based offences.86 In the Netherlands for example, the basic offence of theft is 
aggra va ted when it results in death, injury or damage.87 Fault need not relate to the 
more severe consequence. The ‘objectifying’88, the disconnecting of fault from 
these severe results is justifi ed because there is a subjective connection with the 
basic offence. When you want to take something with force, it can be expected that 
some one may get hurt. When you drive dangerously, accidents are likely to follow. 
In other words, it is not about liability based on bad luck. The fact that the more 
aggra va ted result is strict is justifi ed because it was foreseeable to a reasonable 
person.
This reasoning however implies that it could also be argued that requiring culpa 
as to the aggravated result would have suffi ced.89 By objectifying the result, the 
principle of correspondence has been put under more pressure than necessary. In 
81 Section 20 of the English Offences Against the Person Act 1861, see Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 154.
82 Ashworth 2008A juxtaposes moderate constructivism with the unlawful act theory.
83 Horder 1997.
84 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 519 and Renzikowski 2000, p. 492.
85 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 190 and Reid 2009, p. 183. Halpin 2004, p. 133 submits that 
dangerous driving, which should be avoided altogether, can be contrasted with conduct like 
driving that requires some precautions to be taken. De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 88 submit 
that the more dangerous the conduct, the more foreseeable harmful consequences become.
86 Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Schuld.
87 Articles 311 and 312 of the Criminal Code.
88 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 66.
89 See Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 448–450.
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Germany, this perspective is generally taken. The result need not be intended like 
the other offence elements, but it needs to have been foreseeable. Therefore, at least 
negligence is required.90 Like the aforementioned limited moderate constructivism, 
result based offences are legitimized because the severe consequence such as death 
is the realization of the risk inherent in a basic wrong like infl icting bodily harm.91
For example, in the case where two Hells Angels agreed that they would 
violently take the club jacket of a member of a rivalling motorcycle club, one of 
them stabbed this ‘Outlaw’ to death. This could not be attributed to the other Hells 
Angel under conditional intent, because it was accepted that although the lethal risk 
was foreseen, he had trusted in a good outcome. Nevertheless, the Hells Angel was 
convicted of the offence of infl iction bodily injury resulting, negligently, in death.92 
Notwithstanding strict elements in a few offences, strict liability is not applied in 
German criminal law. In most cases, the alternative of requiring negligence as to 
the result is believed to strike an appropriate balance between individual and 
societal concerns. In the next subsection, this and other functional equivalents to 
strict liability are discussed. I will argue that the alternative of requiring negligence 
cannot meet the demands underlying strict liability.
2.3.4. Functional equivalents
The alternatives to strict liability in substantive law are manifold. An even more 
objectivist approach than applying strict liability is to strike away the objective 
element altogether. There seems to be a trend of legislative action to create fall-back 
offences to use against persons who cannot be convicted for more serious offences. 
Rather than criminalizing the result, the conduct as such is punished.93 Requiring 
fault is hardly relevant when the fall-back offence relates to morally unobjectionable 
conduct. After all, the requirement of intention to the crime of eating pizza is hardly 
signifi cant in precluding the conviction of those that do not deserve condemnation. 
Principles of criminalization, like the harm principle, are important to limit this 
type of criminal law.94
Similarly, striking offence elements altogether goes further than making them 
strict. In the context of traffi cking in human beings, the EU legislator struck what 
may have otherwise been introduced as a (strict) offence element into national law. 
Article 2(4) of Directive 2011/36 holds that the consent of the traffi ckee to the 
90 §18 of the Criminal Code. Some authors even argue that the few strict elements in German 
criminal law must be interpreted as to require negligence. Fault must relate to any element that 
grounds or increases the wrong, according to Roxin 2006, pp. 1038–1040.
91 Beulke 2008, pp. 7–8 and 51. See §227 of the German Criminal Code.
92 27 January 2011 BGH BeckRS 2011, 03958.
93 Spencer & Pedain in Simester 2005, pp. 279–282. This also does away with proof of causation.
94 Husak in Shute & Simester 2002. There is great interest in these principles in English law, which 
can be explained by the popularity of strict liability and the focus on the specifi c, combined with 
scepticism on the general part, see Ashworth 2006, pp. 25–52 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 
581–596.
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exploitation, like prostitution, is irrelevant. Instead of including the lacking consent 
to being prostituted as a strict element that needs to be proven, which would make a 
mistake on the consent of the traffi cker irrelevant, Directive 2011/36 enables 
criminal liability even if the traffi ckee consented to the prostitution.
Secondly, if a basic offence already exists, this can also be charged. Dealing in 
narcotics for example, presupposes possession. Possession can be established easier 
than the intent to sell or distribute. The punishment of the basic offence can even be 
increased. Similarly, the offence element can include alternatives and be given a 
broad interpretation.95 The greater the scope of the objective element, the more 
likely the defendant’s perception corresponds to it. Furthermore, I already explained 
that offences of negligence are easily established. The expansion of duties of care, 
in number and scope, facilitate convictions of negligence. Whereas I argued against 
this practice, negligence is established easily upon the mere violation of the duty. It 
can therefore be argued that it resembles strict liability.96
The prosecution’s case is also facilitated by the creation of offences that 
criminalize the failing to present documentation that shows whether norms have 
been fulfi lled. This is particularly important in professional, specialist contexts, in 
which the ability of an actor to document his conduct may be a legitimate condition 
of the overall regime by which that conduct is permitted and facilitated.97 By using 
a tachograph, the truck driver is able to demonstrate that he did not exceed the 
maximum hours a person is allowed to drive a truck each day. Not using the 
tachograph correctly consists of an offence on its own, which can be 
administratively fi ned.98
Very common in German regulatory law are abstract offences of endangerment. 
It has been submitted that strict results have the character of such an offence.99 The 
basic wrong in a result based offence brings about a foreseeable risk. When it 
occurs, the result based offence can be charged. This risk is also criminalized in 
abstract offences of endangerment, with the difference that the risk need not 
materialize. An act that creates a risk to pollution suffi ces; the actual pollution need 
not be proven.100 In other words, rather than making the result strict, fault can be 
required as to the danger.
Besides the drafting of offences, there are also procedural devices that serve 
similar purposes as strict liability. They are intimately bound with substantive 
law.101 Many regulatory offences are outsourced from criminal law into 
administrative law. In this quasi-criminal fi eld of law, the instrument of punishment 
95 Hörster 2009, pp. 165–181.
96 Compare Koch 1998, pp. 84–85.
97 Simester in Simester 2005, p. 32.
98 See for example the Dutch ‘Arbeidstijden besluit vervoer.’
99 Beulke 2008, p. 51; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 211 and Gropp in Weick 1999, p. 118.
100 Hörster 2009, pp. 166–168.
101 Williams 1953, p. 691 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 40.
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is appreciated as an effective tool in preventing violations,102 while many of criminal 
law’s classic principles are seen as obstacles to the effi cient enforcement of rules. 
By labelling the fi eld of law as non-criminal, legal systems can relax substantive 
and procedural requirements. An example is the lowering of the evidential burden 
of proof. In Germany, the administrative authorities deciding on the penalties for 
regulatory offences may be easier persuaded of the defendant’s guilt than the 
judiciary is in criminal law.103
Most important however, is the reversal of the burden of proof. In this situation, 
fault is presumed and the defendant has to make probable he lacked dolus or culpa. 
For a proper understanding of this reversal, it is necessary to fi rst discuss the 
normal procedure of proof. The cardinal rule in criminal law is that the prosecution 
has the burden to prove all the elements of the offence. The judge or jury needs to 
be persuaded of the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.104 On the continent, 
a different term, ‘conviction intime’, is used for the same level of assurance.105 
Absolute proof is not possible and therefore not required, but if there is a realistic or 
genuine doubt about his guilt, the defendant should be acquitted.106 The burden has 
been set this high because it is felt that it is better to acquit 10 guilty persons than to 
convict one person who is not guilty, given the punitive and stigmatic effect of 
criminal sanctions.
If the Prosecutor succeeds, then the burden is on the defendant to either raise 
reasonable doubt to the evidence provided, or to point at further evidence that may 
cast a doubt on the prosecution’s case. For example, he can raise evidence which 
suggests the availability of a defence like duress. The presumption is that such a 
general defence is absent,107 so it is up to the defendant to raise this issue. He does 
not have to prove the presence of a defence beyond reasonable doubt: he merely has 
to prove that it is probable.108 This is called an evidential burden, in contrast to the 
102 The Commission believes in the preventive effect of strong punishment as well as calculating 
offenders, when they state that in case of repeat offenders a stronger deterrent is necessary, see 
Report on Competition Policy 2008, 23 July 2009, COM (2009) 374. Applied for example in 
12 December 2007, Cases T-101 and 111/05, BASF and UCB [2007] ECR II-4949 and 30 April 
2009, Case T-13/03, Nintendo [2009] ECR II-975.
103 Hörster 2009, pp. 181–184. Nevertheless, strict liability is also rejected if it concerns punishment 
which is not of a criminal (but disciplinary) nature, see 19 February 2003 BVerfG NJW 2003, 
1504.
104 Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462. ‘Beyond reasonable doubt’ is not ‘beyond the shadow of a 
doubt’, see Williams 1953, p. 693. It does not require absolute certainty, which is impossible, 
Hamer 2007, p. 148.
105 Spencer 1999, p. 362 and Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 98. Another difference is that the 
judge on the continent also has a duty to actively investigate the charges made against the 
defendant.
106 Section 13(1)(a) and (4) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 50; Williams 1953, 
p. 691 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 54.
107 Mevis 2006, pp. 600 and 615; Koopmans 2007, p. 54; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 54 and 
Strijards 1992, p. 67.
108 Section 13 (2) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 50; Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 56; Mevis 2006, p. 632; Kelk 2005, p. 151 and de Hullu 2006, p. 355.
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probative burden of the Prosecutor.109 If the defence is assumed to be present, the 
burden of proof once again rests on the prosecution to refute this presence beyond 
reasonable doubt.110
The defendant thus always carries some burdens of proof, or onuses, in the 
criminal trial. A presumption that the defendant is guilty of the offence can also 
arise out of the facts of the case. If the facts of the case bring about a prima facie 
case against the defendant, it is reasonable to require him to provide for an 
explanation. When a person without a working permit is found working for the 
defendant, the presumption that the defendant employed this person calls for an 
explanation.111 Finally, it has been demonstrated that behaviour in certain 
circumstances is judicially interpreted as intending a result. In effect, proof of 
conduct brings about a presumption of dolus, such as hitting a person presumed 
intent to injure. It is up to the defendant to raise contrary indications.
The possession of stolen property and earlier similar conviction(s) can be used 
to presume that the defendant knew the pertinent goods were stolen too.112 Because 
this presumption can be rebutted, it creates a reversed onus for the defendant. The 
‘normal’ burden of proof can also be reversed by a statutory defence. For example, 
an English Act places the probative burden on the defendant to prove that he had 
lawful authority or a reasonable excuse to carry an offensive weapon with him in a 
public place.113 Secondly, a burden can also be reversed by statutory presump tions.114 
For instance, another English Act holds that if the defendant used violence prior to 
the sexual intercourse, the absence of consent is presumed.115
Reversed onuses can be legitimized by a combination of constructivist thinking, 
ease of prove and consent. Individuals who voluntary participate in a regulated 
activity that creates signifi cant risks from which they intend to derive benefi t are 
said to accept strict duties of care and the associated burden of having to explain 
themselves through reverse onuses.116 In competition law, undertakings that attend 
meetings during which agreements of an anti-competitive nature were concluded, 
are deemed to have tacitly approved of these agreements, the presumption which 
can only be rebutted by proving that the undertaking clearly expressed a different 
intention to the other participants in the meeting.117
109 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 56.
110 Section 13(1)(b) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 50.
111 Blum v. Austria, appl. no. 31655/02, 3 February 2005 and Müller v. Austria, appl. no. 12555/03, 
5 October 2006.
112 Section 43(1) of the English Larceny Act 1916 (repealed); section 27(3) of the English Theft Act 
1968 and Williams 1953, p. 697.
113 Section 1 (1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. See also section 3(3) of the English Contempt 
of Court Act 1981.
114 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 56 and Williams 1953, pp. 697–699.
115 Section 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
116 Dennis 2005, pp. 920–921 and Duff in Simester 2005, pp. 137–143.
117 See 25 January 2007, Cases C-403 and 405/04 P, Sumimoto Metal Industries [2007] ECR I-729; 
7 January 2004, Cases C-204, 205, 211, 213, 217 and 219/00 P, Aalborg Portland [2004] ECR 
I-123 and 8 July 1999, Case C-199/92, Hüls [1999] ECR I-4287.
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In Germany, reverse onuses are also considered to violate the presumption of 
innocence and the Constitution.118 In Anglo-American law, much more presumptions 
and reversed onuses exist than in continental law.119 In 1996, around 40 percent of 
the most serious offences in English law place a probative burden of proof on the 
defendant or use a presumption that operates against the defendant.120 At present, it 
is only to be expected that this percentage has grown.121
Despite the close relationship of strict liability and reversed onuses, there exists 
an important distinction. If an offence is strict and no specifi c defence is made 
available to the charge, the perpetrator can only be acquitted if he makes probable 
that he acted with due diligence, in other words, that no reproach can be directed 
against him. In case of a mere reversal of the burden of proof, fault is presumed, but 
the defendant can rebut it.122 In both situations the defendant bears a burden of 
proof, but when the offence is strict, it is almost impossible for him to negate proof 
of that offence (element). If it is a defence for the defendant to prove he had no 
intention to defraud, his chances of acquittal are bigger than when intention is 
altogether irrelevant for conviction.123 Another difference is that reversed onuses are 
justifi ed by the assumption that it is much easier for the defendant to present 
evidence that he did not act careless than it is for the prosecution to prove the 
negative, especially when it concerns something that lies peculiarly within his 
knowledge.124 This justifi cation does not apply to strict liability.
Having discussed almost all functional equivalents to strict liability, including 
the procedural means of reversing the burden of proof, a specifi c alternative is now 
assessed in detail. It can be argued that the alternative in German law of requiring 
culpa hardly ever will make proof diffi cult, whereas it would make liability fairer. 
An important justifi cation for making the consequence in a result based offence 
strict is that this consequence was normally foreseeable. In a regulatory context, 
this foreseeability can be grounded in the special knowledge of the actor who 
participates in that professional activity. This is advanced as a justifi cation for 
imposing strict liability, just as it is argued that the driver of a vehicle implicitly 
consented to the legal regime of traffi c.125
118 23 October 1890 RGSt 21, 131; Bohlander 2009, p. 60 and Renzikowski 2000, p. 498.
119 Ashworth & Blake 1996 and Fletcher 1971, pp. 404 and 436.
120 Ashworth & Blake 1996. These offences are either triable on indictment or triable either way.
121 Padfi eld 2005, p. 19.
122 Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 1004. In other words, strict liability creates an irrebuttable 
presumption of fault (but not of blameworthiness). See also Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 40. The 
difference does not exist when a strict offence is coupled with a defence of lacking negligence, 
like in sections 1 and 4 of the English Hunting Act 2004.
123 Section 352 of the English Insolvency Act 1986 in Attorney-General’s reference no. 1 of 2004 
[2004] EWCA Crim 1025.
124 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 55.
125 See Glover 2007. This is also what Lord Bingham and the ECtHR suggest in O’Halloran and 
Francis v. the UK, appl. nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007.
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If this rationale is taken seriously however, then requiring culpa as to the 
consequence would also suffi ce. The prosecutor would hardly ever have a problem 
in proving that the result was a foreseeable consequence.126 Reversing proof of culpa 
could even further alleviate his burden of proof. Given the intrinsic risk in the 
conduct, it could be presumed that the result was negligent, culpa praesumptus,127 
implying that the defendant makes probable that it could not be foreseen or avoided 
that the risk materialized.
By contrast, in strict liability, the defendant could only escape conviction by 
establishing due diligence or another defence. It is possible that in a particular 
situation, the result was not foreseeable and thus not negligent. If the defendant 
however has to establish that he did everything he could to avoid the harm, he can 
still be convicted for having caused an unforeseeable risk. For example, infl icting 
some harm does not always make the more serious harm foreseeable. A four-year-
old-child had added 30 grams of salt to its pudding, thinking it to be sugar. The 
mother subsequently forced the child to eat the pudding. She recognized that the 
child would get a belly-ache and might become sick, but she did not know that this 
much salt would have lethal consequences. The German Supreme Court held that 
this lethal effect was also not generally known and acquitted her of (intentionally) 
infl icting bodily harm, (negligently) causing death.128 If the crime were one of strict 
liability, she would have probably been convicted.
Nevertheless, strict liability is not always based on a foreseeable relationship 
between conduct and result. In the context of exceeding the speed limit, the 
justifi cation for not requiring that the defendant knew or could have known he 
drove too fast, can be that drivers have enough know-how because they have been 
instructed.129 However, a better explanation for the strict element is the effective 
administration of an enormous amount of violations. Strict liability and reversed 
onuses have become so common in legal systems, that a dogmatic justifi cation is 
not even sought. The interests of effective enforcement dominate.
Only in Germany, intent or negligence is required as to the speeding.130 Intent 
can be inferred from excessive speeding of 50 percent or more, any less can at most 
qualify for negligence. Whereas it is to be expected that negligence is accepted 
easily based on the function of the driver, it may thus also be the case that in slight 
transgressions, negligence cannot be proven.131 From an enforcer’s perspective this 
may induce fear that many perpetrators will challenge their administrative fi ne in 
court and even worse, are likely to be successful.
126 See Bohlander 2009, pp. 32–34 and Hörster 2009, pp. 186–225.
127 Compare Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 534–537.
128 16 March 2006 BGH NStZ 2006, 506; Bohlander 2009, pp. 31–32 and §227 of the Criminal 
Code.
129 Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Schuld.
130 §s 3 and 49(1) of the Road Traffi c Regulation (StVO).
131 Burmann a.o. 2010, notes 126–127 on §3 of the Road Traffi c Regulation (StVO) and Senge 2006, 
note 12a on §10 of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
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In fall-back offences, it can also hardly be said that the defendant could have 
foreseen the result. They are created with the primary goal to facilitate proof. This 
is even accepted in Germany. For example, if the defendant participated in a brawl, 
death or serious bodily injury that occurs as a result of this brawl is strict.132 As in 
other Member States, such an offence also aims to facilitate the attribution of the 
serious consequence to all the participants. In brawls, it is often diffi cult to pinpoint 
who did and foresaw exactly what.
Moreover, strict liability is also used to do away with issues of fault altogether, 
because the legal interest deserves as much protection as possible. An example of the 
latter is the age of minor, with whom the defendant had sexual intercourse. The ratio-
nale of these offences is to protect the minor, also from temptation that origi na tes 
from themselves.133 If negligence would be required as to the age, this would often be 
negated if the minor had pretended to be older. Strict liability imposes a heavier 
burden to check the age of a sexual partner. Only if the defendant did all he could be 
asked to do, can he escape liability. This may rightly be criticized from many 
perspectives, but it does offer the widest scope of protection. In the Union con text, the 
protection of fi nancial interests of the Union, competition and the inte grity of fi nancial 
markets are also given most weight. For instance, strict liability in insi der dealing is 
upheld, because adding a fault element to this offence would weaken the integrity of 
the fi nancial market an investor confi dence.134 The ECJ has there fore not only allowed 
for the use strict liability,135 it has even legitimized its use.
Finally, it is perfectly rational to strictly construe an evaluative element like 
‘dangerous’ (driving) or ‘indecent’. What counts as a certain standard must be 
determined independent of the particular defendant.136 Thus, although culpa with or 
without a reversed burden of proof may be a legitimate alternative for strict liability 
in offences, where the result is made strict because it is foreseeable, this cannot be an 
alternative for strict liability in many other instances. Strict liability is also used to 
alleviate the enforcement of offences and to ensure the greatest level of protection 
for certain interests. Unless concerns of individual fault are considered to outweigh 
these public interests, strict liability must be included in the EU legislator’s toolbox.
2.3.5. Valuation
Strict liability and reversed onuses are allowed in EU criminal law as long as it 
remains possible for the defendant to rebut blameworth iness. In other words, the 
132 §231 of the German Criminal Code.
133 Article 245 of the Dutch Criminal Code and Section 5 of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003, 
see Kelk 2005, p. 200; de Hullu 2006, pp. 342–343; R. v. G. [2008] UKHL 37. In contrast, intent 
must relate to the age of the victim in §176 of the German Criminal Code, see V.3.1.
134 23 December 2009, Case C-45/08, Spector Photogroup NV [2009] ECR I-12073, §37.
135 2 October 1991, Case C-7/90, Criminal proceedings against Paul Vandevenne and others [1991] 
ECR I-4371, §18.
136 Simester in Simester 2005, pp. 42–44.
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lower limit of the principle of guilt does not consist of culpa. There is no such 
general principle of nulla poena sine culpa in EU criminal law, where culpa means 
(at least) negligence. By contrast, the maxim is that there may be ‘no punishment 
without blameworthiness’.137 From ECtHR case-law on article 6, minimum require-
ments can be deduced. A presumption of fact or law may not create an irrebuttable 
presumption of guilt. In other words, article 6(2) at least requires that a defence can 
be raised against the charge. The defendant who is not blameworthy may not be 
convicted.138 National courts have applied these minimum requirements into 
national case-law.139 Blameworthiness forms the core of the guilt principle as 
enshrined in article 6 ECHR.
It is important and therefore warranted to recall the distinction between fault 
and blameworthiness. The latter is an element of every criminal offence, even a 
strict one. It is an implied element, meaning that it is assumed to be present with the 
fulfi lment of the offence. It can however be rebutted by the application of an excuse. 
It is a more basic reproach than the reproach in committing an act negligently or 
intentionally. Negligent offences require gross negligence, whereas strict offences 
only require some degree of blame.140 As mentioned before, this also means that it is 
more diffi cult for the defendant to make probable that he was not blameworthy at all 
than to rebut the inference of negligence.
If the defendant makes probable that (any) degree of blame was absent, that the 
mis take was unavoidable, he cannot be convicted of a strict offence.141 Another 
impor tant way to negate blameworthiness in strict liability offences is to provide a 
‘due diligence’ defence. It imposes on the defendant a burden to prove he had no 
fault and took all the reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid 
the commission of the offence.142 In many English statutes such a defence is 
specifi cally available to a charge, but it can also be raised in contexts where the law 
does not specifi cally provide for such a defence.143 In Dutch law, a due diligence 
defence is seen as a species of the general excuse ‘absence of all blameworthiness’, 
137 17 May 1984, Case 83/83, Estel NV v. Commission [1984] ECR 2195, §43: “Consequently, it must 
be declared that any mistake made by Estel regarding the method for the adjustment of its quotas 
in accordance with article 10 of Decision 1831/81 was not excusable, and that the Commission 
has not committed a breach of the principle invoked.” The principle is that of nulla poena since 
culpa, see §39. As mentioned before, Union (case-)law does not preclude strict liability.
138 See Salabiaku v. France, appl. no. 10519/83, 7 October 1998 and Spronken 1989.
139 HR 11 October 1989, NJ 1990, 812 and in the context of forfeiture, HR 1 April 2003, NJ 2003, 
497; Ormerod 2005, p. 149 and Ashworth 2006, p. 173.
140 Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 114; de Hullu 2006, p. 266 and Mevis 2006. p. 599. See III.4. and IV.6.1.
141 HR 20 January 1959, NJ 1959, 102 and NJ 1959, 103; de Hullu 2006, p. 201; de Jong, D.H. & 
Knigge 2003, pp. 43–44 and Kelk 2005, pp. 200 and 222. In Pham Hoang v. France, appl. no. 
131919/87, 25 September 1992 and Salabiaku v. France, appl. no. 10519/83, 7 October 1988, the 
defendant could also be acquitted if he made probable that he made an unavoidable error.
142 Ashworth 2006, p. 164 and Ormerod 2005, p. 163.
143 Horder 2006A, pp. 237–276, see also Law Commission 2010, p. 148 and Ormerod 2005, p. 156. 
See section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981; section 8(5) of the Health Act 2006; section 
41(11) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
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derived from the general principle that a blameless person cannot be punished. If a 
company exercised due diligence to prevent contamination of its produce with dead 
bugs or that it contained too high levels of toxin, it will not be punished for it.144 The 
required degree of diligence is fl exible and appears to be lower for inexperienced 
individuals. Against a strict charge, a person was for example allowed to rely on the 
advice of his garage manager that his tyres still had enough profi le.145
Under article 6 ECHR, the availability of such a defence is connected to the 
qualifi cation of the charge as criminal. Article 6 applies when the charge is 
criminal. This autonomous concept does not attach much weight to national labels 
and focuses on the nature of the offence and/or the severity of the (possible) 
punishment.146 Therefore, administrative fi nes can also be tested to the requirements 
of the presumption of innocence. If the charge made against the defendant is 
criminal, the use of reverse onuses, presumptions and strict liability can be put to a 
test of legitimacy and proportionality.
Article 6(2) ECHR provides for a minimum level of safeguarding the 
presumption of innocence, just like article 48(1) CFR.147 This presumption protects 
against error in the criminal process and serves as counterweight to the immense 
power and re sour ces of the state, compared to the defendant.148 It encompasses the 
rule in dubio pro reo and second, it implies that the defendant must be regarded as 
innocent until proven guilty. The prosecution has to prove all offence elements 
beyond reasona ble doubt. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence.149 
The principle that the prosecution has to prove all offence elements is not absolute. 
Rebuttable presumptions of fact and law are allowed within reasonable limits, 
taking into account the interests of using those presumptions and the rights of the 
defence.150
In England, a similar test is applied. The difference is that English courts not 
merely consider whether article 6 has been violated, they are under a duty to 
reinterpret the English law in conformity with the Convention.151 This brings about 
that courts can read in a fault element in an offence of strict liability and that they 
can mitigate a reverse onus by holding that the defendant does not carry a probative 
144 HR 2 February 1993, NJ 1993, 476. Smedleys Ltd. v. Breed [1974] AC 389 can be contrasted 
with this, but under current English law, the defendant would have been acquitted by due 
diligence under section 21 of the Food and Safety Act 1990 as well, see Reid 2009, p. 177.
145 HR 13 February 1962, NJ 1962, 430 in Kelk 2005, pp. 223–224.
146 Öztürk v. Germany, appl. no. 8544/79, 21 February 1984 and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, appl. 
no. 14939/03, 10 February 2009.
147 It was already mentioned in a decree of bishop Burchard of Worms in 1010, see Keijzer in 
Remmelink 1987, p. 236 and Spong 2003.
148 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 53 and Ashworth 2006, p. 83.
149 Keijzer in Remmelink 1987, pp. 241–250; Kristen, Borgers & Koopmans in Borgers, Koopmans 
& Kristen 1998, p. 22 and van der Meer in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 112.
150 Salabiaku v. France, appl. no. 10519/83, 7 October 1988; Västberga Tax Aktiebolag and Vulic v. 
Sweden, appl. no. 39985/97, 23 July 2002; Kristen, Borgers & Koopmans in Borgers, Koopmans 
& Kristen 1998, pp. 21–23 and van der Meer in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 114.
151 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
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burden of proof,152 but one of lesser assurance, an evidential burden.153 If this 
cannot be read down in the offence, a declaration of incompatibility should follow. 
However, it seems that courts are not hesitant to read down, even when the 
Parliament clearly intended to reverse a probative burden.154 The English judiciary 
has great discretion in interpreting legislation, even if this interpretation is at odds 
with the legislative purpose. This is fuelled by the fact that a declaration of 
incompatibility does not affect the validity of the provision.155
Nonetheless, the test in English law is similar to that of the ECtHR. It assesses 
whether the reverse onus is imposed for a legitimate aim and is it proportionate to 
the achievement of that aim.156 The focus of the test is on proportionality. The 
factors of assessment are the interests of the criminal justice system and the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, the seriousness of the offence and possible sentence, 
the relative ease of proof for one party and the likelihood of the risk of convicting 
innocent defendants by reverse onuses.157 One of the underlying principles is that 
reverse burdens in offences of a regulatory nature are less problematic, because the 
conviction carries little stigma or punishment. Therefore, less protection against 
erroneous conviction is required.158
Another important factor is to assess what offence elements should normally be 
proven by the prosecutor, because they are seen as the essential elements, core or 
‘gravamen’ of the offence.159 An offence element that is essential to characterize the 
wrong of the offence should in principle not be made strict or presumed. It is up to 
the prosecution to prove that the defendant had fault as to these elements.160 The 
idea is that regarding these elements, at most an evidential burden may be imposed 
on the defendant. However, this is only one factor and does not necessarily warrant 
that conclusion. Other considerations, such as the fact that it is much easier for the 
defendant to disprove a fact are taken into account too. For example, the gravamen 
152 A probative burden of proof does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt like the prosecutor, 
but to the civil law standard of ‘on the balance of probabilities’, see section13(4)(b) draft 
Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 50 and Williams 1953, pp. 707–713.
153 R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; Sheldrake v. DPP [2004] UKHL 43; Hamer 2007; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 57; Ashworth 2006, p. 83 and Ormerod 2005, p. 26.
154 Dennis 2005, p. 926.
155 Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
156 Note that this is similar to the requirements the ECHR set regarding reverse onuses, see Blum v. 
Austria, appl. no. 31655/02, 3 February 2005 and Müller v. Austria, appl. no. 12555/03, 5 October 
2006.
157 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 57.
158 Hamer 2007, p. 170.
159 R. v. G. [2008] UKHL 37 and Hamer 2007, pp. 151–152, the latter who argues ‘gravamen’ means 
“a matter central to the wrongfulness of the alleged misconduct”, “matters that are crucial (…) 
to the criminality of the offence.”
160 R. v. G. [2008] UKHL 37 per Lord Hope of Craighead: “(…) article 6(2) does not proscribe 
offences of strict liability, so long as the prosecution bears the burden of proof of all the elements 
that constitute the offence.” Compare Kessler 2001, pp. 210–214 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1038–1040.
Chapter V
228 
of an offence can be ‘not to v without a licence’. Since it is very easy for the 
defendant to prove that he did have a licence, a probative burden is upheld.161
By treating these English factors as an operationalization of the ‘reasonable 
limits’ requirement of the ECtHR, it can be determined not only what type of 
burden may be imposed on the defendant, but also whether the burden may be 
reversed at all and whether in a specifi c instance, strict liability stays within the 
limits defi ned by the principle of guilt and presumption of innocence.
2.3.6. Traffi c offences
For most Member States dealing with traffi c offences, the interest of effective 
enforcement dominates dogmatic individual concerns. Because offences like 
speeding are committed in enormous volumes, the effective enforcement of these 
offences has led many Member States to lower the safeguards of criminal law, both 
in substantive and procedural law. In this subsection, I will demonstrate that 
allowing for strict liability or reversing the burden of proof in this context strikes a 
more appropriate balance between the competing interests than if one were to adopt 
alternatives of a more procedural nature.
In a group of Member States to which the Nether lands belongs, the registered 
owner of a vehicle is fi ned for (minor) traffi c offences committed with that 
vehicle.162 Since it need not be established who drove when the offence was 
committed, this greatly facilitates investigation and prosecution of traffi c offences. 
In contrast, in Germany, drivers generally have to be identifi ed before they can be 
fi ned. Only under certain circumstances, can the registered car owner be fi ned for 
illegal parking.163
The liability of the registered owner is rationalized in different ways. First, if the 
owner lends his car to someone else, he arguably assumes responsibility for traffi c 
violations committed by that person.164 Second, it is legitimate to impose a burden 
on the owner to recover the fi ne from the actual driver.165 It even appears the 
registered car owner is presumed to be the perpetrator, although courts avoid this 
terminology.166 This presumption is controversial because it is hardly rebuttable; 
161 R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; Hamer 2007, p. 165 and Dennis 2005, pp. 911–913 and 920.
162 Lord Bingham in Brown v. Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817, cited in O’Halloran and Francis v. the UK, 
appl. nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007.
163 §25a of the German Road Traffi c Act (StVG). This fi ne is formally labelled the compensation of 
the procedural costs rather than a punishement, so as to exclude it from the scope of the principle 
of guilt, see 1 June 1989 BVerfG NJW 1989, 2679.
164 Simmelink 2007.
165 See HR 15 July 1993, NJ 1994, 177.
166 The Dutch Supreme Court rejected that this violates the principle of guilt, arguing that the 
registered car owner is not blamed for committing an offence but is only made liable for the 
payment of the fi ne. The only risk that the registered car owner faces, is that he will not succeed 
in recovery of the fi ne from the actual driver if he does not take (civil) measures or proceedings, 
see HR 15 July 1993, NJ 1994, 177.
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the possibilities for exculpation are very slim. In the Netherlands, the registered car 
owner can only successfully argue he was not driving, if he can also prove that he 
could not reasonably prevent this.167 This appears to be a due diligence defence. In 
any event, it suffi ced for the ECtHR, who held that this system of liability does not 
leave the defendant without any means of defence. The Court held that the 
presumption was proportionate, attaching great weight to practical arguments in 
favour of such a system, such as the aim of road safety, the aim that traffi c offence 
should not go unpunished, and that this system prevented the judicial authorities 
from becoming overburdened.168
Another popular approach is to require the registered owner to disclose the 
name of the actual driver under threat of fi nes. This duty to disclose can be 
explained as a corollary of taking the approach to punish the actual driver. The 
approach avoids punishing the innocent, but in doing so creates other problems. 
Under English law, the owner of a vehicle receives a notice in which he is required 
under threat of fi nes to give the name of the driver. If the owner cannot provide the 
information, he will be liable for this offence unless he can show that he exercised 
due diligence in trying to establish who drove.169
Two registered car owners appealed before the ECtHR, invoking the 
presumption of innocence and its derivative rights to remain silent and not 
incriminate oneself. After all, if the owner was driving himself, the threat of fi ne 
could be seen as a coercion to incriminate himself. Nonetheless, the Court did not 
see a violation. Both rights under article 6 are relative, allowing for proportionate 
infringements, assessed on the basis of specifi c criteria. First of all, the nature and 
the degree of the compulsion were held to be criminal in nature. One of the 
applicants argued he would have not received such a high fi ne (GBP 750) if he had 
pleaded guilty to the offence of speeding itself. However, the Court argued that the 
compulsion fl owed from the fact that by driving a motor vehicle, the owner subjects 
himself to the regulatory regime and has thus accepted numerous obligations, 
including the duty to provide the identity of the actual driver. Secondly, the Court 
held that the nature of this inquiry was limited as only the identity was sought. This 
simple fact would not prove that that person had in fact committed the offence, so 
its use was also limited. Finally, the defendant could escape liability by pleading 
due diligence.170
In holding no violation, the Court continued an earlier endorsement of such a 
system.171 The public interest in effectively enforcing traffi c regulations played an 
important role again. The Court understood the practical need to enforce these 
offences, the impact it would have if the Court held a violation and construed a 
167 Articles 8 and 9 of the Dutch Administrative Enforcement of Road Traffi c Offences Act 
(WAHV).
168 Falk v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 66273/01, 19 October 2004.
169 Section 172 of the Road Traffi c Act 1988.
170 O’Halloran and Francis v. the UK, appl. nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, 29 June 2007.
171 Weh v. Austria, appl. no. 38544/97, 8 April 2004.
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legal reasoning to legitimize this system. This reasoning can however be criticized. 
First of all, the ‘implicit consent’ of the owner to the duty to give the identity of the 
driver is questionable. In any event, I believe that aspect should not be given this 
much weight.172 Secondly, the name of the driver is in fact very important for the 
conviction, because the question whether a traffi c offence like speeding itself has 
been committed is hardly ever debatable. It can therefore be disputed that the 
inquiry and the use of the evidence would have been limited.
In my opinion, the coercion to disclose the name of the driver therefore violates 
the right not to incriminate oneself. On the one hand, this right would only apply if 
the regis tered owner was also the driver. However, the proof of the pudding is in its 
eating: only by confessing that he was the driver, could it be established that the 
threat of the fi ne coerced the driver to incriminate himself. Hence, of the two 
approa ches considered so far, I submit that only the system where the registered 
owner is fi ned for the offence is in line with article 6 ECHR. If infringes upon the 
presump tion of innocence but does not violate it, given the low penalty and stigma 
in relation to the grave public interests and the availability of a due diligence 
defence.
In the EU, it is believed that facilitating the cross-border administration or 
prosecu tion of traffi c offences can reduce the number of casualties in traffi c. 
Therefore, fi nes for road traffi c offences should also be enforced if they are 
committed with a vehicle registered in another Member State than the State where 
the offence took place. In order to facilitate enforcement, a Framework Decision 
was created on the mutual recognition of fi nancial penalties.173 The specifi c 
approach of every Member State to traffi c offences is thereby respected: the State in 
which the fi ned person resides, must enforce the penalty.
However, Germany refuses to enforce penalties that it considers not to be in line 
with its criminal legal principles. The enforcement of a fi ne issued by the Dutch 
authorities to the registered car owner, residing in Germany, clashes with the 
German interpretation of the principle of guilt. As a result, the German implemen-
ta tion law enables its authorities to reject the execution of such fi nes.174 The 
enforcement of an Austrian fi ne for failing to disclose the details of the driver is 
also considered to violate legal principles, such as the right to remain silent or 
privilege towards relatives.175 This illustrates that mutual recognition is put under 
pressure in the absence of a suffi cient level of harmonisation.
172 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Myjer.
173 Framework Decision 2005/214 of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to fi nancial penalties, OJ 2005 L 76/16.
174 §87b(3) under 9 of the Code on Mutual Legal Assistance (IRG).
175 Schünemann and Roger 2010, who criticize German implementation law for not explicitly 
making this a ground of refusal. See also Böse 2010.
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2.3.7. Concluding remarks
I demonstrated that the ECtHR and both the Dutch and English legal system 
interpret the principle of guilt as no punishment without blameworthiness. In the 
German legal system, however, the principle of guilt brings about an absolute 
requirement of fault and injunction on strict liability. German scholars acknowledge 
that the ECtHR allows for strict liability and reversed presumptions, but reject them 
based on their view of the principle of guilt, as safeguarded in the German 
Constitution.176 The German approach can be labelled as classical, by reference to 
the principles of criminal law developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century as 
opposed to the later, ‘modern’ interpretations of these principles, required by the 
different context in which criminal law is supposed to operate.177
In all criminal legal systems, the focus is increasingly shifted to instrumental 
reasons of effi ciency. It is to be expected therefore that criminal law will become 
less and less subjective. The principle of guilt and presumption of innocence will be 
eroded further, as they are under pressure in fi elds of law like competition law and 
administrative criminal law and by measures of dispossession and the confi scation 
of illegally obtained advantage.178 In a synthesis, this trend, the approval of strict 
liability and reversed onuses by the ECtHR and ECJ, as well as its popularity in 
many Member States carry great weight.
In deciding in favour or against strict liability, the question is what weight 
should be given to the fact that a limited interpretation of the principle of guilt 
violates the German ‘constitutional tradition’, especially when this is contrasted 
with the very lenient, instrumental approach to strict liability by the European 
courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. It may be expected that the taboo on strict 
liability is perceived by Germany as a fundamental aspect of its legal system that 
may result in this State using the emergency brake procedure under article 83(3) 
TFEU, but such considera tions of feasibility play no role at this stage. Be that as it 
may, it should not be overloo ked that both the European Council and Parliament 
have expressed themselves in favour that “EU criminal legislation should, as a 
general rule, only prescribe penalties for acts which have been committed 
intentionally.” Liability based on serious negligence should be allowed by way of 
exception, but strict liability is taboo.179
176 Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 137–138; Hörster 2009, p. 226 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 448–
450.
177 See de Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 184. Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 137–
138 juxtaposed legal systems that use strict liability and presumptions of guilt like France and 
England as ‘classical’ with ‘modern’ legal systems like Germany that do not use such concepts 
because of the principle of guilt.
178 De Hullu in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, pp. 184–186.
179 Draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
deliberations, Brussels, 27 November 2009, 16542/2/09 REV 2 and EP Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, in its draft report on harmonisation of criminal law in the 
EU of 18 January 2012, no. 2010/2310.
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Whether strict liability should be allowed depends on the context of the offence 
and its penalty. The special part is therefore very important. The case against strict 
liability is strong if a public prosecutor only deals with serous transnational crimes 
with severe penalties. It is therefore obvious that most Directives and Framework 
Decisions that require Member States to take criminal measures require at least 
(serious) negligence. However, if offences of a more regulatory nature are to be 
prosecuted, including fraud against the EU, much more of the justifi cations and 
pragmatic reasons in favour of strict liability apply. For example, it can be imagined 
that fi nancial offences would be very hard to prosecute if intention had to relate to 
each and every single offence element. Strict liability is also justifi ed by an appeal 
to protect particularly vulnerable interests, like the interests of children against 
sexual exploitation or the victims of traffi cking in human beings. Given the focus of 
European criminal law on both categories of offences, strict liability should not be 
precluded. For example, one could envision that the age of the child or the abuse of 
trust is made strict.
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that strict liability can become 
problematic in light of the principle of guilt, which is the underlying principle of 
retribution. It risks convicting the blameless, even if a defence is available, just 
because the defendant is unable to meet this high threshold of proving he could not 
help himself at all. Only by proving fault, the convicted person can be said to be 
truly guilty. Moreover, it is at least questionable whether strict liability can deter. 
Strict liability and its functional equivalents create exceptions to many important 
principles of criminal law. It can therefore be argued that merely providing 
minimum require ments, as the ECtHR does, is unsatisfactory. As long as the 
defendant is not totally deprived of the possibility to raise exculpating grounds, it 
seems every fault element may be presumed or made strict. The ECtHR takes into 
account relevant factors such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the seriousness 
of the offence and possible sentence, the relative ease of proof for one party and the 
likelihood of the risk of convicting innocent defendants by reverse onuses, but it 
attaches much more weight to instrumental interests. As noted, the ECJ seems to 
put even more and exclusive emphasis on reasons of effi cient prosecution.
In order to remedy this situation, I propose to adopt two strategies. First of all, 
strict liability and its functional equivalents should only be used when the court or 
legislator applying it has established that this is necessary. Article 5(4) TEU holds 
that “the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives”. Unlike the Council and EP, I do not propose to preclude 
strict liability. There may be overriding reasons not to require proof of dolus, 
recklessness or culpa as to each and every single offence element. This can be 
reasons of effi ciency or the widest protection of particularly vulnerable interests. 
Given the importance of the fault requirement and the principle that the Prosecutor 
proves all elements of the offence, the need for derogation must nevertheless be 
clearly established and subsequently, it must be argued why a lesser alternative 
would not suffi ce to secure convictions in these cases.
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Consider EU fraud. When the Union is confronted with misappropriation of its 
subsidies on a large scale and the European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce encounters 
signifi cant diffi culties in establishing convictions, the Union legislative can solve 
these problems in different ways. It can lower the required fault element from dolus 
to culpa, eliminate fault altogether, create presumptions or reverse onuses and so 
on. It should be clearly substantiated why and to what extent derogations from 
principles of criminal law are necessary. I have demonstrated that in many result 
based offences, there are no good reasons to impose strict liability. Requiring culpa 
and reversing the burden of proof will also convict those who deserve to be 
punished and can be deterred.
Secondly, the dichotomous approach of the ECtHR to these techniques as either 
being in violation of the Convention or not, should be replaced by a more nuanced 
approach, whereby these techniques can also be mitigated, for example by reading 
in fault elements or defences or by lowering the burden of proof put on the 
defendant, requiring him only to raise some facts that may cast doubt on the 
presumption, as is common in England. Faced with only the option of holding a 
violation or not, a court would feel pressured to approve of the strict practice, as is 
evident in ECtHR case-law. In conform interpretation, the court has more options 
than to simply condemn or approve a manifestation of strict liability. The ECJ has 
held that Member States have to apply implemented EU law in accordance with the 
require ments of the protection of fundamental rights. In other words, in order to 
avoid a violation of human rights, which would be incompatible with Union law, 
Courts have to interpret, as far as possible, the pertinent provision in conformity 
with that human right.180 More weight can be attached to interests of the defendant, 
which would otherwise be dismissed as not reaching the high threshold required to 
hold a violation. The principle of guilt or the presumption of innocence do not have 
to be violated in order to limit strict liability.
By requiring that it should be proven why these techniques are necessary, and 
by enabling judicial control over this question, it can be expected they will become 
less self-evident. More consideration will be given to their application, and more 
often an alternative will be applied that burdens the defendant less. Considering 
that the ECJ held that “the essential characteristic of insider dealing thus consists in 
an unfair advantage being obtained from information to the detriment of third 
parties who are unaware of it,”181 more weight should be given to this feature in 
justifying why the element is made strict and a lesser alternative would not suffi ce 
in securing convictions. The argument that the subjects of these norms will have 
this intent, does not suffi ce to do away with its proof, because it confi rms that the 
Prosecutor’s burden is not problematic and strict liability therefore not necessary. It 
is therefore to be applauded that the proposed new Directive on insider dealing and 
180 13 July 1989, Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany [1989] ECR 2633, §19.
181 23 December 2009, Case C-45/08, Spector Photogroup NV [2009] ECR I-12073.
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market manipulation requires intention in order for criminal penalties to be 
imposed.182
2.4. Mistake on the offence defi nition
The referential principle requires that fault must relate to all offence elements. If the 
offence defi nition requires dolus to an offence element, dolus as to this element 
must be established. The accused cannot be convicted of something that is not 
proven. He cannot be convicted of murder if the victim did not die. Similarly, he 
cannot be convicted for murder if he thought the victim was a deer. Dolus and 
recklessness pre suppo se knowledge, and a mistake or ignorance is its opposite of 
not-knowing. Therefore, it is ‘inexorable logic’ that a mistake of fact negates dolus 
or recklessness.183
In contrast, not every mistake negates culpa. The essence of culpa is having 
made an unreasonable mistake. Therefore, only a reasonable mistake negates 
negligence, because this is a mistake the reasonable person could have also made.184 
By nega ting dolus or recklessness, negligence liability remains unaffected. For 
example, if the defendant thought the victim was a deer, he can still be liable for 
negligent homi ci de.185 To avoid negligence liability, the mistake must have been 
reasonable.186
2.4.1. Terminology
I already introduced the distinction between mistakes on the offence defi nition and 
mistakes as to the legal prohibition.187 The distinction coincides with the more 
often used distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law, error facti 
and error iuris. The latter can be defi ned as an informational fl aw relating to the 
existence, sense, purpose, scope or application of the legal norm that underlies the 
charge. A mistake of fact can then be defi ned as a fl aw that relates to something 
with is subject to such a norm, to something that has no independent normative 
character.188
182 Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, 
Brussels 20 October 2011, COM (2011) 654.
183 R. v. Reid [1992] 95 Cr App R. 391; DPP v. Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347 in Ormerod 2006, pp. 
181–185; Fletcher 1978, p. 687; Bohlander 2009, p. 71 and Strijards 1983, pp. 105–106. See also 
the Corpus Juris in Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 192 and Delmas-Marty 1997, p. 66.
184 Ormerod 2005, pp. 126 and 291; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 132 and Strijards 1983, p. 289. 
See also the Corpus Juris in Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p.192 and Delmas-Marty 1997, 
p. 66.
185 §16(1) of the German Criminal Code; §11(1) of the German Administrative Offences Act (OWiG) 
and Badar 2005, p. 238.
186 6 June 1952 BGHSt 3, 105 and Beulke 2008, p. 88.
187 See IV.2.4.6.
188 Strijards 1983, pp. 59–62 and 345.
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However, the distinction between fact and norm is not always clear. Offence 
elements can consist of both factual and normative aspects. Usually therefore, the 
labels mistake of fact and mistake of law are used functionally to distinguish 
between mistakes that can affect fault and mistakes that cannot.189 This terminology 
focuses more on the effect than the character of the mistake. The decisive principle 
is that a mistake on any aspect – factual or legal – can negate fault if that aspect is 
an offence element to which fault relates. Recall that when a legal aspect is included 
in the offence defi nition, like the wrongfulness of the appropriation, a mistake of 
the actor as to a claim in civil law operates as a failure of proof defence, negating 
the required dolus.190
In German law, the terms ‘mistakes of fact and law’ have been replaced by 
‘mistakes on the offence defi nition’ and ‘mistake as to the legal prohibition’.191 I 
will adapt this terminology because it is the least problematic. The mistakes 
discussed here are failure of proof defences because they can negate an offence 
element. In England, all mistakes used to be seen as complete defence, independent 
of mens rea. However, since the case of Gladstone Williams,192 a mistake is 
predominantly seen as a failure of proof defence.193
The category of mistakes on the offence defi nition can negate fault. Two 
subcategories were identifi ed: a mistake as to elements as to which dolus or 
recklessness is required will negate these fault elements. In contrast, mistakes as to 
offence elements that require proof of culpa must be reasonable in order to negate 
culpa. The second category is called ‘mistakes as to the legal prohibition’. Unlike 
the term suggests, it does not only relate to mistakes on the scope or application of 
the prohibition. It is best understood as the mirror image of the other category, 
encompassing all mistakes that cannot negate a fault element. Mistakes that do not 
relate to the offence defi nition are irrelevant to fault, because fault relates only to 
the offence defi nition. In addition, a mistake can relate to an offence element, but if 
that element is strict, the subjective perception of the defendant as to the element is 
irrelevant.
Mistakes as to the legal prohibition relate to the implied element of blameworth-
iness, not fault. As a consequence, these mistakes must be excusable or unavoidable 
in order to excuse the defendant. The same, high standard, applies to mistakes on 
the scope of law or on the facts that would ground a defence. These putative 
defences are treated like mistakes as to the legal prohibition and discussed in the 
189 Strijards 1983, pp. 105–106 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 332–333.
190 See IV.2.4.7.
191 ‘Tatbestandsirrtum’ and ‘Verbotsirrtum’, see Weigend in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 1390; Arzt 
1976, p. 659; Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 332–333; Beulke 2008, p. 320 and van den Wyngaert in 
Cullen 2003, pp. 319–320 See also the Corpus Juris in Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 192 
and Delmas-Marty 1997, p. 66.
192 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA Crim 4. However, see already Williams 1953, pp. 135–
136.
193 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 607 and 618; Ashworth 2006, p. 188. See Weigend in Schünemann 
a.o. 2001, p. 1390.
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next chapter. In the debate on which elements should be considered as factual and 
which as legal, the categorization is therefore very important for the defendant’s 
possibilities to escape liability. By labelling something as a ‘legal mistake’, a 
mistake on something that is not part of the offence defi nition, the mistake is no 
longer relevant to fault and can at most exculpate when excusable.
2.4.2. Overcoming the inexorable logic
The inexorable logic described above brings about that a mistake negates fault and 
thereby the pertinent offence defi nition. From the perspective of facilitating the 
prosecution of intentional and reckless offences, it is deemed problematic that the 
defendant is able to claim that he made a mistake or just simply did not know. This 
was already demonstrated in the context of offences of ulterior intent. Even when 
the defendant is believed, there is reluctance to let him benefi t from a mistake that a 
reasonable person would probably not have made.
English law therefore sometimes requires that the mistake made must be 
reasonable, but this rides roughshod over dolus and recklessness, resulting in 
negligence liability. Dogmatically, requiring a reasonable mistake means that one is 
punished for intention for being (seriously) negligent.194 One would risk convicting 
and stigmatizing the person who did not know as intentional actor and the person 
who did not foresee as reckless. Therefore, in crimes requiring knowledge, the 
defendant cannot be convicted, however negligent his ignorance. The subjective 
standard of a genuine mistake, however unreasonable it may be, may risk easily 
fabrication and thus abuse of the defence,195 but as will be discussed below, this risk 
must not be exaggerated and secondly, it is better to acquit ten guilty than to convict 
one innocent person. There is only one rule that is acceptable. Since the case of 
Morgan,196 the English judiciary accepts this rule of German and Dutch criminal 
law that a mistake of fact negates intention, regardless of whether it could be 
avoided or whether it is reasonable.197
On the contrary, the English legislature overrules these decisions by introducing 
objective requirements for mistaken belief. Fuelled by extremely low conviction 
rates on rape charges, it was feared that defendants like Morgan could be acquitted 
of rape if they held an honest belief of consent.198 In the case of Morgan, a woman 
was forced to undergo sexual acts. The defendants argued they thought the woman 
consented, based on the remarks of her husband that she would resist to enhance her 
satisfaction. In the Sexual Offences Act 2003, Morgan is effectively reversed, 
194 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 339–340.
195 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 619.
196 DPP v. Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347; Ormerod 2005, pp. 290–291 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 618.
197 Bohlander 2009, p. 71 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 115.
198 See Ashworth 2006, pp. 189–190 and Ormerod 2006, p. 185.
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requiring the actor to hold a reasonable belief that the other consents.199 It has 
already been submitted that if an element is essential to the offence, dolus should 
relate to it. Rape should include the lack of consent and dolus should relate to it.
The risk of providing defendants with an easy excuse must not be exaggerated. 
First of all, any mistake must be honest.200 Courts can reject ignorance based on 
facts and circumstances of the case or the defendant’s history that suggests he did 
not know. This fear, expressed in the context of consent as to rape, seems 
unwarranted, since the convictions in Morgan were upheld, as the House of Lords 
did not accept the men had an honest belief.201 Moreover, it has already been 
submitted that wilful blindness also amounts to knowledge, which is dolus 
indirectus. If it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case that the 
victim probably did not consent to intercourse, the court can infer that the defendant 
must have been aware of this obvious risk. By not taking any further steps to 
negative this suspicion, he closed his eyes to an obvious risk and is legally held to 
have known the victim did not consent.202
Secondly, the application of dolus eventualis to intentional charges prevents 
many mistakes from negating intent. In the Netherlands, most claims of mistake are 
rejected by fi nding dolus eventualis.203 Eventualis is far less sensitive to mistakes 
than the other forms of dolus. It does not require knowledge that a circumstance is 
present or that a result will follow. It merely requires a diluted form of knowledge, 
namely awareness of a risk that the offence element is fulfi lled. For example, if the 
defendant shot dead a human, thinking it was a scarecrow, his ignorance negates 
the intention. But if he considered and accepted the possibility that it was in fact a 
human, he is liable under dolus eventualis.204 Since recklessness also deals with 
awareness of a risk, the abovementioned also applies to reckless offences. The 
difference is that proof of recklessness does not suffi ce to accept intent, like dolus 
eventualis. An offence can however also be drafted so as to include recklessness as 
an alternative fault element alongside intent. Assault, for example, is the intentional 
or reckless application of unlawful force.205
In other words, the defendant must be completely ignorant of the possibility that 
an offence element is fulfi lled to negate knowledge. If he merely made a mistake on 
the degree of the risk, he still was aware of that risk. Even when the defendant 
claims he was completely ignorant, this can be refuted by reference to the fact that a 
199 Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003; Ashworth 2006, pp. 189–190 and Ormerod 2006, 
p. 185. Another example is the offence of unauthorised disclosure of information in section 27 of 
the Identity Cards Act 2006. It is a defence for the person charged with the offence to show that 
he believed, on reasonable grounds, that he was authorised to disclose the pertinent information.
200 Williams 1953, p. 148.
201 The House of Lords also held in Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256 that no Court would believe 
the defendant who argues he did not know that he carried drugs.
202 See Stuckenberg 2007, p. 443.
203 Strijards 1983, p. 143.
204 Bohlander 2009, p. 71; Badar 2005, pp. 236–237 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 350.
205 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA Crim 4.
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normal person would know, or that it is general experience. For example, the 
dangerousness of certain conduct, like stabbing, is clear for everyone. What 
everyone knows, the defendant is assumed to know as well.206 Knowledge can also 
be established by reference to the experience or professional position of the 
defendant. This approach stays closer to the individual state of mind.207 As noted, 
fault can be inferred from external circumstances. Sometimes a statute even creates 
a presumption of fault.
A third set of reasons to substantiate that a mistake not necessarily provides 
defendants with an easy defence is that mistakes to normative elements like 
‘reprehensible’, ‘indecent’ or ‘obscene’ are often irrelevant. The mistaken view of 
the defendant that something is not indecent is irrelevant, because what counts as a 
certain standard must be determined independent of the particular defendant.208 As 
explained before, a mistake is only relevant and thus negates intent if it concerns 
the facts underlying the valuation of a normative element. A similar approach 
applies to recklessness. Any mistaken valuation about whether or not the risk was 
reasonable is irrelevant. The knowledge of the defendant merely needs to relate to 
the facts that are essential for making the valuation of reasonableness.209
Already mentioned as well, is the approach that is popular in Germany to focus 
on the layman perception of normative offence elements. In order for mistakes on 
normative elements to negate intention, an additional requirement must be fulfi lled. 
Since they resemble mistakes on legal aspects, intention is not so easily negated. 
The defendant does not have to understand the element as a lawyer would 
understand it. Intent only requires that the defendant understood the element from a 
layman’s point of view. Any mistake that does not negate this basic knowledge is 
irrelevant to intent.210 Such an irrelevant mistake is called a ‘mistake of 
subsumption’.211 It is an erroneous belief that conduct does not fulfi l an offence 
defi nition. An example is the actor who lets out the air out of all tires of his 
neighbour’s car, incorrectly thinking it would not be qualifi ed as criminal 
damage.212 The mistake is irrelevant for intention because it relates to a specifi c, 
legal interpretation of an offence. It falls outside the scope of the element as the 
206 Strijards 1983, p. 175 and Strijards 1987, p. 102. Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 27 call this 
‘normaliteitssyllogisme’, which means that 1) a normal person, acting as the defendant did, 
would have intent, 2) the defendant is a normal human being, 3) so he had intent.
207 Strijards 1983, pp. 145–146 and 175–176.
208 Compare Simester in Simester 2005, pp. 42–44.
209 See IV.2.4.8. and IV.4.5.3. respectively.
210 This is called “Parallelwertung in der Laiensphäre”, see IV.2.4.8.; Krey 2003, pp. 138–141; Arzt 
1976, pp. 664–665; Beulke 2008, p. 86 and Badar 2005, p. 237. This leaves open only the 
possibility of excusing the defendant if it was unavoidable, see Krey 2003, pp. 142–145 and 
Roxin 2006, p. 486.
211 “Subsumtionsirrtum”. Subsumption means the qualifi cation of conduct under an offence 
defi nition, see Beulke 2008, pp. 5 and 334.
212 Krey 2003, pp. 142–145 and Beulke 2008, p. 85. Another popular example concerns the person 
who removes from his tab some of his consumed beers to decrease his bill, thinking this does 
not qualify as an offence.
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layman understands it and thus falls outside the requirements of what intention 
should relate to.
One of the diffi culties of this approach is to distinguish what elements are 
normative and what are elements are not. It can be said that normative elements are 
given meaning by an additional value judgment, whereas the opposite category of 
descriptive elements are factual and concrete. Descriptive elements are perceivable 
by means of human senses, whereas normative elements cannot be perceived and 
must be intellectually understood.213 The problem is that strictly speaking, all 
descriptive elements get somewhat of a normative character by putting them in a 
legal provision. A strict distinction is therefore often hardly possible.214
However, on closer inspection, it turns out that if the defendant knew all the 
relevant facts or circumstances, it is generally accepted that the defendant 
understood the element as a layman would have. Therefore, one can argue that only 
ignorance of the underlying facts can amount to a relevant mistake.215 This 
confi rms the simple rule stated above that only mistakes as to the facts underlying 
the valuation of a normative offence element negate fault. Since a mistake on the 
scope or meaning of descriptive elements also does not negate intention,216 the 
principle can be deduced that mistakes as to the valuation, scope or meaning of 
offence elements do not negate intention.
Fourth, the correspondence principle brings about that a mistake as to elements 
that are not part of the offence defi nition are irrelevant. For example, since the 
identity of the victim is usually not part of the offence defi nition, fault need not 
relate to it and a mistake on that matter is irrelevant. In other words, since dolus 
usually relates to abstract legal interests, the scope of relevant mistakes is limited. 
These types of mistakes are discussed in detail below. A related strategy to 
overcome mistakes is to interpret objective elements in a broad way. The broader 
the element as to which intent must relate, the more likely the subjective coincides 
with the objective, the less room there is for mistakes.217
2.5. Unintended outcomes
Under the broader label of ‘unintended outcomes’, I will discuss two heavily 
discussed issues of correspondence that revolve around the question how specifi c 
fault must be. Roughly stated, in the fi rst situation, the defendant mistakes the 
identity of his victim, killing Y rather than X. In the second situation, he misses X 
213 Beulke 2008, p. 45 and Roxin 2006, p. 485–486 and 497.
214 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 114; Arzt 1976, p. 649; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 175–176 and 
262.
215 See also Arzt 1976, p. 665: “the lay defendant with full factual knowledge did grasp the 
normative implications suffi ciently correctly for a layman.”
216 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 116 and Beulke 2008, p. 85.
217 For example, the offence element of ‘good’ in theft is interpreted broad as to include virtual 
goods, see Hof Leeuwarden 10 November 2009, NJ 2010, 616.
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and kills Y. In both situations, the question is whether the defendant should be held 
to have intended the death of Y as well, or whether he should be held liable for 
recklessness or culpa at best.
The abovementioned situations deal with the more general question of how 
specifi c intent must be. Does the concretization of the intent to a specifi c person 
matter, or should it only relate to the species of the legal interest involved?218 Both 
approaches can be positioned on one side of a spectrum. I will conclude by arguing 
in favour of a middle ground in which fault is principally general. Deviations from 
what the actor planned are irrelevant to intent, unless the actual outcome is of 
another kind as the planned outcome.
2.5.1. Error in persona vel obiecto
The fi rst situation is discussed in Dutch and German law under the heading of error 
in persona vel obiecto. English law reaches the same conclusions by a somewhat 
different approach that is discussed in detail later. Consider that the defendant 
wants to harm X, but at the time he infl icts harm, he mistakes Y for X. Hamlet 
thought the person standing behind the curtain was Claudius. After he stabbed him, 
he found out it was Polonius. This is called a mistake of person, an error in persona. 
If the defendant erred on the quality of an object, for example when he thought he 
was importing heroine, not cocaine, this is an error in obiecto. Both examples seem 
to create problems for the principle of correspondence, because fault did not relate 
to the specifi c objective element that was fulfi lled. Considering that a mistake of 
fact negates intent, the question is whether these mistakes also negate intent.
The answer is negative. In general, the mistakes are seen as irrelevant. The 
doctrine gives an interpretation of the correspondence principle, focusing on the 
question how precise the object must be, what deviation between the state of mind 
and reality is relevant. Not all deviations have legal consequences. Both errors 
mentioned are unlikely to preclude intent. The defendant who shot Y, thinking it to 
be X, is held to have intended death.219 The defendant who thought he was 
importing cocaine but was in fact importing heroin, will be convicted too.220
In contrast, some legal acknowledgement can be found for making the error in 
persona relevant. It can be argued that the actor would not have shot if he knew he 
shot the actual victim. Hamlet mourned that he had mistaken Polonius for Claudius. 
If the actor knew in advance that he would kill his son rather than his enemy, he 
218 Bohlander 2010A, pp. 617–618.
219 Krey 2003, pp. 150–151; Bohlander 2009, p. 62; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 114; HR 8 April 1997, NJ 
1997, 443; Fokkens & Machielse, note 7 on Opzet; Strijards 1983, pp. 221–225 and Brouns 1988, 
pp. 32–33.
220 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 289–290 and 375; Warner v. MPC [1969] 2 AC 256; Gatzweiler 2008, 
pp. 146–148 and Weber 2009, notes 302 and 371–373 vor 29ff. BtMG and note 28 on §29 BtMG.
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would not have acted.221 It strains the common sense meaning of the word ‘intend’ 
to say that the defendant wanted to kill his son, as this was the very last thing he 
desired.222 However, it is clear that desires and motives are irrelevant to dolus and it 
is no longer a condition for dolus (eventualis) that the actor would have continued if 
he knew the (particular) result would occur.223 The fact that the defendant regrets 
his mistake should only be incorporated in sentencing.
The restriction of mistakes is related to the idea that liability is warranted for 
those consequences that are typical for the danger that was created.224 Why should 
the mistake in identity matter if the defendant wanted to kill a person? The principle 
of correspondence requires that the fault and result and more or less compatible. 
What has happened objectively should in its essential features be in line with what 
the actor tempore delicti thought would happen.225 Thus, a mistake about the 
identity of the object is irrelevant as long as the objects are of the same nature or 
kind.226 On the continent, this is labelled as the doctrine of dolus generalis. It holds 
that the precise object of intent need not be specifi ed as long as it is of the same 
kind.227
A classic example is that the actor shoots a human, believing it to be a scarecrow. 
This mistake negates his awareness of the nature of the object. At most he can be 
held negligently liable for shooting a human being.228 Crimes against the person are 
of a completely different nature than crimes against the property, so the mistake is 
relevant.229 The doctrine is compatible with most offence defi nitions, which require 
after all that the defendant intended to kill a human being. This makes the identity 
of victim irrelevant.230 Superfl uously, the English legislator sometimes expressly 
includes in the offence defi nition that intent need not relate to a particular object. 
Offence defi nitions that criminalize hacking for example, state that intent need not 
relate to a particular computer, program or data.231 The relevance of mistakes 
depends on the offence defi nition. The more concrete the legal interest, the more 
elements included in the offence defi nition, the more sensitive it is to mistakes.232
Sometimes the object does need to have a certain quality. If it is a special offence 
to assassinate a representative of a foreign state, the actor who thought this 
221 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 357–359 and Roxin 2006, p. 531. However, see 25 October 1990 BGHSt 
37, 214, where the father instigated persons to kill his son, discussed later.
222 Bohlander 2009, pp. 62–63 and Bohlander 2010A, p. 618.
223 See Roxin 2006, pp. 460–461.
224 See V.2.3.3.
225 Beulke 2008, p. 89; Williams 1953, p. 105 and Simester & Sullivan, p. 157.
226 23 January 1958 BGHSt 11, 268; Ormerod 2006, pp. 44–45 and 245–247; Williams 1953, p. 104 
and Law Commission 1989, p. 202.
227 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 123.
228 Roxin 2006, p. 535; Bohlander 2009, p. 72 and Beulke 2008, p. 89.
229 Horder 2006B, p. 392.
230 Strijards 1983, p. 223; Bohlander 2009, pp. 62–63; Krey 2003, pp. 150–153 and Beulke 2008, 
p. 89.
231 Sections 1 and 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
232 Strijards 1983, pp. 131–133 and 171–172.
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representative was a national, made a relevant mistake.233 Another example of a 
relevant mistake is the case where the actor is caught on an airport in possession of 
drugs, but argues he thought he was transporting something else, like gold or 
weapons.234 However, the relevance of mistakes can be circumscribed by applying 
dolus eventualis,235 wilful blindness or recklessness.236 For example, it can be held 
that the defendant must have been aware of the risk of importing drugs since he 
trans ported an item of someone else from a notorious destination without checking it.
The mirror image of such a mistake can give rise to impossible attempt, for 
example if the actor thought he was importing heroine but in fact was importing 
fl ower.237 Such a ‘reversed mistake’ is an erroneous assumption of offence elements, 
a false impression that incriminating circumstances are present. Another example is 
that the defendant thinks an already dead person is still alive. This particular case 
will be discussed later.
2.5.2. Aberratio ictus
Situations of ‘attacks gone astray’,238 hitting someone else than planned are labelled 
in Germany and the Netherlands as aberratio ictus. For example, the defendant may 
miss his target or a third party may intervene. Like situations of error in persona, 
they can only be relevant in Dutch and German law when the deviation is not 
already encompassed by dolus eventualis.239 If the actor consciously took the risk 
of hitting someone else, like the person Y who was standing behind the targeted 
person X, intent can be established as to the actual result. If a defendant, 
inexperienced in the use of fi rearms, shoots at someone in a store or crowded bar, 
intent is established as to the actual victim.240 It is therefore argued that true cases 
of aberratio ictus are cases where the risk was not foreseen, when for example, the 
victim just happened to walk in at the time of shooting.241
Since these cases of aberratio ictus deal with unforeseen results, the actual 
result can amount to culpa at most. The defendant is held liable for attempting to 
233 §102 of the German Criminal Code, see Krey 2003, pp. 152–153; Beulke 2008, p. 88; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 157 and Tadros 2005, p. 590.
234 R. v. Taaffe [1984] AC 539.
235 Gatzweiler 2008, p. 147 and Beulke 2008, p. 89.
236 Horder 2006B, p. 392 and Simester & Sullivan, p. 157.
237 R. v. Shivpuri [1986] UKHL 2; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 615; 17 October 1996 BGHSt 42, 
268; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 113–116; Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 372–373 and Beulke 2008, pp. 88 and 
325.
238 Bohlander 2010A, p. 599.
239 De Hullu 2006, pp. 214–215; Fokkens & Machielse, note 7 on Opzet; 16 October 2008 BGH 
NStZ 2009, 210; 10 April 1986 BGHSt 34, 53; Krey 2003, pp. 156–157 and Beulke 2008, pp. 
90–91.
240 1 September 1992 BGHSt 38, 353 and Hof Den Haag 20 July 2009, LJN:BJ3063. See also HR 
9 May 1995, NJ 1995, 501.
241 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 126–127; Strijards 1983, pp. 226–227; Puppe 2009, p. 92 and 
Beulke 2008, p. 89.
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kill the intended victim X, but only for negligently killing the actual victim Y, if he 
should have foreseen the intervention. The intent as to the envisaged victim remains 
unaffected, but because he did not die, there can only be attempt liability.242 In 
other words, the intent in these cases is individualized and attached to the person 
aimed at.243 This relevance of aberratio ictus can be criticized by comparing it to 
the irrelevance of an error in persona. Based on a constructivist rationale, both 
actors have crossed a moral threshold. Further, both actors intended to kill a person 
and the offence defi nition is usually no more specifi c.244
In an attempt to rebut this, the situations are contrasted. In the middle ages, the 
difference was explained by the fact that in case of error in persona, there was an 
element of premeditation, whereas this was lacking in cases of aberratio ictus.245 
Nowadays, however, treating both actions as intentional killing still allows one to 
differentiate between the two killings because premeditation is a factor increasing 
punishment, which for example turns manslaughter into murder in the Netherlands. 
Currently, the argument is that in aberratio ictus, the actor does not kill the person 
individualized as target whereas in error in persona, the actor does in fact hit the 
person he wanted to hit. The offender had the same person in sight he killed in the 
end.246
However, since dolus is always generalis, not requiring individualization, why 
should it matter here? The difference in relevance can therefore better be sought in 
considerations of causation. Bohlander thinks that the reasoning behind the doctrine 
is that the actor wanted to shoot a physical person and missed, which makes it a 
relevant physical deviation in the imagined causal chain, breaking the intent to the 
actual consequence.247 This causal deviation distinguishes it from error in persona, 
but is unpersuasive to legal systems that do not require that intent should encompass 
the causal chain of events in its essential features, like the Dutch.
This therefore partially explains why neither practitioners nor scholars in the 
Netherlands any longer seem to support relevancy of aberratio ictus. Another 
important explanation is that dolus eventualis is applied extensively. Dolus 
eventualis as to a second victim was even established when the defendant had shot 
the fi rst victim at very close range. Apparently, the bullet went through his torso, 
hitting this second victim as well.248 Since most of these deviations are covered by 
dolus eventualis, aberratio ictus is rarely discussed. Even in the dogmatic German 
242 Strijards 1983, p. 227 and 31 May 1920 RGSt 54, 349.
243 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 125–127; Bohlander 2009, pp. 73–74; Beulke 2008, pp. 89–90; 
Fischer, T. 2009, p. 114; 10 April 1986 BGHSt 34, 53 and 25 October 1990 BGHSt 37, 214.
244 Krey 2003, pp. 154–155; Stuckenberg 2007, p. 361 and Bohlander 2010A, p. 599.
245 Laingui according to Vrolijk 2004, p. 189.
246 Krey 2003, pp. 156–157 and Badar 2005, p. 239–240. See also Bohlander 2009, p. 74 and 
25 October 1990 BGHSt 37, 214.
247 Bohlander 2009, p. 74. Bohlander 2010A, p. 600, adds that it must to some extent also be based 
on subconscious attitudes to motive, although this is no different in the irrelevant error in 
persona. See also Puppe 2009 and Badar 2005, p. 240.
248 HR 22 September 1998, NJ 1998, 911.
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legal system, courts are very willing to invoke dolus eventualis to sideline aberratio 
ictus in cases where they do not want to give the defendant the benefi t of merely 
negligence liability.249
Finally, aberratio ictus is hardly relevant in Dutch law, because the idea of dolus 
generalis is embraced. The latter can be juxtaposed with the focus of many German 
scholars, not courts, on the specifi c object of the intent. In fact, in both States, the 
solution of attempt and negligence liability rarely applies. It only applies when fi rst 
of all, the object or subject of the conduct had been individualized and secondly, the 
actual result was unforeseen. If the intent was not individualized, there can be no 
aberratio ictus. The normal rules of intent apply and just as in error in persona, the 
deviation is irrelevant, intent not negated. Dolus is generalis. The defendant wanted 
to kill a human being and he did.250 In German law, it is argued as well that if a 
fl eeing criminal shoots at pursuing offi cers, the court will and should not consider 
whether he wanted to hit a specifi c offi cer.251 If the actor shoots in a crowd, there 
simply is a direct intent as to whomever he hits.252
From a German perspective, unplanned victims of car bombs and poisoned 
drinks can also be treated as irrelevant deviations, because the defendant did not 
have the victim ‘in his sight’. In more causal terms, the actor could not control 
which person would be harmed, and secondly, the modus operandi worked as 
planned.253 In the Netherlands, the unplanned victim of a poisoned cake would 
already be included in the dolus eventualis of the defendant if he accepted the risk 
that the intended victim’s wife would eat the cake.254
Above, I mentioned that German courts are sometimes also willing to invoke 
dolus eventualis to sideline aberratio ictus and convict the defendant of the 
intentional rather than mere negligent offence. A similar pragmatic solution is to 
label situa tions as error in persona when the German court believes the deviation 
should be irrelevant.255 Third, mere negligence liability as to the actual result is 
avoided by applying the doctrine of dolus alternativus.256 For example, an offender 
is being pursued by a police offi cer and his dog. Hoping to kill at least one of them, 
he fi res his last bullet in their direction. Alternative intentions may coexist which 
enables the courts to hold that when the dog is killed, the defendant is liable for 
249 Puppe 2009, p. 92, illustrating that eventualis was established very easily in 16 October 2008 
BGH NStZ 2009, 210.
250 Kelk 2005, p. 204.
251 However, see Beulke 2008, p. 91. For absurd applications of the doctrine, see Bohlander 2009, 
p. 74.
252 See 4 February 1998 BSG NJW 1999, 236; Beulke 2008, p. 85 and Schmitz 2000, pp. 302–304 
and 317–321.
253 Krey 2003, pp. 156–159; and Puppe 2009, p. 92 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 275. In 
7 October 1997 BGHSt 44, 91, a bomb was attached to the car of the intended victim’s neighbour. 
Fortunately, it did not explode. Intent was unaffected and led to attempt liability.
254 HR 19 June 1911, W 1911, 2903.
255 Hsu 2007, p. 44. Courts also sometimes label what should qualify as an error in obiecto as an 
aberratio ictus, in order to make the mistake relevant.
256 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 359 and Puppe 2009, p. 92.
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intentional destruction of goods and for the attempt to kill the offi cer. When the 
offi cer is killed, he is liable for killing him and for attempted destruction of 
goods.257
Finally, the negation of intent in situations of aberratio ictus can be mitigated by 
applying an offence that requires culpa or less as to the result. If it cannot be proven 
that the actor had dolus eventualis as to hitting the actual victim, a result-based 
offence can also be charged. Consider the German case where members of the Rote 
Armee Fraktion (RAF) robbed a bank and were on the run from the police. The 
pursuit continued inside a shopping mall, where shots were fi red. The defendant 
had aimed for a police offi cer but missed and killed a civilian. The fact that the 
defendant must have seen the civilian or the general experience that malls are 
crowded was insuffi cient to establish eventualis if the shooter thought he had a clear 
line of sight. Instead, the actual death was attributed to him through the result-
based offence of robbery causing death, which only requires luxuria as to the death. 
To establish this, the mere use of a weapon in a crowded mall was suffi cient.258
Since situations of aberratio ictus hardly ever lead to mere negligence liability, 
it could be argued they are just as irrelevant to intent as an error in persona. An 
error in persona is relevant only if the intended and actual objects differ in nature. 
It is submitted that in cases of aberratio ictus, this approach should also be taken. 
After all, in the discussion about aberratio ictus there is only consensus that when 
the objects differ, intent as to the actual outcome must be negated.259 For example, 
if the defendant threw a rock at someone, but misses and breaks a window, he did 
not intend to break this window.260 This approach has also been taken by the 
German Supreme Court. The defendant had tried to make X a suspect to divert 
attention away from herself, but in doing so, Y became a suspect. The Court held 
this aberratio ictus to be irrelevant and convicted for the intentional offence. The 
legal order is a protected legal interest of the offence as well, and this is harmed no 
matter who is falsely accused in the end.261
Only when the actual and planned victim differ clearly in nature or, in 
exceptional situations of for example a ricochet,262 can it be warranted and 
necessary to negate intent as to the actual victim, resulting in combination of 
attempt and negligence liability. This means that the actual victim is killed in an 
unintended way and thus becomes an unintended victim in a legal meaning too. I 
thus propose to adopt the same approach to cases of error in persona and aberratio 
ictus. By focusing on the nature of the legal interest involved and/or the way the 
257 Krey 2003, pp. 130–131; Beulke 2008, p. 83; Schmitz 2000, pp. 301–302 and Roxin 2006, pp. 
480–481.
258 15 May 1992 BGHSt 38, 295 and §251 of the German Criminal Code.
259 Hsu 2007, p. 72 and Roxin 2006, pp. 516–517. According to Bohlander 2010A, p. 605, the 
aberratio is irrelevant in Spain too if the legal interests were of equal value and nature.
260 R. v. Pembliton (1874) L. 2 C.C.R. 119.
261 3 May 1956 BGHSt 9, 240.
262 Puppe 2009, p. 92, referring to 16 October 2008 BGH NStZ 2009, 210.
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unforeseen result was brought about, the approach resembles the English one, which 
is discussed now.
2.5.3. Transferred fault
In England, cases of aberratio ictus and error in persona are not distinguished.263 
They are both generally irrelevant to the defendant’s intent. Intent is ‘transferred’ 
from the intended to the actual victim, provided it is of the same kind. In case the 
identity of the victim is mistaken, it is transferred from the intended to the actual 
victim. In the example in the introduction of John, when the police offi cer (Y) 
intervened in the line of fi re and was killed by the bullet aimed at his commissioner 
(X), the intent directed to the death of that commissioner (X) is transferred to the 
police offi cer (Y).264 English law concentrates on the result and convicts on the 
basis of ‘suffi cient similarity’ between intention and result.265 The rationale for this 
transfer is also that deviations of the harm intended should be irrelevant if the 
intended and actual result of suffi ciently similar in nature and degree.266 In that 
case, the actor can properly be treated as if he had the intent for the offence 
committed.267
Whereas the principle, known on the continent as dolus generalis, that intent is 
abstract or ‘impersonal’ and need not be individualized as to the specifi c victim, 
lies at the heart of the doctrine,268 the ‘transfer’ of intent in fact implies the opposite. 
The specifi c intent as to X must be transferred by Y. However, if the intent would be 
general, it need not be transferred. The ‘transfer’ of intent becomes superfl uous if it 
is considered that criminal law usually punishes abstract intentional consequences, 
such as killing a person, rather than a specifi c individual.269 There exists an 
‘indiscriminate malice’ when the defendant shoots into a crowd or detonates a 
bomb. The victim is not individualized.270
Leaving terminology aside, if intent cannot be transferred because the result 
was too different in nature from what was intended, negligence liability can be 
upgraded in a similar way as in continental Europe, namely through result based 
offences and other forms of constructive liability. Since English law knows no 
concept of dolus eventualis, this cannot be used to limit the scope of a doctrine. 
263 See Horder 2006B, p. 383 and Law Commission 1989, p. 159.
264 Williams 1953, p. 104; Horder 2006B, pp. 390–392; Blackstone 1769 (1979), p. 201 and R. v. 
Pembliton (1874) L. 2 C.C.R. 119. By contrast, the deviation is relevant if the result is different in 
nature from what was intended. This is called the ‘no-translation rule’; fault can be transferred 
but not translated.
265 Ashworth 2006, p. 198.
266 Horder 1997; Horder 2006B, p. 385 and Ashworth 2008A, p. 255.
267 Robinson 1984, pp. 620 and 647: ‘substituting’ fault.
268 Horder 2006B, p. 383.
269 Tadros 2005, p. 256; Williams 1953, pp. 101 and 108 and Bohlander 2010A, p. 617.
270 Attorney-General’s Reference no. 3 of 1994 [1998] AC 245. See also Bohlander 2010A, pp. 566–
567.
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Recklessness can fulfi l the same function, but only to a lesser extent. If the 
defendant foresaw that he could kill someone else, he was reckless as to the result. 
The important distinction is that recklessness is no form of intent. Proving 
recklessness cannot preclude the negation of intent. Therefore, proving recklessness 
would only lead to a lesser form of liability such as manslaughter, instead of murder. 
If one wants to refl ect in the verdict that the defendant who missed and killed 
someone else is just as culpable as the person whose plan turned out as planned, the 
doctrine of transferred fault is necessary.
2.5.4. Multiple-actor scenarios
When more actors are involved, things become even more complex. It seems the 
general gist in multiple-actor scenarios is that the liability of the participant, 
principal by proxy, joint principal and so on is connected to the person who directly 
brings about the unintended result.271 The person who induces another to steal one 
of Van Gogh’s ‘Sunfl owers’ but steals a Picasso painting, is also liable as an 
instigator of theft. The intent of instigator need not be more specifi c than that of the 
perpetrator.272 A true case concerns the defendant who had induced another to kill 
his son. To this end, he had informed him on the habits of his son and gave him a 
photograph. After asking the ‘hit man’ if he could identify his son, he left the dark 
place where his son was about to enter. However, a neighbour entered and was 
fatally shot. The error in persona was irrelevant to both the perpetrator and 
instigator.273
Some German scholars oppose this solution in favour of attempt liability for the 
instigator. One argument is that otherwise, the instigator would be liable for two 
murders, if the actor shot the ‘correct’ person after the error.274 Another example 
used to illustrate that the scope of liability is too broad is the German case where 
the victim was held liable for the attempted murder on himself. The victim belonged 
to a group of burglars who had agreed in advance that they would shoot at persons 
that would pursue them in order not to get arrested. One of the burglars had 
mistaken the victim for a pursuer and shot him. He survived, but was also held 
liable as co-perpetrator of this attempted murder.275 Other German scholars aim to 
limit liability by applying a criterion based on the degree to which the defendant 
271 1 January 1859 RG GA 1859, 322; Bohlander 2010B, p. 159 and Hamdorf 2007, p. 221.
272 Hamdorf 2007, pp. 215–220.
273 25 October 1990 BGHSt 37, 214. Compare AG van Dorst in HR 29 April 1997, NJ 1997, 654. In 
that case however, the error in objecto of the perpetrators did not preclude liability of the 
instigator under a reasoning of conditional intent. The Dutch Supreme Court held that by 
instigating the thieves to take away a colour photocopier, he had accepted the possibility that 
they would in fact steal a black and white one.
274 Roxin 2006, pp. 534–535.
275 23 January 1958 BGHSt 11, 268.
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left the actual identifi cation of the victim to the direct perpetrator.276 There is 
authority in English law to limit the scope of secondary liability in the case where 
the perpetrator deliberately kills the wrong victim. This is positioned as a relevant 
deviation in the causal chain of events.277
2.5.5. Conclusion
Cases that are typically discussed under the heading of error in persona and 
aberratio ictus should be treated as irrelevant in principle. Intent as to the actual 
outcome can only be negated if this was of a different nature than the intended 
outcome. This approach can explain the outcomes of most cases in all Member 
States under investigation, reached by either transferring fault, a normative equation 
of interests or by reverting to dolus generalis.278
I rejected the extreme position that a mistake or deviation is always relevant, 
since this is at odds with the neutral character of dolus. The intended act need not 
be desired. It also affronts common sense to hold that the defendant negligently 
killed the person he wanted to kill, because it turned out to be someone else. This 
does not change in case the mistaken victim is someone close to the defendant. 
Fault need not be more specifi c than required by the offence defi nition. Fault, dolus 
in particular, is general in nature. Concretization of the object is only relevant if the 
offence defi nition makes it relevant, such as offences that aim to protect public 
offi cials.
Therefore, only situations where the unintended outcomes differ in nature from 
that intended are relevant, the yardstick of nature being the offence defi nition. A 
clear example is when the defendant attempts to kill, but fails, resulting only in 
damaging an object. The combination of attempt and negligence liability may also 
be warranted if John, who wanted to kill the police commissioner but missed, ‘only’ 
seriously injured the police offi cer who jumped in front of the commissioner. It 
follows that the extreme position of not holding any mistake relevant must be 
rejected too. It completely sidelines the correspondence principle that fault must 
relate to all offence elements. It would allow the defendant to be convicted although 
the offence defi nition is not fulfi lled. It would lead to liability based on the 
traditional versari in re illicita, and attribute whatever consequences occur.
None of the extreme perspectives are applied in the Member States under 
investigation. The German legal system can be juxtaposed with the Dutch and the 
English legal as attaching most weight to the concretization of the outcome. 
However, the underlying principles are the same everywhere and the outcomes in 
case-law do not differ very much. I thus conclude that neither error in personae nor 
aberratio icti are hardly ever relevant. The error in persona is irrelevant in all three 
Member States, which makes the theoretical relevance of aberratio ictus 
276 Bohlander 2010B, p. 156 and Hamdorf 2007, p. 217.
277 Bohlander 2010B, p. 148.
278 See Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 353–356.
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remarkable. There is no satisfactory justifi cation to treat liability for the 
‘unintended’, actual outcome in these cases differently.279
In German theory, the aberratio ictus is distinguished to negate intent as to the 
actual victim. However, it has been demonstrated that there are many ways to avoid 
mere negligence liability. Dolus eventualis, for example, signifi cantly limits the 
scope of aberratio ictus. Did the defendant not foresee that the bodyguard would 
try to catch the bullet meant for his target? The same result is reached by applying 
the doctrine proposed here. When a situation of aberratio ictus is held to be relevant 
in Germany, this will usually also be the outcome under the test proposed here. For 
example, when a hunter misses his target and kills another hunter, the fact that he 
aimed at an object of a different nature, negates his intent.
The doctrine proposed here is consistent and simple. In the general part of 
criminal law for the EU that I propose, dolus eventualis is rejected and recklessness 
does not suffi ce to fulfi l a requirement of intent. This brings about that in order to 
hold the defendant intentionally liable for the bodyguard’s death, the doctrine is 
necessary. In other words, a coherent general part without gaps of criminal liability 
requires the doctrine. That doctrine is simply based on the idea that mens rea is 
generalis: it need not be made concrete as to the specifi c object or way a result is 
brought about. When the harm intended is identical to the harm caused, a deviation 
from what the actor specifi cally intended is irrelevant. The approach does not 
distinguish between the two situations discussed or consider whether other concepts 
like dolus eventualis can apply.
All tests or doctrines lack precision to some extent. In the test proposed here, 
there can also be debate about how different the legal interests involved must be. 
This question must be answered in the context of what the specifi c offence defi nition 
requires and second, in light of the underlying principles of the test. What is most 
important is to have a solution that works. The controversy is inevitable in scenarios 
that are exceptional and complex.280 I will not dwell on even more exceptional and 
complex situations in which for example, unintended victims are injured in an 
unintended way.281 It is not the task of a general part to give a solution to any 
imaginable problem.282
279 The distinction between cases of error in persona and aberratio ictus does remain relevant for 
the liability as to the planned, intended victim. In an error in persona, for example when the 
intended victim was on holiday, the attempt was impossible, which is not criminal in all Member 
States. By contrast, missing the intended victim is a paradigm example of attempt.
280 Compare Bohlander 2010A.
281 See Horder 2006B, pp. 383–390. Consider for example the case where a burglar ate from the 
poisoned cake, see Hsu 2007, p. 88 or a bum who had found it in the dumpster, see Williams 
1953, p. 106.
282 Tiedemann in Tiedemann 2002, p. 6.
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3. PRINCIPLE OF CONTEMPORANEITY
So far, it has become clear that every offence includes a fault element, unless the 
legislator expressly indicated otherwise. The fault element relates to all elements of 
the offence defi nition, unless it is clear that it does not relate to some or any of these 
elements. This can be inferred from the wording or context of the offence and more 
clearly, by express indication of the legislator or courts. The principle of contempo-
raneity, also called concurrence283 or coincidence,284 adds another level to the 
relationship between the fault and objective element(s) of the offence defi ni tion.285
The principle requires that mens rea and actus reus coincide or coexist in time. 
In other words, the question of whether or not the actor had intention must only be 
assessed by reference to the time of the commission of the offence. The defendant is 
not liable for handling stolen goods if he only becomes aware after buying them 
that the goods he bought in good faith are stolen. There is also no intent to kill, if 
the actor inadvertently kills someone and then is happy with the result. Knowledge 
after the fact, dolus subsequens,286 as well as knowledge (only) previous to the act, 
dolus antecedens, is insuffi cient from a perspective of contemporaneity.287 This 
principle refl ects the law’s interest in judging the culpability of the act rather than 
the general character of the actor. Criminal liability is principally only interested in 
the state of mind of the actor at the time of the commission of the offence. It rejects 
culpability based on character, where the act is only of importance as it shows a 
certain disposition, as it manifests a ‘guilty’ character.288
A rigid interpretation of the principle may imply that the pertinent actus reus 
and mens rea elements must co-exist during the whole sequence of events, even up 
to the moment the fi nal result occurs. However, the attribution of a consequence 
does not require the intention to be present until the consequence occurs.289 The 
time of committing the offence is assessed by reference to the act that led to the 
result, not the time when the result occurred.290 It is therefore irrelevant if fault 
becomes absent, for example when the defendant repents, before the result is 
completed. Consider that actor decided he wants to kill the victim with a bomb and 
attaches the bomb to the car of the victim. There is coincidence of mens rea an 
actus reus. Normally, this would remain intact until the result occurs, but this is not 
283 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 159.
284 Ormerod 2005, p. 117.
285 The principle of contemporaneity presupposes correspondence and is therefore often treated as 
part of correspondence, like by Stuckenberg 2007, p. 209 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 187.
286 14 June 1983 BGH NStZ 1983, 452.
287 Bohlander 2009, p. 68; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 269; Krey 2003, pp. 130–133; Fischer, 
T. 2009, p. 105 and Beulke 2008, p. 76.
288 Robinson in Dressler 2002, p. 999; Kelk 2005, pp. 172–173; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 
22–26; Krey 2003, pp. 14–15; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 203 and Beulke 2008, p. 140.
289 Hettinger 2006, p. 291.
290 §8 of the German Criminal Code.
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required. It could be imagined that the defendant repents his actions, decides to 
undo his work yet returns to the car too late.
The principle merely requires a ‘scintilla temporis’, a moment in time at which 
all these elements are all present.291 This point is not fi xed. In result based offences, 
mens rea can coincide with actus reus in just about any point in time as long as the 
actus reus is not completed. In other offences, the requirement may be less fl exible, 
For instance, in an offence like theft, the ulterior intent of appropriation needs to be 
present when the actor takes away the property.292 If this ulterior intent was lacking 
at that time, there can be no liability for theft. Even when the defendant decides to 
appropriate after he has taken the property away, there can only be liability for the 
lesser offence of embezzlement.
In many more cases, the requirement of contemporaneity may become an 
obstacle to liability. To remedy the harsh implications of a rigid interpretation of the 
principle, several interpretations and doctrines are applied, which are discussed 
now. The issues almost exclusively dealt within the context of dolus. In negligent 
offences, contemporaneity is not an issue because the violation of the duty of care 
always precedes the result. It will be illustrated that as a result, no other doctrines 
are necessary to ground negligence liability.
3.1. Dolus antecedens and subsequens
Fault that precedes or follows only after the commission of the offence does not 
meet the requirement of contemporaneity. As a consequence, fault cannot be 
proven. An example of dolus antecedens is the defendant who forgot about the 
(minor) age of the person he had sex with. He had knowledge before the act, but at 
the time of acting, he was ignorant. There was no coincidence, not even during a 
very short period.
As an acquittal would be considered inappropriate, there are multiple options to 
convict the defendant for the intentional offence. First of all, in most Member States 
the minor age of the victim is strict, which also sidelines the requirements of 
contemporaneity. The example must therefore be considered under German law, 
where fault also relates to the age of the victim.293 Second, even in cases where the 
court not simply dismissed the defendant’s claim as incredible, liability could be 
based on a reasoning of latent knowledge. After all, the fact that the defendant knew 
in advance implies that he was also subconsciously aware tempore delicti.294
Mens rea needs to coincide at one point in time before the actus reus is 
completed, otherwise fault is subsequens. By extending the actus reus, the 
possibility for mens rea to coincide is also extended. A fi rst way in which this was 
291 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 159 and Ormerod 2005, p. 116.
292 Bohlander 2009, p. 70.
293 §176 of the German Criminal Code. See V.2.3.4.
294 See IV.2.5.1.
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done was by applying the ‘continuous act’ theory. The actus reus can also consist of 
an ongoing course of conduct. Fault does not have to be present at the inception of 
the actus reus as it can be superimposed upon an existing act as long as it continues. 
In an English case, the defendant possessed mens rea when he realised that he 
parked his car on a police offi cer’s foot, which constituted the actus reus of assault, 
of which he was convic ted. The defendant left his car on the foot after realization. 
He could not have been liable for assault, had he only realised this after this 
continuous act had ended.295
A second and related way of extending the actus reus is based on creating 
danger that brings about a continuing duty. In another English case, the defendant 
was held liable for not preventing the spreading of the fi re after he realised he 
caused it. In other words, the creation of the danger did not complete the actus reus 
because it was held to continue as an ongoing danger. At one point, the defendant 
realizes this danger, and actus reus and mens rea coincide. It suffi ced that the 
defendant possessed the required fault element at any time, provided this was a time 
where preventive steps could still be taken.296 Two acts are joined as one; the fi rst is 
negligent and after realization, the subsequent lack of taking actions grounds an 
intentional omission.
3.2. Dolus generalis
Under the heading of dolus generalis, cases are discussed in which the actor 
mistakenly believes he has achieved his goal. He therefore does not know that the 
result is really achieved by his subsequent act. The case of Thabo Meli is often 
mentioned.297 The defendants thought they had killed the victim, but he only died 
when the defendants wanted to dispose of the body by dropping him into a cliff. 
The problem is that strictly speaking there was intention at the time of the fi rst act, 
but no longer at the second act. Mens rea and actus reus thus do not seem to 
coincide in time.
These cases can be diffi cult to distinguish from cases of dolus antecedens, 
where mens rea also precedes the actus reus. The only way to safely do so is by 
reference to its effect. Whereas dolus antecedens is used to label cases where fault 
is not relevant, cases of dolus generalis are used to label those cases where the 
problem of contemporaneity is overcome.298 In this section, I will therefore explain 
why and how this problem is overcome. Only a few German scholars believe that 
cases dis cussed under this heading are problematic and argue the fi rst act should be 
seen as a failed attempt and the second one as causing the result negligently.
295 Fagan v. MPC [1969] 1 QB 439 and Edge 1995, p. 89.
296 R. v. Miller [1982] UKHL 6 and Edge 1995, p. 86–88. Both ways of extension are included in s. 
23 of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 53.
297 R. v. Thabo Meli [1954] 1 All ER 373. Compare HR 14 June 1960, NJ 1960, 597.
298 See Roxin 2006, p. 522.
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It will become clear again that the concept of intent in Germany is much more 
specifi c than in other Member States. ‘Vorsatz’ is not general in character. Often, 
intent must not only also relate to the specifi c identity of the victim but also to the 
manner in which the result is brought about. In contrast, dolus is generalis in the 
Netherlands: the fault element should relate to the end, not the means. In one case, 
the defendant had strangled the victim and, thinking he had killed him, put him in a 
ditch. Autopsy revealed however, that the victim had drowned. The court saw no 
problem in establishing intent as to the death of the victim, regardless of which act 
killed him. The intent to kill suffi ced.299
In England, the problem is overcome by approaching the two acts as a ‘single 
trans action’. The series of events is seen as a single course of conduct whereby the 
pre sen ce of mens rea at any stage during the events suffi ces. In the aforementioned 
case of Thabo Meli, the whole sequences of events was held to be one complex 
single trans action, rendering the fact that mens rea preceded the actus reus uncom-
pli ca ted.300 The English and Dutch approach can be connected to each other by 
arguing that dolus generalis brings about that the two acts form one sequence of 
conduct.301
In Germany, these deviations also generally do not negate intent, although this is 
based on a different, causal reasoning. In principle, a causal aberration is considered 
relevant in Germany, because intent must also relate to the causal chain of events in 
its essential features. Rejecting the doctrine of dolus generalis, the German 
Supreme Court held that problems of contemporaneity can be overcome if the 
causal deviation was not serious enough to be relevant. Intent must merely relate to 
the causal chain of events in its essential features, bringing about that what is still 
within the parameters of what can be ordinarily foreseen in the normal course of 
events is irrelevant to the question of contemporaneity.302 Deviations that still lead 
to the wanted consequence in a similar way are not substantial and attributed as the 
com ple ted offence. For example, the defendant planned to shoot the victim but the 
shot was fi red beforehand.303 The deviation is also irrelevant when the victim is 
thrown of a bridge to drown but already dies because he hits a pole or boat.304
299 HR 26 June 1962, NJ 1963, 11. See de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 66; Kelk 2005, pp. 201–202 
and Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Opzet.
300 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 161; Ashworth 2006, pp. 162–163 and Ormerod 2005, p. 117. 
Article 56 of the Dutch Criminal Code refers to the concept of a ‘continuing act’, which applies 
when two offences are similar in nature and based on the same intent. However, this concept is 
only relevant to sentencing and is in fact based on the assumption that the defendant committed 
more than one criminal offence.
301 See Beulke 2006, p. 93 and Sancinetti in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 352.
302 21 April 1955 BGHSt 7, 325; 30 June 1988 BGH NJW 1989, 176; Bohlander 2009, pp. 68–69; 
Krey 2003, pp. 134–135 and 148–149 and Beulke 2008, pp. 92–94.
303 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 114–115 and Roxin 2006, p. 524. Compare the dogma ‘intended outcomes 
are never too remote’, mentioned in III.6.2.
304 Beulke 2008, p. 93; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 274 and Krey 2003, pp. 70–71.
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In one case, the defendant had attacked the victim with conditional intent to kill, 
putting sand in her mouth in order to make her stop screaming. After erroneously 
thinking she was dead, the defendant threw the victim in a liquid manure pit, 
causing her death. The German Supreme Court confi rmed the conviction for 
intentional killing, submitting that the deviation was not serious enough to be 
legally relevant.305 In conclusion, intent is also only negated in exceptional 
circumstances in Ger many. It is also recognized that such a defendant should not 
benefi t from his mis take.306 Some scholars have argued these deviations should 
always be relevant, imply ing that intent must cover the whole and exact chain of 
events, which would there fore always result in a double conviction of negligent 
killing and attempted killing. Nonetheless, this is only a minority opinion.307 The 
outcomes are therefore similar to those in England and the Netherlands, but the 
paths to get there are very different.
After all, in the Netherlands, the circumstance that the actor completed his goal 
by other means is irrelevant. Fault need not relate to the specifi c manner of causa-
tion.308 As an alternative to the single transaction theory, the problem of contempo-
ra neity is also solved in England by holding that an act was also a cause of the 
prohibited consequence.309 However, the important difference is that mens rea is 
not connected to causation. Problems of causation do not affect intent. Today, only a 
few Dutch scholars still adhere to the German view that intention should encompass 
the causal chain of events in its essential features, favouring the double charge of 
attempt and negligence when the deviation is considerable.310 This view became 
less and less popular and several exceptions and doctrines were devised to overcome 
what were considered unjust acquittals of the completed intentional offence. In the 
end, the consensus was to disconnect intention from causation altogether.311
It is submitted that the German view that would only hold the defendant liable 
for the attempted offence and the negligent result if the deviation is considered to be 
substantial is too refi ned and results in awkward verdicts. How can someone be 
convicted of attempting to kill a person who died? A person can only be killed 
once.312 Even if in most cases of dolus generalis, the deviation will be at least 
foreseeable according to general experience and thus be irrelevant, this criterion of 
foreseeability can be criticized as inconsistent. After all, the question of intent is 
answered not by reference to what the defendant foresaw but by reference to what 
305 26 April 1960 BGHSt 14, 193.
306 Sancinetti in Schünemann a.o. 2001, pp. 349–350 and 362–363.
307 Hettinger in Seebode 1992, pp. 243–248; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 115 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 
349–351.
308 Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on Opzet; Kelk 2005, p. 201 and Strijards 1983, pp. 212–213.
309 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 162 and Ormerod 2005, p. 117. Compare Hettinger in Seebode 
1992, pp. 250–251.
310 Like Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 125–126.
311 Strijards 1983, pp. 200–213.
312 Compare annotator Pompe in HR 26 June 1962, NJ 1963, 11 and annotator Röling in HR 14 June 
1960, NJ 1960, 597.
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could be foreseen. The standard is understandable with a view to the desired 
outcome, but it includes normative aspects resembling negligence into the concept 
of intent. It is legitimate, even necessary to take normative aspects into account in 
questions of causation, but the appropriate framework for these aspects is an 
independent concept of causation, disconnected from dolus (and culpa). The 
German judiciary increasingly recognizes this, even if not yet formally embraced 
by the Supreme Court.313
I therefore submit that dolus should not relate to the causal chain of events. The 
cases of dolus generalis can lead to complete liability based on the two approaches 
described above. When the deviation is very serious, cases can be excluded from 
(complete) liability based on rules of objective attribution: dolus is not affected. As 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the acceptance that rules on causation 
are dependent on the concomitant fault element does not bring about that causation 
is part of mens rea. It does not imply that causal problems affect fault. Causation 
can negate liability, not fault. This is increasingly recognized in Germany, not only 
in the context of negligent, but also more and more in the context of intentional 
offences.314 The actor either intended to kill the victim and legally caused his death, 
or he intended to kill the victim but did not legally cause the death, resulting in 
mere attempt liability.
3.3. Reversed dolus generalis
In the cases mentioned above, the second act, rather than the fi rst one brought about 
the intended result. In the converse situation, the intended consequence is already 
caused by the preceding act. For example, the actor wants to kill his neighbour at 
night by entering his house and shooting him. However, when he drives through the 
street in the afternoon, he negligently hits the neighbour with his car, killing him. It 
is uncontroversial that this does not suffi ce for intent, so only negligence liability 
applies. This can be contrasted with the situation where the perpetrator entered his 
neighbour’s house in order to kill him. He gave the victim a hit on the head to stun 
him fi rst, but this preparatory act already killed him. It would be unsatisfactory to 
hold this defendant liable only for negligent killing.
The less the two acts can be distinguished in time, space or modus quo, the more 
evident intentional liability seems to become. If the fi rst and second act can be seen 
as a sequence of events, these cases would be treated in the Netherlands and 
England as cases of dolus generalis, bringing about that although objectively, the 
actus reus was already fulfi lled in the fi rst stage, this does not lead to problems of 
contemporaneity. The defendant will be convicted of the completed intentional 
offence, because he brought about the consequence he intended.
313 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 188–191; Hsu 2007, p. 45 and Roxin 2006, pp. 511–515.
314 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 188–189 and Krey 2003, pp. 62–63. See for example, 
13 November 2003 BGHSt 49, 1 and 24 March 2006 OLG Jena BeckRS 2006, 06007.
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These cases are primarily discussed in Germany.315 If the defendant accepted 
the chance that the victim would already die by the preceding act, he is liable for 
dolus eventualis.316 In other cases, the solution of intentional or negligence liability 
is determined by the distinction between attempt and preparatory acts. Preparation 
is not punishable in Germany. Only when the actor enters the attempt phase, are his 
actions directed at the result and thus intentional. The attempt phase must be passed 
to establish an irrelevant deviation. The killing of the neighbour by the smack to the 
head is therefore seen as a relevant deviation from the causal chain of events, 
negating intention.317
In a case where the defendant planned to drug and tie up his wife, transport her 
to a secret location and kill her there, it could not be established when the wife died. 
Giving the defendant the benefi t of the doubt, it was assumed that she already died 
by the tying up or drugging. Since the German Supreme Court, contrary to the trial 
court, thought the tying up and drugging should not yet be considered to be in the 
attempt phase for murder, the deviation was held to be relevant. As a consequence, 
the defendant could at most be held liable for negligent homicide or unlawful 
imprisonment causing death.318
This case can be contrasted with two cases in which the killing was held to be 
intentional. The defendants wanted to hang the victim to simulate suicide, but he 
already died by the strangulation that was meant to subdue him.319 In the other 
case, the plan was to shoot air in the veins of the victim, but the victim already died 
by the previous beating that was directed at breaking his resistance. In that case, the 
Supreme Court not only referred to the irrelevant deviation in the causal chain of 
events, but also argued that the two acts form a unity, which resembles the English 
approach of a single transaction.320
Problems of contemporaneity can be overcome by trying to bridge the gap between 
the act where the actus reus occurred and the act where mens rea occurred. By arguing 
that there is one sequence of events, there is no problem of contemporaneity. Another 
strategy to upgrade what would otherwise be mere negligence liability is to allow for 
an exception to the principle of contemporaneity. To this I now turn.
3.4. Actio libera in causa
If the offender lacks the required fault element at the time of acting, for example 
due to intoxication, this problem can be overcome by applying the doctrine of actio 
315 Roxin 2006, p. 526: ‘umgekehrte dolus generalis.’
316 Wolter 2006. Just like in cases of dolus generalis, when the disposing of the body is also meant 
‘to make sure’, see Sancinetti in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 350.
317 12 December 2001 BGH NJW 2002, 1057; Bohlander 2009, pp. 69–70; Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 
379–380; Beulke 2008, p. 93; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 275 and Roxin 2006, p. 478.
318 12 December 2001 BGH NJW 2002, 1057 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 69–70.
319 6 May 1954 BGH GA 1955, 123.
320 10 April 2002 BGH NStZ 2002, 475.
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libera in causa. This means ‘conduct, which is free in origin’321 and is translated in 
English by ‘prior fault’. In the Netherlands, the terms dolus and culpa in causa are 
often used.322 Fault is located in an earlier time, compensating the lack of fault 
tempore delicti.
The doctrine of prior fault signifi es that a person should not be allowed to take 
advantage of any failure of proof defence to criminal liability if the relevant 
condition or circumstances was brought about by his or her own fault.323 For 
example, the offence of careless driving is held to be already complete when the 
defendant continues to drive while feeling drowsy, so as to avoid the problem that 
the behaviour was involuntary when he in fact did fall asleep and caused an 
accident.324 In an earlier mentioned German case, the epileptic person has been 
warned not to drive. Nonetheless, he drove, had an epileptic fi t and caused a fatal 
accident, injuring many more.325
Prior fault comes in many shapes and forms. Here, it is discussed as an exception 
to the principle of contemporaneity. I already discussed its specifi c role in 
establishing culpa, which can be grounded after all, in the fact that the defendant 
took on a responsibility for which he knew he was unqualifi ed. In negligent 
offences, the doctrine of actio libera in causa is superfl uous, because the concept of 
the violation of the duty of care is already quite broad. The violation of the duty of 
care always precedes the result.326 The aforementioned epileptic driver was 
convicted by the District Court of negligent killing, as the participation in traffi c 
with his disease was a violation of a duty of care, and it was objectively foreseeable 
that accidents could occur.327
The example of the drowsy actor indicates that the doctrine does not only deal 
with the lack of mens rea. It can also prevent offenders from relying on defences 
that negate the voluntariness of the act. Consider that the actor became incapable of 
understanding the wrongfulness of his actions and committed an offence. The lack 
of blameworthiness as a result of a mental disorder can also be overcome by prior 
fault, limiting or even precluding the defence of insanity. Liability can even be 
based on the act of getting in the state of mind that gave rise to the defence. This 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter and to some extent in the context of 
intoxication below.
Right now, I focus on how problems of correspondence in situations of prior 
fault can be overcome. Least controversial is the intentional actio libera in causa, 
321 De Hullu 2006, p. 330: “de van oorsprong vrije handeling.”
322 Strijards 1987, pp. 44–46. The latter is most commonly used.
323 Ashworth 2006, p. 163 and Fletcher 2007, p. 97.
324 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 163. See also Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), p. 94 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 
324–325.
325 17 November 1994 BGHSt 40, 341.
326 22 August 1996 BGHSt 42, 235; 19 February 1997 BGH NStZ 1997, 228; Krey 2003, pp. 40–41 
and Hirsch 1997.
327 17 November 1994 BGHSt 40, 341. The German Supreme Court quashed the decision for not 
dealing with the subjective part of negligence suffi ciently, see IV.6.5.
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which holds the actor liable for the criminal act although the mens rea for that act 
was lacking when the actor committed the offence. Liability is based on the prior 
situation, in which the defendant intentionally created the circumstances that would 
negate fault with a view to facilitating the planned offence. For example, the 
defendant intoxicates himself to gain the courage to kill.328 Even if it is accepted 
that fault was lacking tempore delicti, it is still appropriate to hold the perpetrator 
liable for the offence based on his prior fault. After all, it is only for the prior fault 
that mens rea is lacking tempore delicti.329
In addition, there is a subjective connection between the two events. At the time 
of the actio libera, the intention was already aimed at the specifi c offence which the 
actor wanted to whilst being intoxicated.330 The defendant wanted to kill the person 
–then he got intoxicated- and he killed the person. There is mens rea, only it exists 
prior to the actual actus reus. The problem of contemporaneity is therefore similar 
as in cases of dolus generalis mentioned above and could be dogmatically solved by 
viewing the two events as one sequence of events.331 The alternative is to view the 
grounding of fault in the actio libera as a legitimate exception to the principle.
A negligent actio libera in causa exists when the actor causes the defect inten-
tionally or negligently and thereby does not think about the possibility to commit a 
specifi c offence, which he subsequently does.332 As noted, it is doubted whether 
this doctrine is necessary as to negligent offences, because the prior fault can 
ground the violation of the duty of care. Under both the doctrine of actio libera as 
well as that of culpa, liability is limited to those results that were foreseeable accor-
ding to general experience.333 This is related to the rationale underlying con struc-
tive liability; creating a danger, like intoxication, brings about typical dangers. If 
the actor does not take the necessary precautions to minimize or avoid the risk from 
materializing, he may be held liable for it. If foreseeability would not be required, 
the doctrine would allow for liability based on the stricter versari in re illicita, 
grounding liability for whatever consequences ensue from the preceding act.334
3.5. Intoxication
The ways in which the doctrine of actio libera grounds liability can be illustrated in 
the context of intoxication. Intoxication is a generic concept for losing one’s sound 
mind through intoxicants such as alcohol and drugs. The attitude of society in 
regard to intoxicants, especially alcohol, has always been ambivalent. Whereas 
328 Beulke 2008, pp. 144–145 and Roxin 2006, p. 914.
329 Ashworth 2006, p. 91.
330 4 May 1962 BGHSt 17, 259; Hettinger 1988, pp. 193 and 197 and Beulke 2008, p. 146.
331 See Hettinger 1988, p. 213, who also mentions the German approach of viewing this as an 
irrelevant deviation in the causal chain of events.
332 Beulke 2008, p. 147 and 21 July 1992 BGH StV 1993, 356.
333 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 407–408 and Roxin 2006, pp. 915–916.
334 See V.2.3.3.
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driving under the infl uence of alcohol is regarded as very blameworthy, drinking 
itself is seen as socially acceptable or even desirable conduct. The legal problems 
are just as ambivalent. On the one hand, it is accepted that the intoxication may rob 
the defendant of his ability to be aware of and appreciate danger correctly. Intoxi-
cation may cause the defendant to act out of character or even rob him of any 
control over his actions. On the other hand, it is commonly rejected that the defen-
dant should be able to benefi t from the fact that he created these circumstances 
himself. A perpe trator should not be allowed to escape liability if he got intoxicated 
with a view to raise a defence. Otherwise, legal interests would be insuffi ciently 
protected. As a result, the exculpating effect of intoxication is severely limited.
The outcome of the comparative legal analysis resembles that of dolus generalis. 
In all three Member States, the problem of contemporaneity is generally overcome, 
leading to similar outcomes in terms of adjudication and sentencing, but the path to 
liability is very different.335 These differences not only refl ect a difference in 
approach to the doctrine of prior fault, but also to the nature of fault in general. The 
ques tion of whether or not intoxication can affect intent is directly related to the 
ques tion to which elements it must relate and to what extent. The more specifi c 
intent is, relating to causal aspects or a specifi c identity of the victim, the more 
sensitive it is to mistakes.
An important difference can be made as to the effect of intoxication. In England, 
the issue is treated predominantly in the context of the lack of mens rea. Intoxication 
can support a claim that the defendant was ignorant of a risk or that he made a (very 
unreasonable) mistake.336 By contrast, in Germany, intoxication is usually 
discussed as a problem of blameworthiness. It not necessarily affects intent, but 
certainly can give rise to an excuse like insanity. In the Netherlands, intoxication is 
treated in the light of both mens rea and blameworthiness. Defendants raise 
intoxication as a failure of proof defence and as an excuse, although without much 
success. The difference can be explained by the fact that in Dutch law, a strict 
distinction is made between mens rea and blameworthiness. The German focus on 
the excuse can be explained by the circumstance that intoxication is more likely to 
constitute a mental disorder or diminished responsibility than it will negate fault. 
The signifi cant differences in national law warrant a separate discussion.
It is submitted that intoxication can affect both fault and the capacity to be held 
blameworthy. The person, who is so intoxicated that he is excused, can still act 
intentional and vice versa.337 The difference is important, for if a legal system 
would only recognize that intoxication can negate mens rea, it can have no effect in 
the context of strict liability offences. I will now discuss the various ways in which 
335 Albrecht 1998, p. 86.
336 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 628 and 638; Ashworth 2006, p. 217 and Ormerod 2005, p. 273. 
This does not preclude that intoxication can give rise to an excuse like insanity, see Law 
Commission 1995, pp. 64–67.
337 Gatzweiler 2008, p. 142; van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 299; 22 November 1990 BGH NStZ 1991, 126 
and 14 December 2004 BGH BeckRS 2005, 00267.
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the pertinent legal systems acknowledge and overcome legal problems relating to 
intoxication. It is important to note that in all three legal systems, a prerequisite for 
intoxication to affect fault is that it must be severe enough to really negate intention. 
By consuming just a few drinks, the accused’s intention or knowledge is unlikely to 
be affected. Nonetheless, that threshold is diffi cult to determine in abstracto and 
clearly varies per State.
3.5.1. English law
The English approach to intoxication can best be viewed as a compromise to the 
dilemma. A middle way is chosen between negating mens rea due to intoxication 
and holding intoxicated mistakes irrelevant to mens rea. This is done by partially 
recognizing the fault-negating effect of intoxication. If the intoxication crosses the 
threshold of severity and affects mens rea, the defendant is not held liable for the 
serious offence due to a lack of fault. Nonetheless, he is held liable for a lesser 
offence that also requires mens rea, albeit in a more basic form, like recklessness. 
Like the partial defence of provocation can negate a charge of murder, resulting in 
liability for the less serious offence of manslaughter, voluntary intoxication can 
negate the ‘specifi c intent’ required for murder, but the defendant will still be 
convicted of the ‘basic intent offence’ of manslaughter.338
Two important limitations of the doctrine should be addressed. English law 
requires that the intoxication must have been powerful enough to negate the mens 
rea, for example to completely remove awareness of what one is doing. Even if the 
defen dant was less capable to resist temptation, he still acted intentionally. A 
drunken intent is after all, still an intent.339 Secondly, if the intoxication was 
involuntary, the normal rules of correspondence apply. Hence, he is acquitted if 
fault was lacking. Intoxication is involuntary when the intoxicant was slipped, for 
example in a drink, without the defendant’s knowledge, when it was forced upon 
him or when the intoxi cant was taken in good faith for medicinal purposes.340 It is 
involuntary only if the defendant was unaware that he was taking it, not if he under-
estimated the amount or effect it would have on him.341
The doctrine only enables inculpation when fault is absent due to voluntary 
intoxi cation. In that case, the subsequent question is whether the crime charged is 
one of ‘specifi c’ or ‘basic’ intent. In offences of specifi c intent, the normal rules of 
corres pon dence apply, which brings about that the defendant can be acquitted of 
that charge due to a lack of fault. In contrast, crimes of ‘basic intent’ are governed 
338 See Taylor, R. 2007, p. 347 and Simester 2008, p. 12.
339 R. v. Kingston [1994] UKHL 9; Ashworth 2006, p. 217; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 108; 
Ormerod 2008, p. 295 and Simester 2008, pp. 3–7.
340 R. v. Kingston [1994] UKHL 9; R. v. Hardie [1984] EWCA Crim 2; Law Commission 1993, pp. 
85–86; Law Commission 1995, pp. 11 and 79–87; Law Commission 2009, pp. 77–78 and 
Ormerod 2005, pp. 249 and 272–273. See also section 6(5) of the Public Order Act 1986.
341 Ormerod 2005, pp. 275–276; Ashworth 2006, p. 217 and Law Commission 1995, pp. 30–31.
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by another regime of ‘Majewski’, in order to prevent simple acquittals. In these 
offen ces of basic intent, intoxication is irrelevant to mens rea. It cannot negate mens 
rea. Instead, it will even constitute mens rea.342 If a defendant failed to foresee a 
risk because he was intoxicated, he may be treated as having foreseen that risk in an 
offence of basic intent.343 The voluntary intoxication is treated as a substitute for 
the fault element normally required.344
Usually, this brings about that intoxicated persons are deemed reckless.345 The 
intoxication constitutes recklessness, based on the premise that the intoxication 
brings about that the defendant knowingly takes a risk as to his future actions. The 
prosecutor need not prove an actual state of mind and can rely on the self-induced 
intoxication.346 It is this second step that has attracted a lot of criticism, and scholars 
have argued for the possibility that the prosecution would still have to prove 
reckless ness. After all, so it is argued, proof of recklessness is not so diffi cult with 
intoxi ca ted persons. A momentarily realization of the risk suffi ces.347 An increa-
sing ly popular alternative view is that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant 
would have had mens rea but for being intoxicated.348 Nonetheless, this liability 
based on hypothetical mens rea can also be criticized. It may even be questioned 
whether the English approach is really something different than a normative 
restriction of the relevance of intoxication. In the end, all that the English rules 
generally do is mitigate an intentional charge to liability for the lesser reckless 
offence.349
This distinction also gave rise to the question what crimes of specifi c and basic 
intent are. The matter is not settled; no principled distinction can be made.350 The 
simplest, most workable distinction is to require (direct) intent for offences of 
specifi c intent and recklessness or less for offences of basic intent.351 Nevertheless, 
doubt has been casted on this distinction. The only safe way is of defi ning crimes of 
specifi c intent is follow a list of precedents, where voluntary intoxication has been 
342 DPP v. Majewski [1976] UKHL 2; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 628–629; Ormerod 2005, 
p. 276; Ormerod 2006, p. 187 and Ashworth 2006, pp. 212–213.
343 Taylor, G. 2004A, p. 115 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 141.
344 R. v. Kingston [1994] UKHL 9, see also DPP v. Majewski [1976] UKHL 2.
345 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 633, Ashworth 2006, p. 213, Ormerod 2005, p. 128 and section 
22(1) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 52. See also section 6(5) of the Public 
Order Act 1986.
346 Law Commission 1993, p. 82.
347 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 633–634 and 640–641; Ashworth 2006, p. 218 and Ormerod 
2005, p. 278.
348 R. v. Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413; Law Commission 2009, p. 56; Simester 2008, pp. 3–7; 
Child 2009, p. 500 and James 2007, p. 297. See section 6(5) of the Public Order Act 1986.
349 A comparison can be made with the English so-called ‘partial defences’, discussed in X.3.6., 
which can reduce a charge of murder into the lesser manslaughter.
350 Ormerod 2006, p. 195 and Law Commission 1995, p. 49.
351 DPP v. Majewski [1976] UKHL 2; R. v. Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125; Lynch 1982, p. 138; 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 630–631, Simester 2008, pp. 9–11 and Ormerod 2008, p. 298.
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held to be able to negate mens rea.352 Notwithstanding this ‘unprincipled’353 
distinction, which cannot be justifi ed in strict logic,354 it has been argued that is has 
proved workable.355 Most offences are underpinned by a lesser offence of basic 
intent.356 The approach thus enables a form of mitigation; it strikes a middle ground 
between granting no defence at all and to granting a complete defence. It forms a 
midway course between the possibility of negating mens rea because of intoxication 
and holding intoxication irrelevant to criminal liability.
3.5.2. Dutch law
In the Netherlands, intoxication is hardly ever experienced as a problem of corres-
pondence, because of the general nature of intent. The less specifi c intent is, the less 
sensitive it is to (intoxicated) mistakes. Therefore, intoxication will only negate 
fault in very exceptional circumstances. In a case where the defendant took drugs 
and became psychotic, he thought his family was the devil and needed to be killed. 
This illusion does not however necessarily preclude a court from fi nding that he 
wanted to kill the victims. He was mistaken on the identity of the victims, but not 
as to the fact that he was killing.357
Just like in England, the intoxication must have been powerful enough powerful 
enough to negate fault. The threshold of when it is accepted that fault is absent is 
even higher in the Netherlands. In practice, proof of intent is simply inferred 
objectively from the (violent) act, the proof of which can only be rebutted if the 
defendant makes probable he did not understand the nature of his actions and 
consequences at all.358 In a rare case, the Court of Appeal acquitted the defendant 
who had, when drunk, stolen a bicycle, because the Court did not think the ulterior 
intent of appropriation was proven.359
Because proof of intent does not require much, the substitution of fault by the 
prior act of intoxication is hardly ever necessary. Moreover, even if the intoxication 
did cross the threshold, a lenient test applies. If the defendant can be blamed for the 
lack of fault, for example, because he knew that he should not take alcohol in a 
combina tion with medicine, it is held he voluntary brought himself in that situation 
and dolus in causa is attributed to him.360 Finally, luxuria can be accepted upon 
352 Ormerod 2005, pp. 279–280 and Law Commission 1995, pp. 27–30.
353 Ormerod 2006, p. 198; Ormerod 2005, p. 278 and Law Commission 1995, p. 42.
354 Even the House of Lords admitted this, see DPP v. Majewski [1976] UKHL 2.
355 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 632 and Law Commission 1995, pp. 8–9.
356 Ashworth 2006, p. 213.
357 HR 9 December 2008, NJ 2009, 157.
358 HR 14 December 2004, NJ 2006, 448; de Hullu 2006, p. 218 and de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, 
p. 112.
359 HR 3 February 1959, NJ 1959, 111. In Rb. Amsterdam 9 June 2011, LJN:BQ7589, mentioned 
below, the Court also rejected the intentional offence and convicted for negligence.
360 In HR 11 October 2011, LJN:BR2983, the conviction was quashed because the Court failed to 
suffi  ciently motivate why it believed the defendant knew this.
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proof of intoxication, which resembles the approach in England to accept 
recklessness in these cases.361
This leaves open the possibility that intoxication can lead to a lack of 
blameworthiness. Similar as a mental disorder, the intoxication can be so severe 
that the defendant is no longer capable to make morally responsible decisions. The 
use of intoxicants can lead to hallucinations that qualify the defendant as insane. In 
this context, the doctrine of actio libera in causa explicitly applies. It precludes the 
defendant from relying on the defence which would have otherwise excused him.362 
The rationale for the precluding of the defence is based on the constructivist 
rationale that once the defendant has created a situation, the danger that is typical to 
follow from it, was foreseeable. Just like prior fault in England is grounded in the 
association of drunkenness with disorder and violence,363 in the Netherlands, 
people are held to know the possible consequences of using intoxicants, so they 
cannot rely on these effects to their advantage.364 The defendant can for example 
not claim that previous experience with intoxicants like cannabis did not cause any 
serious mental disorders.365
No subjective connection is required between intoxication and the reaction it 
would have on the defendant or offence committed. The criterion is simply whether 
the defendant can be blamed, allowing for a very pragmatic approach. In one case, a 
tourist had been indulging in the different narcotics available in Amsterdam, like 
alcohol, cannabis and MDMA. In an unexpected hallucination of blind panic, he 
jumped out of the window of his apartment on top of another tourist who was sitting 
on the terrace. The victim became paraplegic and will never walk again. The 
defendant was held to be legally insane at the time, but could not rely on the 
defence. It suffi ced to note that it is generally known that narcotics infl uence the 
state of mind, that effects can differ according to the person and that combined use 
is even more unpredictable. The court even held that it felt it was important to make 
clear that life threatening conduct, committed while intoxicated, will be punished 
with imprisonment.366
By contrast, the precluding of the defence cannot be grounded in cases where 
the previous conduct was not reprehensible. Consider cases where the defendant 
was unaware of the side-effects of medicines because they were not mentioned on 
the leafl et or by the doctor or by the effects of the combined use of them. Given 
these circumstances, he should have also not been aware.367 In this normative way, 
Dutch law also separates between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. In 
conclusion, the case of the tourist makes it abundantly clear that the Dutch approach 
361 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 484, no. 3, p. 7.
362 HR 14 December 2004, NJ 2006, 448 and HR 9 December 2008, NJ 2009, 157.
363 Simester 2008, pp. 7–9.
364 HR 9 June 1981, NJ 1983, 412 and Strijards 1987, pp. 78–81.
365 HR 12 February 2008, NJ 2008, 263.
366 Rb. Amsterdam 9 June 2011, LJN:BQ7589. See also Rozemond 2006, p. 75.
367 HR 21 September 1999, NJ 1999, 790 and HR 16 November 1965, NJ 1966, 404.
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to intoxication is highly restrictive and highly normative. Dogmatic arguments are 
raised to justify intentional liability, but when these arguments no longer suffi ce, 
pragmatic normative reasons are advanced just as easily to ground what is 
considered the most appropriate outcome.
3.5.3. German law
In Germany, there is most room for intoxication as a failure of proof defence. Due 
to its rigid subjectivist approach to mistakes, it is unquestioned that a mistake due 
to voluntary intoxication also negates intent.368 German courts are likely to accept 
or, important in practice, to give the defendant the benefi t of the doubt that he did 
not intend the result he brought about. In cases where the intoxicated defendant 
became violent upon provocation, this mental condition often operates in his favour, 
possibly negating the intent to kill. In the case where the defendant had killed the 
victim by hitting him several times on the head with a shovel, the Supreme Court 
upheld the mere conviction for negligent bodily harm occasioning death, pointing 
out that amongst other, the high level of alcohol in the defendant’s blood might 
militate against intention.369
Even the foreseeability required in negligent offences can be rejected due to 
intoxication.370 Many judgments therefore refl ect an approach to intoxication that is 
completely different from the other two Member States. The German Supreme 
Court approves of these decisions if all elements of intent are carefully considered 
in the light of the relevant circumstances, even when ‘a different outcome might 
appear to be a more accurate refl ection of reality’.371 Convictions are quashed if the 
decision does not clearly ground why intent is accepted despite intoxication.372
However, acquittals are also quashed if the decision does not clearly ground why 
intent is rejected. In some recent decisions, the Supreme Court is taking a less 
lenient approach towards intoxicated defendants. It quashed the negation of intent 
in two cases, because courts failed to clearly substantiate which element of 
eventualis was diminished by the intoxication and to what extent.373 The Supreme 
Court seems to have increased the threshold of when intent is affected and thereby 
brought its approach more in line with Dutch and English law. First of all, it 
acknowledged that only when the intoxication was very severe, is it possible that 
the defendant did not foresee the risk.374 Secondly, it recently acknowledged that 
intoxicants tend to lower inhibitions and therefore unlikely negate the volitional 
368 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 353.
369 15 April 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 233. See IV.3.6.4.
370 In 19 March 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1997, 296 the Supreme Court however quashed the acquittal, 
holding that the lethal risk was foreseeable to the defendant.
371 23 June 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 629.
372 22 April 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 503.
373 27 August 2009 BGH NStZ-RR 2009, 372 and 13 January 2010 BGH NStZ 2010, 276.
374 24 February 2010 BGH NStZ-RR 2010, 214.
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element of dolus eventualis.375 This implies that it no longer adheres to the contrary 
view that was adopted in the abovementioned case of the defendant who hit the 
victim on the head with a shovel.
Like in Dutch law, if the intoxicated defendant is considered to have acted 
intentionally or negligently, this leaves open the question whether he should be 
excused for killing. The normative approach of the Dutch to simply preclude the 
defence in case of voluntary intoxication is unacceptable in Germany. The capacity 
to be blamed, to be morally held responsible is laid down in the Criminal Code and 
requires contemporaneity: it must be present at the time of the commission of the 
offence.376 This brings about that the defendants who lacked the capacity to see the 
wrongfulness of their actions or to act in accordance with this appreciation tempore 
delicti are excused for their crime, however great the reproach is for the preceding 
intoxication.
Besides a full excuse, the sentence of the defendant who is less capable of 
understanding the wrongful nature of his actions can be mitigated as a form of 
‘diminished responsibility’.377 In respect of alcohol intoxication, it appears that in 
practice, the question of whether or not the excuse or mitigation applies is used to 
be assessed almost exclusively by the level of alcohol that is measured or estimated 
to have been in the blood of the defendant. In principle, a level of 3 will excuse and 
a level of 2 will mitigate.378 In more recent years, more factors are taken into 
account, such as alcohol habituation, physical condition, personality, the pertinent 
offence and situation.379
There is a tendency of the judiciary to restrict the excuse-friendly guidelines on 
alcohol percentage, especially for persons used to alcohol. In one case, even a 
possible blood alcohol level of 4.5 did not give rise to exculpation.380 Some 
practitioners argue that intoxicated perpetrators were fully capable of seeing the 
wrongfulness of their actions in order to reach a higher sentence.381 As far as 
violent alcohol induced offences are concerned, the defendant usually does not 
benefi t from the excuse. Research has shown that alcohol can be linked to violent 
offences but from a certain level of 2.9 on, this connection rapidly decreases. This 
implies that in practice, usually only the ground of mitigation applies to alcohol 
375 13 January 2010 BGH NStZ 2010, 276.
376 §20 of the German Criminal Code: “Schuldunfähigkeit.”
377 §21 of the German Criminal Code. In his translation, Bohlander 2009, p. 42 uses the term 
‘diminished responsibility’ for ‘verminderte Schuldfähigkeit’, which should not be confused 
with the partial defence to murder under English law, which is discussed in X.3.6.2.
378 Krey 2002, pp. 2–3 and Bohlander 2009, p. 134. In 22 November 1990 BGHSt 37, 231 the 
preference for relying on these levels is explained.
379 22 October 2004 BGH NStZ 2005, 329; 6 June 2002 BGH NStZ 2002, 532; Roxin 2006, pp. 
890–891; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 392–393 and Bohlander 2009, p. 134.
380 24 July 1997 BGH StV 1998, 258 (level of 3.79); Renzikowski 2000, p. 506 and Joecks & 
Miebach 2006, note 64 on §323a.
381 Fischer, B. & Rehm 1998, p. 99.
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induced violent offences. This facultative mitigation is not likely to follow when the 
intoxication was brought about blameworthy.382
Nonetheless, the application of the excuse is still wide, especially when 
considering that when the excuse cannot be ruled out, it applies in dubio pro reo.383 
As a compensation therefore, a special offence of ‘Rauschtat’ has been created that 
punishes with up to fi ve years of imprisonment the defendant who intentionally or 
negligently got intoxicated and committed a wrongful act, for which he cannot be 
punished due to the excuse.384 Conduct which in itself is innocent is punished. The 
committing of the unlawful act is strict; the actor only needs to have intent or 
negligence as to the intoxication.385 Clearly, the Rauschtat is hard to reconcile with 
German doctrine. As mentioned, strict liability was said to be out of the question in 
criminal law. Secondly, the offence enables the punishment of an excused and 
therefore blameless person. The offence is accepted as an inevitable product of the 
fundamental legal dilemma surrounding the capacity of the intoxicated offender, 
intended to express and uphold both the principles of mens rea as well as the value 
that harmful conduct should not go unpunished even when committed in a severely 
altered state of mind.386
Nevertheless, the maximum penalty of fi ve years imprisonment, has given rise 
to ongoing concern about letting offenders get off too easily. Just as in other legal 
systems, it is deemed unacceptable if the defendant, who at the time of intoxication 
intends or is negligent as to the commission of an act committed in a state of 
incapacity, could not be punished for an intentional or negligent offence.387 It has 
been proposed to increase the maximum sentence to the maximum for the wrongful 
act committed. It has also been suggested that intoxication as a temporary ‘disorder’ 
should not be excluded from the excuse, which after all, although not literally, deals 
with constitutional, continuous defi ciencies of the mind. However, no reform has 
ever been enacted.388
The most relevant proposal in this context is to ground liability on the doctrine 
of actio libera in causa. There are different perspectives on how far this doctrine 
should go that were already mentioned above. A narrow and least controversial 
perspective uses prior fault in scenarios where the actor intentionally got intoxicated 
382 27 March 2003 BGH NJW 2003, 2394; Renzikowski 2000, p. 500; Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 403 and 416–417; Beulke 2008, p. 143 and Fischer, B. & Rehm 1998, p. 97. See also §7 
of the Military Criminal Law Act (Wehrstrafgesetz).
383 18 August 1983 BGHSt 32, 48.
384 §323a of the German Criminal Code and 122 of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG). 
Compare Law Commission 1995, pp. 42–45.
385 Hettinger 1988, pp. 38–39; Senge 2006, notes 23–24 on §122 of the Administrative Offences Act 
(OWiG). The issue is controversial: some have argued that the defendant should have at least 
been able to foresee that he would commit such an unlawful act when intoxicated, see Joecks & 
Miebach 2006, notes 50–52 on §323a; Roxin 2006, pp. 1037–1039 and Kühl 2007, note 13 on 
§323a.
386 Fischer, B. & Rehm 1998, pp. 98–99. See also Fletcher 1978, p. 847–848 and 852.
387 Hirsch 1997. See also Renzikowski 2000, pp. 476–479 and Albrecht 1998, p. 87.
388 Renzikowski 2000, pp. 487–505; Hettinger 1998 pp. 444–449 and Roxin 2006, p. 922.
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in order to facilitate the planned offence. If the defendant became intoxicated with a 
view to gain courage or lose the aforementioned capacity, liability should still 
follow.389 At the other side of the continuum there are those who argue that prior 
fault applies when the offender cannot reasonably exclude the possibility of future 
offences at the time of intoxication, without even basing it on subjective indicators 
such as previous experience with becoming violent.390
The application of the actio libera in causa is hardly as controversial as its 
dogmatic grounding.391 It is either based on arguments that view the intoxication 
and the offence as one act, or viewed as an exception to the aforementioned 
requirement. For example, the causing of the defence can be seen as the beginning 
of the commission of the offence defi nition, the intentional setting in motion of a 
chain of events.392 In the end, it seems no rationale is satisfactory,393 but this does 
not prevent the German Supreme Court from applying it.394 If the actor’s intention 
was already aimed at the specifi c offence at the time of intoxication, he is convicted 
for the intentional offence and the excused rejected.395 The Rauschtat and the 
controversial application of the actio libera in causa refl ect very well that 
intoxication may not always lend itself for dogmatically consistent solutions. 
Realizing that normative considerations play an important role in every legal 
approach towards intoxicated defendants, it would be perhaps simpler to accept 
these rules as a legitimate exception to the principles of mens rea.
3.5.4. Synthesis
In the end, the solution that would be most appropriate for the EU, depends on the 
more general choices made as to how specifi c fault should be and whether defences 
can be limited or precluded by considerations of actio libera in causa. In the context 
of defences, the consensus is that they can be limited in the extreme cases where 
the intoxication was intentionally brought about in order to commit the offence in 
that state. The defendant is not allowed to rely on any excuse like insanity. In less 
extreme cases, it is submitted that an excuse can also be rejected. As will become 
clear in the next chapter, excuses are concerned with a normative judgment, taking 
389 Conditional intent as to the offence also suffi ced in 13 September 2001 BGH NStZ 2002, 28.
390 Fischer, B. & Rehm 1998, p. 97; von Heintschell-Heinegg 2009, notes 71–75 on §20; Hettinger 
1988, pp. 190–194 and Daly 1978, p. 391.
391 Roxin 2006, p. 914 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 403–404.
392 See 24 November 1967 BGHSt 21, 381. Beulke 2008, pp. 144–147 favours the exception model, 
which is rejected by Roxin 2006, p. 915.
393 22 August 1996 BGHSt 42, 235; Hettinger 1988, pp. 437–465 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 406.
394 19 February 1997 BGH NStZ 1997, 230 and 7 June 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 584. Beulke 2008, 
p. 146 submits however that the view that actio libera in causa should be rejected altogether is 
gaining ground.
395 4 May 1962 BGHSt 17, 259; 1 June 1962 BGHSt 17, 333; 24 November 1967 BGHSt 21, 381 and 
Beulke 2008, p. 146.
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all circumstances of the case and the defendant into consideration. A strict temporal 
focus on the time when the offence was committed is not in line with this normative 
character. When the defence is rejected, the lesser degree of blameworthiness can, 
but need not be taken into account in sentencing.
In this chapter, the question is how the actor, who could not form mens rea at the 
time he committed the offence because he was heavily intoxicated, can be held 
liable. First of all, whereas the voluntariness of the intoxication plays a role in 
defences and in sentencing, it is irrelevant in the context of a psychological concept 
of dolus. Secondly, it is reiterated that in result based offences of culpa, intoxication 
presents no problems of contemporaneity. In fact, culpa or luxuria can be grounded 
in the intoxication. This brings about that intoxication is relevant only to dolus and 
recklessness. In principle, all Member States acknowledge that intoxication can 
negate fault, but the situations in which this will actually be accepted differ 
considerably. It is submitted that the awareness and volitional aspects of fault should 
not be held to be negated by intoxication too easily. Whether the mistake was 
brought about by stupidity or intoxication, the defendant should be completely 
ignorant for the mistake to negate knowledge. After all, a drunken intent is also 
intent. Moreover, there are numerous ways to overcome the inexorable logic that a 
mistake negates fault. For example, mistakes on normative elements are hardly 
relevant. The fact that the drunken actor does not consider his exposure indecent 
does not affect his intent.396
Another method to attribute intention was discussed, namely the actio libera in 
causa. Intention or recklessness as to a crime is not negated when it was already 
present before the intoxication. This is even accepted in the German legal system 
and moreover, consistent with the principle of correspondence and the concept of 
dolus advocated here. Dolus is present in case of an intentional actio libera in 
causa, where the defendant got intoxicated in order to commit the crime. However, 
dolus should not be held present by a prior fault of recklessness or negligence. The 
foreseeability of committing an(y) offence whilst intoxicated does not suffi ce for 
the specifi c form of intent required in the actual offence. This approach, which was 
identifi ed in Dutch law, substitutes a standard of intent by one of negligence. If the 
prior fault as to the offence is one of recklessness, for example because the 
defendant knew he had a tendency for violent behaviour when drunk, he should be 
convicted for the reckless offence only. There is no reason to fear that defendants 
may get off too easily as usually, the intoxicated defendant still intended to hurt the 
victim and there is thus no need to resort to a mere offence of recklessness.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
All problems that have been raised in this chapter followed from the strict 
application of legal principles. Whereas it is accepted that fault should always be an 
396 See IV.2.4.8.
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element of the offence defi nition, instrumental reasons are deemed legitimate to 
override this requirement. Whereas it is accepted that mens rea and actus reus 
should coincide in time, it is often deemed inappropriate to negate intention when 
this relationship is lacking. The principles of correspondence are considered to be 
obstacles to reaching liability or a more serious form of criminal liability. As a 
consequence, attempts have been made to reformulate correspondence or make 
permissible exceptions to it. The underlying goal of this ‘rethinking’ is simple; to 
enable liability and ground this in legal principle.
This rethinking has been fuelled by two developments in the last century. First 
of all, criminal law has expanded from the classic mala in se, to an enormous array 
of regulatory offences. This context warranted a more relaxed application of the 
principles, based in necessity and grounded in its quasi-criminal character. For 
example, proof of fault appeared particular diffi cult here and penalties are of a less 
criminal character. Together with this growth, scholarly interest in criminal law has 
also signifi cantly increased. Without this interest, the problems of reconciling 
desired outcomes with the principles that generally apply would probably not have 
been positioned so sharp.
The most important conclusion is that the outcomes are more or less the same 
everywhere. The only difference concerns the legal reasoning underlying the 
outcome. This is a quite familiar conclusion in comparative legal research, which 
proves that the Member States of the European Union to a large extent share the 
same beliefs about mens rea in criminal law. The different approaches that are 
taken to ground the same outcomes refl ect a different way of legal thinking, but this 
does not differ so much that a general part of EU criminal law is impossible to 
identify.
The legal thinking that is common in Germany can be juxtaposed with that of 
the Dutch. In Germany, the principles of correspondence are taken very seriously. 
Criminal law is tried to be kept pure, and in order to facilitate this, regulatory forms 
of criminal conduct are outsourced into administrative law. Every possible legal 
problem receives intricate attention, leading to often complex legal reasoning to 
reconcile outcome with principle.397 The Dutch, by contrast, focus almost only on 
outcome. Pragmatic concerns simply outweigh any problems of legal theory. Many 
dogmatic problems are not clearly identifi ed, let alone legitimized. This may lead 
one to question whether a requirement of contemporaneity even applies in this legal 
system.398 The English approach to these issues is largely pragmatic as well, but 
since the nineteen sixties, there are many scholars who focus on the subjective 
requirements of criminal law. As a result, the dogmatic grounding of outcomes in 
principle has received more attention than in the Netherlands.
An additional reason that can explain the comparative lack of dogmatic attention 
in the Netherlands is that the concept of fault is quite broad. Intent must relate to an 
abstract result. What specifi c legal interest was harmed and in what way this was 
397 Stratenwerth in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 1072–1073.
398 It is hardly ever explicitly discussed as a general principle in Dutch textbooks on criminal law.
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brought about is irrelevant and thus already excludes many problems of 
correspondence. In contrast, German criminal law adheres to a more specifi c 
concept of intent. Amongst others, it requires that intent must relate to the causal 
chain of events in its essential features. I have explained that this leads to many 
problems of correspondence in the context of aberratio ictus and dolus generalis. 
In turn, these problems have given rise to complex solutions and strategies to avoid 
or mitigate the outcome dictated by principle. The overall picture of criminal 
liability becomes highly complicated and therefore hard to grasp. Such a situation is 
undesirable in a general part of criminal law that aims to be simple, foreseeable and 
enforceable. Therefore, dolus should be treated as generalis, and not relate to the 
specifi c identity of the victim of the modus quo.
The yardstick for assessing correspondence is the offence defi nition. Fault does 
not relate to more than the offence defi nition requires. In homicide, the identity of 
the victim is irrelevant, so the error in persona is irrelevant to intent. On the 
contrary, when the status of the victim, like a civil servant, is included in the 
offence defi nition, fault must relate to it as well, unless it has been made clear that 
the element is strict. Such offences are the exception that confi rms the rule of dolus 
generalis. Mistakes on legal aspects are usually irrelevant because the offence 
defi nition only rarely includes legal or normative aspects. If it does, fault only 
relates to the underlying circumstances. The defendant does not have to understand 
these elements like a lawyer would. Dolus is neutral.
This positivist criterion for assessing correspondence of what is included in the 
offence defi nition is not decisive. More normative factors have also been identifi ed. 
For example, fault should relate to the essential aspects of the offence, to those 
elements that give the offence its typical character. This brings about that the 
offence defi nition cannot be drafted in a way that makes the essential element strict. 
The essential character of an offence element can even determine the degree of fault 
and the scope of contemporaneity. Consider the appropriation in theft. In contrast to 
the labelling of this appropriation as wrongful, the defendant must have intended to 
appropriate for himself or someone else. Nothing less than dolus directus suffi ces 
as to the appropriation. Secondly, this intention must exist at the time he took the 
object, like a car, away. The actus reus of taking away cannot be stretched to create 
a moment of contemporaneity, when the defendant only later decides to appropriate 
the car instead of for example merely using it for a joyride.
The rules of correspondence ring hollow if they are sidelined by procedural 
means. If dolus needs to relate to all offence elements, but this is easily proven or 
the burden of proof is reversed, the position of the defendant is not much better than 
in strict liability. Other normative limitations can be derived from principles of 
criminali za tion. These limitations to what can be criminalized make sure that the 
special part is kept within appropriate limits. After all, to overcome or avoid 
problems of corres pondence, sometimes fallback offences are created that 
criminalize conduct that is in itself innocent. Examples are the carrying of objects, 
which can be used for a burglary and the German offence of intoxication. In 
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deciding whether to use criminal law or other measures, the Institutions and 
Member States should focus on these principles of criminalization.399
Some issues of correspondence nonetheless remain problematic. It is for example 
diffi cult to reconcile strict liability with the fault requirement. Cases of actio libera 
in causa also seem to present an insurmountable legal problem. The idea that the 
person who creates the conditions that preclude his liability should not be allowed 
to rely on this is strong. It is accepted in general that the intoxicated person should 
be held liable, the victim protected, but this liability apparently cannot be reconciled 
with contemporaneity. In cases like these, it is simpler and more straightforward to 
accept that liability is an exception to principle based on legitimate interests. This is 
to be preferred over fi ne-grained solutions that are too sophisticated to apply or 
principled yet unsatisfactory negations of liability, which in turn require special 
criminalization to punish the defendant.
399 See draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
deliberations, Brussels, 27 November 2009 16542/2/09 REV 2 and EP Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, draft report on harmonisation of criminal law in the EU of 
18 January 2012, no. 2010/2310.
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This part is structured as follows. First, I will demarcate the object of research by 
explaining that defences do not deny the offence charged. Instead, they negate one 
of the two implied elements of criminal liability: wrongfulness or blameworthiness. 
Furthermore, the defences discussed in this part are of general application, deal 
with a case on its merits and completely negate liability when they are accepted.
In comparative legal research, such a demarcation should never be too strict. 
The apparent unavailability of a particular defence in a legal system requires an 
investigation into legal concepts or doctrines that fulfi l an equal or similar function. 
For instance, the English defence of loss of control diminishes the charge to a lesser 
offence and thereby partially fi lls the gap left by the unavailability of a defence like 
self-defence-excess. Although loss of control does not negate liability and therefore 
does not qualify as a complete defence in this research, it will be assessed, for it 
fulfi ls a similar function.
In chapter VII, defences will be demarcated from what can be called the offence 
part of criminal liability. Defences are not a rebuttal of the offence charged: they 
affi rm that the offence defi nition has been fulfi lled, but raise circumstances that the 
offence should nevertheless be justifi ed or the defendant excused. In some cases, 
raising a defence simply implies the charge is denied, no different than when the 
defendant argues he did not intend to kill the victim. I will solve this apparent 
inconsistency by identifying normative criteria to categorize elements within the 
offence and defence part of criminal liability. In this way, an even clearer picture 
will emerge of what defences are.
The distinction between justifi cations and excuses is paramount or at least well-
known in all legal systems under investigation. This distinction will be put under 
close scrutiny. It will be argued that even if the implications of the distinction are 
rejected, such as the assumption that all participants in justifi ed conduct are 
justifi ed, there are still good reasons to make the distinction. Accordingly, the 
discussion of specifi c defences will be structured along the lines of justifi cations 
and excuses. This means that the rationale of justifi cations and the element of 
wrongfulness it negates will be explained, after which self-defence, necessity and 
so on will be discussed. The chapters on excuses will also start with a general 
discussion on its rationale and its mirror image of blameworthiness, before going 
into the specifi c excuses.
Perhaps needless to say, is that the results of the research are presented again in 
a manner that emphasizes what defences should look like in EU criminal law. The 
common ground of the investigated legal systems is taken as a starting point, and 
only national differences and controversial issues are explicitly addressed. Choices 
in favour of approaches are then made by reference to the criteria mentioned in 
chapter II.
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WHAT ARE DEFENCES?
There are many defences in criminal law, but only one specifi c category is discussed 
here. A defendant can argue he did not commit the offence; that it has happened too 
long ago; that evidence was obtained unlawfully or that an offence element should 
be interpreted more restrictively. All of these claims are not considered to be defen-
ces in the meaning of this research. In this book, a defence is a claim that does not 
deny the charge or the validity of the legal proceedings, but argues that the funda -
men tal requirements for criminal liability of wrongfulness and/or blame worthiness 
are absent.1 Several distinctions can be made to demarcate defences from other 
claims.
1. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENCES
First and foremost, a failure of proof defence can be distinguished from an affi rma-
tive defence. Only the latter defences are properly labelled defences. A failure of 
proof defence seeks to negate the offence charged. The defendant argues, for exam-
ple, that he had an alibi or that he did not intend to cause a result.2 In contrast, by 
raising an affi rmative defence one does not deny that an offence has been 
committed. Instead, the defendant aims to present additional reasons why, all things 
conside red, this offence should not lead to criminal liability. For example, accepting 
self-defence does not negate that the aggressor was intentionally killed. It does 
however reject that the conduct was wrongful in the circumstances. Self-defence 
affi rms the charge, yet negates criminal liability.
It can be argued that a denial of a fault element, when compared with an alibi, is 
also partially an affi rmative defence. The defendant who rejects that he intended to 
kill someone, at least concedes that he killed that person. He argued ‘I did it, but I 
did not do it on purpose’. Affi rmative defences however, do not militate against the 
charge at all. A plea does not only become a failure of proof defence when it com-
ple tely negates all elements of the charge, but also when it only rejects one element 
of the charge. This can be the conduct, the causal requirement, the fault element and 
so on.
A defence relates to the framework of criminal liability, because it denies its 
second or third tier, namely that the conduct was wrongful or the defendant 
blameworthy. The raising of an alibi or the denial of fault relates to the fi rst tier of 
the framework, because it refutes that the offence defi nition is fulfi lled. Defences 
are rejections of the second and third tier of criminal liability, consisting of the 
1 See Strijards 1987, p. 18 and Ormerod 2008, p. 269.
2 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 19 and Leverick 2006, p. 22.
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so-called implied elements of wrongfulness and blameworthiness. Without 
wrongful conduct and a blame worthy actor, there can be no criminal liability. The 
dichotomy coincides with the dichotomy of defences, that of justifi cations and 
excuses. As will be explained later in detail, wrongfulness is negated by 
justifi cations, blameworthiness by excuses.
However, if we consider that some offences include the elements of wrongfulness 
and blameworthiness, the distinction between failure of proof and affi rmative 
defence is put under pressure. In these cases, a defence normally considered to be 
affi rmative operates as a failure of proof defence. For example, self-defence is 
considered to be an affi rmative defence, yet if the defendant is charged with an 
offence that includes wrongfulness, raising self-defence implies a rejection of the 
charge, just like denying intention or raising an alibi. In that context, self-defence 
therefore seems to be a failure of proof rather than a defence that affi rms the charge.
Nevertheless, it will be explained later, that although such a formal perspective 
on defences undermines the basic distinction, the distinction is still valid and 
useful. Decisive for the classifi cation and demarcation of defences in this research is 
its effect of negating wrongfulness or blameworthiness. Sometimes wrongfulness 
and blame worthiness are already included in the fi rst tier of criminal liability. The 
circumstance that self-defence denies the charge does not mean it should be treated 
like a failure of proof defence. In some cases, it does, but this does not alter the 
general classifi cation of self-defence as an affi rmative defence. The problem will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.
2. GENERAL DEFENCES
This research only deals with defences of general application. Many defences 
formulate an exception to a specifi c criminal offence and are therefore often 
included in a subsection of the pertinent offence. These ‘statutory’ defences will not 
be considered in this book, unless this is necessary for a comprehensive legal 
comparison. They do not qualify as general defences of criminal law and therefore 
have not right of existence in a general part of criminal law for the EU. For these 
reasons, a defence based on the parental right of chastisement is excluded too. Even 
if a defendant this defence is still available in this day and age, it can only be raised 
against a charge of infl icting bodily injury.3
The term general should not be misunderstood to mean that the defence must be 
able to apply to each and every single offence. First of all, there are combinations of 
defences and offences that are hardly imaginable, like self-defence in relation to 
fraud. If a general part of European criminal law would only apply to offences of a 
3 The general trend is to make such a defence unavailable, outlawing all forms of corporal 
punishment of children, see section 58 of the Children Act 2004; article 1:264 of the Dutch Civil 
Code and §1631(2) of the German Civil Code. Nevertheless, there is much support for the view 
that light forms of chastisement can be disqualifi ed as injury.
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regulatory nature, self-defence would not need to be included. It would also be 
unlikely that insanity and duress would ever be relevant. Against regulatory offen-
ces, a defendant is most likely to raise a mistake of law, a necessity type defence or 
a plea of due diligence.
Secondly, the application of some general defences has been restricted. For 
example, duress in England cannot be raised against a charge of murder. The 
terminology that will be used in this regard is that the defence of duress is 
‘inapplicable’ or ‘unavailable’ to a charge of murder in England. In contrast, duress 
is ‘applicable’ to murder in the Netherlands, which means that it can be ‘accepted’ 
or ‘rejected’ after assessing on the merits of the particular case.4 If duress applies to 
murder, but the defendant is not allowed to rely on it because of his special position 
in law or because he can be reproached for bringing about the situation of duress, it 
will be argued the defence is ‘precluded’.
The concept of general defences is common on the continent, but less so in 
England. This is related to the aforementioned unfamiliarity and scepticism to a 
general part of criminal law in England. The recognition of general defences is 
diffi cult for a legal culture that focuses on the specifi c. Moreover, the recognition of 
affi rmative defences depends on the distinction between offence on the one hand 
and wrongfulness and blameworthiness on the other. Whereas wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness are now recognized by prevailing opinion in England, they are 
still not as self-evident as in legal systems on the other side of the Channel.
3. SUBSTANTIVE DEFENCES
By limiting the scope of this research to substantive defences, defences based on 
juris diction, statute of limitations, immunities, entrapment and so on are excluded. 
A defence must relate to the merits of a case. These defences relate to the precluding 
of criminal proceedings, not the assessment of criminal liability. The drafters of the 
Rome Statute therefore used the term ‘grounds excluding criminal liability’.5 The 
fact that a head of state may not be prosecuted does not mean he did not commit an 
offence.6 These defences fall outside the realm of the framework of criminal 
liability. They do not relate to the offence, wrongfulness or blameworthiness.7
Infancy can therefore also be excluded from the scope of defences of this book. 
It is assessed only in relation to the abstract age of the defendant at the time of the 
offence. Similar defences, like insanity, can also be argued to relate to something 
more fundamental than offence, wrongfulness or blameworthiness. Nevertheless, it 
requires an assessment as to the effect of the mental disorder on the offence and the 
offender, which makes it a defence that is judged on the merits of the case.
4 I can also contrast a rejection a priori and in abstracto with a rejection in concreto.
5 Ambos 1999, p.2 and Ambos 2006, p. 661.
6 Knigge in Remmelink 1987, pp. 291–293; Strijards 1987, p. 20–32; Duff 2007, pp. 179–191 and 
Beulke 2008, pp. 51 and 176.
7 Bohlander 2009, pp. 17 and 146.
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A plea to the fundamental freedoms of Union law, like free movement of goods 
and service, neither is a defence in this meaning. Just like the argument that a 
criminali zation violates a human or constitutional right, it is a plea of non-
compatibility with higher-ranking law. Moreover, when accepted, that claim sets 
aside the norm as such, rather than its mere application to a specifi c case. For 
example, the automatic expulsion of EU citizens after a criminal conviction is 
incompatible with article 33 of Directive 2004/38 on free movement. In relation to 
these EU citizens, offences that criminalize the being found on a territory whilst 
having been declared an undesirable alien, like article 197 of the Dutch criminal 
code, should be set aside. The EU citizen is neither acquitted because he is justifi ed 
for committing the offence, nor because he is excused, but because the norm must 
be set aside under the principle of supremacy of Union law.8
Because some defences not relate to wrongfulness or blameworthiness, it has 
been argued in Germany and the Netherlands that a fourth tier should be added to 
the framework of criminal liability, dealing with the worthiness and/or need to 
punish. This fourth element should explain why defendants were not punished or 
not even prosecuted, despite the fact that they fulfi lled all elements of criminal 
liability.9 The withdrawal from attempts and the exclusion of punishment for the 
person who obstructs the punishment of a relative have also been placed in this 
context.10 Such a fourth element has however never been accepted by the judiciary 
or prevailing opinion in the two States. There was no practical need to acknowledge 
this, as the possibilities not to punish or prosecute are already covered by law.11 In 
addition, it is argued that a fourth element does not deal with the conditions of 
criminal liability, but with conditions of punishment.12
Nevertheless, in EU law, a ‘defence’ of de minimis non curat praetor has 
generally been accepted. If the harm caused by the offender is minimal, he will not 
be prosecuted or punished. The Commission will not take action in situations where 
the competition was not appreciably restricted or trade not appreciably affected.13 
In concentration control, a ‘SIEC’-test is applied too: only mergers that ‘signifi cantly 
impede effective competition’ are declared incompatible with the internal market 
and are prohibited.14 Given the OLAF’s limited resources, the Offi ce also selects 
8 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
9 Vrij (reprint of 1947) in Buruma 1999 and Roxin 2006, pp. 1041–1050. See also Knigge 1993, 
pp. 36–37; Kelk 2005, pp. 32–34 and 146–147 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 155. 
Similarly, ‘pure’ defences are said to preclude punishment although wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness are not negated, see de Hullu 2006, pp. 293–294 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 
223–225.
10 Roxin 2006, pp. 1041–1042 and §258(6) of the German Criminal Code.
11 Knigge in Remmelink 1987, p. 299; Kelk 2005, p. 301 and de Hullu 2006, p. 361.
12 Knigge 1993, p. 41 and Kelk 2005, pp. 32–34 and 146–147.
13 25 November 1971, Case C-22/71, Béguelin [1971] ECR 949. It should be noted that actions are 
sometimes taken without the actual restriction of competition. Any threat to competition may 
suffi ce.
14 Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
OJ 2004 L 24/1. State-aid in article 107 TFEU is another example.
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which cases it will investigate. The extent as to which the EU budget has likely 
been affected is an important factor in this policy decision.15 Finally, Member 
States should apply a proportionality check to prevent European Arrest Warrants 
from being issued for offences which, although they qualify for surrender, are not 
serious enough to justify the measures which an execution of such a warrant 
requires.16
At the same time, the above-mentioned makes clear that de minimis does not 
qualify as a defence. It does not relate to the elements of criminal liability and it 
merely has the procedural consequence that either no legal action is taken against 
the offender or that he is not punished. In national law too, the principle is only 
relevant in sentencing and the decision to prosecute.17 It generally does not affect 
criminal liability, save for the cases, where a de minimis infringement of an interest 
is interpreted as not fulfi lling the pertinent offence element.18 For example, the 
German Criminal Code excludes from the scope of sexual offences, sexual acts that 
are of insuffi cient relevance to the respective legal interest protected.19 Such 
defences relate to the interpretation of the offence and are therefore not affi rmative. 
Some Union legal instruments also allow Member States to exclude trifl e cases 
from criminalization. For example, Framework Decision 2004/757 allows Member 
States to stipulate that the personal consumption of small quantities of drugs falls 
outside the scope of that Framework Decision.20
4. COMPLETE DEFENCES
The defences discussed in this book aim to completely negate criminal liability. As 
a consequence of this complete negation, the defendant cannot be punished. As will 
be explained, the defendant who is held insane can still be institutionalized in a 
mental hospital, but he cannot be punished. In contrast to complete defences, 
so-called partial defences only reduce criminal liability to a lesser offence. Partial 
defences are common in the English legal system. For example, acceptance of the 
aforementioned partial defence of loss of control reduces a charge of murder to the 
15 This is laid down explicitly in article 5(1) of the Amended Proposal for a Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-fraud 
Offi ce (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EURATOM) No 1074/1999, 17 March 2011, 
COM(2011) 135.
16 Report of the Commission on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States, 11 April 2011, COM(2011) 175, pp. 7–8.
17 German Prosecutors are not always obligated to prosecute, see §§153 and 153a of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.
18 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 178 and Horder 2001, pp. 25–30.
19 §184(1) of the German Criminal Code. See also §§247 and 248 of that Code.
20 Article 2(2) of Framework Decision 2004/757 of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the fi eld of illicit drug 
traffi cking, OJ 2004 L 335/8.
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lesser offence of manslaughter. Although these partial defences are not considered 
proper defences, some of them will nevertheless be discussed in order to make the 
legal comparison between the Member States comprehensive. Loss of control, for 
example, partially fi lls the gap created due to the unavailability of self-defence-
excess in English law.
Criminal liability should be separated from punishment. Punishment 
presupposes criminal liability, but criminal liability does not necessitate 
punishment. In other words, criminal liability enables, but not necessarily brings 
about punishment. For example, the defendant can be convicted, yet not punished.21 
The convicted person may be happy that he is not imprisoned or fi ned, but the 
conviction already stigmatizes him. The establishment of criminal liability 
communicates to that person and the public that he is a criminal. In any general 
part of criminal law, rules on sentencing are therefore distinguished from rules on 
criminal liability.
This distinction and the concept of affi rmative, complete defences are not self-
evident from a historical perspective. Self-defence already existed long before the 
recognition of the concept, but was generally treated in the context of pardoning the 
intentional killing, rather than negating criminal liability altogether. The insight 
that a defence negates wrongfulness or blameworthiness, elements essential to 
criminal liability, was not developed until the end of the 19th century.22
5. CONCLUSION
From the demarcation of this part of the research, it has become clear that defences 
are affi rmative to the charge, can apply in theory to all offences, relate to the wrong-
ful ness of the actor or blameworthiness of the act, and when accepted therefore 
completely negate criminal liability. Accepting a defence means that whereas the 
actor has apparently satisfi ed all elements of the offence charged, there are reasons, 
all things considered, lying within the nature of the conduct or the personal 
circumstances of the actor, not to hold him criminally liable.
Defences exist because the legal order only punishes conduct that is, all things 
considered, wrongful and only those defendants that are blameworthy. The availa-
bility of defences is essential to ensure this. Usually, the offence is wrongful and the 
offender blameworthy, so this is assumed with the fulfi lment of the offence 
defi nition. This explains that the principles of wrongfulness and blameworthiness 
can be safeguarded by the creation of general principles. By treating defences as 
general legal principles, the legislator does not have to include this possibility into 
every criminalization. In addition, general defences facilitate the certainty and fore-
21 Article 9a of the Dutch Criminal Code and section 12 of the English Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000.
22 Vrolijk 2004, p. 193–196 and Witteman 1997, pp. 216–218.
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see ability of criminal liability. They increase the consistency of the law and enable 
the development of theory.
The creation of general rules on defences is however not only convenient. The 
recognition of wrongfulness and blameworthiness as general elements of criminal 
liability through general defences guarantees its non-derogatory normative status in 
law. There can be no liability, hence no punishment, without a wrongful act 
committed by a blameworthy actor. Defences distinguish these two elements of 
criminal liability as something, which the legislator cannot simply circumvent, as 
something more fundamental than an offence defi nition or statutory defence. 
Regardless of the manner in which the legislator has drafted an offence, a defence 
will always negate liability based on the fundamental principles of wrongfulness 
and blameworthiness.
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CHAPTER VII
OFFENCES AND DEFENCES
After demarcating and defi ning ‘defences’, the subject is investigated by contrasting 
it with the offence defi nition, which is the mirror image of defences in many ways. 
In the framework of criminal liability, as introduced in the beginning of the 
previous chapter, the offence defi nition was distinguished as the fi rst tier of criminal 
liability. Defences cover the second and third tier of that framework. When the 
offence defi nition has been fulfi lled, it is assumed that the act is wrongful and the 
actor blameworthy, the assumption only to be negated by the acceptance of a 
defence. In other words, offences inculpate, whereas defences exculpate. The 
offence part of criminal liability is paradigm, whereas defences provide for the 
exception. The offence defi nes the specifi c conditions of criminal liability, whereas 
defences refer to the general requirements for criminal liability, which are 
wrongfulness and blameworthiness.
In this chapter, the legal differences between offence and defence will be 
discussed. There exist some general rules on dealing with inculpating aspects of 
liability that do not, or at least apply differently, to the exculpating aspects of 
criminal liability. First, it will be argued that the principle of legality applies in a 
different way regarding defences. Second, whereas the Prosecutor must prove all 
elements of the offence, the defendant has to raise a defence if he wants to rely on it. 
Third, the acceptance of a defence is refl ected in Dutch judgments to separate this 
special acquittal from the ‘normal’ case where the offence could not be proven.
Fourth, in order to rely on a defence and escape liability, the defendant must at 
least be aware of the circumstances that ground this defence, such as the fact that he 
was being attacked in self-defence. If the absence of the defence is part of the 
offence however, it is implied this is not required. Finally, the rules on mistake 
differ in relation to defences. I already mentioned that an honest mistake on the 
offence defi nition can negate intention, and if reasonable also negligence. A mistake 
on the facts that, if correct, would give rise to a defence, however only excuses the 
defendant and only if it was reasonable.
These differences bring about that the categorization of offence and defence has 
important legal consequences. It is therefore problematic that although the 
dichotomy is widely accepted in all Member States, controversy remains. First of 
all, some offences include the absence of defences into their defi nition. Most clearly, 
this is done by including in the offence “without lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse”.1 Secondly, it has already been explained that reckless and negligent 
offences imply the absence of justifi cations. When these offences are charged, 
raising a defence amounts to a denial of the offence. The defendant does not argue 
1 Sections 7(1), 7(2), 8(2) and 8 (3) of the English Animal Welfare Act 2006; section 4(1) of the 
English Aviation Security Act 1982 and section 2(1) of the English Child Abduction Act 1984.
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he should be justifi ed or excused. Instead, he formally argues he did not commit the 
offence defi nition: the affi rmative defence becomes a failure of proof defence. This 
raises questions regarding the aforementioned ramifi cations of the categorization. If 
the defence operates as a denial of the charge, should a mistake on self-defence 
negate intention? Should the prosecutor prove the absence of self-defence? Must the 
defendant no longer be aware of the justifying circumstances?
Accordingly, it is disputed whether a principled distinction can be made between 
elements that belong to one or the other category. Some authors deny this, arguing 
that the distinction between offence and defence depends on accidents of legislative 
drafting or judicial whim.2 It will be argued however, that there can be good reasons 
to include the absence of a defence into an offence defi nition. If, for example, the 
absence of consent is what gives the offence is essential character, like in rape, it 
should be included into the offence defi nition. This criterion for what should be 
included into the offence defi nition was already introduced in the last chapter, 
where I argued that elements essential to the offence in question may never be made 
strict. Essential are all those elements that give the offence its typical character and 
that separate it from other offences. The scope of the category of defences can be 
deduced a contrario.
This perspective enables one to retain the paramount distinction between 
offence and defence. It provides for a solution to the abovementioned questions on 
the rami fi  ca tions of the distinction. It will be argued that if the absence of a defence 
is included into the offence defi nition because it is essential to it, the defence should 
be treated as a failure of proof defence. If the absence of a defence is included in the 
offence defi nition for other reasons, it should be treated as an affi rmative defence. 
The fact that the defence formally operates as a denial of the charge, as a failure of 
proof defence, does not change the general rules on defences mentioned above, such 
as that the defendant must have acted in awareness of the circumstances that gave 
rise to it.
1. LEGALITY
I will now fi rst discuss in more detail the ramifi cations of pigeonholing elements as 
an offence or defence element, starting with the principle of legality. This principle 
encompasses several rules governing the interpretation and application of offence 
defi nitions. The principle aims to safeguard the position of the defendant vis-à-vis 
the state. It traditionally emphasizes that his position may not be deteriorated by 
ambiguity in law or by extensive interpretation of offence elements. Therefore, 
retroactive application of offences is only allowed, as long as it benefi ts the 
2 See Williams 1982; Gardner 2004, pp. 817–819; Sangero 2006, p. 28 and Simester & Sullivan 
2007, p. 607.
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defendant.3 Extensive interpretation is also only allowed as long as it benefi ts the 
defendant. The question discussed here is whether these rules should also apply to 
defences.
1.1. Limiting defences
An infl uential perspective is that the rationale of legality also applies to defences. 
From that perspective, the judicial creation and extension of defences is unproble-
matic: this limits, rather than extends the scope of liability.4 It also follows that 
existing defences cannot be abolished or restricted ex post facto, because this would 
retroactive aggravate criminal liability and thus deteriorate the position of the 
defendant.5 Nevertheless, there are other considerations relevant here. Just like 
some conditions of defences have been applied more leniently over the years,6 
others have been applied stricter.7
Moreover, retroactive penalisation has been accepted when it concerns 
manifestly illegal acts. Consider that preceding the unifi cation of Germany, border 
guards who had been ordered to shoot GDR citizens trying to fl ee the communist 
regime, were justifi ed under (at least the practice of) the law. Nonetheless, after the 
unifi cation of Germany, they were held criminally liable because it was patently 
clear that they committed serious crimes.8 Concerns of retroactive penalisation 
were outweighed by the manifest illegality of the shooting of unarmed civilians. As 
laid down in article 7(2) ECtHR and 49(2) CFR, the limitation to the rule of non-
retroactivity applies to both offence and defence. When conduct is considered to be 
‘criminal according to the general law recognized by civilised nations’, a defence 
that existed at the time the offence was committed may be withheld, just like an 
offence defi nition that did not exist at that time may be applied. Accordingly, the 
German Supreme and Constitutional Courts held that the pertinent justifi cation was 
clearly in violation with higher (international) law.9
In Anglo-American law, a distinction is made between so-called ‘conduct’ and 
‘decision rules’. The principles of legality do not apply to defences because defences 
are not part of the guiding message of criminal law and are solely designed to direct 
court rulings. This would imply defences can be retroactively abolished. However, 
3 This principle of lex mitior is recognized as a general principle of criminal law by the ECJ, see 
1 June 1999, Case C-319/97, criminal proceedings against A. Kortas [1999] ECR I-3143.
4 De Hullu 2006, p. 85; Kelk 2005, pp. 123–124 and Bohlander 2009, p. 81.
5 Schünemann 1985, pp. 367–368.
6 For example, in the Dutch and English concepts of self-defence, prior fault is now less likely to 
preclude the defence, see IX.3.4.5.
7 For example, the German Courts have applied the condition of proportionality stricter over the 
years, see Fletcher 1978, pp. 573–574 and IX.3.5.
8 Bohlander 2009, pp. 81–82 and 120.
9 3 November 1992 BGHSt 39, 1; 25 March 1993 BGHSt 39, 168; 20 March 1995 BGHSt 41, 101 
and 24 October 1996 BVerfGE 95, 96. These convictions were approved by the ECtHR, see 
K.-H. W. v. Germany, appl. no. 37201/97, 22 March 2001.
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more often, a more precise distinction is made, whereby only excuses are excluded 
from the protecting scope of legality. It is argued that excuses are not intended to 
direct an individual’s behaviour. They contain only a decision rule for the judge. 
Justifi cations, in contrast, do constitute guiding norms or conduct rules for legal 
subjects. The principle of legality thus applies to the offence defi nition and 
justifi cations, but not to excuses.10 This categorization is criticized. It is hard to 
reconcile the impulsive nature of excuses with a situation where an actor plans his 
behaviour in line with case-law on excuses.11 Nevertheless, a person under duress 
can also make well-considered decisions.12 For example, the person who is coerced 
to rob a bank under threat of serious injury may very well trust he can later rely on 
the excuse of duress. The distinction thus does not appear useful in this regard.
1.2. Extending and creating defences
It is settled that courts can no longer create new offences, but whether courts can 
create defences remains an open question. In one approach, courts may create 
defences because this benefi ts the defendant.13 Moreover, by creating a defence, the 
court can prevent that blameless persons are convicted. For example, the Dutch 
Supreme Court created the excuse of lack of all blame to ensure that the blameless 
defendant could be acquitted. They felt obligated to do so, because without the 
excuse, the defendant would be convicted. This would violate the principle of guilt, 
the cardinal rule of criminal law hat no one may be punished without being held 
blameworthy. A conviction of a blameless person would diminish the public’s 
respect for the law. If no excuse had been created, offi cials would have had to bend 
the rules in order to acquit the defendant.14
The contrasting approach is to preclude courts from creating offences. First of 
all, third parties affected by the defendant’s conduct also need to be protected by a 
clear and foreseeable scope of criminal liability.15 Furthermore, it is argued that the 
state of defences has reached a state of maturity and consolidation. Consider that 
the Dutch Supreme Court created the abovementioned defence in 1916. Since it 
functions as a safety-net to acquit blameless defendants, it is highly unlikely that it 
will be necessary to create an excuse again.
10 Ashworth 2006, p. 72, 97 and 136; Alldridge 1990; Sangero 2006, pp. 23–25; Robinson 1990 and 
Fletcher 1998, pp. 87–88. See also German scholar Hruschka in Byrd & Hruschka 2007, p. 323.
11 Ormerod 2005, p. 248, Fletcher 1978, p. 811–812, Fletcher 1985, p. 971 and Alldridge 1990, pp. 
499–501.
12 Duff in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 74. See also Horder in Shute & Sullivan 2002, pp. 284–286 
and Horder 2006A, pp. 26 and 107.
13 Sangero 2006, p. 24 and Fletcher 2007, p. 146.
14 See Horder 2006A, p. 19.
15 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 589 and Roxin 2004, p. 178.
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Given that state of maturity, it is believed that the stability of social norms and 
the separation of state powers militate against a further judicial activity.16 This 
approach is clearly visible in England, where the legislator tends to be seen as the 
supreme authority and the court as devoid of authority.17 If situations fall under the 
scope of criminalization and no defence has been created by statute, English courts 
are inclined to hold the defendant liable, submitting that it is up to Parliament to 
change the law. In discussing the specifi c defences, it will be illustrated that English 
courts avoid the extension, let alone creation of defences, because of respect for the 
legislator’s authority and secondly, because of fear that such recognition would 
undermine the importance of the protection of legal interests and the authority of 
legal norms.18
This strict approach is somewhat mitigated. First of all, I already described how 
unlegislated excuses have been applied as denials of mens rea. By enriching 
concepts like intention with elements of blameworthiness, English courts were able 
to acquit the defendant who could not rely on a specifi c defence, but should not be 
held criminally liable because he was not blameworthy. However, this approach has 
correctly been criticized and has become much less popular.19 Secondly, there is 
some authority for the judicial creation of defences. In the case of Kingston, Lord 
Mustill recognized the ability of courts to develop new defences. He argued that if 
the judicial creation of defences is the proper medium to adapt the criminal law to 
the needs of modern times, the courts should not be deterred by the novelty of it.20
In contrast, the Dutch and German courts consider themselves less restrained to 
alter the scope of criminal liability by modifying or creating defences. It is generally 
accepted in Germany and the Netherlands that courts may create defences.21 From 
this perspective, a common law system should therefore not be understood as 
implying great lawmaking power of courts. In fact, generally, the competence of 
the courts to determine the scope of criminal liability is limited severely by the 
creation of elaborate offence defi nitions and defences, in which all possible 
situations are dealt with comprehensively. In part, this seems the result of a struggle 
between the legislator and courts, in which the former uses its relatively new 
competences quite extensively in an over reactive effort to compensate the 
traditional powers of the latter.
The Dutch courts created two extra-legal defences in order to make sure that the 
defendant is not punished unless he has committed a wrongful act and has been 
16 See Kelk 2005, p. 249; Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 223 and Sangero 2006, p. 24.
17 Fletcher 1978, p. 569.
18 This will be made clear in the context of discussing necessity, self-defence-excess and duress.
19 See Fletcher 1975, p. 316 and IV.2.4.1.
20 R. v. Kingston [1994] UKHL 9 and Ormerod 2005, p. 324. The case dealt with the question 
whether involuntary intoxication could be a complete defence. In any event, the defendant did 
not meet the conditions of this possible defence. Ashworth 2006, p. 72 argues that the approach 
of English courts is inconsistent; one time they create a new defence, other times they deem it a 
task for the legislator.
21 24 October 1996 BVerfGE 95, 96; Fletcher 2007, p. 146 and de Hullu 2006, p. 85.
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held to be blameworthy.22 Therefore, the reluctant approach of English courts can 
also be explained by the fact that although wrongfulness and blameworthiness are 
increasingly acknowledged as implied elements of criminal liability, this is still not 
always the case.23 Only if these elements are recognized as fundamental elements 
of criminal liability, will courts see it as their duty to ensure them, if necessary by 
creating a defence. Since blameworthiness follows from the principle of guilt, as 
enshrined in article 6 ECHR, English courts could increase their competence to 
create defences by relying on their power to interpret domestic law in conformity 
with the ECHR.24
1.3. Guidelines
It is submitted that the principle of legality should apply to criminal liability, 
irrespective of whether something is part of the offence or defence. After all, 
general principles of criminal law determine the scope of criminal liability, just like 
offences. By giving a defence a new, stricter, interpretation, the de facto result is an 
increase of the scope of criminal liability. The decision to restrict the scope of 
offences by adding offence elements or through the raising of general defences can 
sometimes be a mere technical issue.25 The focus should therefore not be on a 
distinction of offence or defence, justifi cation or excuse, conduct or decision rules, 
but on the scope of criminal liability.
The abolition or creation of a defence occurs only in extreme circumstances. 
The abolition of a defence is only allowed when it would otherwise leave manifestly 
criminal conduct unpunished. The creation of a defence is only appropriate if this is 
necessary to ensure lawful conduct and blameless defendants are not punished. In 
practice more important are therefore the judiciary’s possibilities to extend and 
limit defences.
Whether this scope of liability may be limited or extended can be assessed in 
concreto by applying some guidelines.26 First, when extending or limiting a 
defence, it must remain true to its essential character.27 This means for example, 
that self-defence may not be limited by requiring strict proportionality between the 
offence and the danger sought to avert. If this would be the case, the woman who is 
about to be raped would not be justifi ed in using lethal force. Conversely, self-
defence should also not be extended to encompass the use of force against attacks 
22 Absence of all blameworthiness is discussed in IV.6.5. and V.2.3., lack of material wrongfulness 
in IX.4.6.
23 Section Compare Fletcher 1978, pp. 569, 573 and 747.
24 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. See Horder 2006A, p. 37.
25 3 November 1992 BGHSt 39, 1; 22 August 1996 BGHSt 42, 235 and de Hullu 2006, p. 85. See 
§103(2) of the German Constitution.
26 Most of the following guidelines can be found explicitly in Re C. (A minor) [1995] UKHL 15 
and Horder 2006A, pp. 16–17.
27 See Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 589 and Horder 2006A, p. 17.
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that have long ended, because this would blur the line with revenge. This guideline 
explains why the scope of defences has remained very consistent in the last decades.
Second, the legislator’s purpose is decisive. Judicial action can be warranted if 
the legislator explicitly left a matter to the courts to interpret. For example, the 
Dutch and German legislator used short and open defi nitions of defences so that the 
courts and academics could interpret and develop them. By contrast, conscious 
inactivity of the legislator should usually lead to the conclusion that the courts 
cannot intervene. If the given situation has not been excluded from the scope of 
criminalization, the presumption is that the legislator saw no room for defences, 
which the court has to respect.28
Finally, the court must ask itself what will be the (future) consequences of 
extending defences. If fi nality and certainty on an issue cannot be achieved, the 
solution is ineffi cient. For example, in Germany, the creation of an extra-legal 
excuse of absence of all blameworthiness was rejected with the argument that it is 
so vague that it would lead to problems concerning legal certainty.29 Courts should 
also be cautious that the extension of defences does not invite people to seek the 
limits of the law and to raise unmeritorious claims. Citizens must be encouraged 
“to seek redress through political or bureaucratic processes rather than resorting to 
‘self-help’, especially when the latter entails the use of force.”30
2. BURDEN OF PROOF
The offence-defence distinction also infl uences the burden of proof. In general, the 
prosecutor carries the burden of proving the offence charged, whereas the defendant 
must make probable that a defence applies. As noted, if the Prosecutor succeeds in 
proving the elements of the offence, it is assumed that the act is wrongful and the 
defendant blameworthy. The presumption is therefore that a general defence is 
absent, and it is up to the defendant to raise this issue. This is practically convenient, 
because otherwise the prosecutor would always have to prove that all possible 
defences are absent.31
This does not place an undue burden on the defendant. It is obvious that the 
defendant, who knows about any possible defence, raises this. Moreover, the burden 
of the defendant is not so diffi cult to meet, as he merely has to make the defence 
probable, rather than prove it. In addition, this burden rests not only on the 
defendant. In Germany and the Netherlands, the judge has an active task in 
investigating whether a defence applies, particularly if this is raised by the facts.32 It 
could therefore be argued that the defendant merely has to raise the defence.
28 See V.4.4.3.
29 Beulke 2008, p. 158, see IV.6.5.
30 Horder 2006A, p. 17.
31 See III.5. and V.2.3.4.
32 Borgers & Kristen 2005.
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If the judge thinks the facts as stated by the defendant are not unlikely, any 
doubt should tip the scales in favour of the defendant.33 Again, it seems that the 
German judges attach most weight to the principle of in dubio pro reo. German 
judges are most likely to accept facts and circumstances that can ground a defence. 
They even tend to consider all alternative scenarios to the prosecutor’s case, 
accepting any scenario that cannot be refuted. The effect seems to be that the 
defendant is rewarded for remaining silent and not helping to make the facts clear. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands, courts expect cooperation and helpfulness in regard 
to the checking of the validity of the submitted facts from defendants who raise a 
defence.34 Probably the most common reason for rejecting defences is that the court 
does not believe that the scenario as submitted by the defendant is probable.35
3. JUDGMENT
When a defence applies to a charge, the offence is justifi ed or the defendant is 
excused. In the Netherlands, the application of a defence is incorporated into the 
judgment. If a justifi cation or excuse applies, the verdict is not one of acquittal, but 
a ‘discharge of all legal proceedings’.36 In Germany and England, however, the 
acceptance of a defence leads to an acquittal, just as it would when the offence 
defi nition is not proven.37
The special judgment can be explained by reference to the Dutch scheme of 
judicial decision-making, which distinguishes between the question of whether or 
not the charge is proven and the subsequent questions whether this conduct and the 
defendant are also punishable.38 The scheme formalizes the three-tiered framework 
of criminal liability. It creates a binding order of assessing legal cases, an order 
which is not binding in the other two States but also follows nonetheless from the 
logical fact that the application of defences is only relevant after assessing that the 
offence defi nition is fulfi lled. After all, only an offence can be justifi ed or excused.39
The special verdict has a communicative function. When the only available 
verdict is an acquittal, this does not capture the difference between the person who 
was innocent and the person who did commit an offence but was excused. For 
33 HR 17 November 1992, NJ 1993, 267; Kelk 2005, p. 251; de Hullu 2006, p. 355–356; 23 October 
1890 RGSt 21, 131; 5 October 1990 BGH NJW 1991, 503; 14 August 1998 BayObLG NStZ-RR 
1999, 9 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 652.
34 De Hullu 2006, p. 356.
35 Blomsma & Klip 2009. It was therefore exceptional for the Court to accept facts because they 
could not be excluded in Rb. Groningen 9 September 2010, NJ 2011, 52.
36 Ontslag van alle rechtsvervolging, see article 352(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
37 The German judgment must nevertheless must mention the grounds for acquittal, see §267(5) of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
38 Article 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second question of the scheme is omitted, 
namely whether the charge also qualifi es as an offence.
39 See also VIII.3.7.
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example, no difference is made between the defendant who was acquitted because 
the judge did not believe he killed the victim and the defendant who killed the 
victim because he was insane. The verdict makes clear that the latter defendant does 
not walk out free, as measures can be ordered against him.40 The communicative 
function of the law is not only important in distinguishing offence from defence, 
but also in making clear the difference between a justifi cation and excuse. In the 
next chapter, I will return to this matter.
4. DEFENSIVE PURPOSE
In order for a defence to apply, does it suffi ce that its conditions are objectively 
fulfi lled or should the defendant also be aware of this? Consider that the defendant 
is walking in the park at night, looking for someone to beat up. At one point, he 
hears a jogger running towards him. He picks up a large stick from the ground 
and hits the jogger with it, resulting in serious injuries. On the face of it, the 
situation seems simple. The defendant fulfi lled the offence of infl icting serious 
bodily harm.
However, things may radically change if we consider that the jogger was in fact 
a mugger, who was about to rob our defendant. In that case, the conditions of self-
defence were objectively present, whereas the defendant was ignorant of it. This 
situation is called an unknowing justifi cation or a reversed putative justifi cation.41 
Another example is the situation where the defendant walks in the park and sees 
that an old lady is being mugged. Aware that there is a situation of self-defence, he 
relies on the law’s opportunity to use force and injures the mugger. However, his 
purpose in using force was not to defend the old lady, but to beat someone up.
It will be argued that the conditions of a defence should not only have been met 
in reality but also in the defendant’s mind at the time he committed the offence. 
Subsequently, it can be asked what kind of mental element is required. Regarding 
self-defence for example, should the defendant aim to act in defence of someone’s 
life, or should it suffi ce that he realized the requirements of the justifi cation were 
met? The fi rst question has attracted most debate in England, whereas in Germany, 
where a mental requirement has been accepted as self-evident, lawyers have 
focused more on the subsequent question of whether or not awareness suffi ces. 
Nonetheless, the issue hardly comes up in practice, because it is uncommon for all 
the other conditions of a defence to be fulfi lled whereas the defendant was unaware 
of this and/or acted with a different purpose. This explains why in the Netherlands, 
it is not really perceived as a relevant problem.42
40 The term ‘discharge of all legal proceedings’ is therefore unfortunate, because it implies that no 
measures can be ordered against the insane.
41 Christopher 1995; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 120 and Beulke 2008, p. 326.
42 Ter Haar & Meijer 2009, p. 78 submit that there are hardly any decisions where the defensive 
purpose is named explicitly as a requirement, referring to Rb. Zwolle-Lelystad 22 June 2009, 
LJN:BJ0512 as the exception.
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4.1. Dual requirement
Three approaches can be taken.43 The fi rst approach focuses merely on the question 
whether or not the criteria of a defence have been met objectively, that is, in reality. 
The subjective beliefs of the defendant on whether or not self-defence was 
applicable are irrelevant. This approach, which can also be called the ‘deeds theory’, 
emphasizes that the defendant was objectively justifi ed. The defendants above 
objectively prevented the mugger from robbing him and the old lady respectively. 
The objectively justifi ed act can be seen as benefi cial to the legal order and should 
therefore be encouraged, regardless of the mental state of the actor. His actions are 
therefore justifi ed.44
The second approach, by contrast, focuses on the reasons why the act was 
carried out. This ‘reasons theory’ brings about that the defendants above cannot be 
justifi ed. The perpetrator who was ignorant of the justifying circumstances was not 
acting as a private law enforcer, but as a common criminal. He aimed to harm the 
legal order, not protect it.45 The approach brings about that in the opposite situation 
of putative defence, to be discussed in the next paragraph, the defendant is also 
justifi ed if he mistook a jogger for a mugger. Although the conduct was not right in 
fact, it is justifi ed because it was (subjectively) done for the right reasons.
The fi rst and second approach can be labelled utilitarian and deontological 
respectively. The third approach of ‘dual requirement’ cumulates the objective and 
subjective conditions. It requires conduct to be carried out under the justifying 
circumstances and with the pertinent lawful purpose. In order to be justifi ed, the 
actor needs to act for what he believes to be good reasons and which are in fact 
good reasons. A single focus on consequences fails to consider the intrinsic 
properties of actions, but we also should not go as far as to never take into account 
the consequences of our actions. Like actus reus is just as important as mens rea, 
criminal liability should refl ect the objective and the subjective, the harm and the 
state of mind. The defendant who intervened and objectively helped the old lady 
only because he wanted to hurt the mugger is therefore not justifi ed.46
This dual requirement should apply in a general part of criminal law for the EU. 
In order for a defence to apply, its conditions should in reality be fulfi lled: a mere 
subjective approach does not suffi ce. Leaving aside for now the possibility of being 
excused when the conditions of a defence are only subjectively present, an act can 
only be justifi ed if the conditions of the justifi cation are objectively met. It is not 
justifi ed to defend yourself against an imaginary attack. A justifi cation implies the 
43 Leverick 2006, pp. 23–41; Robinson & Darley 1998; Robinson 1997 and Robinson in Simester & 
Smith, A.T.H. 1996.
44 See Roxin 2006, pp. 642–644 and 719; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 585 and 668 and 
Machielse 1986, pp. 588–589.
45 Ter Haar & Meijer 2009, p. 77 and Sangero 2006, p. 97. See also Tadros 2005, pp. 121–123 and 
Horder 2006A, p. 69.
46 Leverick 2006, pp. 24–30 and Tadros 2005, pp. 274–280. In contrast, Robinson 1997, p. 14 
argued that taking advantage of the law is not the same as breaking it.
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action was correct and desirable.47 The subsequent question thus becomes whether a 
subjective fulfi lment of the criteria of defences is required too. The simplest argument 
to demonstrate that the criteria should also be subjectively fulfi lled is to point out that 
de lege lata defences in all three Member States require a defensive purpose, as has 
been made explicit in the context of self-defence,48 necessity49 and duress.50
The dual requirement is also grounded in the distinction between offence and 
defence. It is argued that the objective absence of an objective defi nitional element 
suffi ces for an acquittal, but in order to rely on a defence, its conditions must be 
met, both in fact as in the mind of the actor. In other words, the elements of the 
offence need to be objectively present to convict, whereas the elements of the 
defence must also be subjectively present to acquit. The additional subjective 
requirement for defences is logical if it is considered that conduct that is perfectly 
legal should not be punished, whereas conduct that is prima facie wrong is justifi ed 
only when it is done for the right reasons. Defences are exceptions that enable 
special treatment only to those who merit special treatment: acting for the right 
purpose is essential to merit special treatment.51
The dual requirement can also be grounded in the so-called belief principle. In 
England, a subjective requirement is referred to as the Dadson principle, after the 
case against the constable Dadson who shot and wounded a fl eeing thief. Such force 
was justifi able only against a person who had two previous convictions. The thief 
had two previous convictions, but Dadson did not know this and was therefore 
convicted.52 This is in line with the principle that the defendant should be judged on 
the facts or circumstances as he believed them to be.53 As noted, ignorance of an 
offence element negates a fault element like intent. This belief principle also applies 
to the defence, bringing about that every medal has its reverse. The defendant 
cannot be convicted for an offence of recklessness unless he was aware of the 
danger, but he can also not be acquitted on grounds of self-defence if he was not 
aware of the pertinent justifying circumstances.
47 Leverick 2006, p. 28. Or at least permissible, see VIII.3.4.
48 2 October 1953 BGHSt 5, 245; Beulke 2008, pp. 115 and 122; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 293; HR 8 May 
1990, NJ 1991, 579; HR 8 June 2010, NJ 2010, 339; de Hullu 2006, p. 304 and Fokkens & 
Machielse, pp. 276–277, note 6 on art. 41.
49 11 December 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1998, 173; 15 January 1952 BGHSt 2, 111; Beulke 2008, 
p. 105; HR 14 December 1976, NJ 1977, 174; HR 29 March 1988, NJ 1989, 162; Dolman 2006, 
p. 236 and 323; Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on art. 40 and section 36(3) of the English Road 
Traffi c Act 1972.
50 Bohlander 2009, p. 126; Beulke 2008, p. 152; Roxin 2006, pp. 976–977 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 706.
51 Or at least acting in knowledge of the justifying circumstances, see Fletcher 1978, pp. 556–568 
and 576; Fletcher 1975, pp. 320–321; Tadros 2005, pp. 265–266 and 275 and Sangero 2006, pp. 
28–29 and 219–221.
52 R. v. Dadson (1850) 169 ER 407. See Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 610 and Ashworth 2006, 
p. 155.
53 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA Crim 4; Ormerod 2005. p. 339; Ashworth 2006, p. 141; 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 142 and Law Commission 1993, pp. 69 and 77.
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4.2. Purpose versus mere awareness
If we accept that defences, justifi cations in particular, can also be distinguished into 
an objective and a subjective part, a subsequent, perhaps even more controversial 
question deals with the required degree of such a mental element.54 There is 
consensus that the defendant cannot rely on a defence if he is not aware that these 
conditions are met.55 Does this suffi ce or need his actions also be guided by the 
purpose of the justifi cation?
Given the Dadson principle, it seems that English courts merely require 
awareness.56 In addition however, the Dutch and German Supreme Courts require a 
‘genuine’ defensive purpose.57 This can be contrasted with the position of scholars. 
Most German and many Dutch scholars seem to favour mere awareness,58 whereas 
many English scholars argue in favour of an additional purpose.59 To make things 
even more complex, some scholars differentiate between justifi cations. One 
justifi cation can require a purpose whereas for another, mere awareness would 
suffi ce.60
In fact, additional arguments in favour of a defensive purpose can be derived 
from the criteria and aspects of self-defence. A genuine purpose follows from the 
rule that the defence does not apply to cases where the defendant reprehensibly 
created the circumstances of self-defence in order to enact revenge. His purpose 
was not to defend himself. From an etymological approach, the term self-defence 
also implies one is consciously and purposely defending himself. Third, one of the 
many rationales of self-defence is grounded in the doctrine of double effect. 
Aquinas distinguished self-defence from punishment by the intention with which 
the attacked person harms his aggressor. The intention must be to fend off the 
attack, not to make the aggressor suffer. Only then is the suffering of or injury to 
the aggressor merely a permissible side-effect.61
In any event, true purpose or mere awareness, the difference between the two is 
put into perspective. First of all, the purpose requirement is mitigated by holding 
that it need not be the only purpose.62 In the context of self-defence for example, 
54 Beulke 2008, pp. 96–97; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 584 and Sangero 2006, p. 225.
55 Sangero 2006, p. 30; Alexander 2004, p. 853 and Fletcher 1978, p. 565.
56 See Fletcher 1978, p. 559.
57 11 December 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1998, 173; Roxin 2006, pp. 640–641; HR 8 May 1990, NJ 
1991, 579; Machielse 1986, pp. 590–591, who mentions more case-law that implies such purpose.
58 See Bohlander 2009, p. 80; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 584–585; Roxin 2006, pp. 640–
641 and annotator Buruma in HR 10 February 2004, NJ 2004, 286.
59 Smith, J.C. 1989, p. 40; section 27(1) Law Commission 1993, p. 106 and Tadros 2005, p. 291. 
Fletcher 1998, p. 137 submits that the consensus amongst Western legal systems includes 
awareness as well as purpose.
60 See for example Schünemann 1985, pp. 372–374 and Roxin 2006, pp. 976–977.
61 Fletcher 2007, p. 14 and Smith, J.C. 2002, pp. 958–959.
62 11 December 1997 BGH NStZ-RR 1998, 173; Roxin 2006, pp. 640–641 and Sangero 2006, 
p. 233.
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German courts also accept that other motives like anger played a role next to the 
defensive purpose, as long as this defensive purpose is not completely pushed into 
the background.63 Secondly, it is unlikely that the defendant will reveal his true or 
primary purposes, which leaves intact the reasonable presumption that someone 
acting in a situation of self-defence acted with a (law-abiding) defensive purpose.64
Finally, the discussion on a defensive purpose seems limited to justifi cations. 
This is logical because their objective focus on the valuation of conduct makes any 
additional subjective element controversial. As will be explained later, excuses 
centre not on the conduct itself, but on the reasons of the defendant for acting. By 
their nature, excuses thus already require specifi c reasons for acting. For example, 
in order for an offender to be excused under duress, it must be established that he 
could not reasonably act any differently due to the specifi c pressure he was under. 
Because of these subjective conditions, duress does not apply to the defendant who 
committed the offence because he hated the victim, even though the reasonable 
person would not have been able to act differently.
4.3. Negligent offences
If it is accepted that self-defence requires a defensive purpose, this seems to bring 
about that only offences that are committed with dolus (directus) can be justifi ed. 
After all, if the defendant wants to save himself, he usually also wants to hit and 
therefore injure the aggressor. However, self-defence can also apply to offences 
committed with lesser fault elements. Although usually, negligent offences will not 
have been committed with a defensive purpose, this is not impossible. For example, 
one can defend oneself with a wooden plank, not knowing that it had a rusty nail, 
which caused unforeseen injuries. The defender may have used a fi rearm, believing 
it to be an alarm gun.65 Finally, he may have merely wanted to hit the aggressor on 
the head with a fi rearm, but in doing so the weapon fi red.66
These examples have in common that the defendant wanted to defend himself, 
and in order to do so, aimed to do commit an offence, which inadvertently led to the 
fulfi lment of a more serious offence. Applying the principles proposed in the 
previous chapter, it can be argued he was at least negligent as to these results, 
possibly even reckless. These offences can nevertheless be justifi ed under self-
defence. In Germany, the approach is taken that if the defensive force would have 
also been justifi ed when it was intentional, self-defence also applies to the negligent 
63 11 September 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 29; 6 October 2004 BGH NStZ 2005, 332 and Roxin 2006, 
p. 977.
64 Sangero 2006, p. 234.
65 AG and annotator de Hullu in HR 31 October 2000, NJ 2001, 11; AG Vellinga in HR 10 February 
2004, NJ 2004, 286; Strijards 1987, p. 59; Machielse 1986, pp. 597–599; 30 June 2004 BGH 
NStZ 2005, 31 and Bohlander 2009, p. 80.
66 21 December 1977 BGHSt 27, 313. In the Netherlands, this sometimes qualifi es as conditional 
intent, see IV.5.3.1.
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use of force.67 Defendants are also acquitted by negating negligence, based on the 
rationale that the aggressor bears the inherent risk of defensive force. For example, 
in a case, the aggressor was throwing bricks from a short distance at the offi cer who 
wanted to arrest him. The offi cer aimed to shoot him in the legs, but at that moment, 
the suspect just bended over to take another brick and got hit fatally.68
4.4. Unknowing justifi cation
This leaves us with the question of what to do in case the defendant was unaware of 
the circumstances that gave rise to a defence. Whereas German courts fi nd complete 
liability,69 many German scholars argue that only liability for (impossible) attempt 
should follow;70 a view that can also be found in other Member States.71 The 
defendant believes he has committed an offence when in fact he has not done so. 
This is similar as a reversed mistake, which also leads to liability for an impossible 
attempt.72 That outcome makes sure that other parties are not allowed to act against 
the actor, who is objectively justifi ed.73 It would also bring about that the scope of 
liability is more limited as not all offences can be attempted.74 The consequence of 
the absence of a defensive purpose in the Netherlands is unclear. Usually it is simply 
held that there was no situation of self-defence, resulting in complete liability.75
The most popular view thus seems to be that of complete liability. However, this 
does not also mean that the defendant should always be held liable. Consider the 
real-life example of Motti Ashkenazi, who stole a backpack on a Jerusalem beach, 
which turned out to be full of explosives on a timer. He reported this to the police as 
a result of which he saved numerous lives.76 Since at the time he committed the 
crime he lacked the defensive purpose required for self-defence or necessity, he can 
be held liable for theft. However, given the circumstances, it would have been 
highly undesirable to punish him. A similar hypothetical example exists when the 
actor breaks a window in the night, but in doing so he saves the owner’s life because 
he smells a gas leak when he awakes. The actor lacks the defensive purpose that is 
67 21 March 2001 NStZ 2001, 591; 19 September 1973 BGHSt 25, 229 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 620–623 and 668.
68 30 June 2004 BGH NStZ 2005, 31. See also 21 December 1977, BGHSt 27, 313; 25 March 1999 
BGH JR 2000, 297; Roxin 2006, p. 677–678 and 1099 and Beulke 2008, p. 116.
69 Beulke 2008, pp. 97–98 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 315.
70 Roxin 2006, pp. 719 and 774–775; Bohlander 2009, pp. 80 and 139; Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 668 and 698; and Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 119, 293 and 311.
71 Westen 2008A, pp. 576–579.
72 See Christopher 1995, pp. 234–238; Smith, J.C. 1989, pp. 41–44; Funk 1999; Beulke 2008, p. 326 
and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 374–375.
73 Roxin 2006, pp. 644–645. Compare Christopher 1995, pp. 239–245.
74 §23(1) of the German Criminal Code; article 45 of the Dutch Criminal Code and section 1(4) of 
the English Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
75 Machielse 1986, pp. 590–591.
76 See Robinson 1997, pp. 14–15.
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required for a justifi cation and the act is therefore wrongful.77 From this perspective, 
it would be useful to grant a European Public Prosecutor the discretion not to 
prosecute.
5. PUTATIVE DEFENCES
A putative justifi cation is the mirror image of an unknowing justifi cation. In the 
aforementioned example, the defendant did not know the victim was a mugger and 
could therefore not rely on self-defence. A putative justifi cation would exist if the 
defendant, walking in the park at night, mistook a jogger for a mugger and injured 
him by way of pre-emptive strike. Whereas the unknowing justifi cation deals with 
the question whether a subjective requirement should also be required, a putative 
defence revolves around the question how important it is that the conditions of a 
defence are also objectively fulfi lled. Can the belief of the actor in the justifying 
circumstances serve as a replacement for their non-existence in reality?78
In a purely subjective perspective, this is answered affi rmative. The mistake is 
irrelevant. The defendant is justifi ed or excused just as he would when his 
perception of reality would have been correct. Under this approach, no distinction 
can therefore be made between a regular and a putative defence. A defence that 
seemed necessary to the defendant is necessary in law. It does not matter whether 
the objective, real circumstances are different from the circumstances as he 
believed them to be. The opposite approach is to simply reject the defence in case of 
a mistake. A mere objective perspective identifi es and separates desirable conduct, 
which is truly justifi ed, from putative justifi cations, which cause harm and should 
be discouraged.79 Regardless of the nature of the mistake, the defence does not 
apply and the defendant is criminally liable.
In between the two extremes, an approach exists that makes the mistake 
relevant, but only holds the defendant liable when the mistake was unreasonable. In 
fact, all Member States would agree that there can be no criminal liability when the 
putative defence was reasonable.80 The English standard of ‘reasonable’ is similar 
to the German one of ‘unavoidable’ and the Dutch one of ‘excusable’.81 I will 
discuss and highlight the problems of the national solutions, after which I argue in 
favour of this middle ground, which can be grounded in all legal systems under 
investigation. It will become clear that mistakes on defences are treated very 
differently from mistakes on the offence defi nition.
77 Beulke 2008, p. 326.
78 See Sangero 2006, p. 285.
79 Robinson 1997, pp. 6–9 and 12–14.
80 See Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, p. 1037.
81 See also Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 70. The standard requires more than in culpa, see 
IV.6.5.1.
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5.1. The distinction
Before I discuss the different approaches, two distinctions need to be introduced. 
First of all, putative justifi cations and putative excuses can be identifi ed. Both types 
of mistakes should be treated under the same rule. I will generally refer to putative 
justifi cations and discuss some important aspects of putative excuses in the end of 
this paragraph. Secondly, mistakes on the facts giving rise to a defence are distin-
guished from mistakes on the scope or existence of a defence. In many legal 
systems, the distinction is made with a view to attach different criteria and legal 
conse quences to the two types of mistakes. On the contrary, I will argue in favour 
of one simple rule of excusing the defendant who makes a reasonable mistake on a 
defence.
The former category deals with factual mistakes on the circumstances, that if 
present, would in fact justify or excuse the defendant. Let me illustrate the 
distinction by reference to self-defence. Arguably, all mistakes on the necessity of 
self-defence are mistakes on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation. By mistaking the 
jogger for a mugger, the defendant incorrectly assumes a wrongful attack is 
imminent and therefore errs that self-defence is necessary. Cases of error in 
persona are also treated as a mistake on the facts giving rise to self-defence. After 
all, the jogger who is mistaken for a mugger is conceptually closely related to cases 
in which a third party is mistaken for the intended victim. Cases of aberratio ictus, 
where the defendant misses the intended victim and hits an innocent third party, 
should be treated equally. For example, the defendant might miss the mugger and 
hit a jogger who just happens to pass by.
As will be explained in this paragraph, the defendant will only be excused for 
these mistakes, if they are considered to have been excusable, all things considered. 
In all of these cases, the defendant violates the personal autonomy of an innocent 
victim. This can never be justifi ed, all the more because that would imply the victim 
could not defend himself. The legal order can at most forgive the defendant for his 
mistake. This will not be the case if the defendant can be reproached for not being 
more diligent, either because he should have made sure he was really attacked by 
that person or because by shooting in a crowded place at the aggressor, he should 
have foreseen others could be harmed.
Mistakes as to the legal limits of a defence deal with mistakes on the scope of 
defences or even on the existence of defences. The defendant may err that the attack 
in self-defence need not be wrongful or he may even think there exists a defence of 
self-help. Mistakes on normative elements of the defence are also included in this 
second category. For example, the condition that the degree of force applied in self-
defence must be proportionate is normative. A mistake on what is proportional is a 
mistake on what is allowed by law. Mistakes as to the legal limits of a defence can 
also only excuse the defendant.
The distinction between mistakes is grounded in the fact that the actor who is 
mista ken on the facts giving rise to a recognized justifi cation in principle acts in 
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confor mi ty with the value judgments of the legal order. After all, he would be justi-
fi ed if the mistaken facts were correct. In contrast, a mistaken belief in a non-exis-
ting defen ce implies that the actor is led by value judgments that are not those of the 
legal order.82 The law sets the rules of conduct. The defendant is not allowed to sub-
 sti tute his values judgments for those of the legal order. To do so would excul pate 
those with irrational and dangerous views on what is proportionate.83 This explains 
that mistakes on the scope or existence of defences will hardly ever be forgiven.
5.2. Negation of fault
The aforementioned distinction shows a great resemblance with the distinction 
between mistakes on the offence defi nition and mistakes as to the legal prohibition. 
In German law, mistakes on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation are treated as if 
they were mistakes on the offence defi nition. In short, this means that a putative 
justifi cation will negate intent if the facts would have justifi ed the conduct, when 
actually present. For example, self-defence would have applied if the jogger was in 
fact a mugger. The mistake negates the intent to injure the jogger.
Secondly, there may be a negligent counterpart of the offence charged. If the 
mistake was reasonable in the circumstances, it will also negate negligence in 
Germany. After all, negligence consists of an unreasonable mistake. By contrast, if 
it is not deemed reasonable in the circumstances that the actor mistook the jogger 
for a mugger, he will be held liable for the negligent infl iction of bodily injury. 
Negligence liability is warranted because the actor can be reproached for not 
assessing the situation better. As a compromise, the approach thus enables that a 
mistake on the defence does not completely negate liability, but does lower criminal 
liability from intentional to negligent. Unreasonable mistakes merely amount to 
negligence liability.
To illustrate a mistake on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation, consider the case 
where the defendant shot the aggressor immediately when he thought he reached for 
his gun. The German Supreme Court held that this was a mistake on the necessity 
of shooting, because he could have threatened again, fi red another warning shot or 
waited to see whether the aggressor would also really pull out a gun, arm it and aim 
it. Intention was therefore negated. Subsequently, it was held that negligence 
liability should also be dismissed since the defendant could not be reproached the 
violation of the duty of care in these circumstances.84
In contrast, a mistake on the scope or existence of a justifi cation is treated as a 
mistake as to the legal prohibition. Therefore, rather than negating the fault element, 
the defendant is excused if the mistake was excusable, or as the Germans would 
82 6 June 1952 BGHSt 3, 105; Roxin 2006, p. 627 and Beulke 2008, p. 167 and 171.
83 Ormerod 2005, p. 334; Ashworth 2006, p. 149 and Law Commission 1993, p. 66.
84 9 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 530.
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state, unavoidable.85 Like any defence that falls short of its conditions, avoidable 
mistakes can at most mitigate the sentence.86 An example of a mistake on the scope 
of a justifi cation is the defendant’s mistake that the justifi cation of necessity allowed 
for excessive speeding in order to save a parakeet.87 Whereas the underlying facts 
are well recognized, the defendant makes the mistake of incorrectly weighing the 
pertinent interests. This mistaken valuation can only be excused when it was 
unavoidable.88
Support for this German approach as to mistakes on the facts giving rise to a 
justifi cation can be found in English law.89 It is however controversial in Germany 
itself,90 and should be rejected in my opinion. First of all, it is inappropriate not to 
require that a mistake on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation must be reasonable. 
Treating these mistakes like mistakes on the offence defi nition neglects the 
difference between offence and defence. The actor who is making a mistake on the 
offence defi nition is not aware he is committing a criminal offence. However, the 
fact that the defendant committed a prima facie wrong warrants that he should be 
especially diligent in assessing whether the circumstances giving rise to a defence 
are actually present.91 This diligence must result in requiring that the mistake is 
reasonable.
The approach of letting an honest mistake negate intent is also problematic 
because it brings about that the defendant who was mistaken, however unreasonable, 
about the consent of the victim will not be convicted of rape.92 Since there is no 
comparable negligent offence, the actor is even acquitted. Even if this legal loophole 
were removed by making negligence liability available,93 convicting the mistaken 
defendant of merely this offence would send a strange signal. It should also be noted 
that the German approach only negates intent and negligence. If a putative defence 
were raised against a strict charge, there would be no fault element to negate and 
thus no legal possibility to exclude liability. This is no lacuna in the German legal 
system that rejects strict liability, but it will be a lacuna in EU law, which does 
accept this form of liability.
85 15 September 1988 BGHSt 35, 347; 6 June 1952 BGHSt 3, 105; 15 November 1994 BGH NStZ 
1995, 177; 29 June 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 132; 7 March 1996 BGH NStZ 1996, 338; Beulke 
2008, pp. 161–162, 166 and 172 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 353–354.
86 §49(1) of the Criminal Code. Compare Weigend in Tiedemann 2002, p. 414.
87 18 April 1990 OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1990, 2264.
88 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 698–699 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 312.
89 In England, an honest mistake on the necessity of self-defence acquits, see R. v. Gladstone 
Williams [1983] EWCA. Moreover, Smith, J.C. 2002, pp. 960–961; Ormerod 2006, p. 469 and 
Sangero 2006, pp. 290–293 suggest that a grossly unreasonable belief in the necessity of self-
defence could still give rise to a conviction of manslaughter based on gross negligence.
90 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 118; Beulke 2008, pp. 162 and 166 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 353.
91 Beulke 2008, pp. 168–169; Hörnle 2000, pp. 369–370; Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 496–497 and 
Sangero 2006, pp. 286–287.
92 ‘Nötigen’ in §177 of the German Criminal Code implies the lack of consent.
93 Hörnle 2000, pp. 356–358 and 378–380. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 626–629 and Fletcher in Eser, 
Hassemer & Burkhardt 2000, pp. 252–253.
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Leaving aside for now whether the mistake should be reasonable or not, the 
German solution can be criticized for not distinguishing correctly between dolus on 
the one hand and wrongfulness on the other. The approach neglects the fact that the 
defendant, who kills in self-defence, intentionally kills the aggressor. It makes no 
sense to hold that the accused who mistakenly believed he was attacked, did not 
intend to kill the person he thought to be an aggressor. The German approach 
implies that intention must relate to wrongfulness of one’s conduct, to the non-
existence of justifying circumstances. It implies that dolus is malus.94
This did follow from the theory that treated wrongfulness, the non-existence of 
justifi cations, as ‘negative offence elements’ as to which intent must relate. If the 
defendant thought his conduct was justifi ed, intent as to a negative offence element 
was lacking.95 However, this theory is now generally rejected and these implications 
are commonly rejected. In fact, prevailing opinion appreciates that intent is purged 
by considering consciousness of wrongdoing as an element of blameworthiness, 
rather than intent.96 It is inconsistent with this view to treat a mistake on the facts 
giving rise to a justifi cation as negating intent. Instead, the only approach consistent 
with this view is the approach that is most popular in the other two Member States 
and supported here, which treats all types of putative defences as mistakes on the 
legal prohibition. This means that only a reasonable mistake can excuse.97 In 
conclusion therefore, the German approach must be rejected, because it is neither 
consequent nor just.98
5.3. Honest or reasonable mistake
The approach to putative defences in English law also seems to be inconsistent. For 
some defences an honest or genuine belief suffi ces, whereas other defences require 
the mistake to be reasonable. From case law, it can be inferred that self-defence 
requires a genuine mistake, whereas duress and consent require a reasonable 
mistake.99 Although general approaches to putative defences have been advanced, 
such as a genuine100 or reasonable101 mistake for all defences, it must be concluded 
that de lege lata, the requirement of putative defences must be considered in the 
context of each defence.102
94 Roxin 2006, p. 629 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 364–365 and 496–497. See IV.2.4.6.
95 The ‘Gesamt-unrechts-Tatsbestand’ basically consisted of an amalgamation of the offence 
defi nition and wrongfulness, see Krey 2003, pp. 12–13; Beulke 2008, p. 43; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 
81–82 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 155.
96 Arzt 1976, p. 657. This is called the limited theory of guilt. See X.5.3.
97 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 366–367; Beulke 2008, p. 166; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 162 and 
353; Arzt 1976, p. 657 and Bohlander 2009, p. 76.
98 Fletcher in Eser, Hassemer & Burkhardt 2000, pp. 248–249.
99 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 636 and 675.
100 Section 41 draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 60.
101 Ashworth 2006, pp. 229–230 and Ormerod 2005, p. 127.
102 Ormerod 2005, p. 293 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 619–620.
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As far as putative self-defence is concerned, the approach is similar to that in 
Germany. Mistakes on the facts giving rise to self-defence need not be reasonable 
to acquit, but a mistake on its scope should be reasonable. In Germany, intent is 
also negated by any mistake on the necessity to defend oneself. Only if the 
defendant was mistaken on the scope of self-defence, the mistakes must have been 
reasonable in order to excuse him. The rationales for not requiring a reasonable 
mistake are also similar to those advanced in Germany. Since the mistake would 
have justifi ed his conduct, if it were correct, the defendant aimed to act in 
conformity with the legal order. Secondly, a requirement of reasonableness would 
deter people of helping others.103
The English law on self-defence allows such force to be used as is reasonable in 
the circumstances as the accused believed them to be, whether reasonably or not. 
Mistakes on the necessity to apply defensive force should be assessed purely 
subjective on the basis of the danger he took to be present. Any genuine mistake on 
the facts giving rise to self-defence will acquit.104 On the contrary, a mistake on the 
scope of self-defence, like the question whether or not the response was 
proportionate, must be reasonable to acquit.105 The belief principle does not apply 
here. Normative standards such as proportionality should not be the object of 
subjective assessment.106
Since an honest mistake on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation can acquit the 
defendant, the scope of exculpation seems wider than in Germany, where only 
intent was negated, leaving open negligence liability for unreasonable mistakes. 
However, in practice, liability is not as easily rejected as in Germany. First of all, 
experience shows the lack of a requirement of reasonableness has not resulted in a 
disquieting number of acquittals.107 In effect, unreasonable beliefs are unlikely to 
be accepted as credible. The reasonableness of a belief can indicate that it is 
genuinely held,108 so the unreasonableness of the belief might indicate it was not 
honestly held.109
Secondly, in England, the defendant cannot rely on a putative defence that was 
caused by voluntary intoxication. Thus, when voluntarily intoxicated, the defendant 
should be judged on the facts as they were.110 Finally, if the actor was unsure of the 
circumstances, the doctrine of wilful blindness can operate to preclude the 
103 Sangero 2006, pp. 288–289.
104 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA.
105 Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; R. v. Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 
128; DPP v. Armstrong-Braun [1998] 163 JP 271; R.v. O’Grady [1987] EWCA Crim 2; Simester 
& Sullivan 2007, pp. 621, 623 and 706; Ormerod 2005, pp. 329–330 and Dingwall 2007, pp. 
130–131.
106 Sullivan in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 223–224. See also IV.2.4.8. and IV.4.5.3.
107 Ormerod 2006, p. 454.
108 Section 76(4a) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
109 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA Crim 4 and Sangero 2006, p. 288.
110 Section 76(5) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; R. v. O’Grady [1987] EWCA 
Crim 2; R. v. Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951 and Spencer 2006, p. 267.
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exculpatory operation of his honest mistake.111 Doubt is not considered to be 
ignorance, just a lesser form of knowledge. German scholars also argue that 
whereas these mistakes may negate direct or indirect intent, they do not negate 
dolus eventualis. Nonetheless, the German Supreme Court has accepted putative 
self-defence in the case where the defendant drove into three men whom he thought 
might want to beat him up.112 Moreover, only in Germany in dubio pro reo applies 
in a way that incredible or even absurd claims of the defendant are accepted as 
honest mistakes.
Be that as it may, it is submitted that a putative justifi cation should be reasonable 
to acquit, in particular that only a reasonable mistake as to the necessity of self-
defence should suffi ce. As submitted before, the committing of a prima facie wrong 
warrants that the defendant should be especially diligent in assessing whether the 
circumstances giving rise to a defence are actually present. Requiring a reasonable 
mistake is necessary in order to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
offender and defender.113 If any mistake allows for the use of force, the interests of 
the innocent person who is unreasonably mistaken for an aggressor are not 
respected.114
The reasonableness requirement can also be deduced from article 2 ECHR, 
because under this article an exception to the right of life must be based on a 
reasonable belief in the need to sacrifi ce a life in self-defence.115 English law is thus 
not in line with the aggressor’s right to life, which may only be sacrifi ced if it is 
absolutely necessary, whereas a defendant in England can be acquitted even if his 
attack turns out to be completely unnecessary.116 The English government have 
ignored this problem in legislating section 76 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008, probably due to the public pressure on allowing the 
maximum scope of force for householders defending themselves against burglars.
The United Kingdom has been brought before the ECtHR by relatives of persons 
shot in putative self-defence numerous times. Arguably, the UK failed to protect its 
citizens’ right to life from state agents or private individuals.117 The situation in 
Northern Ireland has led to a lot of complaints to the ECtHR and in the ‘war against 
terrorism’, cases like the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in the London 
Underground in 2005 may be dealt with by the ECtHR in the future.118 Nonetheless, 
111 Sangero 2006, p. 288. See IV.2.5.3.
112 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 119–120 and Roxin 2006, pp. 638–639.
113 Horder in Shute & Sullivan 2002, pp. 292–293 and Leverick 2006, pp. 165–166.
114 Leverick 2002A, p. 349.
115 McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 18984/91, 27 September 1995. See Smith, 
J.C. 2002, Ashworth 2006, p. 147 and Leverick 2002B.
116 Ormerod 2005, p. 332.
117 A Member State can also indirectly violate article 2 by not providing adequate protection for its 
citizens by sanctioning – not necessarily by criminal means – a violation of the right to life, see 
Leverick 2006, pp. 190–192.
118 De Menezes was misidentifi ed as a suspect of attempted bombings on the previous day. The 
family of the deceased settled the matter with the Metropolitan Police.
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the UK has not often been held to have violated art. 2 ECHR. This is because the 
ECtHR has interpreted English law in such a way that it is in fact in line with their 
requirements.119
For example, in Brady v. the UK,120 the application was declared inadmissible 
because –according to the ECtHR – the English court had held that the defendant 
was mistaken for good reasons. The ECtHR looks at the facts of the case at hand, 
rather than the domestic legal framework. Domestic law does not have to be 
formulated identically to the test in art. 2, as long as the substance of the right is 
protected by it. The Court only assesses whether a concrete case violated a right 
under the Convention. In the cases against the United Kingdom, the Court held that 
the facts of the case could indicate a reasonable belief in the necessity of self-
defence. Although the English courts only tested the cases against an honest belief, 
the ECtHR decided this honest mistake was held for good reasons.121
The lack of a reasonableness requirement in English law can also be explained 
by reference to the fact that when the defendant would be convicted of murder, this 
brings about a mandatory life sentence, meaning that he will always have to serve a 
minimum period of 15 years of detention.122 If the mistake would need to be 
reasonable and it was unreasonable, there would be no possibility for the defendant 
to escape the severe mandatory penalty. This is undesirable, because even when the 
mistake is unreasonable, the reproach that can be made against that defendant is 
still not as serious as that to the ‘normal’ murderer, like the hired assassin.123 Doing 
away with the mandatory sentence would solve this and other problems relating to 
defences.124
5.4. Justifi cation or excuse
If a mistake on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation leads to an acquittal, this 
should not be based on the negation of a fault element like intent or negligence. 
What is it based on then? Is the acquittal based on the fact that a putative 
justifi cation makes the act justifi ed? Or does it excuse the actor? This question is 
related to the question whether the mistake must be reasonable or honest to acquit. 
When the mistake only needs to be honest, putative self-defence is logically a 
normal case of self-defence. It does not matter whether the defender was mistaken 
or not, as the circumstances are taken into account as he believes them to be. Both 
putative and regular self-defence justify the conduct.
119 Leverick 2002A, pp. 351–357 and de Than 2001, p. 419. Moreover, some applications were not 
considered in substance because domestic remedies were not exhausted.
120 Brady v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 55151/00, 3 April 2001.
121 McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 18984/91, 27 September 1995 and Leverick 
2006, pp. 185–187.
122 See the detailed sentencing guidelines in Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
123 See Sangero 2006, p. 282.
124 See X.3.6.
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On the contrary, by requiring that a putative justifi cation must be reasonable, the 
putative and regular defence are clearly distinguished. On an objective utilitarian 
approach that looks at the end-result, the mistake can only be an excuse, because 
there is no harm avoided or greater good furthered. In contrast to a justifi ed harm, 
injuring the putative aggressor is objectively wrong.125 As will be discussed in 
detail below, an excuse applies when the defendant could not reasonably have acted 
any differently. If it is accepted that a putative justifi cation can only excuse, it 
follows that a putative defence must be reasonable or in other words, unavoidable. 
For example, in Dutch law, a putative justifi cation excuses when the mistake is 
reasonable.126 This rule, which is also popular in the common law world,127 applies 
to all justifi cations in principle and is therefore simple to apply. The offence charged 
and defence raised may change the outcome, but not the test.
In fact, the rule is not even that different from the German approach of negating 
fault. I explained that if the mistake on the facts giving rise to a justifi cation is 
reasonable, it also negates negligence liability in Germany. In other words, under 
both tests, a reasonable mistake acquits. The difference is that less is required to 
negate negligence than to excuse the defendant. This is logical, because 
blameworthiness is harder to negate than culpa.128 This can be illustrated by 
contrasting two cases. In the above-mentioned German case where the defendant 
thought the victim was reaching for a gun, this mistake was held to be reasonable 
given the threatening circumstances. In a Dutch case however, the defendant who 
made such a mistake was not excused for shooting the victim under putative self-
defence, even though the victim had already threatened him with a knife earlier that 
day.129 Only in exceptional circumstances will the mistake be held reasonable in the 
Netherlands.130
Nonetheless, it seems that Dutch courts are increasingly lenient in allowing a 
puta tive justifi cation like self-defence to negate liability. As long as the defendant is 
not acting for reasons that oppose the values of the legal order, mistakes will not 
easily lead to criminal liability. For example, putative defence was accepted in the 
case where more than ten persons assaulted the defendant. He had used force 
against approaching police offi cers in civilian clothing, who had in fact wanted to 
stop the fi ghting. In such a hectic situation, the mistake was held to be excusable.131 
Another defendant feared repercussions of a motorcycle club after he had stabbed 
some of their members. While he was driving, he was forced into the kerb by police 
125 Robinson 1982, pp. 224 and 239–240; Fletcher 1978, p. 696 and Smith, J.C. 1989, p. 10.
126 De Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 181; Strijards 1983, pp. 188–190 and Fokkens & Machielse, 
note 4 on Uitsluiting en verhoging van strafbaarheid.
127 Sangero 2006, pp. 40 and 283; Horder 1998, p. 147; Leverick 2006, p. 165 and Fletcher 1998, pp. 
90–91 and 161–162.
128 See IV.6.5.
129 Rb. Rotterdam 15 April 2008, LJN:BD1263.
130 Fokkens & Machielse, note 7 on art. 41.
131 Hof Den Haag 9 February 2009, LJN:BH2267.
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offi cers who tried to arrest him. Not knowing they were police offi cers, he 
‘defended’ himself with a fi rearm. This mistake was also held to be excusable.132
Some Dutch courts even seem to suggest that the actor is justifi ed.133 By not 
making clear that the actor is excused due to his reasonable mistake,134 these 
decisions fuel mino rity opinions that view putative self-defence as actual self-
defence.135 In Eng land and Germany too, a reasonable mistake in self-defence has 
been categorized within self-defence as a justifi cation.136 I concede that it can be 
diffi cult to separate the putative from the regular defence. Consider that the 
aggressor is using an unloaded or fake fi rearm. Should the defendant merely be 
excused under putative defence for using defensive force or should he be justifi ed 
under actual self-defence?
The acceptance of mistakes as actual justifi cations follows from an objective ex 
ante assessment of justifi cations. For example, many scholars in Germany hold that 
the question of whether there is a danger, giving rise to necessity or self-defence 
must be carried out objectively ex ante. This brings about that if a danger or attack 
reasonably seemed to be present tempore delicti, the defendant does not have to rely 
on a putative version of necessity or self-defence when it turns out ex post there was 
really no danger or attack.137 If the fi rearm reasonably seemed real or loaded, an 
attack existed. Another example drawn from German law is the justifi cation of 
presumed consent. The consent based on reasonable indications does not become a 
mistake when it turns out later that the person concerned would not have consented, 
had he been able to express his opinion.138
If justifi cations ought to guide conduct, they should be assessed objectively ex 
ante. It can therefore be argued that a justifi cation should apply when this seems 
reasonable tempore delicti.139 However, if we focus on the position of the other 
party, such as the presumed aggressor, it would be better to merely excuse the 
defendant. When the defendant mistakes that he is being attacked, equalling 
putative to actual self-defence would prejudice the presumed aggressor, which is all 
the more problematic if that person is not at fault for the mistake. A putative 
justifi cation must be categorized as an excuse in order to enable this presumed 
aggressor to defend himself and in order for third parties to be able to intervene on 
behalf of the presumed aggressor. After all, if the putative defender would be 
justifi ed, this implies that any person defending himself against the unnecessary 
use of force cannot rely on self-defence. Self-defence is possible only against a 
132 Hof Den Haag 28 February 1997, NJ 1997, 373.
133 Ter Haar & Meijer 2009, pp. 88–91. See for example, Rb. Alkmaar 8 July 2008, LJN:BD6660.
134 See for example Hof Arnhem 21 January 2009, LJN:BH1023.
135 Like de Hullu 2006, pp. 312–313 and less explicit, Machielse 1986, p. 507, 539 and 693.
136 Like Roxin 2006, pp. 636–637. See also Tadros 2005, pp. 281 and 289–291; Fletcher 1985, pp. 
971–982 and Fletcher 1978, pp. 696 and 762–769.
137 See Bohlander 2009, p. 110; Roxin 2006, pp. 659 and 730 and Beulke 2008, p. 114. In contrast, 
Fischer, T. 2009, p. 305 favours an objective ex post evaluation.
138 Roxin 2006, pp. 636–637 and 822 and Beulke 2008, p. 132. See IX.5.4.2.
139 Husak 1989, pp. 508–518.
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wrongful, that is, non-justifi ed attack. This also follows from the principle to be 
discussed in the next chapter, that two opposing actors cannot both be justifi ed. 
Only one of the two acts can be lawful.140
5.5. Error in persona and aberratio ictus
In case the defendant is mistaken about the identity of the aggressor or if he misses 
the actual aggressor and hits a hostage, the view that a reasonable mistake can 
excuse is also most appropriate. The English doctrine that transfers defences, just 
like fault, from the intended to the actual object141 in these cases of error in persona 
and aberratio ictus must be rejected too. It is erroneous because it brings about that 
the defendant would be justifi ed in harming or killing an innocent, with all the 
aforementioned ramifi cations. Whereas dolus is generalis, justifi cations surely are 
not. Whereas the identity of the object is usually irrelevant for the offence defi nition, 
a justifi cation like self-defence gets its justifi catory character from the fact that it is 
directed against a wrongful aggressor. An offence committed against an innocent 
third party can only be excused.142
The German approach to these cases must be rejected as well. In the case where 
the defendant not only hit the aggressor but also the aggressor’s wife, he was 
acquitted through two particular approaches that have both been rejected. First, 
from this aberratio ictus, attempt liability followed as to the actual aggressor and 
negligence was established as to the injuries to the wife, who tried to restrain the 
aggressor. The attempt was justifi ed by self-defence, but this did not rub off on the 
negligent wounding of the wife of the aggressor, because she was not part of the 
attack. In a next step, this mistake was treated like a mistake on the facts giving rise 
to a justifi cation, which enabled the court to hold that the injuries to the wife were 
not negligent because the mistake was reasonable. After all, the defendant must 
have been in an emotional state and could not see anything at all.143 It is submitted 
that the most straightforward approach to an acquittal would be to excuse the 
defendant for the intentional injuries infl icted upon the wife since the mistake is not 
reproachable.144 A general part of criminal law for the EU should try to avoid 
unnecessary diffi cult doctrine.
140 Fletcher 1978, pp. 763–767; Fletcher 1998, pp. 90–91 and 161–162; Horder 1998, p. 147; Leverick 
2006, p. 165; Ashworth 2006, p. 230 and Greenawalt 1984, p. 1922. See VIII.3.6.
141 Simester & Sullivan, p. 157; section 24(2) of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, 
p. 53 and Williams 1953, p. 107.
142 See section 24(2) of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 53; section 32(2), Law 
Commission 1993, p. 112 and Bohlander 2010A.
143 30 November 1923 RGSt 58, 27.
144 If the collateral damage was unreasonable, complete liability for the intentional offence should 
follow, taking into account the special circumstances in sentencing.
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5.6. The distinction reconsidered
A putative defence should excuse, regardless of whether it is a mistake on the facts 
giving rise to the defence or whether it is a mistake on the scope of the defence. The 
defendant, who fatally shot a thief in the erroneous belief that the pertinent legal 
provisions allowed him to shoot at thieves, could invoke the excuse too.145 By 
contrast, the German approach is founded on the distinction between mistakes on 
the facts giving rise to a justifi cation and mistakes on the scope or existence of a 
justifi cation. The English approach is founded on this distinction too, as often, only 
the mistakes of the second category need to be reasonable.
However, that distinction is not always easy to make and gives rise to overlap. 
For example, mistakes on normative elements, like proportionality in self-defence, 
are considered to be mistakes on the scope of a justifi cation. However, if the 
defendant overestimated the nature and degree of aggressive force directed against 
him, a mistake on what degree of force is proportionate as a response can also be 
viewed as a factual mistake.146 Because the distinction is diffi cult to make, 
inconsistency and uncertainty can be avoided by applying one solution to both 
types of putative defences.
Nevertheless, the difference between the two categories of putative defences is 
relevant. A mistake on the scope of a defence can be seen as a species of a mistake 
as to the legal prohibition, which brings about even stricter requirements apply in 
order to excuse the defendant. A mistake on the conditions of a defence, such as the 
mistaken belief that the law allows one to shoot at thieves, is unlikely to be accepted 
as reasonable. Like a mistake of law, the mistake is even considered to be irrelevant, 
unless very special circumstances apply, such as that the chief of police had told the 
defendant that he could shoot at thieves. The broader defence of mistake as to the 
legal prohibition will be discussed in the chapter on excuses.
5.7. Putative excuses
Another distinction was made between putative justifi cations and putative excuses. 
Both categories should also be treated under one simple rule, which holds that the 
defendant is excused if the mistake was reasonable or unavoidable. The difference 
is that a putative excuse often appears to be a pleonasm; a mistake about a mistake. 
After all, most excuses already consist of a form of mistake. Self-defence-excess 
and duress can be viewed as putative versions of self-defence and necessity 
respective ly.147 Duress is about what the defendant reasonably believed the threat to 
145 HMG 6 October 1978, NJ 1979, 1. The justifi cation is article 42 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
146 1 July 1952 BGHSt 3, 194 and 9 May 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 530. See Bohlander 2009, p. 76.
147 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 353, 669 and 671; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 301 and Sangero 2006, 
p. 297.
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be and had good cause to fear.148 This means that both a correct and incorrect but 
reasonable belief qualify as regular duress. The defence of superior orders consists 
of a mistake too, namely on the legality or competence of the order.149 A reasonable 
mistake excuses the defendant under the defence; a lawful superior order would 
simply justify the actor. If excuses are framed to negate liability for reasonable 
mistakes, it follows that a mistake that is reasonable either qualifi es as the excuse or 
is rejected.150 There is no room left to excuse on the basis of a putative excuse.
Moreover, both mistaken and true facts have the same effect on the actor, 
namely that of psychological coercion.151 From a psychological perspective, there is 
thus no reason to separate putative duress from regular duress. However, if only the 
subjective perspective would be relevant, the normative character of duress is 
neglected. The law has set the limits of what can be excused, limits, which cannot 
be made dependent on the defendant’s perception of the law. Otherwise, any frailty 
of the defendant would lead to offences go unpunished. Normative aspects keep 
excuses within acceptable limits, making sure the interests of victims are also taken 
into account. Hence, even if there are mistakes that are not already encompassed by 
the regular excuse, these mistakes must always comply with the general rule of 
putative defences to negate criminal liability. For example, in order to excuse the 
defendant under duress, the mistaken fear must be unavoidable.152
Other putative excuses cannot acquit the defendant under any circumstances. 
Insanity and infancy do not include any subjective requirement. The defendant need 
not be aware of the circumstances giving rise to the defence, the assessment of the 
defence is purely objective. Therefore, the mistake of the defendant that the 
conditions of the defence are in fact fulfi lled is of no infl uence to criminal 
liability.153 It can thus be concluded that the scope of putative excuses is much 
smaller than that of putative justifi cations. It can now also be concluded on the issue 
of mistakes in criminal law, that only mistakes on the offence defi nition can be 
relevant to fault; all others mistakes can at best excuse the defendant.
6. THE DISTINCTION UNDER PRESSURE
In the previous paragraphs, several ramifi cations of the distinction between offence 
and defence were identifi ed. The principle of legality has been developed with a 
148 R. v. Graham [1981] EWCA Crim 5; Ormerod 2008, p. 329; Ashworth 2006, p. 222 and Beulke 
2008, p. 154.
149 Nieboer 1991, p. 264. See X.6.
150 See Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 19 on Boek I Titel III Inleidende opmerkingen.
151 Like Strijards 1987, pp. 118–119. See Roxin 2006, p. 987.
152 §35(2) of the German Criminal Code; Roxin 2006, pp. 987–988 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 702 and 713; Dolman 2006, p. 177; R. v. Graham [1981] EWCA Crim 5; R. v. Howe 
[1986] UKHL 4 and R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22.
153 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 367–368. This is an argument in favour of seeing insanity as an exemption 
rather than an excuse, see X.7.6.
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view to apply to the offence defi nition. It can also be applied to defences, but only 
in a more limited fashion due to the different nature of defences. Secondly, the 
burden of proof depends on whether something is part of the offence defi nition or 
not and third, the application of an affi rmative defence can bring about a special 
verdict, different from the acquittal that follows upon negation of an offence 
element.
In order to be held liable, the objective and subjective elements of an offence 
need to be proven. In order to be justifi ed or excused, the conditions of a defence 
must also be fulfi lled both objectively and subjectively. In dealing with deviations 
between objective reality and subjective perception, it became clear that such 
deviations can negate liability when they concern the offence defi nition, but that 
this is the exception when they relate to a defence.
First, if an offence defi nition is fulfi lled only objectively, for example because 
the defendant was ignorant of a circumstance that the offence requires knowledge 
on, the defendant is acquitted for his mistake.154 In contrast, the defendant cannot 
rely on a defence if he is unaware that it applies to his situation. Second, if the 
defendant thinks he has fulfi lled the offence defi nition, whereas this is objectively 
incorrect, there can be liability for impossible attempt at most. However, if the 
defendant mistakenly believes he has met the conditions of a defence, this is a 
putative defence and can at most excuse when reasonable.
6.1. Non-ideal offences
Because of these differences, the dichotomy of offence and defence is practically 
important. At the same time however, the dichotomy is put under pressure, when 
the absence of a defence is included in the offence defi nition. This can be the case 
when the offence includes terms like ‘without lawful purpose’ or the elements of 
wrongfulness and blameworthiness that defences negate. For example, in the 
Netherlands, wrongfulness is read into an offence element like ill-treatment.155 In 
England too, it is an essential element of all crimes of violence that the violence or 
threat thereof should be unlawful.156 We will call these ‘non-ideal offences’, as 
opposed to the ideal offence underlying the aforementioned structure of the offence, 
in which an affi rmative defence either justifi es the act or excuses the actor.157
Two important categories of non-ideal offences are reckless and negligent 
offences. Recklessness and culpa require an unreasonable risk. When a justifi cation 
is accepted, this brings about the risk was reasonable. A justifi cation therefore 
denies the offence elements of recklessness158 and culpa. When accepted, it leads to 
154 See V.2.4.
155 ‘Mishandelen’ in article 300 of the Dutch Criminal Code, see Kelk 2005, p. 154.
156 R. v. Gladstone Williams [1983] EWCA; Ormerod 2006, p. 453 and Law Commission 2006, p. 3.
157 Koopmans 2007, pp. 88–89 and Nieboer 1991, pp. 240–241. See also Gardner J. 2007, p. 151.
158 See IV.4.5.
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an acquittal.159 It is accepted in all three Member States that a justifi ed risk is not 
careless. For example, if the attacked person negligently injures the aggressor with 
a warning shot, the acceptance of self-defence negates culpa. I also explained that 
an excuse negates the subjective part of culpa.160 Negligent offences therefore 
subsume justifi cations and excuses, wrongfulness and blameworthiness.161
In these non-ideal offences, the acceptance of an affi rmative defence brings 
about that the offence defi nition is not fulfi lled. The defence negates an element of 
the offence. Justifi cations and excuses thus operate as a failure of proof defence, 
which implies they are treated like any other denial of the charge, such as an alibi or 
the claim that mens rea was lacking. These offences raise the question whether the 
distinction between offence and defence holds up. It is questioned whether the 
distinction is not arbitrary, depending merely on how the offence defi nition is 
drafted. I will however explain that there is in fact a material way to distinguish 
offences from defences. What should be encompassed by an offence is a normative 
question, not merely one of positive law.
Given the important ramifi cations of whether an element belongs to the offence 
or defence, it makes a lot of difference to the defendant whether the absence of a 
defence has been included into the offence defi nition or not. In general, the 
defendant will benefi t when this is included in the offence defi nition. In contrast to 
the regular situation, it implies that the defendant needs not be aware that the 
justifying circumstances are fulfi lled and that a putative defence negates intent.162 
Furthermore, when the implied elements of wrongfulness and blameworthiness are 
expressly included in the offence defi nition, they form part of the prosecutor’s case. 
This implies that the prosecutor has to prove the absence of all defences and that the 
defendant does not carry any burden of proof.163
The concept of non-ideal offences has attracted most attention in the 
Netherlands. This is quite logical if we consider the procedural signifi cance of the 
question under Dutch law. I already mentioned that of the three States, only a Dutch 
verdict distinguishes between an acquittal due to lack of proof and a ‘discharge’ 
because of the acceptance of an affi rmative defence. When the offence is non-ideal, 
the application of a justifi cation leads to an acquittal rather than a discharge.164 In 
159 Roxin 2006, p. 1077; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 299, 305 and 319; Beulke 2008, p. 99; 
Ormerod 2005, pp. 318–319 and Williams 1953, p. 574; Pompe 1935, p. 90; Dolman 2006, p. 88; 
Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 46–47 and Krabbe in Krabbe & Harteveld 1999, p. 133.
160 HR 19 February 1963, NJ 1962, 512; de Hullu 2006, p. 251 and Keulen & Otte 1999, p. 50. See 
also IV.6.5.
161 Koopmans 2007 pp. 100–103; de Hullu 2006, p. 257; Kelk 2005, p. 207 and Krabbe in Krabbe & 
Harteveld 1999, p. 131.
162 In German law, both mistakes on the offence defi nition and on the facts giving rise to a 
justifi cation negate intent, regardless of the offence defi nition, see VII.5.2.
163 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 58–59. On p. 608, they mitigate this difference by arguing that the 
prosecutor also bears the ultimate burden of disproving affi rmative defences.
164 Article 352 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; de Hullu 2006, p. 66 and Koopmans 2007 
pp. 88–103.
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the other two Member States, the offence is also not justifi ed: it is not fulfi lled. The 
difference is however hardly noticed, since the verdict is always an acquittal.
Practically more important is that Dutch courts can generally reject a failure of 
proof defence easier than a justifi cation or excuse.165 Therefore, much less 
motivation is also required from courts when they reject a justifi cation or excuse 
that formally operates as a failure of proof.166 For substantive law, this is important 
because the more diffi cult it is for courts to reject a defence, the wider the 
substantive scope of the defence tends to be. For example, the Dutch Supreme Court 
has in effect widened the scope of self-defence by quashing convictions for 
insuffi ciently motivating why self-defence did not apply.
6.2. Affi rmative or failure of proof defence
Although the application of defences to non-ideal offences implies that they should 
be treated as failure of proof defences, often they are treated not any different than 
affi rmative defences applying to ideal offences, thus requiring a defensive purpose, 
which the defendant has to raise it and so on. For example, even though self-defence 
often operates as a failure of proof defence, it is generally recognized and treated as 
a justifi cation.167
The practical consequences of a justifi cation, having the effect of denying the 
charge, has generally been accepted not to be an inconsistency of the three tiered 
framework of criminal liability and not even an exception, but as a technical legal 
issue with implications only for procedural aspects of law. No one would argue that 
it would no longer be up for the defendant to raise self-defence or that he need not 
act with a view to apply self-defence. Otherwise, the defendant, who unknowingly 
injured a mugger, would be acquitted of the charge of infl icting (wrongful) injuries, 
whereas he would have been convicted of any other offence that does not require 
wrongfulness, like homicide.
Another example is the application of consent to offences against the person. 
The permission of the person who was injured negates the express offence element 
of wrongfulness. However, the circumstance that consent technically negates an 
offence element does not bring about that it is no longer treated as an affi rmative 
defence: the defendant will only be able to rely on consent if he was aware of the 
other person’s permission for the injury.168 By contrast, in other contexts, consent 
not only technically operates as a failure of proof defence, but is also treated as 
165 Articles 358(3) and 359(2) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
166 Koopmans 2007, pp. 85–87 and 129 and Keulen & Otte 1999, pp. 55–56. This difference has 
been mitigated by case-law and the extension of the duty to motivate in article 359(2) of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, but never abolished completely, see Koopmans 2007 pp. 116–135.
167 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 176; Sangero 2006, p. 41 and Machielse 1986, pp. 699 and 702.
168 10 July 1962 BGHSt 17, 359; Roxin 2006, p. 571; Beulke 2008, p. 130 and Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 275.
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such. For example, rape is characterized by sexual intercourse without consent.169 
The absence of consent is an offence element and interpreted as such, not as the 
negative of the defence. If the defendant thought the other person consented, he did 
not intend to rape her.170 The question can be asked why consent is considered as a 
justifi cation in one offence and as a failure of proof in another, if in both cases they 
technically negate the charge. I will now attempt to explain the difference.
7. REAFFIRMING THE DISTINCTION
It can be explained why and when an affi rmative defence, that may seem to operate 
as a failure of proof defence, nevertheless should be considered and treated as an 
affi rmative defence. This explanation attempts to remove the doubt, caused by non-
ideal offences, on the distinction between offence and defence. It affi rms the 
framework of criminal liability by giving normative criteria on what should be 
included in the offence and what should be included in the defence part of criminal 
liability.
The explanation is grounded on two assumptions. First, the non-ideal offence 
element like wrongfulness can be distinguished from the implied element. The 
offence element can be given a specifi c meaning and thus be distinguished from the 
broader implied element. In this way, the affi rmative defence does not negate the 
specifi c meaning that is included in the offence, but relates to the broader implied 
element. Justifi cations and excuses retain their affi rmative character with all the 
aforementioned implications.
Secondly, this specifi c meaning follows from the typical character of the 
offence, wording or purpose of the legislator. In Directives that includes 
wrongfulness, the specifi c meaning of this element is often explicitly defi ned.171 A 
non-ideal offence element can be given a specifi c meaning if it gives the offence its 
essential character, like the lack of consent in rape. When a defence like consent 
negates that specifi c meaning, it should be treated as a failure of proof defence. 
Other justifi cations that are raised against this offence operate as affi rmative 
defences, because they do not deny the essence of the offence. In this way, a 
dogmatic explanation is provided why in most cases, the application of a 
justifi cation or excuse does not bring about that the conditions of that defence are 
made more lenient, just because it technically denies the charge.
169 See Section 1 of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003. §177 of the German Criminal Code and 
article 242 of the Dutch Criminal Code refer to coercion, which vitiates and is therefore the 
opposite of consent, see HR 13 September 2005, LJN:AT5834.
170 If consent were treated as an affi rmative defence, this putative defence could only negate 
liability if the mistake was reasonable. English law also requires a reasonable belief in the 
consent of the other, but this is put forwards simply as a statutory exception to the normal rules 
on mistakes on the offence defi nition, see V.2.4.2.
171 See article 2(a) of Directive 2008/99 of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law, OJ 2008 L 328/28.
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7.1. Different meanings of non-ideal elements
Starting with the fi rst assumption, a minority opinion in the Netherlands argues that 
when wrongfulness is included in offence defi nitions, it has a specifi c meaning. It is 
argued that a general defi nition of wrongfulness cannot be upheld for all offences. 
The purpose of including wrong ful ness into an offence like the deprivation of 
freedom is different from its inclusion in crimes of dishonesty. Wrongfulness is 
therefore often included into offence defi ni tions in many different ways, by terms 
such as ‘unlawful’, ‘wrongful’, ‘without permission’, ‘without necessity’, ‘without a 
licence’, ‘ill-treatment’ and so on.
This doctrine of ‘facet wrongfulness’ holds that the meaning of wrongfulness 
always depends on its wording and context. The term ‘facet’ refers to the feature 
that wrong ful ness only represents one aspect or facet of the broad concept of 
wrongful ness. This restricted meaning of wrongfulness in a specifi c offence should 
thus be distinguished from the broader meaning of wrongfulness as an implied 
element, which is negated by the application of justifi cations. In other words, it is 
denied that the offence element absorbs the implied element. Instead, the express 
and the implied element coexist.
The approach creates at least two different concepts of wrongfulness. One 
concept of wrongfulness is expressly included into the offence defi nition and has a 
specifi c meaning depending on the pertinent offence; another concept of implied 
wrongful ness is negated by justifi cations that do not relate to the specifi c meaning 
of the express element. The offence element of wrongfulness does not absorb all 
justifi ca tions. The offence defi nition is argued to contain only one specifi c meaning 
of wrong ful ness. Most justifi cations therefore do not negate the offence defi nition, 
but retain their status as an affi rmative defence.172
A similar proposal has been made as to negligent offences. The common view in 
the Netherlands is that the subjective part of negligence, which consists of 
blameworthiness, belongs to the offence defi nition. Therefore, the negation of this 
part by an excuse implies a denial of the offence.173 To overcome this implication 
and its ramifi cations, it has been argued that the concept of negligence could also be 
made narrower by excluding from it blameworthiness. In other words, the subjective 
part of negligence would be moved from the fi rst to the third tier of liability in the 
structure of the criminal offence. An excuse would not deny proof of the charge but 
negate the question on the blameworthiness of the actor, which would remain on the 
third tier of the framework. Excuses would then operate as affi rmative defences 
rather than as a failure of proof.174
This reasoning is already incorporated in the German structure of the criminal 
offence. Prevailing opinion in Germany views the subjective part of negligence as 
172 Kelk 2005, pp. 125–127; Fokkens & Machielse, notes 1–4 on Wederrechte lijk heid and Machielse 
1986, pp. 698–699.
173 Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on Schuld and Mevis 2006, pp. 607 and 632.
174 See de Jong, F. in Boone a.o. 2004 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 69–73, 121–123 and 294–295.
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belonging to blameworthiness. When an excuse is accepted to a negligent charge, 
the defendant is excused rather than the charge negated. I mentioned before that 
only this approach dogmatically enables the taking of measures against an insane 
person who committed a negligent offence.175 This positioning should therefore be 
favoured in European criminal law.
7.2. Essential element of the offence
In order to determine whether a justifi cation or excuse denies the specifi c meaning 
of the non-ideal offence element or whether it operates as an affi rmative defence, 
one has to determine the specifi c meaning. This is done by reference to the typical 
character of the offence, wording or purpose of the legislator. In Dutch law, the 
meaning of wrongfulness must be explained in each offence by reference to the 
‘typical wrong’ that the legislator aimed to combat by legislating this offence.176 
This typical wrong or character of an offence is referred to in England usually as 
the ‘essential element of the offence’. Just like in Germany, the offence defi nition 
should embody the typical infringement of a legal interest. Every offence has its 
individual label and characterizes its typical content of wrong in comparison to 
other offences and non-criminal conduct.177
For example, in most offences against property, the lack of consent is an 
essential ele ment. The offence’s typical character lies in the fact that something is 
done against the will or without permission of the party concerned.178 Therefore, 
the pro se cu tor should prove this; intention must be negated if the defendant was 
un aware of its absence and so on. In contrast, consent operates as an affi rmative 
defence against the charge of infl icting bodily injury, because the typical wrong of 
the offence is the injury itself. The qualifi cation of the injury as wrongful is not 
essen tial to its character. The German Supreme Court held that if wrongfulness 
does not constitute an essential part of the offence, its inclusion in the offence 
defi nition should be considered merely as a redundant referral to the implied 
element, as a remin der of the legislator to the judge that he must consider that a 
justifi cation might apply.179
This offence-specifi c approach can also explain why in relation to the same 
offence, a justifi cation sometimes becomes a failure of proof, whereas another 
justifi cation would simply justify the act. For example, the offence of damaging 
goods requires, amongst others, proof that the damage was infl icted wrongfully.180 
175 Roxin 2006, p. 1104; Beulke 2008, p. 342 and Bohlander 2009, p. 55. See IV.6.5.3.
176 Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on Wederrechtelijkheid.
177 R. v. Hunt [1987] AC 352; Beulke 2008, pp. 38 and 42; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 169–
170 and Kelk 2005, pp. 85–86 and 129–131. De Hullu 2006, p. 183 argues this ‘Typizität’ is not 
popular in the Netherlands.
178 Beulke 2008, p. 126.
179 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194 and Smith, J.C. 1989, pp. 45–47.
180 Article 350 of the Dutch Criminal Code. Intent need not relate to the wrongfulness.
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Wrongfulness in this context can be interpreted in line with the essence and 
purpose of the offence as damage that is carried out without permission. This 
explains why consent of the owner in regard to the damage operates as a failure of 
proof defence. On the contrary, other justifi cations cannot negate the offence-
specifi c meaning of wrong ful ness and therefore can only justify the actor. Consider 
the defendant who needed to protect himself against an attack of an unleashed dog. 
He succeeded in defending himself, but in doing so wounded the dog. The damage 
is wrongful in the meaning that the owner did not consent to it, but the defendant 
may invoke the justifi cation of necessity to justify his actions.181
The defendant who raises the consent of the owner in regard to the charge of 
infl icting wrongful damage thus need not even have known the owner consented to 
the damage. He can also not be convicted if he incorrectly thought the owner 
consented. By contrast, the defendant who protects himself against the dog does 
need to have been (at least) aware of the facts giving rise to necessity. Even though 
formally, the justifi cation becomes a failure of proof defence, it still requires a 
defensive purpose. Moreover, if he was mistaken on the need to protect himself, 
this putative defence can only excuse the defen dant, if that mistake was reasonable.
In the previous chapter, it was already explained that wrongfulness is included 
into offence defi nitions that relate to behaviour that is frequently carried out in 
accordance with the law, such as the destruction of property, sexual intercourse, the 
access to information systems and the detention of persons. Wrongfulness 
appropria te ly restricts the scope of the offence so it includes the essential wrong, 
safeguarding its typical character. If the absence of consent would not be an offence 
element, rape would be much too broad. If the deprivation of freedom need not to 
be wrongful, police offi cers would commit multiple offences a day.182
In that context, it was argued that dolus must relate to wrongfulness if it is an 
essen tial element of the crime. In this context, it is stressed that essential offence 
elements should be included into the offence defi nition. It does not suffi ce to argue 
that someone who has sexual intercourse can invoke consent as a defence. It would 
be inappropriate for the police offi cer to invoke his offi cial powers as a defence. 
Clearly, it is sensible to draft offence defi nitions so that they encompass the most 
common situations, leaving the rare situations for defences.183 Thus, in some cases, 
the defence should be included in the offence defi nition. It would it be ineffi cient to 
require all those people to raise the lack of wrongfulness as a defence to the 
offence.184
181 Self-defence can only be applied to human aggressors, see IX.3.4.1. Another example is that 
articles 405–407 of the Dutch Criminal Code refer to acts committed ‘without necessity’. In 
those offences, necessity operates as a failure of proof, whereas other justifi cations should be 
considered as affi rmative defences.
182 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194; de Hullu 2006, pp. 180–181; Bosch 2008, p. 165 and Mevis 2006, 
p. 591. See IV.2.4.7.
183 Nieboer 1991, pp. 229–230 and de Hullu 2006, p. 278.
184 See Koopmans 2007, p. 91.
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However, the decision of what to include in the offence should not be a mere 
matter of drafting ease and effi ciency. Requiring the actors above to raise a defence 
would also violate the typical character of the offence. In other words, the offence 
should encom pass actions, which there are prima facie reasons not to perform. It 
explains why a defence such as consent is sometimes part of the offence, such as 
absence of consent in rape, and sometimes not, like in assault. The reason for this is 
that there is a general reason not to assault people, whereas there is no general 
reason not to have sexual intercourse. The harm sought to criminalize is sexual 
intercourse without con sent, not plain sexual intercourse. Without wrongfulness in 
the offence defi nition, innocent conduct would be criminal.185
The distinction of offence and defence appreciates the difference between 
typical wrong and atypical situation of justifi cation. Criminal law should 
communicate that there has been committed no offence. It is inappropriate to 
require the defendant to raise a defence because that would imply that although the 
conduct is generally wrong, it was justifi ed in his circumstances. Instead, the 
conduct was not wrong at all. The distinction of offence and defence is crucial to 
the project of criminal law in communicating morally signifi cant distinctions. In 
conclusion, the application of defences to non-ideal offences therefore not 
undermines, but strengthens the distinction of offence and defence. It is useful and 
relevant to make the distinction. Now, it will be considered whether it is also useful 
and relevant to distinguish affi rmative defences into justifi cations and excuses.
185 Campbell in Dennis 1987, pp. 81–84; Gardner 2004, pp. 819–821; Duff 2004, pp. 830–831; 
Mevis 2006, p. 616; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 92 and Strijards 1987, pp. 2–4 and 15–17.
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CHAPTER VIII
JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES
The categorization of defences into justifi cations and excuses is very common in 
western criminal law. It is accepted in the Dutch, German and EU legal system and 
even if not accepted generally in England, it is at least well known. The application 
of a justifi cation means that criminal law acknowledges other norms that can 
prevail over the violation of the criminal norm. The application of an excuse is to 
adjust the requirements that apply to normal people in normal situations to the 
specifi c (abnormal) situations or people. Criminal law does not want to impose an 
unbearable burden.
The bifurcation plays an important conceptual and normative role in theory and 
practice. It makes a fundamental distinction between wrongfulness and blame-
worthi ness, between right and wrong, between act and actor, between an objective 
evaluation of all things considered and subjective reasons for acting. A justifi cation 
is the mirror image of wrongfulness, whereas the acceptance of an excuse negates 
blameworthiness. The dichotomy coincides with the second and third tier on the 
ladder of criminal liability. The fundamental character of wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness warrant a special position on the framework of criminal liability. 
Wrongfulness and blameworthiness are derived and thus infl uenced by the principle 
of harm and guilt respectively. A justifi cation is based on the principle ‘no 
punishment without wrongfulness’; an excuse if based on the principle ‘no 
punishment without guilt’.1
Before it will be discussed what the individual justifi cations and excuses of EU 
criminal law should look like, the dichotomy as such will be put under closer 
scrutiny. In more detail, it will be explained what justifi cations and excuses have in 
common, in what ways they differ and most importantly, what practical legal 
consequences this brings about. The consequences of the dichotomy have been 
questioned, and as a result, the dichotomy as such too. In this chapter, that criticism 
will be addressed, after which it will be concluded that even if some of the 
consequences are less important than generally accepted, there are many dogmatic 
and practical reasons to uphold the distinction of justifi cation and excuses.
1. HISTORIC ORIGINS
The distinction of justifi cation and excuse can be traced back to many sources. 
Already in 1625, Grotius discussed whether wars could be justifi ed. His concept of 
wars included what we would now include in self-defence. The term ‘causa 
justifi ca’ or justifying reason was introduced. In 1793, Gentz, a student of Kant, 
1 Nieboer 1991, pp. 239 and 260–261.
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used the example of two shipwrecked persons fi ghting for a plank that is only large 
enough to support one of them in order to illustrate the difference between 
justifi cations and excuses. When Kant himself discussed this case in 1797, he 
argued that the necessity of the situation does not make what is unjust lawful. 
However, no law can demand from a person that he sacrifi ces himself. Necessity 
knows no law. The certain threat of death will always weigh heavier that the 
possible death penalty. Thus, the act of violent self-preservation is not justifi ed, 
‘inculpable’, ‘unsträfl ich’, but merely excused, ‘impunible’, ‘unstrafbar’.2
The dichotomy is so self-evident in German and Dutch law that it is incorporated 
in legislation and case-law. The incorporation of the dichotomy in legislation is 
most visible in the provisions of certain defences in the Criminal Code of Germany. 
When the justifi cation of self-defence applies, the pertinent paragraph holds that the 
result is that the defendant does not act wrongful. If he is excused for exceeding the 
limits of self-defence, the defendant will not be punished. The acceptance of the 
excusing form of necessity, which will be called duress, is that blameworthiness is 
lacking.3 By contrast, the 1871 Imperial German Criminal Code did not yet make 
the distinction. The three partite structure of criminal liability was not introduced 
before the beginning of the twentieth century.4 Although currently self-evident, the 
dichotomy is therefore only recognized for about a century in law.5
In the Netherlands, the distinction was also not made before the twentieth 
century. The Dutch Criminal Code was drafted at the end of the nineteenth century, 
which explains why the Code does not differentiate between justifi cation and 
excuses, merely stating in defences that “he who … is not punishable.” Only after 
the Code had been enacted was the dichotomy acknowledged by scholars and 
applied to the existing defences by the judiciary.6 The Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1921 does incorporate the dichotomy. The judicial model of decision-
making in article 350 follows the three-tiered structure of criminal liability, 
separating the question of punishability of the act from that regarding the actor. 
This is commonly accepted to relate to the implied elements of wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness and therefore also to justifi cations and excuses.7
Even though the distinction is not such an important part of criminal legal 
doctrine in England as it is in Germany, in recent decades that difference has 
greatly diminished. Whereas two decades ago, English law still appeared to lack 
interest in the distinction for want of practical relevance,8 it has gained popularity 
2 Hruschka in Byrd & Hruschka 2007. This would nowadays therefore be called duress, to 
emphasize the excusatory nature of the confl ict of interests.
3 §§32, 33 and 35 of the German Criminal Code respectively.
4 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 37–41.
5 Roxin 2006, p. 963 submits the dichotomy has been accepted in German scholarship since 
approximately 1930.
6 Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on Uitsluiting en verhoging van strafbaarheid; Kelk 2005, p. 249 
and Nieboer 1991, pp. 242–243.
7 De Hullu 2006, pp. 273–274 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 45–46.
8 See Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 19 and Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 78.
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since then. It can be expected that this trend towards acceptance of the dichotomy 
and its implications will only continue in the years to come. It would be tempting to 
ascribe this trend to the infl uence of German legal thinking, as a result of German 
scholars publishing in English, Anglo-American scholars doing research on 
German law or by the interaction of German and Anglo-American scholars.9 It has 
nevertheless also been submitted that the distinction of justifi cation and excuse has 
its roots in the common law distinction between justifi able and excusable homicide.10 
The homicide is merely excused when the defendant was not an innocent person 
defending himself against an aggressor, but someone participating in a quarrel, who 
needed to kill his adversary to avoid immediate death.11
The lesser infl uence of the dichotomy in English law can be explained by a 
number of reasons. First and foremost, English lawyers and especially English 
courts are less concerned with dogmatic reasoning than they are with fi nding an 
acceptable outcome. To an English judge, the legal reason for the outcome is 
subsidiary. It does not matter whether the defendant is acquitted because of a 
justifi cation or excuse.12 To some, it does not even matter whether the defendant is 
acquitted because he is justifi ed, because he lacks intent or because he cannot be 
said to have caused the crime.13 The conceptualization of justifi cations and excuses 
is therefore only perceived as important as far as it brings about different legal 
consequences.
Secondly, the division of actus reus and mens rea is the traditional dichotomy in 
English law. As noted, when justifi cations and excuses came to the fore, they were 
often pigeonholed with actus reus and mens rea respectively. One result is that fault 
elements and blameworthiness are still often not clearly separated. This has been 
illustrated by cases where the defendant who acted under duress was said not to 
have acted with intent. Blameworthiness needs to be separated from mens rea in 
order to carve out conceptual space for excuses. This is increasingly recognized in 
English law, which therefore seems to make a similar development as in German 
and Dutch law. Just like German and Dutch law soaked off fault elements from the 
concept of blameworthiness (Schuld/schuld), English law now increasingly 
distinguishes blameworthiness from the concept of mens rea.14
9 For instance Bohlander 2008, Fletcher 1978 and Eser & Fletcher 1987 respectively.
10 Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 797–798; Fletcher 1998, p. 131 and Fletcher 1978, p. 857.
11 Finkel & Parrott 2006, pp. 207–208 and Blackstone 1979, pp. 183–188.
12 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 per Robert Walker LJ: “I do not think it matters whether 
these defences are regarded as justifi cations or excuses.”
13 Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1992] UKHL 5 per Bingham M.R.: “For 
present purposes I do not think it greatly matters whether one simply says that that is not an 
unlawful act, or that the doctor lacks criminal intent, or that he breaches no duty or that his act 
did not cause death.”
14 See III.5. and IV.2.4.1.
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2. CONTROVERSY
There is now widespread consensus in the legal systems under investigation that 
defences either relate to the wrongfulness of the act or the blameworthiness of the 
actor. Defences are therefore either justifi cations or excuses. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that the matter is uncontroversial. Even in the Netherlands and Germany, 
the demarcation of the categories, their rationale and the implications are all highly 
debated. First, whereas the classifi cation of defences is generally accepted, 
numerous examples have been given to question this. For example, whereas duress 
is an excuse, it has also been argued that where there is great disparity between the 
interest that saved and sacrifi ced, like when an actor is compelled under a threat of 
death to give the key of a safe, the actor should be justifi ed rather than excused.
Secondly, attempts have been made to describe the rationale or character of a 
justifi cation and excuse. These will be discussed in detail in the fi rst paragraphs of 
chapters IX and X. Monistic theories aim to give an all-encompassing rationale, 
which is applicable to all justifi cations or excuses. For example, justifi cations are 
often described as a confl ict of interests. By contrast, it has been argued that when a 
consenting party waives her interest, there is no confl ict of interests. As a result, 
pluralistic theories have gained popularity, such as that a justifi cation consists of 
either a superior or an absent interest.15
Third, the dichotomy brings about some implications. Amongst others, it is 
accepted that excuses only operate personal, whereas justifi ca tions are universal. A 
justifi  cation thus applies to all perpetrators and accomplices of an offence. However, 
as will also be explained in more detail below, in some situations, a justifi cation 
should operate only personally. Therefore, whereas these practical implications 
make the categorization of defences highly relevant, they are controversial too.16
As a result of all the controversy, English scholars in particular, have criticized 
the dichotomy and advan ced other categorizations instead.17 The dichotomy sits 
much easier with US scholars, which can in part be explained by the Model Penal 
Code’s recognition of the dichotomy. Amongst these alternative categoriza tions, 
one often fi nds a separate category of mental condition defences. As will be 
explained at the end of this chapter, I also believe there are good reasons to 
distinguish so-called exemptions like insanity from justifi cations and excuses. 
There are also Dutch scholars who have put the dichotomy in perspective.18 In 
German law, by contrast, one will almost only fi nd proposals to modify or extend 
the dichotomy. The dichotomy as such is widely accepted.
15 See IX.1.
16 For example, Gur-Arye 1986, pp. 71–89 denies the implications of the distinction.
17 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 611–612; Ormerod 2005, pp. 248–249 and Ormerod 2008, p. 271.
18 Like Knigge 1993, pp. 37–39 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 271, 274–276, 298 and 360.
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3. DIFFERENCES
I will now discuss the differences between justifi cation and excuse and practical 
consequences thereof in detail. I will assess whether the criticism vented against 
these differences is warranted, after which I conclude which differences hold up.
3.1. Communication
The most fundamental rationale of the distinction is that a justifi cation negates the 
wrongfulness of the act; an excuse negates the blameworthiness of the actor.19 This 
brings about a communicative difference. A conviction communicates the reproach 
towards the perpetrator, makes clear that he should be condemned for doing what 
he did. Preventive purposes are served by making clear that this conduct is criminal, 
signalling that it will be punished. A difference can be made between acquitting the 
defendant who did not commit the crime at all, and acquitting the defendant who 
committed the crime but was justifi ed in doing so, because of, for example, self-
defence.
The dichotomy of justifi cation and excuse enables an even more nuanced 
communication. There is a moral difference between having acted, all things 
considered, in accordance with the legal order and merely being excused because you 
cannot be blamed for having infringed the norms of the legal order. The defendant 
who raises an excuse confi rms the wrongdoing and merely seeks to assert an 
explanation for his conduct. Not only lawyers can understand this difference.20 
Because of the natural character of this difference, it is therefore both feasible and 
desirable for courts to explain why someone is granted a defence.21 This can be done 
by creating a special verdict, such as ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’,22 but it can also 
be done simply by explaining clearly in the judgment why the defendant is acquitted.23
In legal terms, wrongfulness constitutes the law’s socio-ethical condemnation of 
the act, whereas blameworthiness constitutes a social-ethical reprimand against the 
actor.24 The acceptance of an excuse makes clear to the defendant and the public 
that what he did was wrong, whereas the acceptance of a justifi cation denies that 
what the defendant did was wrongful in the eyes of the legal order. The distinction 
can explain why it is relatively easier for a court to excuse a defendant than to justify 
his conduct. An excuse does not deny the prima facie wrong of the offence; it also 
19 Krey 2003, pp. 12–13; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 578; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 609; 
Ashworth 2006, p. 97; Ormerod 2005, p. 248; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 55 and Fokkens 
& Machielse, note 13 on art. 41.
20 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 26–27.
21 Leverick 2006, pp. 40–41; Tadros 2005, pp. 120 and 266; Greenawalt 1984, pp. 1900–1901 and 
Robinson 1982, pp. 245–248.
22 See Section 2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883.
23 See Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 27.
24 Krey 2003, pp. 12–13 and 18–19 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 65.
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does not deny the wrongfulness of the act all things considered. The excuse does not 
threaten the general application of norms and thereby the authority of the legislator. 
Instead, it strengthens the general injunction by admitting its wrongful character.
The effect of the dichotomy has been summarized as that it “gives a clearer 
response to the public at large as to how they should relate to an acquittal, and holds 
greater educational value, clarity, and guidance for behaviour.”25 If the distinction 
is not made, there is a danger that the public believes that excused conduct is 
labelled as legal or justifi ed. Because of that danger, courts may become unwilling 
to excuse the defendant, fearing that this message will be misinterpreted. The result 
of such fears is that excuses are framed very limited or rejected altogether.26 A 
clear-cut example is the conviction of an English court of the crew of the 
Mignonette, who ate the cabin boy when they were cast away to feed upon his body. 
The excuse of duress was rejected because the court feared the public would 
misunderstand their acquittal as a vindication of their actions.27
3.2. Rationale and conditions
Another implication of the categorization is that it affects its rationale and 
conditions.28 Theoretical structuring infl uences the law as it is. For example, to 
categorize self-defence as an excuse would limit the defence to only the most 
important interests and impose a strict duty to retreat, because only then the actor 
does not have any alternative.29 By focusing on the justifi catory nature of self-
defence, stricter limits are placed on proportionality. It has also been argued that if 
a defence is a justifi cation, the fact that the defendant can be reproached for causing 
the conditions of his defence is not relevant, because it does not change the justifi ed 
character of his conduct. In contrast, this prior fault does affect an excuse like 
duress because the person who acts wrongful cannot be exculpated if he has done 
something blameworthy.30
3.3. Enabling measures
From a German and Dutch point of view, the dichotomy facilitates the distinction 
between measures and punishment. Punishment presupposes blameworthiness, 
whereas measures merely require a wrongful act. Therefore, by excusing the insane, 
they cannot be punished, but measures of rehabilitation or incapacitation can be 
ordered against them. It is also sometimes argued that forfeiture of assets, the losing 
25 Sangero 2006, p. 15.
26 See also Sangero 2006, p. 16 and Tadros 2005, p. 266.
27 R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 and Fletcher 2007, pp. 321–324. See IX.4.5.3.
28 Fletcher 1978, p. 855.
29 Sangero 2006, p. 38 and Fletcher 1978, p. 855.
30 De Hullu in Verbruggen, Verstraeten, van Daele & Spriet 2005, p. 55 and Roxin 2006, p. 751.
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of rights and civil compensation is still possible when the defendant is excused, in 
contrast to when the act is justifi ed.31 Defendants therefore prefer to be justifi ed 
rather than merely excused. However, it is clear that measures can also be taken in 
all three legal systems without the establishment of a wrongful act. The deprivation 
of illegally obtained advantage for example, can also relate to offences that have 
never been charged or proven.32 Secondly, a person can also be admitted to a mental 
hospital based on other fi elds of law, which do not require a (wrongful) act.
The perspective one takes on this supposed distinction is very much related to 
the perspective one takes on the nature of justifi ed conduct. Does a justifi cation 
make conduct right or does it merely make it not wrongful? Does the acceptance of 
a justifi cation communicate that the conduct is commendable or merely that it is 
permissible? The latter, in my eyes correct view, brings about that the above-
mentioned implication also collapses. Even when the defendant sacrifi ces a lesser 
interest of a third party in justifying necessity, it can still be fair to require him to 
compensate that third party.33 The wrongfulness of the act is not completely 
negated. A degree of wrongfulness, suffi cient for compensation in civil law 
remains. Similarly, the application of an excuse does not preclude blameworthiness 
in a civil law sense.34
3.4. Complete or partial negation of the implied element
There is another way to frame the abovementioned question. This is to ask whether 
a justifi cation completely negates or merely diminishes the implied element of 
wrongfulness. Both questions are controversial in all three States. Broadly 
speaking, three approaches are taken. Obviously, the fi rst is to argue in favour of 
complete and the second in favour of partial negation of wrongfulness. Both 
approaches thus agree that the justifi cation of conduct at a minimum implies that it 
is permissible. The contro versy relates to the question whether justifi ed conduct can 
also be right, and thus, whether wrongfulness is also completely negated. A third, 
differentiated approach, is to argue that in some instances justifi ed conduct is right, 
whereas in other it is merely permissible.
In contrast to this controversy regarding justifi cations, it is widely accepted that 
excuses do not completely negate the reproach of blameworthiness, but abstain 
from this reproach due to empathy for the situation of coercion or confl ict. The 
effect of an excuse like duress is that it limits the degree of blameworthiness to a 
degree that falls short of the threshold for criminal liability. This is the common 
31 See Fletcher 1978, p. 761; Robinson 1982, p. 290; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 608 and Ormerod 
2005, pp. 247–248. Under the old common law, an excusable homicide still led to the forfeiture 
of the actor’s property, see Sangero 2006, p. 33 and 35.
32 See Harry van Offeren v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 19581/04, 5 July 2005.
33 Fletcher 1978, p. 761.
34 Fokkens & Machielse, note 13 on art. 41 and note 1 on Schuld; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 590 and Roxin 2006, pp. 613–615.
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view in German law.35 By contrast, a justifi cation does not operate in degrees; it is 
either wrongful or justifi ed. Its acceptance thus completely negates the implied 
element of wrongful ness.36 This perspective brings about that a justifi cation is 
viewed as commendable or right conduct.
In contrast, prevailing opinion in the Netherlands seems to be that both 
justifi cations and excuses only reduce wrongfulness and blameworthiness to a level 
insuffi cient for criminal liability, implying that a residue of wrongfulness and 
blame worthiness is left. If a complete negation would be required, too much may be 
demanded before a defence would be accepted.37 Accordingly, it has been sub-
mitted that justifi ed conduct is permissible, not good or right conduct.38 Many 
German scholars also argue that justifi ed conduct is merely permissible conduct.39 
The acceptance of a justifi cation communicates that the actor’s conduct is not 
censured and thereby tolerated. It does not communicate a positive valuation of the 
act.40
In English law, the issue is hardly ever related to the impact on the implied 
elements of criminal liability, which is obvious, given the lack of a clear recognition 
of the implied elements. It is simply argued by some that the justifi cation implies 
the actor did the right thing, whereas more argue it merely implies that conduct is 
permissible.41 The most popular approach in England is a differentiated one. It is 
argued that in some instances, a justifi cation legalizes the behaviour or harm 
caused. In other instances, it is perceived as only permissible. Self-defence, for 
example, is considered right when the defendant used only moderate force against a 
serious attack. By contrast, it tends to be considered as merely permissible when the 
force used to avert the attack was less proportionate or when the defendant provoked 
the attack.42 Some German scholars take a similar approach.43
35 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 57–58 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 626–627 and 
701. Other excuses like insanity and mistake of law are said to completely negate all 
blameworthiness.
36 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 171.
37 De Hullu 2006, p. 274–275; den Harder 2006; Strijards 1987, pp. 36–37 and Fokkens & 
Machielse, note 1 on Schuld. See also Kelk 2005, p. 250–252. The Dutch legal terminology for 
excuse, ‘schulduitsluitingsgrond’, implies the opposite.
38 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 16–17 and Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 2 on Boek I Titel III Inleidende 
opmerkingen. See Hof Amsterdam 9 December 2005 LJN:AU7731. In contrast, see AG 
Remmelink in HR 1 March 1983, NJ 1983, 468 and Strijards 1987, p. 37.
39 Beulke 2008, p. 96.
40 Roxin 2006, p. 600 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 579–582.
41 A residue or remainder of wrongfulness also follows from the consideration that the justifi ed 
killing in self-defence does not eliminate the prima facie reasons against killing, see Campbell 
in Dennis 1987 and Gardner 2004, p. 819. Partial negation is also accepted by US scholars 
Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 111; Greenawalt 1984, p. 1905 and Husak 1989, p. 500.
42 Horder 2006A, pp. 99–101; Robinson 1982, p. 214; Husak 1999, p. 52 and Duff 2004, p. 832.
43 Günther in Seebode 1992. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 600–601 and Mitsch 2007, p. 201.
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Another differentiated approach in England separates strong from weak 
justifi ca tions.44 This also resembles the distinction made in German law between 
proper justifi  ca tions like self-defence on the one hand that ground a ‘right to 
interfere’, and weaker justifi cations like presumed consent on the other, that merely 
provide for a ‘licence to act’. The latter do not affect the wrongfulness of the act, 
but lead to the con clu sion that it would be unfair to punish the defendant.45 This 
second differen tiated approach differs from the previous one by holding all 
accounts of self-defence as right conduct, completely negating wrongfulness, 
regardless of the specifi c circum stances of the case. This subtle distinction between 
the complete negation and partial reduction of implied elements lacks direct 
practical relevance and is no longer made in the following sections. It will simply be 
stated that the acceptance of a justifi cation or excuse negates wrongfulness or 
blameworthiness respectively.
3.5. Personal and universal application
Perhaps the most important practical implication of the dichotomy is that justifi ca-
tions are believed to have a universal character, whereas excuses operate only 
perso nally. This means that if someone is justifi ed, a third party may assist that 
person, whereas if that someone is merely excused, a third party may not intervene. 
For example, if the defendant helped someone who was using force in self-defence, 
he will not be liable for aiding and abetting. In contrast, if that someone was 
coerced to injure another, the defendant will be liable for helping that excused actor. 
The defendant was not personally coerced to injure the victim.46
Whereas it is generally accepted that excuses apply only personally,47 the 
question whether justifi cations also apply to other participants or accomplices is 
again very controversial. This is often accepted based on the perspective that 
justifi ed conduct is said to produce a net benefi t and therefore no wrong. It should 
therefore be supported by the legal order, by making clear that others are allowed to 
help the justifi ed actor. Moreover, a justifi cation relates to the conduct, not to a 
specifi c defendant. Whereas excuses apply because of the understandable subjective 
reasons for a defendant to commit a crime, justifi ed conduct is objectively right. It 
should therefore apply to all perpetrators of that conduct. This is refl ected in the 
national doctrines on participation. Participation is only possible in a wrongful act, 
44 Dressler 1987, p. 1161 and Duff 2004, p. 832.
45 Bohlander 2009, pp. 78–79.
46 Ormerod 2008, p. 269; Fletcher 1978, pp. 761–762; Tadros 2005, pp. 281–282; Sangero 2006, 
p. 13; 20 June 1932 RGSt 66, 288; Roxin 2006, p. 964; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 578 
and 701; Bernsmann 1996, p. 184; Bosch 2008, pp. 171 and 184; Kelk 2005, p. 300 and Fokkens 
& Machielse, note 14 on art. 41.
47 R. v. Quick [1973] QB 310; §29 of the German Criminal Code; Bohlander 2009, p. 115 and 
Beulke 2008, p. 148. In contrast, see Husak 1989, pp. 493–495 and 519–520.
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so a justifi cation applies to all participants.48 Liability of the participant is derived 
from the wrongful act. Liability is thus accessorial in a limited way, for it does not 
require criminal liability of the principal, who may be excused.49
Prevailing opinion in Germany follows this reasoning strictly and holds that 
justifi cations are universal. On the contrary, the most popular approach in England 
and the Netherlands is a differentiated one. Although as a rule, a justifi cation 
operates to all participants and accomplices, there may be instances where this is 
not the case. A differentiation can be made with a view to the role of the individual 
defendant. For example, a justifi cation is not universal when two people use force 
against an attacker, whereby one of them exceeds the amount of proportionate 
force. It can only be argued that the other is justifi ed. Or, consider that one of the 
defenders is a police offi cer. Whereas the other, a citizen, is required to retreat, the 
police offi cer is not. The fact that the police offi cer is justifi ed in using force, does 
not rub off on the citizen, which is inconsistent with a universal application of 
justifi cations. It has therefore been argued that all defences should be assessed 
according to each participant or individual. After all, defences always appeal to 
exceptional circumstances, which are predominantly determined by specifi c 
circumstances of the case for a specifi c defendant.50
It can even be argued that a justifi cation always operates personally, if we recall 
that every justifi cation requires a defensive purpose. As explained before, the 
defendant must at least be aware of the justifying circumstances. A defensive 
purpose implies that a justifi cation is personal, based on the subjective beliefs of the 
person who relies on it.51 If an old lady is being mugged, the defendant who uses 
force against the mugger for the joy of beating this person up will not be justifi ed if 
he does not know the lady was being attacked. It can be concluded therefore, that 
even though the implication is well known and often applied, it is by no means a 
general rule. It seems inconsistent with the requirement of a defensive purpose and 
fails to appreciate other personal features of justifi cations. Accordingly, it should be 
rejected in a general part of EU criminal law.
3.6. Incompatibility
The incompatibility rule holds that two opposing parties cannot both be justifi ed. 
Justifi cations are therefore ‘incompatible’. Self-defence against self-defence is 
impossible. This already follows from the condition of that justifi cation that the 
48 Beulke 2008, p. 100.
49 Bohlander 2009, pp. 167–168.
50 De Hullu 2006, p. 358 and Holland 1989, p. 244. Article 50 of the Dutch Criminal Code has been 
interpreted as meaning that all defences operate personal, see de Hullu 2006, pp. 358–359 and 
Nieboer 1991, pp. 242–243, but it has also been argued that is says nothing more than that 
personal defences only operate personally, see Kelk 2005, pp. 250 and 301.
51 It could also be argued that a defensive purpose is inconsistent with the universal character of a 
justifi cation and should therefore not be required. See VII.4.
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attack that is averted must be wrongful. Since a justifi ed attack is not wrongful, the 
party opposing that attack cannot rely on self-defence. In other words, when a 
person is justifi ed in infringing a legal interest of another in necessity or self-
defence, that person cannot rely on self-defence to stop the infringement. This 
condition, like the rule of incompatibility, prevents escalation of confl icts and 
makes sure that the message of the law is univocal: only one of two opposing parties 
can be justifi ed.52 In contrast, self-defence can be applied against the actor who is 
merely excused, such as the person who is coerced under duress to rob you.
The incompatibility of justifi cations is generally accepted in the Netherlands53 
and in Germany,54 but whereas many US scholars also argue in favour of it,55 there 
is hardly any support for it in English law.56 The rule follows from the other 
implications. If a justifi cation completely negates wrongfulness and operates 
universally, it may not be resisted.57 If the force was justifi ed under self-defence, 
the victim has to endure or tolerate this and others are not allowed to intervene. If 
conduct is merely excusable, the victim and others are allowed to act against the 
excused actor.58 That implication was rejected because in some situations where 
two actors act jointly against another, only one of those actors can be justifi ed. A 
personal application of justifi cations is however not inconsistent with the 
incompatibility rule. The rule is also in line with the communicative difference 
between justifi cations and excuses and therefore adopted.
3.7. Order of assessment
From the structure of criminal liability, it follows that the logical order of assessing 
defences is that justifi cations precede excuses. As laid down in article 350 of the 
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge must determine fi rst whether the act 
was wrongful before investigating the blameworthiness of the defendant. It needs to 
be asked what the defendant can be blamed for. A person cannot be reproached to 
have done something good. Conversely, what is justifi ed need no longer be excused. 
Justifi cations are therefore assessed before excuses.59 This order of assessment 
52 Or both actors can be excused, see Sangero 2006, pp. 284–285 and Fletcher 1978, p. 767.
53 HR 27 May 1986, NJ 1987, 8; AG Knigge in HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509; Mevis 2006, 
p. 621; Kelk 2005, p. 284 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 41.
54 8 May 1990 BGH NStZ 1990, 435; 26 October 1993 BGHSt 39, 374 and Roxin 2006, pp. 661–
662.
55 Greenawalt 1984; Robinson 1982, pp. 273–275; Fletcher 1978, p. 830 and Husak 1999, p. 43.
56 Tadros 2005, p. 291 even rejects it.
57 It has thus also been argued that ‘permissible justifi cations’ might confl ict, see Husak 1999, 
p. 55.
58 Krey 2003, pp. 18–19; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 578 and Beulke 2008, p. 100.
59 Strijards 1987, p. 40; Pompe 1935, p. 18; Peters, A.A.G. 1966, p. 144; Nieboer 1991, p. 74; van 
Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 13; Dolman 2006, p. 89; de Hullu 2006, p. 356; Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, p. 701; Beulke 2008, p. 27; Daly 1978, p. 381; Husak 2005, p. 291; Hall 1976, p. 640; 
Greenawalt 1984, p. 1899; Fletcher 1985, p. 958; Fletcher 1978, p. 798 and Baron 2005.
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warrants the analogy of the three pillars of criminal liability with three rungs of a 
ladder,60 or with three stories of a building.61
Again, whereas many US scholars accept this, there exists no general rule on the 
hierarchy of defences in English law.62 This reluctance to incorporate the distinction 
can also be explained by the preference for ‘fl at legal reasoning’. In contrast to an 
ordered, three tiered structure of criminal liability, English law used to, and still 
tends to apply a ‘holistic approach’ in assessing criminal liability, whereby order of 
assessing the elements of criminal liability is irrelevant. The main elements of the 
crime, actus reus and mens rea are put on the same footing, and the order of 
assessing is considered immaterial.63
In contrast, the logic mentioned above dictates that the order of assessment is 
accepted. Moreover, a binding order of assessing criminal liability can make the 
scope of criminal liability clearer, more consistent, more rational and better to be 
predicted. It facilitates a critical evaluation of criminal decisions by higher courts 
and scholars, which would again strengthen values of consistency and certainty.
3.8. Conclusion
It can be concluded that although the line of criticism raised against some 
differences of justifi cations and excuses is legitimate, most of them hold up. Even if 
in legal comparison, it is not accurate to state that only the application of an excuse 
enables measures, that only justifi cations completely negate their mirror image or 
that a justifi cation always operates universally, there are still many other differences 
that warrant making the distinction between justifi cation and excuse.64
It has been argued that the dichotomy, by making a distinction between 
condemning the act and condemning the defendant, enables important 
communicative functions of the law. If that difference is not made, there is a risk 
that excuses are applied restrictively. Further, the conditions of individual defences 
are infl uenced by the category to which they belong. Amongst others, the 
justifi catory defences have stricter requirements of proportionality. It has also been 
confi rmed that justifi cations are incompatible and that the distinction is important 
to structure the order of legal reasoning. Therefore, the distinction is useful. It 
serves a practical purpose and should be maintained in a general part of criminal 
law for the EU.
60 Horder 2006A, pp. 99–101. See also III.4.
61 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 23.
62 Ormerod 2008, p. 269 and Baron 2005.
63 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 22–23; Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 74–75 and 81–83 
and Fletcher 1985, p. 951.
64 Another difference accepted in German law is that a mistake on the facts underlying a 
justifi cation is said to negate intention whereas similar mistakes relating to excuses, can at most 
excuse. This was rejected for a general part of EU criminal law in VII.5. Putative defences 
should be treated alike.
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CHAPTER IX
JUSTIFICATIONS
After discussing the rationale(s) of justifi cations, the meaning and requirements of 
its mirror image, wrongfulness, will be explained. Subsequently, it will be argued 
what self-defence, necessity and consent should look like in a general part of 
criminal law for the EU. This synthesis will be presented from the common ground 
of the different sources, pausing at signifi cant legal differences. A choice will be 
made in favour of one of those approaches or even another one, taking into account 
the aforementioned criteria such a consistency and legal certainty.
1. RATIONALE
Whereas offences are static, justifi cations bring a dynamic element of social change 
into the doctrine of the criminal offence.1 Whereas offence defi nitions either 
prohibit or command certain conduct, the permissive rules enshrined in 
justifi cations recognize that in exceptional cases, the conduct is not wrongful. The 
criminalization therefore does not apply in concreto.2 Justifying conduct means 
that the general norm was not meant to apply to this special case or these kinds of 
special cases.3 Alternatively, it means that criminal law acknowledges other norms 
that can prevail over the violation of the criminal norm. All things considered, the 
infringement of the legally protected interest is permitted.4
An all-encompassing rationale for justifi cations holds that “all justifi cations 
constitute an appropriate means to a proper end.”5 Under the lesser evils theory, the 
harm caused is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further 
a greater societal interest.6 It seems that the currently, the most popular approach is 
the compromise of a pluralist theory of justifi cations, which combines the latter 
theory of ‘superior interest’ with one that includes justifi cations like consent under 
the limb of ‘absent interest’.7 After all, it has been argued that in consent, there is 
no confl ict of interests. The waiver of legal protection simply brings about that there 
is no infringed interest.8
1 Roxin 2006, pp. 615–616.
2 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 46–47.
3 Bosch 2008, p. 164.
4 Nieboer 1991, p. 244 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 157.
5 Sangero 2006, p. 89.
6 Robinson 1982, p. 214; Tadros 2005, p. 271 and Roxin 2006, p. 616.
7 Eser in Eser & Fletcher 1987, pp. 48–49; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 580–581 and 590–
591; Roxin 2006, p. 615–618 and Sangero 2006, p. 90.
8 Like Roxin 2006, pp. 545–555 and Ashworth 2006, p. 318.
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This view can however be put into perspective by focusing on the legitimate 
purpose of the activity that is consented to. When a patient consents to surgery, two 
interests can be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the patient is sure to be in pain after 
the surgery and risks a further deterioration of his medical condition is the surgery 
does not have the desired result. However, if he does not consent to surgery, the 
consequences for his health may even be worse. The patient, or someone else when 
is he incapable to decide, thus chooses in favour of the lesser of two evils.9
All justifi cations can thus be covered by the lesser evils theory. What makes the 
justifi ed conduct, all things considered, at least permissible to the legal order, is the 
belief that it objectively creates a net benefi t. In other words, every justifi cation is 
based on a weighing of interests, which results in choosing in favour of the 
prevailing interest. It follows that proportionality is a general rule of all justifi ca-
tions. In contrast, excuses centre on the personal reasons that forgive the defendant 
for exceeding the objective limits of proportionality.
The fact that someone is allowed to kill in order to avert being raped does not 
mean that the justifi cation of self-defence allows for disproportional conduct. Instead, 
the weighing of interests is not merely concerned with the contrasting legal interests 
involved, which are in this case, the life of the aggressor versus the sexual and/or 
bodily integrity of the attacked person. More abstract interests are also important, 
including the reproach that can be made against the aggressor for creating the confl ict, 
as well as the harm to the legal order which the completion of the wrong ful attack 
would bring about. The lack of a wrongful attack in necessity thus also explains why 
the requirements of proportionality are stricter with regard to that justi fi ca tion.
2. WRONGFULNESS
As noted, implied elements of criminal liability like wrongfulness and blameworthi-
ness seek to impose the application of certain substantive values that are not 
necessa ri ly contained in the individual statute. Although to some extent, positive 
law also safeguards this, these values are not all of legislative origin. Rather, they 
can be traced back to a legal tradition. As a product of legal, political, philosophical 
and moral experience, it serves as a protection against unfettered and arbitrary state 
power versus the individual. They are a minimum condition for just punishment.10
Wrongfulness in this meaning ensures that only conduct that violates the norms 
of the legal order, all things considered, is punishable. An additional control takes 
place on the level of wrongfulness. Because wrongfulness is required for criminal 
liability, justifi cations can preclude liability. The implied element of wrongfulness 
does not refer to the illegality of the conduct, the fulfi lment of the offence defi nition, 
9 If there is no legitimate purpose to contrast, consent does not apply, see IX.5.3.
10 Naucke 1984, pp. 316–320.
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but to the material wrongfulness.11 The act is only wrongful in a material way when 
it expresses a social damaging violation of a legal interest that should be fought by 
the criminal law.12 Material wrongfulness is indicated upon acceptance of the 
fulfi lment of the offence defi nition, but given only when no justifi cations apply.13
3. SELF-DEFENCE
On the one hand, self-defence is the most popular and self-evident defence of all.14 
On the other hand, its scope and application consistently give rise to controversy, 
evidenced by much public debate and an enormous amount of case-law on the topic. 
First, it will be explained that this controversy follows from contrasting views on 
the rationale of self-defence. By exclusively focusing on the person attacked, or by 
forfeiting the rights of the aggressor, self-defence can become a very broad defence, 
justifying even the most serious offences. By taking into account the whole legal 
order, more limitations on the defence seem warranted. It will be explained that 
self-defence is a justifi cation, grounded in the weighing of interests. All interests or 
rationales should therefore be taken into account.
Subsequently, the conditions of the justifi cation will be discussed. This will 
again be done in an integrated manner, focusing on what the concept should look 
like in the EU, whilst highlighting national differences. It is concluded that the 
national legal criteria have been moving towards each other. After all, in 
comparison to a few decades ago, the German scope of self-defence has been 
restricted, whereas the Dutch concept has been extended. Nowadays, the concepts 
fi nd each other in the middle. As a result, the most signifi cant difference between 
the Member States is that there exists no excusatory form of self-defence in 
England. This problem will be addressed in the chapter on excuses.
3.1. Rationale
Self-defence has been grounded in diverging rationales. Accordingly, there exist 
different views on the question what the ideal or dominant rationale of self-defence 
should be. Monistic theories are losing ground to theories that ground self-defence 
in a combination of rationales.15 In England, self-defence is most often based on the 
autonomy of the attacked person and the culpability of the aggressor. The double 
rationale that is prevailing in the Netherlands and Germany is based on the natural 
11 De Hullu 2006, p. 179; Strijards 1987, pp. 1–11; Kelk 2005, p. 124; Bosch 2008, p. 170; Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 137–138 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 171.
12 Roxin 2006, pp. 601–602.
13 Kelk 2005, pp. 123–124; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 81 and Beulke 2008, p. 41.
14 Müssig 2003, p. 224; Leverick 2006, p. 1 and Leverick 2007, pp. 563–564.
15 14 June 1972 BGHSt 24, 356; Roxin 2006, p. 656; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 639–640; 
annotator Keijzer in HR 8 April 2008, NJ 2008, 312 and Machielse 1986, pp. 523–524.
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right to defend oneself on the one hand and the preservation or protection of the 
whole legal order on the other.16
3.1.1. Natural right
First and foremost, defending oneself can be seen as a natural right. This 
rationale has been dominant until the 19th century, after which the rationale of 
the legal order grew in importance.17 Historically, it is grounded in the right of 
self-preservation of man.18 It is argued that before the formation of societies, 
personal survival was essential. A natural right existed to defend oneself against 
attacks from others. In the narrative of the contract between the individual and 
the state, the individual transferred his freedom to the state, in return for 
protection. With the emergence of societies, the authorities aimed to strengthen 
their power, the monopoly of violence in particular, by suppressing all forms of 
taking the law into one’s own hand, including self-defence. Only when the central 
governing authority had become strong enough, was it seen fi t to recognise self-
defence.19
Nonetheless, it has also always been clear that the state cannot always intervene 
in time. A legal system cannot uphold the right to life, protected under article 2 
ECHR, without a right to self-defence. The contract between state and citizen 
therefore does not exclude their natural right of self-preservation. According to 
Hobbes, the obligation of citizens to their government lasts “as long, and no longer, 
than the power lasteth by which (the government) is able to protect them”.20 Self-
defence is a subsidiary right. Only when it is absolutely necessary to defend 
yourself, is this allowed, which explains that in order to rely on self-defence, one 
must not have been able to retreat or get (offi cial) help.
Currently, the state monopoly of violence is threatened by the decreasing trust 
of citizens that their state will safeguard their interests.21 If the law is not enforced 
or offenders are let off too easily, citizens feel the need to take the law into their 
own hands. For example, if the police are reluctant or refuse to take away stolen 
property from the thief, the citizen feels coerced to do this himself. Secondly, 
excessive violence infl icted against the aggressor can be explained by lacking 
confi dence that he will get his desert through the criminal justice system.
The natural right to defend oneself focuses on the autonomy of the attacked 
person. The autonomy of the person relates to more than just his life, although it is 
16 De Hullu 2006, p. 299 and Machielse 1986, pp. 523 and 710.
17 Beulke 2008, p. 112 and Machielse 1986, p. 523.
18 See Blackstone 1769 (reprint of 1979), p. 186.
19 See Sangero 2006, pp. 30–31; Strijards 1987, p. 57 and Pawlik 2002, pp. 278–280.
20 Dressler in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 272. See also Sangero 2006, pp. 77–79; Fletcher 1978, 
p. 867; Pawlik 2002, pp. 278–280 and Kelk 2005, p. 284.
21 See Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie 2008, pp. 32–33, 54–55 and 59; Buruma 2005, 
p. 440 and Leverick 2006, pp. 138–139.
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the most important aspect of it. It also includes his bodily integrity, liberty and 
property.22 The attacked person is entitled to give priority to his own interests when 
they are in confl ict with those of another, because they are his own interests and 
therefore more valuable to him.23 Moreover, the attack is wrongful. The attacked 
person does not have to tolerate this wrongful attack,24 expressed by the adage that 
“Right should never give way to Wrong.”25
3.1.2. Legal order
At the same time, the right to life also concerns the life of the aggressor. Whereas 
the right to life is not absolute, it does greatly restrict the use of deadly force by 
requiring a high threshold of necessity and proportionality.26 A single focus on the 
interests of the attacked person would not require proportionality. It would suffi ce 
that the defensive force, of whatever degree and for whatever danger, is necessary 
for the protection of the autonomy of the attacked person.27 In other words, this 
limitation to the right of self-defence can only be based on a rationale that 
concentrates on other interests as well, such as those of the legal order as a whole.28 
Excessive injury to the aggressor may harm the legal order. Only this perspective 
can explain the upper limit of proportionality in both self-defence and self-defence-
excess.
Accordingly, the focus on the rationale determines the scope of the defence. By 
focusing on the natural right to defend oneself, one will be more inclined to accept 
that someone reacts very violently. Self-defence will be framed as a broad defence. 
On the other hand, if we focus on the legal order and the monopoly of violence of 
the state, one will be more inclined to demand that the citizen avoids confrontation 
and respects the interests of the aggressor.29 No Member State under investigation 
focuses only on the autonomy of the attacked person. The idea that self-defence also 
protects the legal order has become increasingly important. Any infringement of 
the autonomy of an individual can also be seen as an infringement of the legal 
order.30 The adage that right should never give way to wrong has therefore also been 
positioned in this context.31 The rationale enables the use of force by private 
22 Sangero 2006, p. 98.
23 Sangero 2006, p. 60 and Leverick 2006, pp. 50–51.
24 Beulke 2008, p. 112; ‘braucht nicht zu dulden.’
25 Sangero 2006, p. 61; Smidt 1881A, p. 379 and Fletcher 1973, p. 379.
26 Ashworth 1975, p. 283 and Sangero 2006, pp. 42–43.
27 Fletcher 1973, p. 381.
28 Sangero 2006, p. 70; Roxin 1981, pp. 74–77; Pawlik 2002, p. 260; Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, pp. 
1023–1024; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 675–676 and annotator Keijzer in HR 8 April 
2008, NJ 2008, 312.
29 Annotator Buruma and AG Knigge in HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509; Machielse 1986, pp. 
481–482 and Roxin 1981, p. 76.
30 Pawlik 2002, p. 297.
31 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 639–640; Beulke 2008, p. 112 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 285.
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individuals to prevent crime,32 deterring aggressors from committing wrong.33 It 
also justifi es the right to help a third party who is being attacked, as defending the 
third party protects the legal order.34
The broader question is what portrayal of man and society we have. If we only 
grant citizens a role of a witness calling the police, the portrayal of man is especially 
consumptive and non-active. If we want to emphasize own responsibility in the fi ght 
against crime, the citizen needs to have possibilities.35 There is a tendency in Member 
States to increasingly entrust private individuals with law-enforcement tasks. The 
scope of their competences, including self-defence, should therefore be suffi ciently 
wide. Governments encourage its citizens to contribute actively in the prevention of 
crime. To quote former English Secretary of State for Justice Jack Straw: “Law-
abiding citizens should not be put off tackling criminals by fear of excessive 
investigation. The law should be seen as supporting them right from the start.”36 With 
that aim, the Dutch Government also issued an instruction to law enforcement 
agencies not to arrest those acting within the lawful limits of self-defence.37
3.1.3. Forfeiture
A rationale that concentrates on the culpability of the aggressor has been labelled 
the classic and most common rationale for self-defence in Anglo-American law. 
The rationale focuses on the aggressor’s rights in two possible ways, the fi rst of 
which is an approach of forfeiture. The aggressor, by his conduct, loses his right to 
life or at least the right to claim this right. This approach has been criticised and a 
more appropriate variation – that of reduction – has been put forward. In this 
approach, the aggressor does not lose his rights, but because the aggressor is 
responsible for the danger, the value of his rights is reduced when balancing the 
competing interests at stake.38 This responsibility can range from weak, consisting 
of a mere causal connection to the danger to strong, for example, when the 
aggressor intended to harm the defendant’s interests. The stronger the 
responsibility, the greater the reduction of the aggressor’s interest.39 The rationale 
thus explains why in the situation where the life the aggressor is juxtaposed with 
32 Sangero 2006, p. 67.
33 Roxin 2006, pp. 654–655 and Roxin 1981, pp. 73–74.
34 Sangero 2006, p. 98.
35 Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie 2008, pp. 92–93.
36 ‘Reforms to give public confi dence in tackling criminals’, Ministry of Justice, 19 December 
2007, www.justice.gov.uk/news/ newsrelease191207a.htm.
37 Instruction on how to act regarding a plea of self-defence, Council of Procurators-General, 
13 December 2010, Stcrt. 2010, no. 20474.
38 Sangero 2006, pp. 44–45 and 61, Leverick 2006, pp. 2 and 46–47; Fletcher 1978, p. 858 and 
Fletcher 1973, p. 377.
39 As will be explained below, the lower limit is causal or legal responsibility, excluding self-
defence against infants and involuntary acts.
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the life of the attacked person, the latter is objectively justifi ed in favouring his 
own.
Only implicit references to forfeiture can be found in German and Dutch 
literature.40 The acceptance that the interest of the attacked person may outweigh 
those of the aggressor is usually explained by the fact that the attack was wrongful: 
right should not give way to wrong. However, by this focus on ‘right’, the rights of 
the aggressor are easily overlooked. As a result, in Germany, the scope of self-
defence is sometimes very wide. Moreover, it is submitted that the idea of forfeiture 
is strongly rooted in popular sentiment. Many people seem to think that the 
aggressor, the criminal, should have fewer rights than the attacked person, the 
victim. For example, disproportionate injuries infl icted upon a burglar are believed 
to be acceptable as caused by his own criminal conduct. The risk inherent in self-
defence should be taken by the person who gave rise to it.41 In law, this is 
recognized by justifying the defendant who, in a situation of self-defence, 
negligently infl icted more serious injuries than intended.42
It may not always be easy to distinguish this from the view that self-defence is 
punishment or that it constitutes a down-payment on the expected punishment. 
After all, courts tend to take the harm infl icted upon the aggressor into account 
when sentencing him.43 From that point of view, the aggressor gets what he 
deserves. Taking the law into one’s own hands is considered appropriate to a large 
extent. However, such a perspective exceeds the scope of self-defence. The 
justifi cation allows for the defending of legal interests, not the punishment of those 
who threaten or violate these interests.44 The state has the monopoly on punishing 
criminals. If it were different, the punishment of the criminal would depend on the 
discretion of the attacked person. The power of the individual under self-defence is 
limited. He only acts as a substitute for the state with a view to limit the violation of 
the legal interests of others and/or to enable the investigation and prosecution of 
crime.
3.1.4. Weighing of interests
All legal systems struggle with the fundamental dilemma to strike a balance 
between contrasting public interests. The English Crown Prosecution Service stated 
that “on the one hand the rule of law and the Queen’s peace must be maintained and 
violence discouraged. On the other hand, the involvement of citizens in the 
prevention and investigation of crime is to be encouraged where it is responsible 
40 See annotator Keijzer in HR 8 April 2008, NJ 2008, 312; Engländer 2008, pp. 51–52 and 62–63; 
Erb 2005, pp. 593–598; Beulke 2008, p. 115 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 639 and 653.
41 See 21 December 1977 BGHSt 27, 313; Beulke 2008, p. 116; Bohlander 2009, p. 122 and Roxin 
2006, pp. 677–678.
42 See VII.4.3.
43 See §60 of the German Code of Criminal law and Sangero 2006, pp. 188–191.
44 See also Roxin 1981, pp. 73–75.
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and public-spirited.”45 Just like Dutch and German law attempt to construe the 
rationale of self-defence by balancing diverging perspectives, Israeli scholar 
Sangero proposed to balance all the different rationales and interests in search of 
the prevailing interest.46 Self-defence is about striking a balance between competing 
interests. In other words, self-defence is about proportionality. It should not focus 
merely on the interests of the defendant or on the interests of the legal order. All 
rationales are needed to explain the scope of self-defence in law. These rationales 
are taken into account as ‘abstract legal interests’ alongside the specifi c legal 
interests of the persons involved.47
First, the legitimate interests of the attacked person and of the aggressor are 
weighed, because both have a legitimate interest not to be injured or harmed. On a 
second level, the abstract interests come into play. A reduction concerning the 
interests of the aggressor may follow from his responsibility for creating the 
(wrongful) situation. This way, the theory can support the application of self-
defence to the person who creates more harm than he prevents, for example when 
using deadly force to prevent rape or by killing multiple aggressors.48 The converse 
is also true. For example, when the attacked person gave his consent to the attack, 
the factor of his autonomy does not work to justify self-defence against the attack.49
It is also accepted widely within the EU that different rationales determine the 
scope of self-defence. The interests or rationales of self-defence are interrelated.50 
After all, a violation of the autonomy of one person also injures the legal order. The 
legal order also stands in direct relationship to the culpability of the aggressor, 
because an intentional injury harms the legal order even more.51 The theory 
mentioned here is clearer about this than the double rationale of Dutch and German 
law, which tries to ground all aspects in either the legal order or the natural right. It 
is able to include the aspects of forfeiture into self-defence and in line with the 
general view of justifi cations as serving the prevailing interest.
3.2. Scope
Self-defence is a general defence, which suggests it should apply to all offences.52 It 
used to be considered merely in the case of homicide and other serious violent 
45 CPS:‘Self-defence and the prevention of crime’, www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section5/chapter_d.html.
46 Sangero 2006, p. 73. Compare Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 639.
47 Sangero 2006, pp. 93–106.
48 Sangero 2006, pp. 75 and 94.
49 Sangero 2006, pp. 100–101.
50 Roxin 2006, pp. 654–656 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 640.
51 Sangero 2006, p. 96.
52 The general character of defences is somewhat controversial in England. Ormerod 2005, p. 342 
suggests that although Courts have diffi culty recognizing self-defence as constituting a 
defence to crimes generally, they should. The Law Commission 1993, pp. 68–69 agrees with 
him.
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offences, but that connection was already let go more than a century ago.53 The ECJ 
has even recognized it as a possible defence in competition law.54 Thus, although it 
is usually applied to charges of violent offences,55 other offences are not necessarily 
excluded. On the principle that a greater includes the lesser, the defendant should be 
allowed a non-forceful response when an act of force would have been justifi ed.56 
The threat of force and other non-violent means to avert the attack are more 
considerate to the interests of the aggressor and are therefore more likely to meet 
the requirements of proportionality.
On the other hand, when compared to the broader justifi cation of necessity, 
self-defence is characterized by the use of force directed against an aggressor. 
Therefore in principle, self-defence is limited in scope to offences that aim to 
protect a legal interest of the aggressor. Individual interests of third parties and 
public legal interests cannot be infringed under self-defence.57 This explains why 
the use of a fi rearm against the aggressor can be justifi ed under self-defence, 
whereas the illegal possession of fi rearms cannot. The offence of illegal 
possession of fi rearms aims to protect a more general legal interest of public 
safety.58
Nevertheless, the illegal possession can be justifi ed under another defence like 
necessity. In all three Member States, the possession will be justifi ed if it is closely 
related to its use in a situation of self-defence, such as arming oneself with a view to 
avert an attack in the near future.59 This justifi cation under the broader defence of 
necessity therefore puts the distinction in perspective.60 Only in England, such 
preparatory acts have also been justifi ed under self-defence.61 This difference can 
be explained by the restricted scope of other compulsion defences in England. Since 
53 Machielse 1986, pp. 520 and 588; Roxin 2006, p. 657; Finkel & Parrott 2006, pp. 207–208; 
Blackstone 1979, pp. 183–188 and Fletcher 1998, p. 131.
54 7 June 1983, Cases 100–103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Française [1983] ECR 1825.
55 Strijards 1987, p. 54; Machielse 1986, p. 544 and Law Commission 1993, p. 68.
56 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 705.
57 Roxin 2006, pp. 716–717. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 650 and Beulke 2008, 
p. 115.
58 The distinction between individual and public legal interests may be diffi cult to apply, because 
offences often aim to protect both individual and public interests, see IX.5.3.1. The scope of self-
defence can be extended to offences that also aim to protect a public legal interest, by way of 
exception to the principle or by looking which interests, public or individual interests of the 
aggressor, were actually infringed by the defendant’s conduct. Compare R. v. Renouf (1986) 82 
Cr App R 344.
59 See R. v. Salih [2007] EWCA Crim 1750 and 13 January 2010 BGH NStZ-RR 2010, 140.
60 HR 23 October 1984, NJ 1986, 56; 19 March 1986 BGH NStZ 1986, 357; Roxin 2006, pp. 717–
718 and 1001; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 291–292 and Sangero 2006, pp. 120 and 128.
61 Attorney-General’s Reference no. 2 of 1983 [1984] EWCA Crim 1; Ormerod 2005, pp. 340–341; 
Lanham 2005, pp. 85–97 and Ashworth 2006, p. 142. See also section 44(5) draft Criminal 
Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 62 and section 29(2), Law Commission 1993, p. 110.
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necessity is restricted to very severe dangers and duress does not apply to murder, 
lawyers tend to widen the scope of self-defence.62
Besides offences that protect public legal interests, the scope of self-defence also 
does not extend to the infringement of individual legal interests of persons other 
than the aggressor. Self-defence does not apply to ‘collateral damage’, the infringing 
of interests of persons who are not part of the attack.63 Exceptions have been made 
for objects of third parties that are damaged or destroyed in the course of self-
defence. For example, self-defence has been accepted when the aggressor uses 
goods of a third party to attack the defender, who is then necessitated to use force 
against these goods. Nevertheless, many have submitted that the better approach is 
to apply only necessity-type defences to such cases.64
After all, the precluding of self-defence does not rule out that the collateral 
damage is justifi ed by necessity, (presumed) consent or excused under duress. It has 
been argued, for example, that if a third party is used as a shield by the aggressor 
and is killed, the shooter cannot rely of self-defence, but can be excused under 
duress.65 The issue can also be approached as an aberratio ictus, a situation where 
the attacked person misses the aggressor and hits a third party. This collateral 
damage can be excused as a form of putative self-defence if it was unavoidable.66 In 
any event, in contrast to the sacrifi ce of goods of third parties, it is more appropriate 
to excuse the actor than to justify such acts, since the latter would imply that it is 
objec tively permissible to sacrifi ce the life and limb of third parties, that this third 
party would have to tolerate the infringement and would not be allowed to defend 
himself.
3.3. Criteria
The criteria for self-defence can be deduced from the legal defi nitions in §32 of the 
German Criminal Code and article 41 of the Dutch Criminal Code.67 As to English 
law, self-defence has a variety of sources.68 English case-law on self-defence has 
been codifi ed in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The 
codifi cation intends to clarify the operation of the different existing defences in 
62 Sangero 2006, pp. 109, 119 and 162. Machielse 1986, p. 527 also noted that in the Netherlands, 
cases now considered to be paradigm examples of necessity have been classifi ed as self-defence 
before due to a limited interpretation of necessity.
63 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 650 and Beulke 2008, p. 115. See HR 11 January 2011, NJ 
2011, 339. This seems to be neglected in HR 22 February 2011, NJ 2011, 107, where the 
defendants hit third parties and not the aggressor.
64 This is discussed as aggressive necessity in IX.4. See Bohlander 2009, pp. 102–103; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 650–651 and Roxin 2006, p. 718.
65 5 May 1892 RGSt 23, 116; Roxin 2006, pp. 716–717; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 650; 
Bohlander 2009, pp. 102–103; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 293 and Sangero 2006, p. 280.
66 See VII.5.1.
67 §15 of the German Administrative Offences Act (OWiG) is identical to §32.
68 Ormerod 2005, p. 329.
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English law, such as the common law defence and section 3 of the Criminal Law 
Act 1967, which grants persons the power to use force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime or in arresting offenders or suspects.69
It follows that the scope of self-defence in England is wider, as the use of force 
necessary to effectuate an arrest by citizens is laid down in Dutch and German law 
as procedural competences.70 These competences are distinguished from the 
justifi cation discussed here, even if they can give rise and are similar to situations 
of self-defence. The purpose of an arrest is to facilitate the investigation, not to 
avert an imminent attack. The purpose of using force in self-defence is to make the 
aggressor fl ee, not to hand him over to the authorities.71 Moreover, self-defence in 
Dutch and German law can bring about that crime is prevented, but the justifi cation 
primarily relates to the protection of specifi c legal interests.
In order for self-defence to justify a criminal offence, the attack that is averted 
by that offence must be wrongful, of human origin, infringe an individual interest 
and be imminent. In other words, self-defence must be necessary. Moreover, the 
defendant must at least be aware of these facts and act in line with the requirements 
of proportionality. In short, self-defence must be necessary and proportionate. It 
will be explained that the categorization of the criteria of self-defence into the limbs 
of necessity and proportionality is useful, but by no means self-evident.
In England, the force applied must be reasonable and force is only reasonable 
when it is necessary and proportionate.72 This unifi cation of necessity and 
proportionality into one requirement of reasonableness is an example of the fl at 
legal reasoning mentioned before. English law tends to sweeps within one inquiry 
aspects that would otherwise be distinguished.73 However, unifi cation is 
undesirable because it shadows the distinction of the two important limbs of self-
defence,74 which not only serves an analytical purpose but has legal consequences 
too, such as in the context of mistakes. As noted, in order to negate liability by a 
claim of putative self-defence in German and English law, a mistake as to the 
necessity merely needs to be genuine, whereas a mistake as to proportionality also 
needs to be reasonable.75
Nevertheless, a strict distinction can be diffi cult to make. Amongst others, the 
so-called issue of subsidiarity can be said to belong to either of the two limbs. In 
EU and Dutch law, ‘subsidiarity’ is not only used as an alternative term for necessity 
but more specifi cally to refer to the requirement of ‘least intrusive means’. This 
69 Section 5 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 creates a defence to the offence of destruction or 
damaging of property or threats thereof. It falls outside the scope of section 76.
70 §127 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure and article 53 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The German Civil Code also includes some provisions on self-help, see §§229 and 
230; Roxin 2006, pp. 802–803 and IX.3.4.5.
71 Machielse 1986, pp. 561–563.
72 Ormerod 2005, p. 334. See section 76(3) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
73 Fletcher in Eser & Fletcher 1987, p. 89.
74 Sangero 2006, pp. 111 and 146.
75 See VII.5.3.
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means that in defending himself or another person, the defendant should choose to 
use the means that are least intrusive to the interests of the aggressor.76 For example, 
if using his fi sts would suffi ce to avert the attack, the defendant is not allowed to 
use a weapon. It is argued that self-defence consists of a test of double necessity: it 
should have been both necessary to defend the pertinent interest and to commit the 
specifi c offence.77 The offence can only be justifi ed if it was the least intrusive 
means to avert the attack.
This choice of what type of defensive means should be used is however closely 
connected to the subsequent question of proportionality of how one should use this 
least intrusive means. For example, if a fi rearm may be chosen, the defendant can 
subsequently choose to fi re a bullet at the leg or torso of the aggressor. As a result of 
this close connection, proportionality is often understood to encompass not only the 
intensity of the defence (proportionality) but also the choice of defensive means 
(subsidiarity).78 In Germany, the least intrusive means is also discussed in close 
relation with the intensity of the defence, the latter therefore dubbed proportionality 
stricto sensu.79 Here, proportionality will also be discussed in this broad meaning, 
including the choice of defensive means.
Necessity and proportionality mutually infl uence each other. The less is required 
from necessity, the more is required from proportionality. For example, when the 
refusal of someone to leave the premises would allow for the use of force against 
him under necessity, the nature and intensity of the use of force will be severely 
limited under the requirement of proportionality. This interrelationship is in line 
with the rationale of self-defence as balancing interests and the tendency to be 
discussed below, that the criteria of self-defence are more likely to be considered as 
factors than as absolute conditions.
Until a couple of years ago, signifi cant differences could be identifi ed between 
the national legal concepts of self-defence. The justifi cation still has the widest 
scope in Germany, although it has become more restricted in recent decades. In the 
last decade, Dutch law case-law has also lost most of its sharp edges.80 The 
requirements of necessity and proportionality have become less absolute, more 
dependent on the others conditions of self-defence and the specifi c circumstances of 
the case. As a result, the law of the three Member States has considerably moved 
closer to each other.
76 In EU law, this refers to the least intrusive means of infringing the free movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services, see 23 October 1997, Case C-189/95, Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909. 
A scheme of expensive licenses existed in Sweden, required to import, produce and sell 
alcoholic beverages. The ECJ held there were also other less intrusive measures available to the 
trade between Member States to further public health.
77 Machielse 1986, p. 646. See also Ten Voorde 2008, p. 796.
78 Machielse 1986, p. 661; de Hullu 2009, pp. 314–318 and Fletcher 1978, p. 870.
79 See Roxin 2006, pp. 674–683; Beulke 2008, pp. 115–117 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 
651–652.
80 Ter Haar & Meijer 2009, pp. 1–5 and 163–166.
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There exists consensus in Europe on most criteria of self-defence.81 Two 
conditions are more controversial, namely the scope of interests that can be 
defended and whether there must be proportionality between the attack and the 
defensive force. German law on self-defence strictly speaking does not require 
proportionality, but it will be demonstrated that in effect, a proportionate 
relationship between attack and defensive force is required. Secondly, the German 
concept of self-defence is in theory also relatively broad because any legal interest 
may be defended in self-defence. Nevertheless, it will be demonstrated that this 
does not lead to different outcomes in criminal liability in comparison to the legal 
systems that do limit the interests that may be defended.
3.4. Necessity
The fi rst requirement for self-defence, necessity, can be divided into several aspects. 
The necessity requirement logically excludes situations where the attacked person 
has a reasonable alternative. By requiring that the attack is imminent and there is 
no possibility of retreat, it can be said that the attacked person had no alternative 
than to use force. Other aspects of necessity include the nature of the attack, which 
must be wrongful and threaten a legitimate interest.82
A popular approach is to treat the criteria of necessity not just as absolute 
conditions, but as factors that infl uence the proportionality requirement. This is 
appropriate because in the end, any justifi cation and self-defence in particular 
revolves around proportionality. On the one hand, the approach enables that the 
defence is broad enough to encompass new situations that should be justifi ed. On 
the other hand, the proportionality requirement safeguards that only actions that 
were proportionate in light of the imminence and wrongfulness of the attack, the 
possible alternatives to the offence as well as other facts and circumstances are in 
fact justifi ed.
3.4.1. Wrongful attack
Only a wrongful attack can give rise to self-defence. In other words, there must be 
an attack and that attack must be wrongful. An attack can be defi ned as an 
81 Compare Witteman 1997, pp. 262–270.
82 Compare 12 July 1962, Case 16/61, Modena v. High Authority [1962] ECR 289, at p. 303: 
“Legitimate self-protection presupposes an action taken by a person which is essential in order 
to ward off a danger threatening him. The threat must be immediate, the danger imminent, and 
there must be no other lawful means of avoiding it.” The condition that the attack must be 
wrongful was added by the judgment of 18 March 1980, Joined cases 154, 205, 206, 226 to 228, 
263 and 264/78, 39, 31, 83 and 85/79, Valsabbia and others v. Commission [1980] ECR 907, 
§138.
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immediate threat to legally protected interests through human behaviour.83 Attacks 
of an animal only qualify under self-defence if a human has incited it. In that case, 
the animal can be equated with any other tool the aggressor could have used to 
attack. In other cases, defensive force against animals can only be justifi ed under 
necessity.84 Animals are no subjects of the law and can therefore not act.85
An attack will also almost always consist of an intentional act. It is however 
accepted that the attack may be negligent as well, for example, when the aggressor 
is pulling the trigger of a loaded gun, which he believes to be unloaded.86 Whereas 
the terms used in national codes resembling ‘attack’ may be said to imply intent, 
the will or even awareness to attack is not required. Even attacks that do not meet 
the threshold of culpa are sometimes said to qualify. For example, a driver may be 
exercising due care and can thus not be said to act negligently. However, he still 
threatens to hurt other participants in traffi c. It has been argued self-defence can 
also be applies against such a person.87
As explained before, when the aggressor is not blameworthy because he is 
excused, he still acts wrongfully. Only justifi cations negate the wrongfulness of the 
attack.88 The circumstance that the aggressor is excused, for instance, because he is 
coerced under duress to kill the defendant does not preclude the defendant’s right to 
self-defence. This implies that self-defence is not grounded in the blameworthiness 
of the aggressor. By contrast, there are minority views that do focus on the reproach 
that can be made against the aggressor, requiring that the aggressor is blameworthy 
or even acts with some degree of fault.89
The outcome of these perspectives are however similar. First, the minority 
opinion holds that the attacked person may defend himself against the excused 
aggressor under necessity.90 Secondly, the fact that prevailing opinion allows self-
defence against an insane or negligent aggressor still brings about that other 
requirements of self-defence are stricter. For example, the attacked person is 
required whenever possible to retreat or get help and use even more moderate force 
against excused aggressors. Blameworthiness and fault on the part of the aggressor 
83 Bohlander 2009, p. 100; Roxin 2006, p. 657; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 640 and Fletcher 
2007, p. 268.
84 17 June 1901 RGSt 34, 295; 26 February 1960 BGHSt 14, 152; Beulke 2008, p. 102; Roxin 2006, 
pp. 657–658; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 640; de Jong D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 171; 
Machielse 1986, p. 540 and Strijards 1987, pp. 61–62.
85 De Jong D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 171; Kelk 2005, p. 286 and Machielse 1986, pp. 538 and 572.
86 Bohlander 2009, p. 100; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 640–641 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 286.
87 Beulke 2008, p. 114 and Engländer 2008, pp. 264–266.
88 Roxin 2006, pp. 659–660 and 663–665; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 648; Machielse 1986, 
pp. 547 and 572; Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Ormerod 2005, p. 338; Horder 1998, 
p. 145 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 704.
89 See Sangero 2006, p. 59 and IX.3.1.3.
90 Like Sangero 2006, pp. 51, 54 and 129 and Engländer 2008, p. 264. Views like these are also 
mentioned in Beulke 2008, p. 113; Roxin 2006, pp. 661–665 and Machielse 1986, p. 641.
Justifi cations
 347
thus do not ground self-defence, but still infl uence the decision whether the conduct 
of the defendant was justifi ed.91
The requirement that the attack must be unlawful92 or wrongful expresses that 
self-defence is a fi ght of right against wrong.93 It serves to exclude from the defence 
situations wherein public offi cials carry out their offi cial tasks of, for example, 
arrest.94 The ECJ therefore also held that the defence “cannot be pleaded against a 
public authority acting lawfully within the legal framework of its powers.”95 
Because the attack must be wrongful, no self-defence is allowed against a justifi ed 
act. As noted, the incompatibility of justifi cations thus follows from this criterion.
The requirement that the attack must be wrongful does not require however that 
the aggressor fulfi l a criminal offence.96 For example, a light blow against 
somebody’s body that does not cause him pain is not a criminal offence, but it does 
give rise to self-defence. The attacked person will however have to behave in a 
manner that is proportional to this minor aggression. Another example is the 
attempt to injure a person, which is also not punishable under Dutch law, but does 
trigger a right to self-defence for the attacked person.97 A wrongful attack can 
therefore be labelled as the non-justifi ed infringement of a legal interest.98 An 
aggression that is at odds with the mandates of the legal order as a whole will in 
principle qualify.99
Under this reasoning, it could also be argued that self-defence is available 
against aggressors that are ‘innocent’100 because they cannot be said to have acted. 
For example, the aggressor was sleepwalking, had an epileptic fi t or was used by 
91 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 648 and 661; Roxin 2006, pp. 683–686; Beulke 2008, pp. 
117–119 and 153–154 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 41. In German law, when the 
aggressor in not blameworthy, the requirements of proportionality are increased in a three 
staged manner, discussed in IX.3.4.5.
92 This is the term most often used in England, see Law Commission 1993, pp. 106–108.
93 Machielse 1986, p. 570.
94 Fokkens & Machielse, p. 278, note. 6 on art. 41. The fact that the arrest was illegal almost never 
makes it a wrongful attack, allowing for the use of force self-defence. First of all, the powers of 
arrest merely require reasonable suspicion, see article 27 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure and section 24 of the English Police and Evidence Act 1984. An arrest is not illegal 
because the defendant did not commit the crime. This is controversial in Germany, see Beulke 
2008, p. 123 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 613–614. Secondly, there are other, more 
propor tio nate means, like legal remedies such as habeas corpus to protect the right to freedom, 
see Sangero 2006, pp. 134–135; Ormerod 2005. p. 339 and Law Commission 1993, p. 73.
95 18 March 1980, Joined cases 154, 205, 206, 226 to 228, 263 and 264/78, 39, 31, 83 and 85/79, 
Valsabbia and others v. Commission [1980] ECR 907, §138.
96 14 March 1989 BGH NStZ 1989, 431; Roxin 2006, p. 669; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 647; 
HR 8 June 2010, NJ 2010, 339; Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on art. 41; Machielse 1986, pp. 
546–547 and 582–583; Strijards 1987, p. 62; section 44(1) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 
1989, p. 61; Ormerod 2005, p. 338, Ormerod 2006, p. 459 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 704.
97 De Hullu 2006, pp. 301–302.
98 14 August 1992 BayObLG NJW 1993, 211.
99 Bohlander 2009, p. 102 and Beulke 2008, p. 114.
100 The term ‘innocent’ is also used for excused aggressors, see Leverick 2007, p. 569.
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someone else as a pawn. However, even if the attack may be wrongful, prevailing 
opinion denies that this constitutes an attack. The lack of a voluntary act means that 
there is no human conduct. Similarly problematic are insanity and infancy, which 
can be considered an exemption, refl ecting that the actor is not a subject of the law. 
Like an animal, their attacks would not qualify under self-defence.101
Again however, the outcome would not be so different, as the defendant could 
apply (some) defensive force against the child or insane based on necessity.102 The 
practical relevance of these much debated but rare cases thus deals with the question 
which defence applies: self-defence or a necessity type defence. A different solution 
is to characterize the conduct of the person who uses the innocent aggressor as a 
pawn as an (indirect) unlawful attack, against which the attacked person may 
defend himself by turning towards the pawn.103 Self-defence could also be made 
available in these cases by focusing more on the autonomy of the individual and 
much less on the responsibility of the aggressor for the act. Under the rationale of 
the autonomy of the attacked person, the (lacking) responsibility of the aggressor 
for the attack may be held irrelevant.104 The Law Commission simply solved the 
issue by including involuntary actions, actions from minors and excused actions as 
acts that would otherwise not be criminal, but do justify self-defence.105
3.4.2. Legitimate interests
Self-defence is not aimed at the prevention of crime. On the one hand, an attack 
need not be a crime to give rise to self-defence. On the other, the interests that may 
be defended in self-defence are limited. Due to this limitation, self-defence is 
demarcated from a general right to fi ght wrong.106 There is a tendency to widen the 
scope of interests that may be defended with force, which is limited at the same 
time by emphasizing that more restraint may be warranted when one defends 
interests that are less important and/or less personal to the defendant.
The wrongful attack needs to be aimed at a legitimate interest of the attacked 
person. It is undisputed that interests like a person’s life, liberty, body and property 
qualify as legitimate interests that can be defended against wrongful attacks under 
self-defence.107 The interests that allow for the severe instrument of self-defence 
clearly belong to the most important and fundamental legal interest the law aims to 
protect. No threshold exists as to how severe the attack on these interests must be. 
101 See X.7.6.; Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Horder 1995, p. 436; Machielse 1986, pp. 
547–548 and 641–642 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 41.
102 Beulke 2008, p. 112; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 650; Roxin 2006, pp. 658–659 and 
Machielse 1986, pp. 633–634.
103 Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 41.
104 See Horder 1998, p. 145.
105 Section 44(3) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, pp. 61–62 and section 27(3) Law 
Commission 1993, p. 108.
106 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 640; Pawlik 2002, p. 261 and Roxin 1981, p. 75.
107 Sangero 2006, p. 123 and Roxin 2006, pp. 669–670.
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For example, no distinction is made between a short or long-lasting deprivation of 
liberty and between a severe in comparison to a normal assault. The severity of the 
attack does play a role in the context of proportionality. In general, the less severe 
the attack, the less severe the defensive force may be.
The scope of legitimate interests is the widest in Germany, where the starting 
point is that any individual legal interest can be defended.108 On the contrary, Dutch 
law exclusively lists the interests that can be defended. The two legal systems are 
illustrative of the two distinct approaches in Europe in this regard.109 For example, 
in the Netherlands, the ‘honour’ of a person is commonly restricted to sexual 
integrity, as a species of an attack on the body.110 It does not allow for self-defence 
against insults or provocations.111 By contrast in Germany, one is allowed to defend 
oneself against insults. However, this does not mean that the person using force in 
response to an insult will be justifi ed in self-defence. The justifi cation will often be 
rejected, because the use of force against an insult will not be held to be necessary, 
let alone proportionate.112 In other contexts, this approach also applies, which brings 
about that the wide scope of legitimate interests in Germany does not often lead to 
different outcomes in comparison to the other Member States.
The differences in these contexts are also mitigated in other ways. In contrast to 
Germany,113 trespass cannot give rise to self-defence in the Netherlands.114 However, 
it is assumed that this will usually bring about an immediate danger to life, body 
and/or property and thus qualify for self-defence.115 When the attacked person is 
inside his own house, he can in principle not be required to retreat. Moreover, 
trespass is a criminal offence, enabling the powers of arrest and use of reasonable 
force to effectuate that arrest.116 The proposal117 to introduce a legal presumption 
that a situation of self-defence is present when someone trespasses was therefore 
rejected as superfl uous by almost all Dutch practitioners and scholars.118
108 Beulke 2008, p. 114 and Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, pp. 1025–1027. See 14 August 1992 
BayObLG NJW 1993, 211, where the blocking of a car from moving forward was also held to 
qualify for self-defence.
109 Witteman 1997, pp. 221–223.
110 Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on art. 41.
111 HR 22 January 2008, RvdW 2008, 171 and de Hullu 2006, p. 300. Such insults could give rise to 
a duel, which was criminalized as a mitigating lex specialis in the Dutch Criminal Code until 
2006.
112 14 February 1952 BGHSt 3, 217. In contrast, ripping a piece of paper that is insulting to the 
person concerned can be justifi ed.
113 15 May 1979 BGH MDR 1979, 985; 29 January 1982 BGH StV 1982, 219 and Roxin 2006, 
p. 669.
114 HR 14 April 1998, NJ 1998, 662.
115 HR 27 May 2008, NJ 2008, 510; de Hullu 2006, p. 301 and Sangero 2006, pp. 266–267 and 271.
116 Article 138 of the Dutch Criminal Code; Rozemond 2006, p. 98 and Machielse 1986, pp. 560–
564.
117 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31 407 no. 2 and Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie 2008, 
pp. 15 and 51–52. Compare articles 122–6 of the French Penal Code and article 43 of the 
Criminal Code of the Dutch Antilles.
118 Annotator Borgers in HR 27 May 2008, NJ 2008, 510 and Machielse 2008.
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The advantage of the German approach is that it does not preclude self-defence 
a priori. It emphasizes the relationship between the interest that is attacked and the 
appropriate aversion of this attack.119 The advantage of a limited list of interests that 
can be protected is that it communicates clearly that some interests such as honour 
are a priori excluded from protection and balancing. This strengthens certain 
values such as freedom of speech and prevents infractions based on non-recognized 
(illegitimate) interests. The choice for one or the other approach is less important 
because it does not tend to change the outcome of criminal cases.
If it is considered that the above-mentioned legal interests of a third party may 
also be defended, then self-defence is perhaps not the best label for this 
justifi cation.120 The justifi cation is not derived from the attacked person, because the 
third party may defend his interests even if the attacked person himself is unaware 
of the attack.121 On the other hand, if the attacked person explicitly does not want to 
be helped or if the circumstances clearly indicate this, self-defence is not allowed 
under the rationale of the autonomy of the attacked person.122 The case for defence 
of another is bolstered by the rationale of the legal order and the circumstance that 
the motivation is altruism rather than egoism. However, when third parties 
intervene, the chances increase that this party mistakenly assesses the situation.123
In contrast to individual legal interests, public legal interests are a matter of state 
offi cials only. The rationale of individual protection and the legitimate exception to 
the injunction on taking the law into one’s own hands do not apply. If public 
interests could be defended, this would lead to scenes the State has exactly wanted 
to prevent by taking the monopoly on force. More damage can be done to the legal 
order if individuals could act as voluntary police offi cers. Self-defence is thus not 
allowed against for example driving intoxicated, but if an individual is at peril as a 
result of this, self-defence can apply.124
This strict limitation made by German scholars can be juxtaposed with the 
aforementioned tendencies of States to privatise public tasks, including those of law 
enforcement and to emphasize that citizens are co-responsible to create a safer 
society. As noted, citizens can rely on legal provisions that allow for the use of force 
necessary to arrest offenders. In addition, differences are put into perspective if we 
take into account that precluding self-defence again often merely implies that the 
justifi cation of necessity is the better legal basis.125 For example, the private citizen 
119 Favoured by Sangero 2006, p. 127 and 132 and Witteman 1997, p. 262 too.
120 De Hullu 2006, p. 299; Beulke 2008, p. 114; R. v. Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63 and Sangero 2006, pp. 
1–2.
121 Sangero 2006, pp. 242–243.
122 Beulke 2008, p. 115; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 649; Roxin 2006, pp. 654 and 713 and 
2 October 1953 BGHSt 5, 245.
123 Sangero 2006, pp. 243–249 and 263–265.
124 Roxin 2006, pp. 654 and 669–672 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 639–643.
125 See Roxin 2006, pp. 673–674. Moreover, exceptions are made in Germany for the direct 
interests of the state.
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was justifi ed under necessity to detain a spy in order to keep him from fl eeing with 
secrets over the border.126
3.4.3. Imminence
Self-defence only applies against attacks that are imminent, have begun or are 
on-going.127 In those cases, the attacked person cannot wait for the offi cial 
authorities to protect his interest. Therefore, it is necessary to make an exception to 
the injunction on the use force by private individuals. In order to avert the attack, to 
minimize the harm, he must act himself, leaving aside for now other alternatives 
such as retreating.128 The diffi culty lies in determining the limits of this temporal 
require ment: when does the attack start and when it end? It is located in between 
two facets. On the one hand, self-defence may be performed at its earliest when 
danger is already close. It may be performed on the other hand only as long as the 
attack continues, otherwise it would be retaliation.
To start with the latter facet, the right to self-defence ends with the end of the 
attack. The attack is on-going until the aggression had been factually completed 
either by abandoning the attempt, by its failure or by causing the defi nite violation 
of the protected interest, so there is no more further harm to be avoided. The 
completion of the legal elements of an offence is not constitutive, as the person 
whose bag is stolen may pursue the thief and use force to regain possession in self-
defence. The attack will be on-going until the thief has secured full and safe 
possession of the bag.129
If the criteria that determine the beginning of the attack are too strict, defensive 
force can become useless.130 When the attack has already started, some harm may 
have already been infl icted and the defendant may no longer be able to stop the 
attack. In the absence of other options, the defendant must be allowed to avert any 
harm to a protected legal interest. The criterion is therefore that the attack or danger 
thereof should be imminent, not that the interest is actually infringed.131 Under the 
criterion that the danger is imminent, one is allowed a pre-emptive strike.132 In one 
case, the defendant had been warned that an infamous gang was on their way to his 
126 Roxin 2006, p. 729 and Beulke 2008, p. 104.
127 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 644. The terminology in Germany is that the attack must be 
current (gegenwärtig), in the Netherlands that it must be immediate (ogenblikkelijk).
128 Kaufman 2007, pp. 354–359.
129 12 February 2003 BGHSt 48, 207; Bohlander 2009, p. 101; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 645; 
Roxin 2006, p. 668; Sangero 2006, pp. 257–260; Machielse 1986, pp. 551–555 and Fokkens & 
Machielse, pp. 280–281, note 7 on art. 41.
130 7 November 1972 BGH NJW 1973, 255; Fokkens & Machielse, p. 277, note 6 on art. 41; 
Machielse 1986, p. 552; Rozemond 2006, p. 99 and de Hullu 2009, p. 312.
131 HR 2 February 1965, NJ 1965, 262 and HR 30 March 1976, NJ 1976, 322 and de Hullu 2006, 
p. 303. See also Machielse 1986, pp. 552–553.
132 R. v. Deana (1909) 2 Cr App R 75; Ashworth 2006, p. 145; Ormerod 2005, p. 336 and Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 708.
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house and that they were armed with fi rearms. The Court of Appeal held that the 
defendant opened fi re and therefore rejected self-defence. The Dutch Supreme 
Court quashed this judgment.133
In contrast, the mere fear of an attack cannot warrant self-defence.134 There is a 
grey area between mere fear and imminent danger, which puts great weight on the 
circumstances of the case and gives the judge a lot of discretion.135 An imminent 
danger can be distinguished from mere fear by viewing this danger as reasonable 
fear. Danger is assessed objectively with a reference to a third person or external 
manifes tations. There can be no attack when the will to harm a legal interest is not 
yet made known externally.136 The danger needs to be real, to be capable of 
infringing the interests. Hence, an impending danger of black magic is not included: 
a mere subjective fear of the defendant is irrelevant.137 Likewise, the real intentions 
of the aggressor are less important than what impression the defender could 
reasonably have gotten.138 This objective approach to external manifestations bears 
resem blance to the test for attempt,139 but the attack does not have to qualify as an 
attempt yet in order for a pre-emptive strike to be justifi ed.140 It has been submitted 
that an imminent attack immediately precedes an attempt. It is normally situated at 
the end of the preparatory stage, just before attempt would start, such as reaching 
for a fi rearm or approaching the person threateningly.141
Proposals have been made to widen the imminence requirements to encompass 
attacks that can no longer or only very diffi cult be repelled later, like an attack that 
is announced for the following day. For example, it has been argued that it should 
be about the imminence of the necessary response.142 In contrast, most German 
scholars argue that this ‘quasi self-defence’ can only be justifi ed under necessity 
where it does suffi ce that the need to act is imminent.143 Similarly, it has been 
argued the focus of self-defence has been too much on one-off adversarial 
encounters. In the context of women who kill their abusive partners, there may have 
been no immediate danger. However, if they would need to wait until another attack 
would follow, they would have most likely failed in the attempt to repel the attack. 
Self-defence should be available, based on the question whether the defendant has 
had a fair and reasonable opportunity to do other than (s)he did.144 However, this 
133 HR 21 December 2004, NJ 2007, 469. See also Buruma 2005, pp. 440–441.
134 HR 8 February 1932, NJ 1932, p. 617.
135 Machielse 1986, p. 553 and Ashworth 2006, p. 142. See also Sangero 2006, p. 157.
136 Roxin 2006, p. 667 and 9 January 1985 BayObLG NJW 1985, 2600.
137 HR 18 September 1989, NJ 1990, 291; de Hullu 2006, p. 304 and Strijards 1987, pp. 62–63.
138 Machielse 1986, p. 557.
139 Rozemond 2006, p. 100 and Roxin 2006, pp. 665–666.
140 Strijards 1987, p. 62 and Machielse 1986, pp. 558–559.
141 7 November 1972 BGH NJW 1973, 255; 19 September 1973 BGHSt 25, 229; Roxin 2006, pp. 
665–667 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 644.
142 See Sangero 2006, pp. 157–158.
143 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 640 and 644–646; Roxin 2006, p. 668; Beulke 2008, p. 113 and 
Fischer, T. 2009, p. 291.
144 Horder in Shute & Sullivan 2002, p. 290. See also Sangero 2006, p. 340.
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test resembles that of duress, which is submitted to the better framework for 
assessing these cases.
The best approach, similar to the aforementioned one on legitimate interests, is 
to apply a low threshold to the criterion of imminence. At the same time, the period 
of time that remains until the interests will be infringed is taken into account in 
assessing what alternative exists and what degree of force would suffi ce. For 
instance, the less imminent the attack, the more likely there is a possibility of 
retreat, which the defendant can therefore have been expected to use. By contrast, 
the more imminent the attack becomes, the more should be allowed. For example, 
the immediacy of the situation demands that the attacked person decides what to do 
in a short time period. This infl uences the proportionality test, as one cannot judge 
everything ‘to a nicety’ in a short period of time. This approach fi ts in best with the 
courts’ broad and fl exible approach to this requirement, as well as the view of self-
defence as requiring a balancing of all the interests and criteria. It enables the most 
important overarching criterion of proportionality to play a major role.
3.4.4. Possibility to retreat
The use of force in self-defence seems to be only necessary when there are no 
alternatives, one of which is to avoid or end the confrontation by retreating. This 
implies that if there is a possibility to retreat or get help, one should use it. The 
person, who was attacked at his door, should have therefore closed the door. Instead, 
he armed himself and confronted the aggressor in his front yard.145 A focus on the 
monopoly of violence brings about a strict duty to retreat or avoid confl ict. In 
ancient English law, a duty to retreat applied to attacks that were not classifi ed as a 
felony.146 The Dutch Supreme Court also for a long time applied the rule that self-
defence is not necessary when there is a possibility to retreat.147 By contrast, a strict 
duty to retreat has never been part of the German law on self-defence, since right 
should never give way to wrong.148
Currently, an absolute duty to retreat no longer exists in any of the three Member 
States. It is therefore more appropriate to talk about a possibility to retreat. English 
and Dutch law have moved towards German law, by considering the possibility to 
retreat as a factor. It is no longer an independent condition, which requires a certain 
threshold to be met, but a fl exible factor that is interrelated with the other conditions 
of self-defence. Most notably, the possibility of retreat does not necessarily preclude 
the justifi cation, but it can infl uence what amount of force is allowed. The weight of 
the duty to retreat also depends on the other conditions of self-defence, such as the 
blame worthiness of the aggressor or the defendant himself. For example, a real duty 
to retreat may exist when the aggressor is an infant or the defendant provoked the 
145 HR 16 September 2008, LJN:BD1728.
146 Sangero 2006, pp. 198–199.
147 De Hullu 2006, p. 305, referring to HR 18 June 1957, NJ 1957, 446.
148 Roxin 2006, p. 657 and Perron in Schönke & Schröder 2010, note 40 on §32.
Chapter IX
354 
aggressor.149 In other words, the requirement of retreat is assessed according to the 
facts and circumstances of every case. As a consequence, the scope of self-defence 
has become broader than it was.150 A second reason why this criterion has become 
broader is that Dutch courts are required to better substantiate why they rejected 
self-defence based on a possibility to retreat.151 By quashing convictions for 
rejecting the defence on insuffi cient grounds, the condition in effect becomes more 
lenient.
The requirement gives some general guidelines. In principle, quickly giving way 
to, ducking away and getting directly available help, which is not capable of 
interpretation as giving up the legal interest, can be required from the attacked 
person. Getting (offi cial) help is only required when this help is immediately 
available without extraordinary efforts.152 The attacked person cannot be required 
to retreat when the path of retreat endangers the attacked person, when retreat 
would merely gain time or when it is hardly possible.153 In principle, a person 
attacked at home also has no duty to withdraw.154
The defender is not required to run away or avoid certain places, even if he 
knows that he may run into trouble.155 The modern rationale for this rule is that 
retreat harms the legal order as it “constitutes a retreat of law and order before the 
aggressor who violates the law.”156 A strict duty to retreat would bring about that 
right gives way to wrong.157 If it were different, this would encourage aggressive 
and threatening behaviour. The defendant is therefore less likely to be reproached 
for not retreating and/or seeking the confrontation if he was acting lawful.158 An 
example of this is the case, where the defendant could not use his right of way 
because a trailer blocked the driveway. He would have moved it himself, if he had 
not been having an argument with its owner for some time. Knowing there was a 
149 Leverick 2006, p. 82; Fokkens & Machielse, pp. 274–275, note 3 on art. 41; Bohlander 2009, 
p. 104 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 652 and 655.
150 HR 21 December 2004, NJ 2007, 469; HR 21 November 2006, NJ 2006, 650; HR 6 October 
2009, NJ 2010, 301; HR 15 November 2011, NJ 2011, 542; de Hullu 2006, pp. 306 and 316; 
Machielse 1986, p. 710; R. v. Bird [1985] EWCA Crim 2; Duffy v. Chief Constable of Cleveland 
Police [2007] EWHC 3169; section 44(7) draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 62; 
Leverick 2006, p. 72 and Bohlander 2009, p. 104.
151 The Dutch Supreme Court has quashed many judgments for this reason in the last years. See for 
example, HR 12 July 2011, LJN:BQ6720.
152 5 October 1965 BGH VRS 30, 281; 11 January 1984 BGH NJW 1984, 986; Roxin 2006, p. 680 
and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 655–656.
153 HR 15 January 2008, RvdW 2008, 120; Kelk 2005, p. 288 and Sangero 2006, pp. 197 and 202–
203.
154 Ashworth 2006, p. 144; Ashworth 1975, p. 294; Sangero 2006, pp. 185 and 269–270 and de Hullu 
2009, p. 315. Of course, this is different when aggressor and defender are living together. In R. v. 
Hussey (1925) 18 Cr App R 160, even deadly force against an unlawful eviction was allowed, 
but as Leverick 2006, pp. 137–140 submits, this would not be the outcome when tried today.
155 Ashworth 2006, p. 144; Ormerod 2005, pp. 336–338 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 707.
156 Sangero 2006, p. 194.
157 Machielse 1986, p. 655 and annotator Buruma in HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509.
158 Blomsma & Klip 2009.
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risk the owner would react violently, he went into the owner’s greenhouse to ask 
him to move his trailer, only to be told to get out of there. The defendant however 
stayed where he was and was attacked, after which he defended himself by stabbing 
the victim with a pair of scissors.159
Because the adage that right should not give way to wrong is deeply rooted in 
German law, it has a very weak retreat requirement. German courts have 
legitimized a lenient approach by arguing that the law does not require a 
‘humiliating retreat’.160 The German Supreme Court even held in the case where a 
schoolboy who had been bullied numerous times before, brought a knife to school 
and stabbed his bullies, that this defendant was not required to get help of teachers 
since this would be a shameful retreat.161 Whereas the rationale of the humiliating 
retreat is also clearly present in English162 and Dutch163 law, it is submitted that the 
‘dishonour’ of retreat is insuffi cient to justify the retreat rule, especially in this 
extreme way. Such a wide scope of self-defence fails to respect the interests of the 
aggressor and, in combination with a pre-emptive strike, runs the risk of over 
stimulating self-assertion.164 Accordingly, in as far as the requirement is weaker 
than in England and the Netherlands, it must be rejected.
The more relaxed approach to retreat can better be explained in light of the 
abovementioned shift from a strict monopoly on violence to a society where the 
responsibility to fi ght crime is shared between state and citizens.165 Helping others 
cannot be reconciled with a duty to retreat. It has always been accepted that public 
offi cials cannot be required to retreat, as it is their duty to protect the legal interests 
of others.166 However, private individuals can also act in self-defence with a view to 
help others or even use force with a view arrest a suspect. In the current, hardened 
and complex multicultural society with lots of violence in places of entertainment, 
against shopkeepers, bus drivers, ambulance personal and other offi cials, there will 
not be a lot of understanding for judicial decisions that apply a strict duty to retreat 
to the detriment of the defender.167
159 HR 29 April 1997, NJ 1997, 627. See also HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509.
160 26 May 1964 BGH GA 1965, 147. See also Fischer, T. 2009, p. 295.
161 24 July 1979 BGH NJW 1980, 2263. In contrast, see Hof Amsterdam 22 July 2008, LJN: 
BD8276, where even self-defence-excess was rejected and Roxin 2006, p. 681.
162 “It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten times more distasteful to kill.” Beale, cited 
in Sangero 2006, p. 196 and Leverick 2006, p. 77.
163 De Hullu 2009, p. 316 submits that in Dutch Parliament, it was already argued in 1900 that the 
defendant should not be required to use every possibility to retreat, as this would imply the 
‘cowardly giving up of one’s legal interests.’
164 Compare Ashworth 2006, p. 145 and Leverick 2006, p. 82.
165 Stichting Maatschappij, Veiligheid en Politie 2008, p. 24.
166 Sangero 2006, pp. 197 and 202–203; Hof Amsterdam 9 December 2005, LJN:AU7731; Hof 
Arnhem 20 November 2008, LJN:BG4942.
167 Ter Haar & Meijer 2009, p. 45.
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3.4.5. Prior fault
If the defendant sought the confrontation or provoked the aggressor, he is partially 
responsible for the situation of self-defence. The approach to this prior fault is 
located in between two extreme positions. On the one hand, prior fault does not 
change the fact that there was a situation of self-defence. This extreme view would 
argue in favour of making prior fault irrelevant. On the other hand, it would offend 
common sense to acknowledge an unrestricted right for the defender who is 
responsible for creating the conditions of the defence.
Therefore, a middle ground has been chosen in all Member States. The defence 
is only rejected in serious cases of prior fault, to be discussed below. In all other 
cases, the degree of prior fault infl uences the weight of the other requirements of 
self-defence. Just like the other criteria of necessity, prior fault is therefore an 
independent factor that plays a relevant, but not necessarily decisive role.168 For 
example, the defendant who expects an aggressive response is expected to consider 
the alternatives to self-defence with more caution, thus increasing the weight of a 
duty to retreat or get help.169 This illustrates again that self-defence consists of a 
‘total judgment’ of all the circumstances of the case.170
Another example of how prior fault operates as a corrective mechanism is that it 
limits the degree of force that is justifi ed. In Germany, a three-staged approach 
applies to cases of prior fault. The blameworthy causing of a situation of self-
defence requires that the attacked person does his utmost to evade the attack or fi nd 
help. If this is not possible, he should exercise more restraint in the choice of the 
weapon of defence and its use. He will have to restrict himself to defensive force 
before moving towards a counter-attack.171 For example, the defendant who 
returned armed to the place of argument in order to settle the score was required to 
threaten with a weapon before using it and subsidiary, to use it in a non-lethal way. 
This increased duty applied even if it meant that he risked more injuries. Only if all 
else fails, can lethal force be justifi ed, because the defendant is not required to 
undergo serious interferences such as serious bodily injury or death.172
168 R. v. Nicholas Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377; Bohlander 2009, p. 111; Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 665; Roxin 2006, p. 691; HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509; annotator de Hullu in HR 
31 October 2000, NJ 2001, 11; de Hullu in Verbruggen, Verstraeten, van Daele & Spriet 2005, 
p. 50; annotator Buruma in HR 7 February 2006, NJ 2006, 508 and Rozemond 2006, p. 152.
169 Sangero 2006, pp. 192, 203 and 322.
170 De Hullu 2006, pp. 309–310.
171 14 June 1972 BGHSt 24, 356; 15 May 1975 BGHSt 26, 143; 7 July 1987 BGH NStZ 1988, 450; 
10 November 2010 BGH NStZ-RR 2011, 74; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 652 and 655; 
Roxin 2006, pp. 689–690; Eisele 2001, p. 146 and Schünemann 1985, p. 369. ‘Schutzwehr’ and 
Trutzwehr.’
172 7 March 2002 BGH NStZ 2002, 425. See also 21 March 1996 BGHSt 42, 97; 26 October 1993 
BGHSt 39, 374; 12 December 1975 BGHSt 26, 256; Roxin 2006, pp. 686 and 690–691; Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, p. 665 and Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 299–300. The concrete requirements are 
determined by reference to the concrete situation, which takes into account all circumstances, 
including the weapons used, strength and characteristics of the participants.
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In recent decades, the role of prior fault in the three national legal systems has 
moved towards each other. In Germany, prior fault has never been a signifi cant 
limitation of self-defence. Due to a narrow focus on the need to defend oneself 
tempore delicti and the maxim that right should never yield to wrong, in general, at 
most more is required from the other requirements of self-defence in such cases. In 
the other two States, the concept has been treated less as an absolute condition and 
also more as a corrective mechanism. The limiting effect of prior fault is also 
applied more leniently. For example, nowadays the defence is also not likely to be 
rejected just because the defendant did not exercise more caution by getting help or 
leaving a place, when he feared an attack.173
The question of whether or not the prior fault must lead to a rejection of the 
defence depends on all the circumstances of the case. Important issues are the 
degree of prior fault and the seriousness of the attack. The more prior fault, the 
more restricted the right to self-defence. The more serious the attack or the interest 
endangered, the less rigid the other requirements will be.174 Prior fault can be 
distinguished in kinds. The defendant can have created the conditions of self-
defence with a view to apply the justifi cation. For example, the defendant aimed to 
create the conditions for self-defence in order to lawfully infl ict violence upon his 
enemy. Less serious is the case where he foresaw the risk that the aggressor would 
be provoked. In a negligent form, the question is whether the reaction of the 
aggressor was foreseeable to a reasonable person.175
The defence is usually rejected in cases where the purpose of the defendant was 
to incite an attack. In such a case, another requirement of self-defence will not be 
fulfi lled, namely that of defensive purpose.176 In Germany, the defence is precluded 
in these cases through the notion of abuse of rights.177 However, courts are very 
reluctant to accept that it was the purpose of the defendant to abuse the defence by 
creating the conditions of self-defence. For example, the returning to a crowded small 
bar, armed with a shotgun, to confront the person who had attacked him and perhaps 
had his missing money, was labelled as an intentional provocation, (only) verging on 
a purposeful provocation. Therefore, the defence is hardly ever precluded.178
The mere fear of the defendant that the aggressor may attack him will not 
necessarily preclude the subsequent necessary application of force.179 Consciously 
173 HR 22 February 2011 NJ 2011, 107 and HR 7 December 2010, NJ 2010, 677.
174 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 665; Roxin 2006, p. 691 and ter Haar & Meijer 2009, p. 142.
175 Strijards 1987, pp. 44–46 writes about ‘dolus’ and ‘culpa in causa’. The most serious form of 
prior fault is labelled in Germany as ‘Absichtsprovokation’. See also annotator Keijzer in HR 
2 February 2010, NJ 2010, 282; Beulke 2008, p. 120; Roxin 2006, pp. 687–688 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 662–663.
176 Bohlander 2009, pp. 104–105; Beulke 2008, pp. 118–120 and ter Haar & Meijer 2009, pp 84–85.
177 14 June 1983 BGH NStZ 1983, 452; Beulke 2008, p. 120; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 298–299 and Kelk 
2005, p. 288.
178 26 October 1993 BGHSt 39, 374.
179 R. v. Nicholas Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377; Ormerod 2008, p. 369 and HR 28 March 
2006, NJ 2006, 509.
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seeking out the confrontation will often preclude a fi nding of self-defence,180 but it 
is not required prima facie that a defendant should avoid certain places. The 
circumstances are decisive. It is unreasonable to hang around your enemy’s house 
and might even indicate violent intention under the guise of self-defence. By 
contrast, one cannot be required to stay away from his workplace, just because he is 
likely to be confronted with his enemy.181
The question is not only whether a risk was taken, but also whether that risk was 
reasonable. Consider the ambulance man who knows he enters a dangerous situation 
but has to in order to help a victim. If he is attacked, he may defend himself.182 The 
legal order aspects of the defendant’s actions can outweigh the concomitant prior 
fault. In the above-mentioned case, the defendant knew that there was a considerable 
risk that the persons who were blocking his right of way would be provoked by him 
asking them to move. It was however perfectly lawful for him to ask this. Conduct, 
which is perfectly legal and invites violence, cannot preclude self-defence.183 If it 
were to be any different, the aggressive would limit the freedom and rights of 
others.
Prior fault does not preclude self-defence as it does in for example duress, 
because the force is directed against the aggressor who acts wrongful, not against 
an innocent third party.184 Only an actio illicita in causa, conduct, which is illegal 
in origin, can negate self-defence.185 The justifi cation is therefore usually rejected 
in cases where criminals foresaw a violent encounter, like a rip-deal. The rationale 
of the legal order militates against application, as there is no right against wrong.186 
In certain circumstances, conduct, which is not wrongful, but clearly socially 
unacceptable, can also give rise to limitations of self-defence under prior fault. 
Consider the football supporter who, dressed in the club’s outfi t, goes to the 
supporter’s home of the rivalling club.187
By giving more weight to lawful motives of the defendant in particular, and by 
applying a more lenient approach to prior fault in general, the Dutch judiciary has 
widened the scope of self-defence in the last years. This can be contrasted with the 
perspective that citizens are supposed to exhaust legal remedies to safeguard their 
180 HR 24 October 1989, NJ 1990, 353.
181 See also de Hullu 2006, pp. 309–311 and Rozemond 2006, pp. 106–108.
182 De Jong D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 173 and Strijards 1992, p. 272.
183 HR 29 April 1997, NJ 1997, 627; HR 28 March 2006, NJ 2006, 509; section 44(6) draft Criminal 
Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 62; section 27(7), Law Commission 1993, p. 108; 12 January 
1978 BGHSt 27, 336; 21 March 1996 BGHSt 42, 97 and Beulke 2008, p. 120.
184 Leverick 2006, pp. 120–121.
185 See Sangero 2006, p. 336 and Hruschka 2001, p. 880.
186 See Rb. Zwolle 29 May 2008, LJN:BD1958 and BD9248 and HR 27 May 1986, NJ 1987, 8 and 
Machielse 1986, pp. 615–617.
187 A similar case was HR 1 July 1987, NJ 1989, 389. Another example is a Nazi that attends a 
meeting of Jewish WWII survivors, see Robinson 1985, pp. 40–42 and Leverick 2006, p. 123. 
Roxin 2006, pp. 687–693 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 662–664 argue that although 
the criterion of socially adequate conduct is commonly applied in Germany, it does not provide a 
clear line of demarcation. The criterion should therefore be restricted to wrongfulness.
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rights instead of taking matters into their own hands. In the context of offences 
against property, it was explained that this perspective led to a wide interpretation 
of intent as to the wrongfulness, enabling the conclusion that these persons 
committed offences against property.188 In Germany, citizens have rights of self-
help under civil law that can provoke the aggressor. Because this self-help is lawful, 
the defendant may defend himself regardless of the provocation.189
In English law too, the strict rule that seemed to preclude self-defence in most 
cases of prior fault has recently been widened by holding that “the mere fact that a 
defendant goes somewhere in order to extract revenge from the victim does not of 
itself rule out the possibility that in any violence that ensues self-defence is 
necessarily not available as a defence.”190 The threshold for precluding the defence 
is set high, which brings about that in most cases, the requirements of the defence 
are only made stricter. In other words, a yes or no test is replaced by approach that 
takes into account all the circumstances of the case.
Prior fault is least likely to preclude self-defence in Germany, and when it 
operates as a corrective mechanism in lesser cases than purposeful prior fault, it 
also not often leads to a rejection of the defence. As another middle way, negligence 
liability is sometimes established. To illustrate this, consider the case where G had 
been injured in a fi ght and in revenge, he wanted to infl ict similar injuries on M, the 
person responsible for this. He asked the defendant to take care of this by shooting 
M in the legs. The defendant lured M into a secluded area and then tried to hit him 
to facilitate the intended shooting. However, M saw it coming and hit the defendant 
(in self-defence) with a cosh, striking him to the ground. At that point, he wanted to 
hit the defendant who was still lying on the fl oor seriously wounded again, uttering 
the words, “You pig, I will kill you.” The defendant then took the gun and fatally 
shot M. The German Supreme Court held that self-defence was not precluded 
because of the defendant’s previous attack. The justifi cation should be connected, 
not to when he tried to hit M, but to the point of time he was lying at the ground, 
when M’s situation of self-defence had ended. The defendant at that time acted to 
defend himself, whereby the previous attack is irrelevant. The defence was limited 
due to the prior fault, but these stricter requirements were met since it was 
established that the defendant could do nothing else but shoot M at that time. He 
was thus justifi ed in killing M, but in order to overcome an outright acquittal of the 
defendant, he was held liable for negligent killing, as the intended severe wounding 
could and did in fact result in the death of M.191
The case recognized that bad men can be justifi ed in self-defence too. It would 
however strain everybody sense of justice if the defendant would be acquitted. In 
fact, he was also held liable. As a middle ground solution to these cases, prior fault 
188 See IV.2.4.7.
189 5 April 2011 BGH BeckRS 2011, 09435. See §§229 and 230 of the German Criminal Code.
190 R. v. Nicholas Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377, in contrast to R. v. Brown [1973] NI 96, cited 
in Sangero 2006, p. 321.
191 22 November 2000 BGH NStZ 2001, 143 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 665.
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neither precludes the defence nor is irrelevant. Liability is grounded in the prior 
unlawful act, the actio libera or illicita in causa.192 The approach resembles that of 
German lawyers in cases of dolus generalis, where a complex sequence of events 
was also separated into two acts. If the victim was killed by what the defendant 
thought to be the disposing of the body, he is liable for the failed attempt to kill and 
the negligent killing. Dolus is assessed in relation to the exact time when the actus 
reus was fulfi lled.193 In both contexts, the requirements of criminal liability are 
rigidly assessed by reference to the offence, which is narrowly interpreted as the 
killing itself, rather than the whole sequence of events and the circumstances 
leading up to it. It is awkward to hold that a result like death is both wrongful and 
lawful.194
It can be concluded that there exists consensus that prior fault should not 
preclude self-defence except for cases where it was the defendant’s purpose to abuse 
the justifi cation. In all other situations, self-defence can, but need not be rejected. 
Even if self-defence is no longer precluded a priori so easily, a signifi cant degree of 
prior fault most likely will result in the rejection of self-defence, even if there was a 
situation of self-defence tempore delicti. Merely guidelines can be given as 
everything depends on the circumstances. Amongst others, an important factor for 
the effect of prior fault is whether or not the conduct that gave rise to the situation of 
self-defence was lawful.
This approach applies to all criteria of necessity. The imminence requirement, 
the duty to retreat and the interests that can be protected currently function more as 
a factor in assessing self-defence, than as cumulative criteria with a high threshold. 
The questions of necessity are not as decisive as they have been in the past. Self-
defence therefore revolves around proportionality. The balancing of all factors is 
usually conducted in the context of proportionality. Possible alternatives and not 
very immediate dangers infl uence what is allowed as proportionate force. Only 
proportionate defensive force is in line with the protection of the legal order. Finally, 
the dividing line between self-defence as a justifi cation and the excuse of excessive 
self-defence is drawn by proportionality.
192 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 665; Mitsch 2001, pp. 751–755 and Sangero 2006, pp. 328–337. 
Although often used interchangeably, an actio libera is about an act, which was free in origin, 
see V.3.4., whereas an actio illicita was wrongful to begin with, see Hruschka 2001, pp. 880–
881. There is controversy on whether or not the German Supreme Court has recognized this 
doctrine, since the fourth Senate has rejected it and other Senates also not explicitly recognize it, 
see Roxin 2006, p. 694 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 300.
193 See V.3.2. Robinson 1985 (US) proposed a similar solution that should apply to all defences 
where the actor has in way generated the conditions of his defence. See also Gur-Arye 1986, pp. 
78–79.
194 Mitsch 2001, p. 755 however argues that the fact that the solution is hard to ground in theory, 
should not distract us from the argument that this solution is acceptable as fair.
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3.5. Proportionality
The second limb of self-defence consists of a proportionality standard that assesses 
the relationship between the offence committed and the amount of harm likely to be 
suffered by the defendant, or likely to result if the defendant had not intervened 
with force.195 Simply put, it is about weighing the interests of the aggressor against 
those of the defendant, but it will become clear that the balancing is more complex. 
In evaluating the proportionality of the defendant’s actions, one has to take into 
account all the circumstances, including in particular the nature and degree of the 
force used, the seriousness of the evil to be prevented and the possibility of 
preventing it by other means.196 For example, how likely is it that the victim will 
gain full compensation for his injury if he avoids the use of force? How probable is 
the occurrence of the danger?197
It should be stressed that it is not required that force must be exactly in proportion 
with the attack: it may not be disproportionate. As long as the defensive force was not 
a disproportionate response to the attack, the defendant will be justifi ed. It is not 
required that the anticipated evil should have been greater than the force used to avert 
this. For instance, lethal force can be justifi ed even when the danger to the attacked 
person was of severe bodily harm or less, as in rape.198 This can be grounded in the 
reproach that can be made against the aggressor and because the defendant cannot be 
required to make a perfect weighing of interests in an urgent situation.
First, it is argued that the interests of the aggressor carry less weight, because 
the attack emanates from him, or that his interests are not only juxtaposed with 
those of the attacked person but also the legal order as a whole, which is attacked by 
him.199 Since force applied in necessity relates to a third party, rather than a 
wrongful aggressor, it requires that the interest that is saved should be (signifi cantly) 
more important than the interest sacrifi ced.200 Secondly, the defendant’s actions are 
not weighed on a gold balance. Because of the urgency of the situation, the 
immediate necessity of action and the emotions brought about by attacks of basic 
legal interests like life and limb, the defendant is not required to judge everything 
to a nicety.201 As discussed in detail later, this leaves room to accommodate 
mistakes on proportionality in the justifi cation.
195 Ashworth 2006, p. 140.
196 S. 76(7a) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 333–334.
197 Sangero 2006, p. 175.
198 11 September 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 29; Sangero 2006, pp. 168, 183 and 196–197 and Leverick 
2006, pp. 157–158.
199 Roxin 2006, p. 655.
200 Sangero 2006, p. 168.
201 Machielse 1986, p. 661 and 713; annotator van Veen in HR 1 March 1983, NJ 1983, 468 and 
Ashworth 2006, p. 148. See also 20 September 1920 RGSt 55, 82.
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3.5.1. Least intrusive means
Proportionality can be divided into different aspects. It has been noted that one 
aspect deals with the least intrusive means of defence, after which it is questioned 
in what way the defendant should have used this means. For example, the defendant 
should use his fi sts rather than a weapon if that will suffi ce to repel the attack. 
Secondly, he should shoot at the leg of the aggressor instead of the torso or head.202
However, in German law, it is required fi rst and foremost that the means must be 
capable of either ending or at least hindering the attack. This element of adequacy 
or suitability is easily met. Only what is clearly not adequate to end the danger is 
excluded from self-defence, like the destruction of goods that have no relation to the 
attack. The defendant does not have to be certain that his actions will in fact be able 
to avert the attack. What suffi ces is the possibility that by this action the attack is 
diminished in intensity or postponed. Thus, the defendant is allowed to defend 
himself with force against a superior opponent or great number of opponents, even 
if he accepts the possibility he might get the worst of it.203
The requirement that the least intrusive means should be chosen is seriously 
mitigated by the rule that the defendant is allowed to take the means that are most 
likely to be effective.204 The least intrusive means must still promise the immediate 
and fi nal cessation of the attack, estimated ex ante. The defendant is not required to 
use less intrusive means if its usefulness to defend is doubtful.205 In other words, in 
choosing the means, the risk that a means might not be effective enough does not 
have to be taken by the attacked person.206 For example, if the aggressor was 
already so close that shooting in the foot might not stop him, lethal force can be 
accepted.207
3.5.2. Proportionality stricto sensu
In the subsequent issue of proportionate application of the means chosen, the same 
considerations apply. Threatening with a weapon is also only required if the 
circumstances allow for it.208 German courts easily reject that the defendant 
should have threatened fi rst. For example, it is argued that this would have brought 
202 Fletcher 1978, p. 870; 11 September 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 29 and Beulke 2008, p. 115.
203 Beulke 2008, p. 115; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 651–652; Bohlander 2009, p. 10; Roxin 
2006, pp. 674–675 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 294.
204 Annotator van Veen in HR 1 March 1983, NJ 1983, 468. See also Fletcher 1978, p. 870.
205 Roxin 2006, pp. 674–675 suggests that a stricter approach is taken in newer case-law. The old 
formula in case-law is that the chosen means must avert the danger with certainty; the formula 
in newer case-law is that lesser means are not required if its effect is doubtful.
206 11 September 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 29; 10 February 2000 BGHSt 45, 378; 25 October 2001 
BGH NStZ 2002, 140; Roxin 2006, pp. 674–675 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 653.
207 26 May 1964 BGH GA 1965, 147.
208 14 June 1972 BGHSt 24, 356; 13 March 2003 BGH NStZ 2004, 615; 9 August 2005 BGH NStZ 
2006, 152; 30 June 2004 BGH NStZ 2005, 31 and Roxin 2006, p. 676.
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about the risk of losing the knife, which would then be used against him.209 
The defendant does not have to accept the risk of getting injured.210 Only in cases 
of prior fault and innocent aggressors will the choice and means of use be 
more limited.211 More emphasis will be put on the duty to threaten and to apply 
force as least intrusive as possible, always however with the limitation that 
the lesser use must still be able to suffi ciently protect the defendant’s interests.
What means qualify as least intrusive and what application of this means is 
proportionate is assessed by reference to the strength of the attack, the 
dangerousness of the aggressor and the available means, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the situation.212 Because of the enormous weight of the 
circumstances of the case, the approach to proportionality, like that of necessity is 
very factual and casuistic.213 Both aspects are established ex ante objectively by 
reference to a reasonable criterion fi gure at the time of the attack, being aware of all 
objectively knowable circumstances as they were at the time, rather than they 
turned out to be ex post.214 This ex ante yardstick also brings about that the 
balancing should be about evaluating the anticipated results for the aggressor and 
the attacked person. The defendant’s conduct does not become disproportionate 
because the harm to the aggressor was more serious than anticipated. Courts 
nonetheless tend to take into account the actual consequences of the defence, 
placing too much focus on chance. As an unfortunate result, the defendant bears the 
risk of defensive action.215
3.5.3. Objective standard
Despite the objective standard, individual characteristics can lower and raise the 
proportionality requirement. For example, disparity of strength, size and 
relationship between defender and aggressor can explain why the use of weapons 
against an unarmed aggressor can be proportionate. On the contrary, a trained 
boxer can be expected to use his fi sts.216 ‘Garantenstellung’ indicates that a 
defendant has a certain function, to which norms apply and therefore more can be 
expected from him. He guarantees his conduct, on which others may rely. A police 
offi cer is for example deemed to be better in assessing situations and responding 
209 12 January 1978 BGHSt 27, 336.
210 15 May 1979 BGH MDR 1979, 985 and 25 November 1980 BGH NStZ 1981, 138.
211 21 March 1996 BGHSt 42, 97.
212 28 February 1989 BGH NJW 1989, 3027; 9 August 2005 BGH NStZ 2006, 152; Beulke 2008, pp. 
115–116; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 651–652.
213 Kelk 2005, p. 290 and Machielse 1986, p. 664.
214 25 June 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 626; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 651; Beulke 2008, p. 116 
and Roxin 2006, p. 678.
215 Sangero 2006, p. 174 and Blomsma & Klip 2009. Compare Machielse 1986, p. 663–664.
216 25 November 1980 BGH NStZ 1981, 138; Law Commission 2004, pp. 76–77; Roxin 2006, pp. 
659, 676 and 678; HR 23 October 1984, NJ 1986, 56 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 306–307.
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appropriately.217 In cases where a not very proportionate response of a police offi cer 
was justifi ed, this is often grounded in the lack of education and experience. The 
question is what can be expected from a police offi cer in the position and rank, age, 
education and experience of the defendant.218 In contrast, other individual 
characteristics, such as unusual short-temper, are not taken into account as they 
would confl ict with the normative character of proportionality and self-defence.219
What if the defendant thought it was proportionate to seriously harm the 
aggressor whereas this moderate objective standard does not allow for this? As 
mentioned before, such a mistake in the context of proportionality must be 
reasonable to negate liability. A mistake on the scope of proportionality can be 
distinguished from a mistake on the facts giving rise to self-defence. When the 
defendant for instance believes that his property outweighs the life of the aggressor, 
he errs in believing that he can shoot a fi rearm at a thief. This mistake is treated like 
a mistake on the legal limits of a prohibition. Since the law sets the rules of conduct, 
mistakes on these rules are unlikely to excuse the defendant, let alone justify the 
conduct.
Nonetheless, the concept of proportionality allows for mistakes within limits. 
Since the valuation of the defendant’s actions may only not be disproportionate, it 
can also be argued that as long as such a mistake is reasonable, self-defence will 
apply without reference to any putative form. The requirement is lenient because 
“detached refl ection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.”220 If 
the defendant for example thought it was proportionate to shoot the thief in the leg 
in order to prevent him from steeling a very valuable object, this will not be 
considered disproportionate, even if it turns out later that the thief would have also 
been apprehended soon otherwise.
A second type of mistake exists when the defendant is overpowered by emotions 
like fear or rage and exceeds what is proportionate in the given situation. This 
mistake is also not putative self-defence but called self-defence-excess.221 This is 
recognized as a general defence of the excusatory type in Germany and the 
Netherlands, based on the understanding that the defendant could not act reasonable 
because of the emotions caused by the attack. The mistake is excused since it is not 
blameworthy in the specifi c circumstances. Conduct, which is not disproportionate, 
can be justifi ed, but even if it is, it may be excused within certain limits of 
disproportionality. Through the excuse, excessive force does not have to bring about 
criminal liability.
217 Ashworth 2006, p. 148 and Tadros 2005, p. 354. See AG Remmelink in HR 2 February 1982, NJ 
1982, 384. On the other hand, a police offi cer is also required to engage in unpredictable, 
threatening situations. By focusing on the duty to engage and help others the proportionality 
requirement is relaxed.
218 HR 1 March 1983, NJ 1983, 468.
219 Tadros 2005, p. 355.
220 Holmes J, cited in Ashworth 2006, p. 148.
221 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 353; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 301 and Sangero 2006, p. 297.
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The lack of such an excuse in English law can explain why there is a tendency to 
include more acts of excessive force into the English justifi cation of self-defence. In 
the absence of other legal solutions that allow for an acquittal, courts are lenient in 
applying the test of proportionality.222 The law enables this by stating that “evidence 
of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and instinctively thought 
was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong evidence that only 
reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose.”223
After all, the exclusion of the excuse can lead to harsh results, especially if we 
consider that the defendant was attacked and that intentional killing will result in a 
mandatory ‘life’ sentence for murder, which always brings about a minimum of 15 
years of imprisonment.224 This harshness is also mitigated by not prosecuting in 
those cases where the degree of force was not very far beyond the threshold of what 
is reasonable.225 Secondly, the defendant is only required to raise evidence that 
suggests the availability of self-defence. After this threshold has been met, it is up 
to the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defence. Only when the jury are sure 
that the force used by the defendant was disproportionate, they are allowed to fi nd 
him guilty.226 Another important mitigation consists in the existence of two partial 
defences that can reduce a charge of murder to the less serious manslaughter. These 
defences with similar rationales as self-defence will be discussed together with self-
defence-excess.
3.5.4. Developments
The existence of self-defence-excess in Dutch law has been advanced as an 
explanation for a relatively stricter test of proportionality.227 Disproportionate 
conduct that should not be punished can be excused under self-defence-excess. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, a clear relaxation of the requirement is visible in the 
Netherlands. By quashing many convicting judgments for rejecting self-defence as 
disproportionate on insuffi cient grounds, the Dutch Supreme Court again indirectly 
extended the scope of proportionality. Because of this and changing perceptions, 
Dutch courts are increasingly lenient in allowing self-defence. The jeweller who 
saw he was being robbed, took a gun, descended the stairs and started shooting 
could rely on the defence.228 So could the defendant who pursued a burglar with a 
222 Horder 2006A, pp. 56–57. See also Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, p. 1034.
223 Section 76(7) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which codifi es R. v. Palmer [1971] 
AC 814.
224 Sangero 2006, p. 297 and Kaye 1997, pp. 451–455. Schedule 21 (11) of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 reads: “Mitigating factors that may be relevant to the offence of murder include – the fact 
that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence.”
225 CPS:‘Self-defence and the prevention of crime’, www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section5/chapter_d.html.
226 R. v. Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245.
227 De Hullu 2006, p. 307.
228 Rb. Breda 8 May 2003, LJN:AF8365.
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baseball bat, caught up with him and in overpowering him, infl icted him serious 
injuries.229
An opposite trend exists in Germany, as a result of which the national concepts 
of self-defence have moved towards each other. Whereas traditionally, 
proportionality was foreign to the German concept of self-defence, it can now be 
concluded that this is also an important limitation to self-defence.230 An example 
that is most often advanced to illustrate the lack of a proportionality requirement is 
that of the farmer who caught schoolboys stealing his apples. He would be acquitted 
based on self-defence for shooting at them, because this was the only way of 
stopping them. Clearly, this gave rise to quite some controversy, as the property 
rights to apples seem to be favoured over the lives of the young boys.231 In order to 
avoid such outcomes, Dutch Parliament explicitly included a proportionality 
requirement.232 By contrast, German law traditionally puts great weight on the 
dogma that right should never yield to wrong, focussing on necessity. Theft 
constitutes an on-going attack, and if there were no other means of ending the 
attack, even lethal force was allowed to secure property.233 Any other solution 
would imply that the farmer has to accept the loss, thus yield to wrong.234 Dutch 
scholars from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century also did not 
think much of a proportionality requirement, because this would unduly favour 
wrong to the detriment of right.235
Nonetheless, even in Germany, it was increasingly recognized that the lack of 
such a requirement could lead to absurd outcomes that can hardly be said to serve 
the legal order.236 The legal order is after all, concerned with the interests of the 
aggressor too. Consequences that are blatantly disproportional to the threatened 
harm can be disallowed as disproportionate under the doctrine of abuse of rights, 
even when it was the only option available.237 These ‘socio-ethical limitations’ of 
proportionality are grounded however not in the general test of proportionality 
(‘Verhaltnismäβig keit’) but in the concept of ‘Gebotenheit’, which also translates as 
229 Rb. Almelo 19 October 2007, LJN:BB6018, see ter Haar & Meijer 2009, p. 168.
230 Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, p. 1038; Jäger 2006, p. 42; Dannecker in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 156–
157 and Sangero 2006, pp. 74, 127 and 170.
231 In 20 September 1920 RGSt 55, 82, a farmer had shot at thieves who were fl eeing with his fruit. 
He was justifi ed because they did not respond to his warnings. The German Supreme Court saw 
no problem of proportionality.
232 Smidt 1881A, p. 379 and de Hullu 2006, p. 298.
233 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 639 and 651.
234 See 20 September 1920 RGSt 55, 82.
235 Machielse 1986, pp. 662 and 713.
236 Roxin 2006, p. 684 and Schünemann 1985, p. 367. See also Hruschka 2003, p. 223.
237 5 May 1892 RGSt 23, 116; Beulke 2008, p. 118; Sangero 2006, pp. 65 and 170–172; Fletcher 
1978, pp. 871–873; Fletcher 1973, p. 385 and Fletcher 2007, pp. 140 and 202.
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proportionality,238 yet has also been related to the limb of necessity.239 By separating 
these two concepts, it can be insisted that self-defence does not require a general 
test of proportionality.240 Instead, the limitations merely take the sharp edges of the 
justifi cation, by excluding clearly unacceptable applications, such as the farmer 
shooting at kids stealing fruit.241
The German legislator foresaw in particular limitations as necessary when 
children and madmen attack, trifl e attacks or when the defendant was also partially 
responsible for the situation.242 In addition, it is accepted that the right to self-
defence should be limited in cases of great discrepancy between the interests 
involved and, more controversial, in cases of a special familiar or marital 
relationships.243 The same three staged approach applies as discussed in the context 
of prior fault above, of which the third is a strict(er) test of proportionality.244
On the other hand, it seems that this limitation is again applied very mildly by 
doctrine and jurisprudence. Prevailing opinion still would allow killing to save 
property. The farmer may not shoot the schoolboy who is about to steal an apple, 
but the man who is running away with a box of diamonds may be shot. Moreover, 
under German law, mistakes on the facts underlying the balancing of interest can 
negate intent. This is reinforced by in dubio pro reo, since it is also common in this 
context to assume the facts to the benefi t of the defendant if there is any doubt.
For example, in a case, two junkies broke into a pharmacy. When the defendant, 
a neighbour, noticed this, he took his gun and shouted that they had to come out and 
surrender. The junkies came out and fl ed, not responding to the warning shots of 
the defendant. One of them was hit in the back by a bullet and severely injured. The 
Supreme Court held that it was clear that a shot fi red with the intent to injure could 
not be justifi ed, since the junkies had only been able to take syringes with them. 
However, it was accepted that the defendant had only wanted to give warning shots, 
whereby it was held that the victim could be hit by a ricochet. To me, this seems 
implausible, given the defendant’s experience in shooting and the distance between 
238 Roxin 1981, pp. 77–78; Roxin 2006, pp. 679 and 683–685; Beulke 2008, p. 117; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 658. In the Dutch provision on self-defence, ‘geboden’ also denotes 
proportionality, see Smidt 1881A, p. 379 and de Hullu 2006, p. 298. The German legislator 
wanted to expressly include the socio-ethical limitations by including the word ‘geboten’ in the 
Code’s provision of self-defence, but this was struck in a later draft of the 1962 Criminal Code, 
see Roxin 2006, pp. 683–685.
239 See for example 16 July 1980 BGH NStZ 1981, 22. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 684–685 and 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 658.
240 25 June 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 626 and Beulke 2008, p. 118.
241 Beulke 2008, p. 118.
242 Roxin 2006, p. 683 and Schünemann 1985, pp. 369–370.
243 However, an abused woman should not be limited in her right to defend herself, especially if the 
attack is serious, see 25 September 1974 NJW 1975, 62; Roxin 2006, pp. 701–704 and Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 661–662. In 18 April 2002 BGH JZ 2003, 50, the Supreme Court even 
leaves open whether this limitation based on marriage still applies.
244 25 September 1974 BGH NJW 1975, 62; Beulke 2008, pp. 118–120; Bohlander 2009, pp. 104–
105; Roxin 2006, pp. 685–708 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 660–666.
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him and the victim. Secondly, it was argued that even if he did aim at the victim, it 
could be that the defendant was mistaken on the facts that allowed for a different 
valuation. Shooting would be allowed if something of great value was stolen, which 
mistake would thus negate his intent. Moreover, if he had taken care to minimize 
the harm, negligence liability would also be negated.245
This leniency could prove to be problematic with a view to the right of life under 
article 2 ECHR, which does not allow for exceptions based on the defence of 
property.246 Self-defence is limited in this context because the property is 
considered less important than the bodily integrity, including the bodily integrity of 
the aggre ssor.247 On the other hand, the right to property rings hollow without the 
possibi lity to defend it by force.248 Prevailing opinion in Germany takes the view 
that article 2 is of no relevance to the right to self-defence since it only regulates 
con duct of offi cial authorities.249 This enables the justifi cation of the person who 
uses lethal force to protect property. However, this view is incorrect. Under 
so-called indirect horizontal application of human rights, the state is also required 
to guarantee the right to life by prevention and prosecution of individuals who 
violate this right.250
Another reading of article 2 ECHR is that it only precludes purposeful killing. 
The German translation of article 2 reads ‘Absichtliche Tötung’, killing with dolus 
directus, so it is argued that German law is in line with the ECHR. This version of 
article 2 is stricter than the English text that refers to intentional killing, but on both 
readings, killing with dolus eventualis or recklessness is not covered by article 2, 
allowing deadly force where the risk of death was only taken for granted.251 The 
ECtHR has however made clear that a state can also be convicted for violating 
article 2 if lives are lost due to recklessness or dolus eventualis.252 Some argue that 
to preclude life threatening force in response to serious infringements of property 
would violate the basic principles of the German law on self-defence,253 others 
argue that the difference is practically irrelevant given the reluctance of the 
245 15 May 1979 BGH MDR 1979, 985. See also 25 March 1999 BGH JR 2000, 297.
246 Bernsmann 1996, p. 178; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 708 and 713 and Ormerod 2005, p. 332.
247 See Smidt 1881A, pp. 378–379 and Machielse 1986, p. 625. Kelk 2005, p. 285 submits that more 
is allowed in a materialistic culture as that of the US.
248 Sangero 2006, p. 252; R. v. Hussey (1925) 18 Cr App Rep 160 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 300–301.
249 Roxin 2006, pp. 697–698; Beulke 2008, p. 118; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 298 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, pp. 666–667.
250 Witteman 1997, p. 271 argues that most EU Member States disagree with the German view too.
251 Roxin 2006, pp. 698–699.
252 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, appl. no. 48939/99, 30 November 2004, §93: “Where it is established that 
the negligence attributable to State offi cials or bodies on that account goes beyond an error of 
judgment or carelessness, in that the authorities in question, fully realising the likely 
consequences and disregarding the powers vested in them, failed to take measures that were 
necessary and suffi cient to avert the risks inherent in a dangerous activity (…), the fact that 
those responsible for endangering life have not been charged with a criminal offence or 
prosecuted may amount to a violation of Article 2 (…).”
253 Roxin 2006, p. 698.
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judiciary to allow deadly self-defence in order to avert attacks to property.254 The 
latter is most probable as Germany, to my knowledge, has never been held to violate 
article 2.
It can be concluded that the scope of defensive force is still the widest under 
German law. It should be noted however, that from a legal historical and European 
comparative perspective, the lenient German approach to self-defence, which has 
been mitigated to a large extent, is quite unusual. Self-defence was quite a 
restrictive defence in Germany until a very broad version was included in the 
Prussian Criminal Code of 1851. It has been argued therefore that a 
proportionality principle could easily be included in the German tradition of self-
defence.255
Secondly, even if the so-called socio-ethical limitations are not labelled as a 
principle of proportionality, they do constitute a limit of proportionality on self-
defence. The situation in Germany generally does not differ from that in other 
countries where a principle of proportionality is expressly formulated. 
Proportionality is expressly taken into account in the Netherlands, indirectly 
through reasonableness in England and de facto in Germany. The German judge is 
by now moreover just as sceptical towards the use of fi rearms against trifl e attacks 
as his counterparts in England. This similarity facilitates the creation of a EU 
concept of self-defence.256
4. NECESSITY
Legal interests can confl ict in many diverging situations. The right to free speech of 
one person can confl ict with the freedom of religion of the other. The freedom to 
transport goods without restrictions between Member States can be at odds with 
public health. The application of necessity implies that it can be justifi ed to sacrifi ce 
one interest in order to serve another. The defence applies in a situation of actual 
danger to legally protected interests, which danger can only be averted by 
infringing less valuable interests of third parties. In other words, a sacrifi ce is 
justifi ed when it is the only reasonable alternative and when the served interest 
outweighs the sacrifi ced interest. Only then is the act of saving deemed to be ‘the 
appropriate means to reach the legitimate goal.’257
Justifi ed necessity must be distinguished from the excuse duress, although it 
will become clear, that in the end, only a gradual distinction can be made.258 In 
England in particular, there is disagreement on whether cases should be dealt under 
the doctrine of necessity or the similar duress by circumstances. English appellate 
254 Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, pp. 1024–1025. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 666–667.
255 Witteman 1997, pp. 264–265. Compare Weigend in Tiedemann 2002, p. 414.
256 See Perron in Arnold a.o. 2005, pp. 1019–1021, 1036–1037 and 1039.
257 Beulke 2008, p. 102.
258 Dolman 2006, p. 175; de Hullu 2006, p. 289 and Rozemond 2006, p. 81.
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courts have agreed that there is no real distinction between the two defences.259 It is 
argued that both revolve around the infringement of the freedom of choice of the 
actor. The two can however be separated by focusing on the nature of the pressure 
to commit the offence. In duress, the pressure arises from the danger (to life or 
limb), whereas in necessity, the pressure arises from the necessity to choose.260
More often, necessity is distinguished from duress by focusing on its 
justifi catory character. In a necessity plea, the focus is on the value of the 
defendant’s act, claiming that by breaking the law more benefi t was obtained than if 
it had been followed. The choice made in necessity is objectively right or at least the 
lesser of two evils. In duress, by contrast, the actor is only excused for making the 
wrong, but understandable choice.261 For instance, the person who is speeding to 
get his injured father to hospital can be juxtaposed with the person who is speeding 
because a criminal tells him to at gunpoint. In other words, necessity applies if the 
legal rule does not apply in concreto, whereas duress applies when compliance with 
the law could not reasonably be required.262 Other differences will become apparent 
in discussing the two defences, such as the lack of a (strict) proportionality 
requirement and more room to take into account individual characteristics in 
duress.
Necessity itself can be distinguished into an aggressive and a defensive form. As 
far as the damage or destruction of objects is concerned, the difference between 
aggressive and defensive necessity is laid down in German law.263 Decisive is 
whether the interest that is sacrifi ced belongs to a third party or the person who 
created the danger. The normal case of necessity is aggressive. It is aggressive, 
because it harms a legitimate interest of third party. The defence is not aimed at the 
person who is the source of the threat or danger.264 An example is the use of someone 
else’s umbrella to fend off an attack by a dog. Since the impending injury to the 
defendant would be disproportionally high in comparison to the damage caused to 
the umbrella, the third party is not entitled to refuse another to interfere with his 
object. This is based on solidarity of the legal order that requires a certain tolerance 
of the individual in circumstances, leaving intact the civil legal duty to 
compensate.265
When the infringed interest belongs to the person who gave rise to the confl ict, 
defensive necessity may apply. A classic example is the harming or killing of a dog 
that attacks. Since this does not qualify as a human attack, it was explained that 
self-defence cannot justify this. The owner of the dog did however create the need 
259 R. v. Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977 and R. v. Quayle and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1415.
260 Dolman 2006, pp. 174–175, 183, 188, 233–239, 302 and 310. See also Holland 1989, p. 262.
261 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 721; Law Commission 
1993, pp. 63–64 and Rozemond 2006, p. 81.
262 Dolman 2006, p. 188.
263 §§228 (defensive) and 904 (aggressive) of the German Civil Code.
264 Leverick 2006, p. 6 and Sangero 2006, pp. 68, 118 and 128.
265 §904 of the German Civil Code; Bohlander 2009, p. 107; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 675 
and Beulke 2008, p. 103.
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to use force by leaving him unleashed. Other cases that fall outside the scope of 
self-defence can also be justifi ed in this context. Consider the aforementioned 
aggressor, who is insane or under the age of criminal liability. Many scholars argue 
that self-defence cannot justify the use of defensive force against these aggressors, 
but defensive necessity can. The difference with other cases of necessity is that 
more is allowed when the sacrifi ce concerns an interest that is connected the origin 
of the danger. Because the person whose interests are infringed also gave rise to the 
confl ict, it is only fair he has to bear the consequences of his own actions.266 As 
will be discussed later, the more lenient approach to proportionality in defensive 
necessity can explain why someone is allowed to sacrifi ce the life of another in 
order to save their own.
4.1. Rationale
Necessity is most easily understood as a justifi cation of lesser evils. Faced with two 
unpleasant alternatives, the defendant decides to break the law in order to avoid a 
more serious evil to himself or others. In this confl ict of duties or interests, the 
defendant is justifi ed for saving the prevailing interest.267 The outcome of necessity, 
all things considered, must outweigh its disadvantages. The interest must be 
furthered that is prevailing from the objective perspective of the legal order.
Saving the prevailing interest thus furthers the legal order. When sacrifi cing an 
interest is the only reasonable means to save the prevailing interest, the offence 
committed is therefore not wrongful. Whereas self-defence is grounded for a large 
part in the individual autonomy, necessity is grounded in the collective good of the 
legal order. If the defendant saved his own life by breaking a window of a burning 
building, he is not justifi ed because of a right to save his own life. He is justifi ed 
because the legal order values his life over a window.268
It has been perceived as problematic that in necessity, the defendant substitutes 
his weighing of interests for that made by the legislator. After all, by criminalizing 
conduct, the legislator already noted a confl ict of interests and decided in favour of 
one. The law may even indicate that necessity is precluded in favour of a system of 
exemptions. Against the acceptance of necessity it is argued that the power of the 
law is affected by recognizing that it does not always apply, possibly undermining 
the validity and authority of rules.269 Instead, it is argued that justice must be done 
though the heavens fall: fi at justitia ruat caelum. However, this perspective leads to 
266 Bohlander 2009, p. 107; Roxin 2006, pp. 758 and 775–778; Beulke 2008, p. 102 and Machielse 
1986, pp. 524–528. See IX.3.4.1.
267 Fokkens & Machielse, note 5 on art. 40; Machielse in Balkema a.o. 1995, pp. 227–231; Leijten in 
Groenhuijsen, Mulder & Remmelink 1992; 25 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 242; Beulke 2008, p. 102; 
Ormerod 2005, p. 315 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 716.
268 See Fletcher 1998, p. 138.
269 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 714–715.
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absurd consequences and does not apply in any of the legal systems under 
investigation.
In contrast, the availability of the defence shows that the legal system 
acknowledges that necessity knows no law: necessitas non habet legem. There will 
simply always be cases, in which the offence defi nition is fulfi lled, but the defendant 
should not be held liable, because all things considered, he did the right thing for 
society. It is benefi cial to the legal order that the defendant achieves the greater 
good rather than slavishly follow the letter of the law.270 It is accepted that not all 
situations can be foreseen and encompassed in legal provisions. As such, necessity 
is a paradigm example of the importance of general principles to criminal law.
This approach to legislation has only become more important in current society. 
In this day and age, it is impossible to anticipate all developments that affect the 
balancing of interests currently laid down in the law. For example, new insights 
may show that the interest protected by a norm, such as environmental protection, 
detriments another norm that is considered more important now, like food safety. 
Similarly, new insights may show that the interest protected by a norm is actually 
better protected by breaking the letter of the law. The likelihood that legal subjects 
fi nd themselves in a confl ict of duties is exacerbated by the fact that within the EU, 
numerous actors are creating norms. Vast amounts of norms originate from the EU 
institutions, Member States, (non-)governmental organizations and so on.
The contrasting approach is to legislate very elaborately and to update the 
relevant pro vi sions as soon as necessary. With a focus on foreseeability and legal 
certain ty, possibly combined with a lack of trust that the citizen and the judge will 
balan ce the competing interests appropriately, the legislator aims to capture all 
possible confl icts in legislation. However, this is not only very time-consuming; it is 
also impossible, as in practice, unforeseen situations always tend to occur. More-
over, extensive legislation may create such an enormous and incomprehensible 
amount of norms, that it operates counterproductive from the perspective of 
foresee ability. Such legislation only serves to strengthen the legislator’s power over 
that of the judiciary.
From a perspective of deterrence, the maxim that necessity knows no law also 
refl ects that punishing the defendant for serving the prevailing interest is counter-
productive. The defendant should not be deterred from committing the offence if it 
furthered the common good. After all, on an objective utilitarian perspective, the 
defendant did the right thing.271 By contrast, from a deontological perspective, it 
can be argued that a good end never justifi es bad means.272 Necessity is more than a 
utilitarian calculation; otherwise the killing of one person to harvest his organs in 
order to save multiple patients would be justifi ed.
The question already arose what it means to do the ‘right thing’, what it means 
to be justifi ed. In this context, the views on whether the defendant’s actions in 
270 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 716; Williams 1953, p. 567 and Dolman 2006, p. 245.
271 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 717. Compare Dolman 2006, p. 157.
272 Williams 1953, p. 570.
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necessity are correct or merely permissible also differ greatly.273 The general 
guideline here is also that the clearer it is that the protected interest outweighs the 
sacrifi ced, the stronger the character of the justifi cation will be. Since necessity 
presupposes that the act is objectively, all things considered, right, many view 
necessity as a strong justifi cation in comparison to self-defence, which after all, 
only requires that the defensive force was not disproportionate.274
The most extreme view is that the application of necessity brings about a duty to 
act.275 For example, a father failed to throw his children out of a burning house, 
which would have been prevented their deaths. The fall would probably not lead to 
any and certainly not to serious injuries. The German Supreme Court held that, in 
choosing between certain death and possible injury, the father is not only allowed to 
choose the least of evils in necessity, he is even obligated to act, and failure to 
comply with this duty brings liability for an omission in the picture.276
Seen as the right thing to do, it logically follows that the person acting in 
necessity cannot be countered by necessity or self-defence. The party concerned 
has to take the harm.277 Necessity is therefore also seen as an expression of the 
principle of solidarity. People are asked to take into account that they might also 
themselves be in such a situation, which makes it close to one’s own individual 
interest.278 The requirement to take the loss of the lesser interest need not only be 
grounded in altruism. In defensive necessity, this is also based, similar to self-
defence, on the fact that the ‘victim’ gave rise to the situation that necessitated the 
defence.
Necessity is based on a weighing of interests, so just like self-defence, all the 
different rationales can be taken into account as factors in one rationale that 
balances all the interests.279 Such a multifaceted rationale is recognized in 
Germany. By shaping the current defence not as a mere weighing of goods, but as a 
weighing of interests, it becomes clear that the relative weight of the confl icting 
legal interests is merely one issue to take into account.280 Other aspects, like the 
aforementioned responsibility of the person whose interest is sacrifi ced for creating 
the situation can adjust this starting position. The fault of the victim can tip the 
scales in favour of the defendant. Conversely, the prior fault of the defendant or his 
special position can bring about that he has to take the loss.
273 Dolman 2006, p. 123; Dressler 1987, p. 1161 and Roxin 2006, p. 727. See VIII.3.4.
274 Horder 1998, p. 155; Bohlander 2009, p. 107 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 675.
275 Ormerod 2005, p. 322. In R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687, it was held in the context of abortion 
meant to save the life of the mother: “In such a case he is not only entitled, but it is his duty 
(JHB: my italicization) to perform the operation with a view to saving her life.”
276 28 July 1970 BGH JZ 1973, 173.
277 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 675. See VIII.3.5.
278 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 305 and Roxin 2006, p. 727.
279 See Roxin 2006, p. 728.
280 Roxin 2006, p. 735 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 685.
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4.2. Sources
Necessity, or vis, used to be considered only as vis absoluta and vis compulsiva. 
The former entails a negation of the voluntary act requirement.281 The textbook 
example is that someone pushes the defendant against a window, which breaks as a 
result. The defendant did not move: he was moved. Such a case is about the 
complete, often physical impossibility to act differently. This absolute impossibility 
to act differently is contrasted with duress, also known as vis compulsiva, a relative 
impossibility to act differently. In situations of vis compulsiva, the coercion is not 
physical, only moral. The defendant had a theoretical choice to act differently, but 
could not reasona bly be expected to act this way because of the overwhelming 
pressure on him.282 This moral coercion already could exculpate the defendant in 
the nineteenth century. The justifi cation of necessity has only been developed in the 
twentieth century on the basis of duress.
There used to be quite some fear that the acceptance of necessity would 
undermine the validity and authority of rules. The defence was not encompassed in 
older Criminal Codes, which implied that it was unavailable.283 In time, necessity 
none the less found its way through the application of duress. At fi rst therefore, 
necessity was only allowed in cases where the defendant had to avert an immediate 
danger to his or another person’s life. Only this could bring about the required 
irresistible psychological pressure. Not until later, the essence of necessity as a 
confl ict of interests was acknowledged in Germany and the Netherlands.284 In 
England, by contrast, the defence is often still limited to dangers that qualify under 
duress.
Article 40 of the Dutch Criminal Code is now accepted to encompass both 
duress and necessity. Until 1923, however, this was uncertain. The legislator of the 
1886 Code, which currently still applies, probably had not carefully considered the 
matter.285 In 1923, the Supreme Court accepted that necessity could also arise in 
ab sen ce of an irresistible pressure, based on the choice in favour of the most valuable 
interest, rather than personal danger to life and limb.286 The defendant, an optician, 
had sold a pair of glasses to a person who had apparently lost his. He sold them after 
opening hours, which was criminalized. The question was whether he was allowed 
to let his duty to help this person prevail over the duty to abide the legal rule on 
opening times. The Court held that the duty to help should prevail and acquitted the 
de fen dant based on necessity, which was held to be a part of article 40.287
281 Bohlander 2009, p. 37; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 703; Strijards 1987, pp. 91 and 121 and 
Nieboer 1991, p. 268.
282 Dolman 2006, pp. 96–97.
283 Dolman 2006, pp. 100–101.
284 Dannecker in Tiedemann 2002, p. 159 and Dolman 2006, pp. 102–105 and 111–117.
285 Dolman 2006, pp. 227 and 309.
286 Dolman 2006, p. 177.
287 HR 15 October 1923, NJ 1923, p. 1329. See Dolman 2006, pp. 230–231. The Dutch High Military 
Court had already held in 1915 that necessity could arise from a confl ict of duties. A marine 
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A similar development occurred in Germany. The old Criminal Code of 1871 
only included a provision similar to duress and the necessity type-justifi cations of 
the (current) Civil Code that entered into force in 1900 only dealt with the lawful 
destruction of goods.288 The lack of a general defence of necessity meant that the 
actor could not be justifi ed in the situation that required a violation of something 
different than goods, such as causing bodily injury. For example, medically indica-
ted pregnancy terminations could be excused for the mother, but the doctor could 
rely on no such exculpation, even though the conduct was viewed as appropriate. 
This lacuna prompted the Supreme Court in 1927 to recognize and apply necessity 
to the doctor who performed an abortion on a woman who became suicidal because 
she was pregnant. Like the Dutch Supreme Court had done a few years ago, the 
defence was based on the principle of weighing of goods and duties, accepting the 
newly found distinction between justifi cations and excuses.289
Initially, necessity was recognized in cases of medically indicated pregnancy 
terminations, but today it applies to collisions of interests of all nature.290 In the 
1927 case, the defence was read into an excuse that resembles duress. Later, it was 
also labelled an extra-legal defence.291 The current §34 of the German Criminal 
Code on necessity only entered into force in 1975.292 Medically indicated 
terminated pregnancies are now covered by §218a of the Criminal Code, leaving 
open only exceptional situations to the general defence.293 There exist many more 
specifi c rules on necessity-type situations in German law.294 The generalis retreats 
in favour of the specialis, but the general defence can also correct the application of 
special defences in certain cases.295
In contrast to the development in Germany and the Netherlands, in England, the 
fear that a broad acceptance would deteriorate the authority of the law and lead to 
anarchy persists to this day. It is feared that if individuals were allowed to be the 
judge of when to dispense with the letter of the law, they “would be too ready to 
avail themselves of exceptions which they might suppose to apply to their 
offi cer, also the ship physician, was ordered to report the names of the marines who had a 
venereal disease. He was allowed to let his duty of secrecy prevail over the offence of non-
compliance with orders, see Dolman 2006, pp. 215–216. In general, lower Courts had already 
been more generous in accepting necessity as a defence before 1923, carefully constructing (or 
masking) their verdicts with words that resembled the doctrine of dures, see Dolman 2006, 
p. 309.
288 §§228 and 904 of the German Civil Code and Roxin 2006, p. 723.
289 11 March 1927 RGSt 61, 242 and Roxin 2006, pp. 723–725. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, p. 676 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 106–107.
290 Beulke 2008, p. 104. See for example, 13 November 1958 BGHSt 12, 299.
291 See Roxin 2006, p. 725 and for example, 29 May 1959 BGHSt 14, 1.
292 §16 of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG) is identical.
293 In the Netherlands, there also exist special rules on euthanasia, but necessity can still be invoked 
in cases that fall beyond the scope of the those rules, see HR 9 November 2004, NJ 2005, 217.
294 Listed by Roxin 2006, p. 727.
295 Bohlander 2009, p. 107 and Roxin 2006, pp. 775–778. See also Dolman 2006, p. 89.
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circumstances.”296 “The law regards with the deepest suspicion any remedies of 
self-help, and permits those remedies to be resorted to only in very special 
circumstances. The reason for such circumspection is clear – necessity can very 
easily become simply a mask for anarchy.”297
Moreover, it was feared that this defence would expose innocent persons to great 
danger. This explains why English courts still adopt a persistently restrictive 
approach to necessity, which will become even clearer in the following discussion 
of its conditions.298 By using conditions that belong to the defence of duress, courts 
reject necessity. For example, Shayler disclosed secret MI5 information, based on 
the necessity of protecting the public by revealing malpractice of the Security 
Service. The Court of Appeal held the defence could not apply, amongst others 
because there was no threat to the life of persons for which the defendant is 
responsible.299
On the one hand, it was recognized that it would be unfair and useless to punish 
those who acted under necessity (or duress). On the other hand, it was believed to 
be impossible to defi ne these cases, so it was thought better to leave hard cases to 
the clemency of the crown, parole boards or prosecutorial discretion.300 This 
solution refl ects a more general legal approach popular in England to solve, or better 
mitigate, issues of liability through sentencing and administrative discretion than 
through a general part of criminal law. Doctrinal inconsistencies are not perceived 
as very problematic because unfair outcomes can be mitigated by the executive. 
More recent cases seem to show courts have become less reluctant,301 perhaps 
under infl uence of continental law.
Dismissing a strong reliance on the executive, I favour the application of 
necessity. After all, it is important to refl ect in the judgment that the act served the 
general good. Necessity should matter to criminal liability, not merely to sentencing. 
The difference is important to both the accused and the public, because punishment 
entails stigmatization, whereas the application of necessity entails approval.302 
More over, criminal liability is a matter of adjudication. Just like the executive 
should not judge on whether the offence defi nition is fulfi lled, the executive should 
also not be the judge of when wrongfulness or blameworthiness is of an insuffi cient 
degree. The defendant should not be left at the mercy of administrative discretion. 
He is entitled to a debate on his liability in a court. Only an open debate can ensure 
a consistent and thus fair application of the law.303
296 Nineteenth century lawyer Stephen, still cited in Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254.
297 Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] 2 All ER 175 per Edmund Davies LJ.
298 Ormerod 2005, p. 316.
299 R. v. Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977. Accepted by the House of Lords in R. v. Shayler [2002] 
UKHL 11, criticized by Gardner, S. 2005, p. 374 as unconvincing.
300 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 and R. v. Howe [1986] UKHL 4.
301 Ormerod 2005, p. 323.
302 See Dolman 2006, pp. 107 and 110. In R. v. Pommell [1995] EWCA Crim 7, Kennedy LJ found 
an absolute discharge unsatisfactory, because the stigma of conviction would remain.
303 Williams 1953, p. 583 and Ormerod 2005, p. 313.
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Hence, the existence of necessity as a general defence has often been denied in 
case-law, but roughly since the nineties its existence has been recognized in English 
case-law, even if courts are inclined to adopt a restrictive approach. The English 
parliament has never even debated about the defence, yet it has increasingly 
included statutory defences of necessity.304 An example is section 36(3) of the Road 
Traffi c Act 1972, which holds that a person is not to be convicted of driving on a 
footway or bridleway in contravention of subsection (l), if he proves that the motor 
vehicle was so driven “for the purpose of saving life or extinguishing fi re or 
meeting any other like emergency”. In addition, a common law defence of necessity 
is said to exist, which is held to apply in different contexts as a negation of the 
offence element ‘unlawfully’.305 In 1977, the Law Commission deemed a general 
defence of necessity undesirable, but later it repeatedly submitted that necessity and 
other common law defences should be retained.306
4.3. Criteria
Like in self-defence, the criteria of necessity can be categorized in two limbs. The 
fi rst limb requires, amongst others, that the defence is necessary, because the 
danger cannot be averted by other, less intrusive means. Because only the prevailing 
interest may be served, proportionality requires that the served interest outweighs 
the sacrifi ced interest. The defence is also infl uenced by concepts such as prior fault 
and the special position of the defendant.
The scope of necessity in England remains imprecise307 due to the restrictive 
and offence-by-offence approach of courts, the lack of Parliamentary intervention 
and fi nally, the confusion stemming from the interchangeable use of necessity and 
duress (by circumstances). As a result, the English concept of necessity is often said 
to include conditions that only apply to duress in the other Member States, which 
makes it considerably stricter in scope. Instead, necessity should be differentiated 
from duress and therefore does not require, amongst others, a threat to serious 
injury or worse that overrides the defendant’s will.
In comparison, the recognition of necessity as a general defence in the Criminal 
Codes of Germany and the Netherlands and the consistent interpretation by the 
courts, make it much easier to identify the scope of necessity in these Member 
States. As a consequence, the English conditions of necessity will receive less 
weight in constructing a general defence of necessity for the EU. Nevertheless, the 
304 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254. See Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 713–715 and 
Ormerod 2005, pp. 315–317.
305 R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687, see Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 and Law Commission 
1977, pp. 21–22.
306 Law Commission 1977, pp. 30–32; section 4(4) and 45 draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 
1989, pp. 44 and 62 and section 36 Law Commission 1993, pp. 64 and 114–115.
307 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 per Brooke and Robert Walker LJJ.
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general restrictive approach to the justifi cation common in England will be 
extensively considered in discussing the different conditions.
4.4. Subsidiarity
A situation of necessity exists when there is a present danger for life, limb, freedom, 
honour, property or another legal interest, that can only be averted by impacting 
other legal interests.308 First, it will be discussed which legal interests may 
legitimately be served under necessity. Second, the concept of present or imminent 
danger will be explained. Third, the sacrifi ce of an interest can only be justifi ed if it 
was adequate to serve the prevailing interest and if it was the least intrusive means. 
The fi nal aspect considered here is any prior fault of the defendant in creating the 
situation of necessity.
4.4.1. Legitimate interests
As far as self-defence is concerned, it was explained that some legal systems chose 
to exclusively list the interests that may legitimately be protected by the use of 
force. As far as necessity is concerned however, all interests may give rise to 
protection. The German provision on necessity lists some legal interests but makes 
clear that a danger to any other legal interest may also qualify.309 The served 
interest need not even be protected by the criminal law. In this way, necessity is for 
instance also available to the employee who obeys irregular orders in order not to 
lose his job.310 As noted, the restriction of the defence to avert only serious threats 
to life and limb has been abolished, allowing all interests to be protected. In 
England, the defence is also not confi ned to serious threats in mostly medical 
contexts, but there are only a few cases where necessity was accepted without 
identifying such a serious threat.311
By contrast, in Union law on the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital, the interests that may be served to the detriment of these freedoms, such as 
public health, are exclusively mentioned in the pertinent primary or secondary 
legislation. As noted in the context of self-defence, such an approach emphasizes 
the exceptio nal character of limitations to free movement. If any interest could be 
taken into account this would invite Member States to make more exceptions and 
detriment the force of the rule. Nonetheless, the approach is less rigid. Interests can 
be added by the ECJ under the rule of reason doctrine, such as consumer and 
308 Beulke 2008, p. 104.
309 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 680 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 305.
310 Roxin 2006, pp. 728–729. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 680.
311 Ormerod 2005, pp. 316–317.
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environment protection. By adding interests, the Court makes sure the possible 
restrictions keep up with the demands of a changing society.312
4.4.2. Imminence
The danger or confl ict of interests can arise due to human conduct but it can also 
arise outside of human conduct. For example, natural sources can also trigger 
necessity.313 The origin of the danger does not matter, although some origins bring 
about that special rules apply. What is important is that the danger or confl ict must 
give rise to a necessity to act immediately. If this temporal requirement is not 
fulfi lled, the application of the justifi cation is not necessary. Offi cial authorities or 
even the legislator would be able to solve the confl ict. Hence, the breaking of the 
law by the defendant would be premature and therefore unnecessary.
The scope if imminence can be quite broad. Consider the case that put necessity 
and duress in the picture in England. The court was asked to rule on the legality of 
a proposed surgery of conjoined twins, which would surely bring about death of 
Mary. If nothing was done however, Jodie would surely die within months as well. 
The danger to the life of Jodie was imminent, but not so imminent that a court 
could not be asked to consider whether the taking of Mary’s life would be 
justifi ed.314 In such cases of medical necessity, there is the opportunity and time for 
doctors to place the relevant facts before the court. This opportunity is not at odds 
with the imminence requirement. Only some degree of urgency is required.315
The requirement is therefore broader than in the context of self-defence. Self-
defence requires an acute concentration of the danger, which means that at least an 
immediate situation of infringement of a legal interest is at hand.316 Necessity 
requires an imminent danger, not an attack. An attack may not yet be imminent, 
whereas the danger already is. This is why the arming yourself in anticipation of a 
wrongful attack does not qualify under self-defence, but it does qualify under 
necessity.317
German courts have accepted that the danger is imminent if harm is not yet 
directly pending, but a later averting of that danger will not be possible or only with 
much more risks. In other words, one can seriously fear that the (normal) 
continuance of a situation will lead to occurrence or an increase in harm if counter-
312 Eijsbouts a.o. 2010, pp. 100–101. See for example, 20 September 1988, Case C-302/86, 
Commission v. Denmark [1988] ECR I-4607. Compare IX.3.4.2.
313 Dolman 2006, pp. 176 and 185; Bohlander 2009, p. 110; Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 
and Williams 1953, p. 573.
314 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254.
315 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 716.
316 Roxin 2006, p. 732; Beulke 2008, p. 105; Strijards 1987, pp. 51–52 and Re A. (Children) [2000] 
EWCA Civ 254: “The principle is one of necessity, not emergency.”
317 See Roxin 2006, pp. 732–733 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 683.
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measures are not immediately taken.318 For example, if separating the conjoined 
twins would have been postponed further, the risk that neither of the twins would 
have survived would have increased too. Secondly, the danger is imminent if it is a 
permanent danger that can be realised at any time without warning. Consider a 
crumbling building: no one knows at what point it will actually cave in.319 In both 
situations, the defendant must make his choice to act or endure the harm 
immediately. The condition is therefore better understood as imminence to act.320 
This is also the Dutch321 and English322 perspective on the matter.
In Germany, the imminence requirement of necessity is equated with that of 
duress.323 In contrast, many English and Dutch scholars submit that the character of 
necessity brings about that refl ection is possible, whereas duress is much more 
impulsive.324 In any event, there is consensus that some time for refl ection is 
allowed in necessity. This follows from the requirement to meticulously weigh the 
competing interests and to carefully consider whether there are alternatives to 
committing an offence.325 Although there was urgency in deciding on the case of 
the conjoined twins, time was taken to make the right choice. Refl ection is desirable 
because it ensures that the defendant makes the correct decision. The imminence to 
act must therefore not be seen as requiring a split-second decision. The requirement 
is broad and is thus closely related to other conditions of necessity. For example, if 
more time appeared to be available to solve the confl ict, often more alternatives 
could still be chosen.
Nonetheless, imminence has been given an upper limit by arguing that 
situations of general necessity that linger over a longer period or affect many are 
excluded from necessity. There has to be a concrete and more or less acute situation 
of necessity. The general lack of housing therefore, does not allow for squatting.326 
318 11 March 1927 RGSt 61, 242; Roxin 2006, pp. 732–733; Beulke 2008, p. 104 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 683. Compare R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687.
319 Bohlander 2009, p. 111; Beulke 2008, p. 105; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 306 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, p. 683.
320 Compare 5 March 1954 BGHSt 5, 371 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 683.
321 Dolman 2006, p. 246 and Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 5b on Overmacht.
322 Compare R. v. Hudson and Taylor [1971] EWCA Crim 2 and Ashworth 2006, p. 222. US scholar 
Robinson 1989, p. 189 submitted that “the proper focus is not on the timing of the threat but 
rather on the timing of the act needed to avoid the threat.”
323 Roxin 2006, pp. 969–970; Bohlander 2009, p. 124 and Beulke 2008, p. 152.
324 Law Commission 1993, p. 64; Ormerod 2005, p. 325; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 674–675; 
Kelk 2005, p. 278 and de Hullu 2006, p. 288.
325 HR 10 February 1987, NJ 1987, 662; Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on art. 40; 15 January 1952 
BGHSt 2, 111; 25 March 2003 BGHSt 48, 255 and Roxin 2006, p. 725. Bohlander 2009, p. 126 
and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 706 and 713 submit this duty will usually only be relevant 
when the defendant made the wrong choice, thus to the test the reasonableness of putative 
necessity.
326 Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] 2 All ER 175. In Hof Den Bosch 
3 March 2009, LJN:BH4471 necessity was accepted over a longer period of time for the 
numerous times the defendant broke the same law. The Dutch Supreme Court quashed the 
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Neither does poverty allow for stealing.327 It is argued that necessity is not meant 
to justify cases that arise regularly. An essential feature of defences is that they 
apply only to exceptional circumstances where the implications of wrongfulness 
and blameworthiness are not warranted. Hence, in recurring situations defences 
cannot solve what the legislator should solve.328 “Where a social problem is 
structural and continuous, it must be addressed through the legislative and political 
process.”329
Examples of recurring situations are euthanasia and abortion. They used to be 
tested under necessity as extraordinary cases but are governed by special rules now, 
because these confl icts occur often and have therefore been addressed by the 
legislator.330 However, the examples also show that a ‘structural problem’ or 
‘recurring situation’ may not always be so easy to identify. At what point does a 
problem become structural? Should the defendant be held criminally liable because 
the legislator did not yet address the recurring confl ict? The answer of English 
courts would be a frank ‘yes’. Problems affecting many in society, like the use of 
cannabis to relieve pain, call for legislative action. If the legislator did not want to 
change the law to accommodate these people, the courts do not see any room to 
allow for the defence of necessity.331
By contrast, Dutch and German courts camoufl age pragmatic reasons with the 
doctri nal cloak of imminence. Necessity has never been accepted when an offence 
has been committed because the actor found himself in needy circumstances.332 
The courts deny that the need to act was imminent, yet this is not the true reason 
for rejecting it. After all, the fact that the danger is imminent for many does not 
change the fact that it is also imminent for the specifi c defendant. Hunger can 
constitute an imminent need to act. Rather, necessity is precluded when it affects 
many, because of underlying fears of undermining the legal order. After all, if the 
specifi c defendant would be allowed to act, so would others.333 English courts 
seem to attach most weight to these considerations and are also most open about 
them.
It is therefore also imprecise to argue that necessity requires an exceptional 
situation. It would be more accurate to submit that pragmatic reasons militate 
acquittal for not substantiating why every single event charged was justifi ed, see HR 12 July 
2011, NJ 2011, 578.
327 Kelk 2005, p. 279; de Hullu 2006, p. 288; Ormerod 2005, p. 317; Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 723 and Williams 1953, p. 576.
328 Dolman 2006, p. 332 and Roxin 2006, pp. 748 and 773–774, the latter who therefore criticizes 
13 November 1958 BGHSt 12, 299 for accepting ‘economic necessity’, a term which was coined 
by Williams 1953, pp. 572 and 576.
329 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 723.
330 See articles 293(2) and 296(5) of the Dutch Criminal Code; section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967; 
§218a of the German Criminal Code and Kelk 2005, p. 280.
331 R v. Quayle and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1415.
332 Fokkens & Machielse, note 11 on art. 40.
333 See Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 694.
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against the acceptance of necessity when acceptance brings about that multiple 
offenders would be justifi ed. After all, this would undermine the validity of the 
norm. For example, necessity was also accepted to quash an administrative ‘fi ne’ for 
not paying a parking ticket. The defendant had bought a ticket and picked up four 
children. When they were all strapped in and ready to go, one of them had to pee, so 
she had to take them all back inside and return again. As a result she was 8 minutes 
late and found a ‘ticket’. The court held it was a situation of necessity, rejecting the 
argument that the defendant could have been faster or have left the other three 
children in the car.334 It can hardly be said that the case deals with a very exceptional 
situation. Judgments like these merely elaborate extensively and explicitly on the 
exceptional circumstances of the case, so others cannot derive rights from it.
Secondly, normative factors that infl uence the weighing of interests play an 
important role. Much weight is given to the valuation of interests as conducted by the 
legislator and other governmental institutions. For the same reason, results of legal 
proceedings must be accepted and can only be resisted with legal remedies. Unlawful 
prosecution or measures of deportation can therefore not be justifi ably resisted by 
criminal offences.335 The valuation may be incorrect or out-dated but needs to be 
followed anyway; otherwise the authority of the whole legal order could be affected. 
The valuation of interests is therefore a normative, not an objective exercise.336
4.4.3. No other means of aversion
Necessity can only justify a criminal offence if it was the only reasonable way to 
solve the confl ict of interests. If it was possible not to commit the offence or only a 
less serious offence, the defence does not apply. As in self-defence, the question of 
alternatives can be divided into the aspects of adequacy and subsidiarity. The 
means of defence must be able or adequate to end the danger and secondly, the least 
intrusive available means must be chosen.337 In Union law, these requirements are 
framed as that the measure that confl icts with a freedom must be appropriate for 
securing the attainment of the objective pursued and secondly, that it does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.338
In the context of the freedom of movement in the internal market, the measure 
of restriction must be appropriate or able to serve the interest it seeks to protect. In 
Cassis de Dijon, the German government argued that fruit liquor should have a 
334 Rb. Den Haag 1 December 2009, LJN:BL4483. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 688.
335 Beulke 2008, p. 110 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 692.
336 Compare HR 11 January 1977, NJ 1977, 458. The defendant had argued that selling soft-drugs 
was absolutely necessary to prevent the selling of hard-drugs in a youth centre. The Court held, 
that even if the correctness of this argument was accepted, the defence failed, because the 
defendant weighed the interests differently from the legislator.
337 25 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 242; Roxin 2006, p. 734; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 683; 
Bohlander 2009, p. 111 and Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254.
338 8 September 2005, Case C-40/04, criminal proceedings against Yonemoto [2005] ECR I-7755, 
§55.
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minimum alcoholic percentage of 25% to be allowed on the market, which 
precluded Cassis de Dijon from being sold in Germany. The ECJ held that this 
restriction could not be justifi ed by the aim of public health, since it was not 
adequate to serve that interest. The arguments of the German Government that that 
strong liquors tend less easily induce tolerance than highly alcoholic beverages was 
questioned, especially since most of the ‘strong’ drinks are diluted with soft-drinks 
before consumed.339
Just like in the context of self-defence, the principle of adequacy implies that a 
defensive purpose is required. It implies that the offence was committed with a view 
to protect the prevailing interest. A burglar can therefore not rely on necessity for 
breaking a window if, by chance, this helped to save a family from carbon monoxide 
poisoning.340 The principle is not strict in the legal systems of the three Member 
States. After all, the defendant who exceeded the speed limit to get a person to hos-
pi tal did not know whether this would save that person. On the one hand, the measu-
res taken by the actor do not have to avert the danger with certainty, but on the other 
hand, they may also not be merely improbable. It is only required that the violation 
of the norm at least increases the chances of saving the interest of higher value.341 
In general, acts of protest, like ‘house occupations’, throwing a brick at the police or 
pulling the emergency break of a train, cannot serve the prevailing interest.342
Subsidiarity in a narrow meaning is the condition of the least intrusive means. If 
an ambulance is directly available, it is not necessary to exceed the speed limit to 
get someone to the hospital. The ECJ explained that the measure that con fl icts with 
a freedom may not go beyond what is necessary. It can only be justifi ed if it is 
necessary in order to attain an authorised objective that cannot be achieved by 
means that place less of a restriction on the free movement of goods within the 
Union.343 A restriction to competition is assessed by an ‘indispensability test’, 
which means that it may not restrict competition more than absolutely necessary.344
In a German case, a journalist who took a knife on board a passenger aircraft to 
expose the failure of security measures could not rely on necessity, since the 
carrying the knife on board was no longer necessary for the goal. He could have 
made his point by giving the knife away after passing security checks. By bringing 
the knife on board, he actually created a danger.345 The Dutch journalist who 
exposed failing security measures on an airport was convicted for carrying a false 
employee pass after his investigative reports had ended, because this was no longer 
339 20 February 1979, Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR I-649.
340 Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on art. 40; Dolman 2006, p. 323 and de Hullu 2009, p. 299.
341 Roxin 2006, p. 734; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 307 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 683.
342 Respectively, 7 July 1982 OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1982, 2678; HR 14 December 1976, NJ 1977, 
174 and HR 29 March 1988, NJ 1989, 162. See also Machielse 1986, p. 592; Dolman 2006, p. 236 
and Strijards 1987, p. 52.
343 20 June 2002, Joined Cases C-388/00 and C-429/00, Radiosistemi [2002] ECR I-5845, §42.
344 Art 101(3) TFEU and Eijsbouts a.o. 2010, pp. 167–168.
345 25 October 2005 OLG Düsseldorf NStZ 2006, 243.
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necessary.346 Hacking into automated systems is also often done with a view to 
prove that they are protected insuffi ciently. This purpose is however exceeded when 
the hacked data is published online, exposing it with the risk of abuse.
Alternatives to committing the offence include legal remedies, the possibility of 
retreat or getting offi cial help.347 When multiple interests of equal value can be 
sacrifi ced, for example, when any car will suffi ce, the actor may choose any 
arbitrarily. This is only different when a third party volunteers his interest or when 
the actor can avert the danger by sacrifi cing his own interest or that of the 
benefi ciary. However, proportionality is the decisive condition, which means that 
the actor does not have to refrain from sacrifi cing goods of third parties if he could 
also avert the danger by taking for granted personal bodily injury.348 Similarly, a 
duty to take the risk of losing the legal interest can follow from the special position 
of the defendant. Police men, fi re-fi ghters, sailors, doctors and parents vis-à-vis 
children are more likely required to take certain risks. That a fi re-fi ghter is expected 
to risk his life does not however bring about that he is also required to sacrifi ce 
himself, if for example death or serious injury is certain.349
In some situations, committing an offence cannot be justifi ed, even if it is the 
only solution available to the defendant. When the actor has a special duty to 
respect the law at the expense of a more valuable legal interest, the necessity of 
violating the norm is excluded beforehand.350 This can follow from the circumstance 
that the legislator already considered the possibility that interests would confl ict 
and decided in favour of one interest. For instance, the defendant charged for not 
fulfi lling her duty to earmark her animals, could not rely on the rule that prohibits 
animal cruelty because earmarking had already been considered an exception to 
that prohibition by the legislator.351 Legislating is a method of permanently solving 
confl icts.
Moreover, when the legislator has provided for clear exceptions to a norm and/or 
the possibility to apply for a permit or exemption, this generally excludes other 
means of solving the confl ict of interests.352 If there is no such procedure, the 
assumption is that the legislator saw no room for a defence in general.353 Sometimes 
346 Hof Amsterdam 28 April 2011, LJN:BQ2981. The Court of Appeal tested this and other charges 
not to necessity but to the freedom of speech under article 10 ECHR. He was acquitted of other 
charges. By contrast, see HR 27 June 1995, NJ 1995, 711.
347 Beulke 2008, p. 105; Roxin 2006, p. 764 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 675–676 and 
684. They submit that the duty to retreat and to get help has more weight than in self-defence, 
because it is not a situation of right against wrong.
348 Roxin 2006, pp. 734–735 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 684. See IX.4.5.1.
349 Roxin 2006, pp. 754–755 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 690.
350 Dolman 2006, p. 164 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 170 and 173–174.
351 HR 16 September 2008, NJ 2008, 512.
352 Dolman 2006, p. 164 and de Hullu 2006, p. 289. Compare in EU competition law, 30 September 
2003, Joined Cases T-198/98 and T-212/98–214/98, Atlantic Container Line and Others v. 
Commission [2003] ECR II-3275, §§1110–1122 and 1381–1385.
353 HR 26 March 1991, NJ 1992, 196 and de Hullu 2006, p. 286.
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the Union or national legislator explicitly precluded any exceptions.354 In any event, 
not using the legal alternative of applying for a permit seems to bring about that the 
condition of subsidiarity was not met. For the purpose of comparing national 
approaches, we will take a look at the offences of cultivating or possessing cannabis 
for medicinal purposes. In the Netherlands, the fact that a permit was refused does 
not always preclude the defence, but it the defendant did not even apply for one, 
subsidiarity is generally lacking.355 However, it has been made clear in this specifi c 
context that even if the defendant omitted to apply for a permit, the justifi cation is 
not necessarily precluded. Under exceptional circumstances, it can still apply.356
The case is as follows; two defendants, a person suffering from multiple sclerosis 
(MS) and his wife, were charged with cultivating cannabis. This has always been 
criminal in the Netherlands, tolerated by the Public Prosecution’s Service only in 
small quantities for own consumption. In the recent decade, the Dutch government 
has not only come down on large scale cultivation but also on the aforementioned 
cultivation for personal use. The Drugs Act allows for an exemption to the 
injunction, which, according to the Public Prosecutor, implies that necessity is 
precluded. The defendants did not even apply for the exemption. The Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court allowed the defendants to rely on necessity nevertheless, 
because the defendants knew that applying for the exemption would be 
unsuccessful, as only companies could be given a permit. In other words, there was 
no real alternative available to the defendants.
Furthermore, if the legislator made available a procedure for exceptions, 
necessity is not precluded; it merely means that the justifi cation can only be 
accepted in exceptional circumstances. Necessity was accepted because the 
circumstances were held to be exceptional. First, it was established that cannabis 
helped to relieve pain and prevent spastic seizures and that at some point, this is the 
only substance that can help MS-patients. Second, it was established that the 
medicinal cannabis available in pharmacies did not have the desired effect. Third, 
the danger of cannabis sold in ‘coffee shops’ was that they were full of fungi, 
bacteria and pesticides, to which MS-patients are very sensitive. Moreover, the 
defendants would not be able to afford cannabis from a coffee shop in the quantities 
the MS-patient needed it. Taking all this into account, both the Court of Appeal and 
the HR held that the confl ict of interests – the criminal offence versus the relieving 
of pain and prevention of spasticity – could be settled in favour of the latter. This 
means the defendants were (from then on) justifi ed to grow cannabis.
354 In Hof Leeuwarden 22 July 2011, LJN:BR2402, the Court of Appeal refers to the Dutch 
legislator who explicitly rejects an exception because the offence is an implementation of an EU 
Directive that does not allow for exceptions.
355 HR 19 April 1983, NJ 1983, 572.
356 HR 16 September 2008, NJ 2010, 5 and HR 18 May 2010, NJ 2010, 289. This is a general rule in 
all contexts, see HR 12 July 2011, LJN:BP5971.
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A somewhat stricter approach seems to be taken in Germany. Whereas it is also 
argued that the defence can be rejected for not applying for a permit,357 the defence 
has been accepted in cases where the defendant did not use this possibility, similar 
to the above-mentioned Dutch case. In one case, the German court held that a permit 
would never be given to an individual since exceptions to the Drugs Act must be 
grounded in a public interest. The defendant can therefore not be required to use this 
possibility.358 The same court argued later that only in exceptional circumstances, 
the accused can rely on necessity for growing and possessing cannabis. The court 
emphasized the fact that the need must be so exorbitant and atypical, that it can be 
said that this case falls outside the scope of what the legislator has foreseen. In other 
words, since the legislator has not made these exceptions possible, it is presumed 
that the weighing of interests has already been conducted to the detriment of the 
consumer. Necessity in general is therefore precluded.359 Nevertheless, seriously ill 
persons can be justifi ed for growing and possessing cannabis, if they made sure that 
cannabis as a pain killer is the ultimum remedium.360
Most weight is given to the presumed intention of the legislator in England. 
Defendants cannot rely on necessity for cultivating, possessing or supplying others 
with cannabis in order to alleviate pain based on pragmatic concerns that this 
contravenes the legislative policy and scheme on a continuing and regular basis. 
The acceptance of necessity would hamper effective enforcement and create a 
parallel market in which no prescription was needed. The fact that the exemption 
scheme does not allow for such an exception is said to indicate that the legislator did 
not allow for such a possibility. It is up to the legislator to change policy, for 
accepting the possibility of relying on necessity “would involve a positive invitation 
to the jury to act contrary to the law and to take over the role of the legislative 
authorities.”361 Conversely, this implies that when new legislation is being drafted, 
or when Union legislation that allows for the prohibited conduct still needs to be 
implemented, the judge needs to anticipate this legislative purpose in favour of the 
defendant.362
In conclusion, if the legislator foresaw a confl ict of interests by providing a 
statutory defence or exemption procedure, or if he provided for the exact conditions 
of conduct in some other way, this is generally considered to exclusively regulate all 
possible confl icts and thus precludes necessity. The legislator’s authority to settle 
confl icts of interests is applied strictly. The separation of powers and the principle 
357 30 June 2005 BVerfG 2 BvR 1772/02 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 306.
358 18 November 2002 KG (Kammergericht) Berlin BeckRS 2009, 22705. In contrast, in 30 June 
2005 BVerfG 2 BvR 1772/02, the law was interpreted in a way that did not preclude the 
defendant from applying for a permit.
359 25 May 2007 KG (Kammergericht) Berlin NJW 2007, 2425. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 746–747.
360 Körner 2007, notes 1426–1427 on §29 BtMG. See 28 April 2004 AG (Amtsgericht) Berlin-
Tiergarten NStZ-RR 2004, 281 and 24 June 2004 OLG Karlsruhe NJW 2004, 3645.
361 R v. Quayle and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1415.
362 See Hof Den Bosch 3 March 2009, LJN:BH4471. Whether the implementation period is still 
running, should be irrelevant from this perspective.
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of legal certainty require that the judiciary does not undermine that authority. On 
the other hand, the defendant may still be justifi ed in case of exceptional 
circumstances that the legislator did not foresee. Necessity should not be precluded 
because there will always be situations that the legislator did and could not foresee. 
It enables the legal system to keep up with changing views in society. The strict 
English approach is therefore rejected in favour of an approach that allows for each 
case to be assessed on its merits. Such an approach is in line with the trend that 
conditions of defences no longer set an absolute threshold that needs to be met, but 
operate as one factor amongst many others that mutually infl uence each other. This 
trend is also evident in prior fault, a limiting factor of necessity discussed now.
4.4.4. Prior fault
The role of prior fault in necessity is similar to that role in self-defence. First of all, 
causing or provoking the situation of necessity does not necessarily rob the 
defendant of the possibility of relying on necessity. For example, although the 
defendant caused an accident, he can still be justifi ed in leaving the scene of that 
accident when he has to run away in order to escape being beaten up by the 
victim.363 In favour of making prior fault irrelevant to the application of necessity, it 
is argued that the justifi ed conduct does not change the prevailing quality of the 
interest when the actor is to blame for getting into a situation of necessity. In other 
words, the result is more important than the origin.364 It is only likely that the 
defence will be rejected when the defendant intentionally created a situation of 
necessity in order to abuse the defence, just like in self-defence.365
It could be argued that prior fault is more likely to preclude necessity in the 
Netherlands and England. In English law, such a restrictive approach is in line with 
the similar restrictive approach to prior fault in the context of duress and the 
restrictive approach to necessity in general. However, since both approaches have 
been rejected, prior fault’s limiting effect on necessity should not be given great 
weight either. In the Netherlands, prior fault could also preclude necessity if the 
actor foresaw or at least could have foreseen that he would get himself into a 
situation of necessity or in a situation where he would have to break the law.366 
However, considering the Dutch Supreme Court’s relaxation of the limiting role of 
prior fault in self-defence and duress, it can be expected that currently, prior fault 
will also no longer always preclude necessity.
Prior fault should therefore operate as it already operates in German law, namely 
as an independent condition, a factor that infl uences the other criteria of the 
363 Bohlander 2009, p. 111; Roxin 2006, pp. 751–752; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 695 and 
Fischer, T. 2009, p. 307.
364 Roxin 2006, p. 751 and Machielse in Balkema a.o. 1995, pp. 234–240.
365 See also Fischer, T. 2009, p. 307.
366 HR 9 June 1987, NJ 1988, 318; Dolman 2006, pp. 165–167 and 249 and Fokkens & Machielse, 
note 9 on art. 40.
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defence, such as the weighing of interests under proportionality.367 If the actor 
foresaw that he would create a danger to himself, the weight of his interests can be 
minimized in balancing the confl icting interests, up to the point that the conclusion 
must be that a relatively light interference of his own interest has to be taken rather 
than averted. If the driver in the aforementioned example foresaw the traffi c 
accident and the subsequent risk of being beaten up, he is less likely to be justifi ed 
in fl eeing the scene of the accident. Although he should not tolerate a beating, he 
had to take the risk of being attacked over fl eeing in fear of what might happen. His 
prior fault brought about that his interest to bodily integrity was no longer 
prevailing.368 A second example is that if the defendant foresaw a confl ict of 
interests, this implies he had more time to consider and more time to use alternative 
means of solving the confl ict. This approach of prior fault is favoured because it 
enables the fl exibility to differentiate cases. Unlike the other approaches, it does not 
bring about any serious objections and fi nally, it fi ts in best with the role of prior 
fault in the context of other defences, like self-defence.
A third, less popular, way to deal with prior fault is to ground liability for the 
prior conduct under the doctrine of actio illicita in causa.369 Like in the German 
law on self-defence, the judiciary and scholars sometimes accept necessity but also 
hold the defendant liable for a negligent offence. Just like the abovementioned more 
popular approach, this solutions strikes a middle ground between precluding the 
defence altogether and holding it irrelevant. An example concerns the truck driver 
who got stuck in a road where he was not supposed to drive. He needed to dump his 
load, which was an offence but still brought about less damage than not doing so, 
for this would have destroyed the truck. Nevertheless, the driver was convicted for 
negligently dumping the manure under actio illicita in causa.370 The application of 
the doctrine in this context is specifi cally criticized for not stimulating the defendant 
to save the prevailing interest. The law should make sure that the actor who is to 
blame for causing a situation still protects the prevailing interest.371
Necessity and the related ‘force majeure’372 is also a common defence in many 
fi elds of EU law. Usually, the defence is statutory, laid down explicitly in a 
Regulation or Dir ective to apply to that specifi c conduct.373 The scope of the 
defence is stricter in EU law than in national criminal law. First, prior fault tends to 
367 Beulke 2008, pp. 106–107 and Roxin 2006, p. 751.
368 Roxin 2006, pp. 752–753.
369 Beulke 2008, pp. 106–107.
370 26 May 1978 BayObLG NJW 1978, 2046. See Hruschka 2001, pp. 870–872.
371 Roxin 2006, p. 754.
372 See Dannecker 1993, p. 241.
373 See article 12 of Regulation 561/2006 of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social 
legislation relating to road transport, OJ 2006 L 102 and article 10(2) of Regulation 3887/92 of 
23 December 1992, OJ 1992 L 391, as well as article 48 of Regulation 2419/2001 of 11 December 
2001, OJ 2001 L 327, both ‘laying down detailed rules for applying the integrated administration 
and control system for certain Community aid schemes.’ See also article 45 of the Statute of the 
Court of Justice.
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preclude the legal subject from relying on that concept. If the actor foresaw the 
confl ict of interest or if it was foreseeable, the defence is rejected. For example, the 
general dangers of the market are foreseeable and should therefore be borne by 
companies.374 In general therefore, only unforeseeable circumstances can give rise 
to necessity. Secondly, force majeure often also requires that the actor exercised all 
due care.375 This brings about that the EU defence is hard to classify as in some 
ways, it resembles the justifi cation necessity, but in other ways it is similar the 
excuse of due diligence that can be raised in offences of strict liability. The defence 
is therefore only of limited relevance to our synthesis.
4.5. Proportionality
Since necessity is based on the concept of lesser evils or prevailing interest, 
proportionality plays a decisive role. The actor should choose the lesser of two evils. 
By committing the criminal offence, more should be preserved than otherwise 
would have gone lost.376 To establish whether the defendant’s actions are justifi ed, 
all the interests involved, all the circumstances of the case and all conditions and 
factors of necessity are considered. The condition of proportionality can be labelled 
a weighing of interests. It does not, however, consist of an abstract valuation of legal 
interests, but a concrete test based on the circumstances of the case. All interests 
that are directly and indirectly involved should be weighed. In particular the 
following must be taken into account; the nature, origin, intensity and proximity of 
the danger, nature and scope of threatened damage, the relationship in value and 
rank between colliding interests, special duties to endure danger or to protect 
interests, the end-goal of the actor, the benefi ts for society, prior fault, the possible 
irreplaceability of the damage and the chance of saving one or both interests.377
Like in self-defence, the condition of proportionality takes into account to what 
extent the other conditions of necessity are fulfi lled. Prior fault can for example, 
bring about that the balancing scales are adjusted. Secondly, a lenient criterion such 
as that of adequacy is put into perspective by requiring more under the heading of 
proportionality. If the means used to avert the danger is unlikely to be successful, it 
will less likely be proportional to use. The numerous aspects of proportionality and 
its close relationship to the other conditions of necessity show that the effort to give 
an all-encompassing description of this condition is doomed to fail.378 Let us focus 
therefore on the most debated aspects of this balancing exercise.
374 Dannecker 1993, p. 240.
375 9 November 1995, Case C-235/94, Bird [1995] ECR I-3933; 11 July 2002, Case C-210/00, 
Käserei Champignon Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6453, §79 and 18 January 2005, Order in Case 
C-325/03 P, Zuazaga Meabe [2005] ECR I-403. See also X.4.4.2.
376 Dolman 2006, pp. 239 and 310.
377 Beulke 2008, p. 106 and Dolman 2006, p. 252.
378 Bohlander 2009, p. 113; Roxin 2006, p. 736 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 685–686.
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The most important difference with self-defence is that after all aspects are 
balanced, the protected interest must outweigh the sacrifi ced interest. For the 
offence to be justifi ed, it must positively be established that it was proportional. It 
does not suffi ce to argue that it was not disproportional.379 The difference was 
explained by the fact that necessity is not about right against wrong. It is about 
right against right and about safeguarding the prevailing interest. The interest that 
is sacrifi ced in necessity generally belongs to a third party, not a wrongful 
aggressor. Only if the person affected by the defendant’s actions is somehow 
responsible for causing the situation of necessity, will the condition of 
proportionality be applied more leniently.380 To equate the proportionality 
requirement of necessity with that of self-defence is therefore to neglect the 
different nature of the justifi cations.381
The exact degree of proportionality remains controversial. Some submit that the 
balancing exercise requires that the protected interest substantially outweighs the 
sacrifi ced interest,382 whereas others argue that the difference between the 
confl icting interests must not be great, only evident. It is only required that “on an 
evaluation of all circumstances of the case it is clearly of higher importance, leaving 
no doubt in the mind of the average reasonable person.”383 Some include into 
necessity that the saved interest must at least be equal to or greater than the 
sacrifi ced interest.384 This brings about, that situations in which interests of equal 
value confl ict, can also be solved under necessity. However, generally these 
situations are considered to give rise to a defence sui generis called ‘collision of 
duties’. For example, when a father can only save one of his two drowning children, 
there is no prevailing interest. Necessity does not apply and the saving of one at the 
expense of the other is justifi ed on the principle that the law cannot ask the 
impossible: impossibilium nulla obligatio est.385
4.5.1. Legal interests
It is evident that the interest to life usually outweighs a confl icting interest 
concerning an object. The protection of life and limb almost always prevails over 
379 Fokkens & Machielse, pp. 274–275, note 3 on art. 41 and Sangero 2006, pp. 196–197.
380 Kelk 2005, p. 284; Machielse 1986, pp. 524–528; Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 6b on Overmacht 
and Glazebrook 1972, p. 89. See IX.4.1.
381 According to the criteria of necessity as submitted by Stephen in 1887, the evil infl icted must 
merely not be disproportionate to the evil avoided. These criteria have been subscribed to in Re 
A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254.
382 Beulke 2008, p. 106. Compare ‘wesentlich’ in §34 of the German Criminal Code.
383 Bohlander 2009, p. 113. See also Roxin 2006, pp. 766–767 and 783–784; Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, pp. 696–697 and Kelk 2005, p. 278. Dannecker in Tiedemann 2002, p. 158 submits the 
pertinent position of the ECJ is unclear.
384 Strijards 1987, pp. 49–50.
385 Bohlander 2009, p. 95; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 611–612 and Roxin 2006, pp. 778–
782. See 28 May 2002 BGH NStZ 2002, 548.
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all other rights. For example, a doctor is justifi ed in breaking his duty to remain 
silent by disclosing the HIV-positive state of a person to his sexual partner.386 The 
weighing of interests encompasses more than the abstract weight of the confl icting 
interests, but it is an obvious starting point. After all, if the human life would 
always prevail, a terrorist’s demands would also have to be followed.387 Any 
interest can be legitimately protected under necessity, but the weight of that interest 
infl uences the fi nal decision of justifi cation or not. A justifi cation under necessity is 
most likely to follow for protecting serious legal interests, just as it is most likely to 
follow when only regulatory rules are infringed, evident by the example of speeding 
to save a seriously injured person.
The exercise is another illustration of the authority of the legislator, because 
much weight is put on the valuation of legal interests by that legislator. First, the 
legal protection of an interest indicates that it is important. Secondly, there can be 
no weighing of interests when the norm implies that it should also be respected at 
the expense of more valuable interests. Third, the legal valuation is evident in the 
different ranges of sentencing to offences. Since homicide can be punished more 
severely than (illegal) abortion, the legislator apparently values the life of the born 
more than that of the unborn. This valuation should also be the starting point of a 
weighing of interests in necessity. In many other cases however, the legislator’s 
valuation is not so evident and therefore less helpful. Amongst others, the range of 
sentencing of offences is not always very different.388
The legislator’s view is not absolute because sometimes the subjective of an 
interest needs to be taken into account. A good can have more weight if it is very 
personal, has sentimental value, is irreplaceable or when a lot of work has been put 
into it.389 However, the subjective valuation can only be taken into account as far as 
the legal order recognizes this. The assessment must remain objective in essence. 
For example, the defendant’s perspective that the life of his parakeet was so 
important that it was proportional for him to exceed the speed limit with more than 
50 km/h was considered to be a mistake and can therefore only excuse when 
reasonable.390 Conversely, if the defendant stands in no close relation to the 
protected interest, this will also negatively infl uence the weight of that interest.391
386 8 July 1999 OLG Frankfurt am Main NJW 2000, 875.
387 Roxin 2006, pp. 737–738 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 687.
388 Roxin 2006, pp. 736–737; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 307; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 695–696 
and Dolman 2006, pp. 163, 168 and 241.
389 Roxin 2006, pp. 757–758; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 687 and Dolman 2006, pp. 175 and 
244.
390 18 April 1990 OLG Düsseldorf NJW 1990, 2264. Offences committed based on conscientious 
grounds can also be rejected because an objective situation of necessity was lacking, see for 
example Hof Leeuwarden 3 August 2011, LJN:BR4247 and BR4250.
391 Compare Nieboer 1991, p. 258 and Machielse 1986, p. 606.
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4.5.2. Concrete interference
Besides the abstract valuation of the interest, it is also important to consider the 
concrete interference with that interest, in other words, the likelihood and intensity 
of the interference. As far as the intensity is concerned, it is obvious that an object 
can be merely damaged or completely destroyed. An infringement can also be 
reparable or irreparable and permanent or transitory. A minor interference of a 
higher valued interest can be justifi ed to save a serious interference of a lesser 
valued interest.392
The second aspect concerns the likelihood that the confl icting interests will be 
infrin ged or saved. There exists hardly a threshold of how likely it must be that the 
danger in fact will lead to an infringement of the protected legal interest. As long as 
the interference is not totally improbable, it is deemed necessary to save the interest. 
The risk is assessed normatively. Therefore, even if fatal consequences are perhaps 
only ten percent, this can still not be risked since it is so serious.393 Similarly, there 
exists no real threshold of adequacy as to how likely it must be that the defendant’s 
actions will in fact save the prevailing interest. This absence is compensated under 
the weighing of interests. The less likely it is that the danger will occur, the more 
serious the interference of the sacrifi ced interest should be. The smaller the chance 
of success fully protecting the prevailing interest, the less likely the act will be 
justifi ed.394
This explains why the defendant is justifi ed to exceed the speeding limit to take 
an injured person to hospital, if it is almost certain that person will otherwise die. 
In that case, the concrete danger to the life of one person outweighs the abstract 
danger to the lives of other participants in traffi c.395 In contrast, if the injuries of the 
person were neither life threatening nor urgent, the defendant is not justifi ed in 
creating an abstract danger to others by exceeding the speed limit.396 Things may 
again change if the abstract danger is realized. It is unlikely that the defendant will 
be justifi ed for causing an accident, certainly not if fatalities are the result.
392 Roxin 2006, pp. 737–738; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 687–688 and Simester & Sullivan 
2007, p. 718.
393 See IV.3.4.5.
394 24 June 2004 OLG Karlsruhe NJW 2004, 3645; Roxin 2006, pp. 730 and 742; Fischer, T. 2009, 
p. 305; Beulke 2008, p. 106 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 682–688.
395 Roxin 2006, pp. 742–743 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 688. See also 28 April 2004 AG 
(Amtsgericht) Berlin-Tiergarten NStZ-RR 2004, 281, where a seriously ill person was justifi ed 
in growing and possessing marihuana. The Drugs Act serves the abstract interest of public 
health, which was not concretely endangered whereas the defendant’s concrete interest was 
furthered.
396 HR 20 January 1976, NJ 1976, 206. Or driving whilst intoxicated, see 16 April 1987 OLG 
Koblenz NJW 1988, 2316.
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4.5.3. Joint risky ventures
If the victim of an offence is the source of the danger, less is required from the 
proportionality requirement. This can be illustrated by reference to the controversial 
situations known as ‘joint risky ventures’.397 The term ‘joint’ refl ects that all 
persons concerned agreed upon a venture, which they know harbours risks, like 
mountaineering, sailing or diving. The joint risky venture presupposes solidarity, 
which brings about mutual obligations. On the one hand, there exists a duty to help 
each other if necessary. This can be used to ground omission liability. On the other 
hand, a duty can exist to take the danger, especially if one person becomes a threat 
to the whole group. This can justify the sacrifi ce of that person’s interests.
Cases that are labelled as joint risky ventures are characterized by the fact that 
multiple persons are jointly in danger, whereby one has to be killed or sacrifi ced to 
save all. Equal interests of different persons are at stake and every person can only 
safeguard his interest at the expense of the equal interest of the other.398 Classic is 
the aforementioned hypothetical of two shipwrecked men. There is only one plank 
in the water, which is also only large enough to support one of them. If one of the 
two persons manages to secure the plank, the danger of drowning that endangers 
them both is realized for the one without the plank.
Almost everyone agrees that the person who survives should not be held 
criminally liable for causing the death of the other.399 Kant argued that neither man 
would have a moral right to push the other off the plank, but that this does not mean 
one should be criminally liable for doing so. After all, such criminal law would not 
deter: the certain evil of drowning would be outweighed by the uncertain evil of 
receiving the death penalty.400 This became evident in the case against Dudley and 
Stephens.401 The crew of the yacht Mignonette were cast away in a storm, 
compelled to use an open boat without much provisions. After some time, two of 
the crew, Dudley and Stephens, killed the cabin boy to feed upon his body. They 
claimed that if they had not killed the weakened boy, all would have died. In order 
to emphasize that their conduct was illegal, the men were convicted and sentenced 
to death. This mandatory penalty was however reduced to six months 
imprisonment.402 Later people saw the trial as a charade, doubting whether other 
seafarers would be infl uenced by it.403 The decision is generally accepted to be 
397 Term used by Bernsmann 1996, p. 183 to denote what is called in German 
‘Gefahrengemeinschaft’ and in Dutch ‘gevaargemeenschap’. This is not to be confused with the 
concept of ‘joint criminal enter prise.’
398 Roxin 2006, p. 739; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 686 and Dolman 2006, p. 162.
399 Roxin 2006, p. 1025.
400 Finkelstein 2001, pp. 280–281 and Fletcher 1998, p. 84. Compare Roxin 2006, pp. 1025–1028.
401 R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273.
402 On the death penalty and the power of the Queen to grant mercy, see Simpson 1984, pp. 235 and 
242.
403 Gardner, S., 1986, pp. 435–436 and Simpson 1984, in particular pp. 240–241.
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wrong. Dudley and Stephens should have been acquitted rather than being made an 
example to others.
The controversy of joint risky ventures therefore concerns the correct solution, 
more specifi cally whether the actor can be justifi ed and if so, it this can be grounded 
in necessity? It is problematic that prevailing opinion on necessity requires the 
prevailing interest to outweigh the sacrifi ced interest. In the case of one life versus 
the other, necessity would thus not apply. Instead, the aforementioned defence of 
collision of (equal) interests may apply.404
Problematic is also that more in general, the acceptance of a justifi ca tion implies 
that the opposing parties could not both be justifi ed. After all, if it is accepted that 
the person who is being pushed off the plank has a right of self-defence against the 
aggressor, that aggressor cannot at the same time be justifi ed by necessity to push 
him off. If both would be justifi ed, both would be allowed to resist each other and to 
throw the other off. It is argued therefore, that the ‘aggressor’ can at most be 
excused under duress.405
Justifying the defendant for killing an innocent person is also problematic from 
the point of view that a justifi cation communicates that what the defendant did was 
right or at least permissible. Hence, the point of view that the defendant in these 
cases should merely be excused is popular.406 Most of the cases mentioned are 
therefore also often discussed in the context of duress. However, applying an excuse 
implies that a(n arbitrary) third party is allowed to take action in these cases.407 
Hence, in the end, many scholars therefore do not use existing defences and the 
categories of justifi cation and excuse to solve these cases.408
Necessity is not only rejected because when two lives confl ict, there is no clear 
prevailing interest; it is also rejected based on a prohibition on such a quantifi cation 
or valuation of lives. Every life has the same value, which also means that a doctor 
may not sacrifi ce a patient with small chances for survival to save one or more with 
high chances, that the madmen may not be sacrifi ced to save the Nobel price winner. 
Neither may the lives of some be sacrifi ced to save the lives of many. For example, if 
a runaway carriage threatens to run over several people on one track, the trackman 
would not be allowed to switch the track so only one person would be killed.409
The existence of this taboo in German law may be explained as a result of 
experien ces during WWII. An example given to ground the prohibition is that 
404 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 168 and 172.
405 Nieboer 1991, p. 258 and Finkelstein 2001, pp. 280–281.
406 Kelk 2005, pp. 275–276; Beulke 2008, pp. 107–108; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 686–689 
and Bernsmann 1996, p. 183. In Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254, reference is made to 
the Canadian case of Perka, where Wilson J said that killing in necessity for self-preservation 
would at best be an excuse. “It could not possibly be declared by the court to be rightful.”
407 Roxin 2006, p. 762.
408 See Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 5d on Overmacht; de Hullu 2006, p. 289; Clarkson 2004; 
Roxin 2011, p. 563 and Roxin 2006, p. 742.
409 Roxin 2006, pp. 738–739; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 686; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 308 and 
Kelk 2005, pp. 275–276.
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doctors coope ra ted with Nazis to kill mental patients, because of fear that if they 
rejected, others would replace them and spare none.410 It can also be explained by 
the great infl uence of deontology in Germany, which leads to a rejection of purpose 
oriented utilitarian thinking, of which necessity is an expression. To most people, 
the revulsion against intentional killing can be so strong that we are unwilling to 
consider utilitarian reasons for it.411 In England, this has led to the rule, which will 
be discussed in detail later, that duress cannot apply to murder. Based on the case 
against Dudley and Stephens, the same used to be accepted in regard to necessity, 
but the ruling in the case of the conjoined twins is often interpreted as that a 
necessity plea is now possible to a charge of murder.412
Nonetheless, it can also be argued that the danger is realized in regard to all 
when nothing is done. In doing so, the case can be distinguished from the normal 
case of necessity where a danger can only be averted at the expense of another. It 
can be argued that whereas in the normal case, the sacrifi ce of an equal interest is 
wrongful, in a joint risky venture, an equal interest can be sacrifi ced because if 
nothing is done both interests are lost. By sacrifi cing, more is preserved than lost by 
doing nothing.413 In other words, the interests are not equal; either the interest of 
one or the interests of both are violated. It cannot be prohibited to minimize an evil 
that cannot be prevented. Reasonable law cannot prohibit that at least one human is 
saved when the saving of both is impossible.414
This line of reasoning is most convincing in cases where the victim has already 
been designated by the situation. Consider the case where a mountaineer holds his 
fellow-climber after he had slipped and is dangling over a cliff. Not being able to 
recover him, the danger exists that both will fall to their death, necessitating the 
mountaineer to drop his fellow-climber.415 Another case that is often referred to – 
but never dealt with by a court – is the death of a young man during the Zeebrugge 
ferry disaster. During the evacuation of the Herald of Free Enterprise, a young man 
was preventing the way of escape for people because he was immobile, frozen on 
the ladder. Apparently petrifi ed or in shock, he was pushed off the ladder, fell in the 
water and was never to be seen again.
In cases where either one dies or all will die, the victim poses a threat to the 
person who has to sacrifi ce him.416 A comparison can therefore be made to 
aggressive and defensive necessity. As mentioned before, defensive necessity is 
characterized by the fact that the sacrifi ced interest belongs to the person who gave 
410 See Roxin 2006, p. 740, euphemistically called the Euthanasia-case.
411 Williams according to Brooke LJ in Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254.
412 See X.4.5.1.
413 Dolman 2006, pp. 162 and 240.
414 Roxin 2006, p. 740.
415 In Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 such a case is mentioned. Joe Simpson miraculously 
survived by landing on a snowy ice bridge 100 feet below and told the mountaineer Simon Yates: 
‘You did right.’
416 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Ormerod 2005, pp. 320–322; Simester & Sullivan 
2007, pp. 720–721 and Ashworth 2006, pp. 151–152.
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rise to the danger. The person hanging on a rope or blocking the only escape route 
probably also did not choose to be the source of the danger, but he is the reason the 
danger exists. In the German civil provisions on necessity, it is recognized that the 
interests of that person are less deserving of protection and therefore carry less 
weight. As a conse quen ce, the requirement of proportionality is more lenient.417 
Hence, the life of the defendant can be argued to outweigh that of the person giving 
rise to the danger.
A similar way to approach this is to argue that sacrifi cing the life of third parties, 
persons who are not related to the danger, can never be justi fi ed because of 
principles of autonomy and human dignity. By taking these princip les into account 
as abstract interests in a weighing of competing interests, more weight is given to 
the preservation of their interests. In Germany, it is argued that in case of regular or 
‘aggressive’ necessity, where the actor interferes with an interest of an innocent 
third party, the principle of autonomy brings about a stricter test of proportionality. 
An interference with the interests of third parties can only be justifi ed when the 
prevailing interest is much more valuable, because by sacrifi cing an interest of a 
third party, the legal order as such is also infringed.418 For example, a rich woman 
is not allowed to rip an umbrella out of the hands of a poor woman when it starts 
raining all of a sudden, in an effort to save her expensive dress.419
If a simple weighing of the interests that are directly involved would suffi ce, 
fundamental rights and principles such as human autonomy and dignity would be 
violated.420 By giving important values such as human dignity special weight, it 
can be said that the act of necessity is, in a socio-ethical perspective, the right 
means to a right goal.421 In England, these examples are also given to emphasize 
the relation ship of sacrifi cing interests of those who gave rise to the danger. A 
necessity plea cannot be invoked when a personal right of a non-consenting person 
is overridden who poses no threat to the person or property of others. The 
autonomous person who posed no threat cannot be hurt. Only when the defendant’s 
response is addressed to the source of peril and the victim’s interests are served as 
well, does the defence allow for the infl iction of personal harm.422
Nevertheless, some German scholars argue that in these situations where the 
victim would have died anyway, the defendant can merely be excused. They argue 
that necessity must be rejected. After all, fault on behalf of the victim for creating 
the situation, let alone a mere associative connection to the danger cannot ground a 
right to interfere with his life and a duty to tolerate this infringement. Prior fault 
417 §228 of the German Civil Code; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 688–689; Roxin 2006, pp. 
775–777; Roxin 2011, pp. 558–559 and Machielse 1986, pp. 524–528.
418 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 685 and 691–692 and Roxin 2006, pp. 618, 744–745 and 766.
419 Roxin 2006, pp. 620–621. See also Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 717–718.
420 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 697.
421 Roxin 2006, pp. 724–726 and Fletcher 1998, p. 138. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 676.
422 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 719–721.
Justifi cations
 397
and special duties can bring about a duty to take a risk, but not a duty to sacrifi ce.423 
Moreover, some seem to suggest that no defence should apply on this basis at all. 
They point out the danger in using the argument that the victim is doomed, which 
could also be invoked to kill the terminally ill to save other patients.424
The German Constitutional Court held unconstitutional and void, the law that 
would permit the shooting down of a hijacked plane if necessary to prevent it from 
being used for a terrorist attack like those of September 11th, 2001. The Court 
refused to consider the fact that the passengers in such a situation were already 
doomed. The (innocent)425 passengers would become mere means to an end, and by 
using people as objects, the human dignity and right to life, which enjoy the highest 
protection, would be violated.426 The Court thus put much weight on the prohibition 
on the quantifi cation and valuation of lives, rejecting the perspective that victims, 
who are designated to die in any event, may be sacrifi ced.
Again, the rejection of necessity in Germany does not imply that liability should 
follow. Many German scholars have rejected the decision in favour of justifying the 
shooting down.427 Moreover, the German Constitutional Court left open what the 
decision under criminal law should be for the individual who shot down the 
airplane. There seems to be consensus that it should be possible to shoot down the 
airplane, even if the legal grounding is highly controversial.428
Nevertheless, in England a principally different approach is taken. The principle 
that it can be justifi ed to sacrifi ce the person who gives rise to the danger, to 
sacrifi ce the interest that will be lost in an event, prevails over concerns against the 
weighing of lives. It has been argued that necessity would apply to the 
abovementioned scenario in England. The English Govern ment has in fact made 
clear that it reserves the right to shoot down the air plane.429 In the case of Re A 
(Children), the court was asked to rule on the legality of a proposed surgery of 
conjoined twins. Jodie and Mary were con joined at the abdomen and both sisters 
relied on Jodie’s heart. The two evils were the following; if Mary and Jodie would 
be separated, Mary would surely die, as she was incapa ble of independent existence. 
However, if they would not be separated, Jodie’s heart would eventually fail within 
months, leading to the death of both sisters.
423 Beulke 2008, p. 108 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 686–687.
424 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 309 and Roxin 2006, p. 742.
425 If the airplane is unmanned or only occupied by persons who want to use it as a weapon, it may 
be shot down. This was also the case in 2003 when a confused individual threatened to use a 
hijacked sports plane as a weapon on Frankfurt, see Kersten 2005, p. 661. The threat was 
however not executed and the plane landed safely.
426 15 February 2006 BVerfG NJW 2006, 751. See also Beulke 2008, pp. 108–109, Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 687.
427 Overview in Roxin 2011, p. 552.
428 Sinn 2004, p. 591 and Kersten 2005, p. 663.
429 Bohlander 2006 and Ormerod 2005, p. 322. The Royal Air Force appears to have carried out 
such an exercise in July 2010.
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A balance was struck in favour of separation, because Mary was imperilling the 
life of Jodie and destined to die in any case. She remained alive only by ‘draining 
the life blood’ out of Jodie. Only Jodie had a chance of survival. Thus, although 
‘innocent’, Mary posed a threat to Jodie’s life, which could only be taken away by 
sacrifi cing her life. By emphasizing the fact that Mary was designated to die and 
the source of the danger, the court distinguished this case from other similar cases, 
like that of Dudley and Stephens, where someone else could have been sacrifi ced 
too.430 The cabin boy was selected because he was weak and had no children, but 
he was an autonomous person who posed no threat to the defendant.431
In conclusion, it is clear that the fact that the victim gave rise in some way to the 
danger or confl ict is of infl uence in deciding whether or not the defendant should be 
held liable. The more the victim resembles the wrongful attacker, the more the 
degree of force used against him will resemble that which is allowed in self-defence. 
Whereas it is agreed the individual defendant should not be held liable, some 
ground this in necessity, whereas others merely excuse the defendant under duress. 
The choice depends on the individual case and the implications of accepting a 
justifi ca tion or excuse to that case. It is clear that duress would allow for more in 
this context: the more lenient proportionality requirement of duress not necessarily 
requires that the saved interest clearly outweighs the sacrifi ced. A third group of 
scholars ground the solution in supra legal defences, sometimes even avoiding the 
justifi cation-excuse dichotomy.
Finally, a problem is that one can almost never be sure that it is necessary to 
sacri fi ce an interest. In reality, it is very diffi cult to ascertain whether action must 
imme dia tely be taken and that there are no other means of averting the danger. At 
the moment the castaways start fi ghting over the plank, they do not know whether a 
ship would have passed them in time. As an alternative that at least buys some time, 
they may for example agree that one person will be treading water so the other can 
rest on the plank, and that they regularly switch positions.432 Also, it cannot always 
be sure that the airplane will be used as a weapon, that the situation of the passen-
gers is hope less. The problem of these cases is therefore often not just one of 
propor tio na lity, but also one of subsidiarity.433
4.6. Lack of material wrongfulness
Necessity is sometimes seen as the genus of which duress and self-defence are a 
species.434 Consider that in German and Dutch law, duress is labelled as ‘excusing’ 
430 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254; Ormerod 2005, pp. 320–321; Ashworth 2006, p. 154 
and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 711–712.
431 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 721. Nevertheless, the defendants maintained that the cabin boy 
was in fact designated to die in any event, which was also accepted by the Prosecutor, see 
Simpson 1984, pp. 60–67 and Williams 1977, p. 96.
432 If the hypothetical took place on a hot air balloon, subsidiarity would be easier to affi rm.
433 15 February 2006 BVerfG NJW 2006, 751; Roxin 2006, p. 742; Roxin 2011, p. 561; Meyer 2004, 
p. 207 and Sinn 2004, p. 591.
434 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 and Williams 1953, p. 574.
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and ‘psychological necessity’ respectively. Most differences with duress and self-
defence have been mentioned, so the delimitation of necessity with the defence of 
‘lack of material wrongfulness’ remains.435 This defence, only recognized in 
Dutch law, has very much in common with necessity, but is also broader.
Its most important difference with necessity is that it does not consist of a 
confl ict of two or more interests. By pleading the defence, the actor instead argues 
that although he violates the law would, he is serving the interest protected by that 
norm better than by complying with it.436 In other words, there is a confl ict of 
norms, but not a confl ict of interests. Although his conduct formally fulfi ls the 
offence defi nition, substantively this conduct is not wrongful. In some cases, 
conduct that literally breaks the law actually favours or minimizes the harm it seeks 
to avoid. The defence brings up for discussion the criminal offence, rather than 
allowing for the justifi cation of some extraordinary cases.
The origin of the defence lies in a case called after its defendant, the ‘veterinary 
surgeon’. The surgeon had broken a rule that prohibited bringing healthy cattle into 
contact with cattle that had been infected with foot-and-mouth disease. He acknow-
led ged these facts, but asserted that by doing so, the cattle had been better off than 
by complying with the rule. After all, the healthy cattle were almost sure to get 
infec ted too and by infecting them at a time when they were not giving milk, they 
did not become as ill as they would have, when infected later. Veterinarians shared 
this view in general at the time. The Dutch Supreme Court accepted this view as 
well and concluded that the conduct was not wrongful, as a consequence of which 
the conviction was quashed.437
Although it is generally assumed that the Court accepted the surgeon’s defence 
as ‘the lack of material wrongfulness’, the Supreme Court made no such explicit 
reference. The annotator who was also a judge in the case favours this interpreta-
tion438 and several lower courts have accepted it explicitly.439 The Supreme Court 
never got a chance again to say anything about this defence, as subsequent cases 
never got further than a Court of Appeal. One of them concerns a mother who had 
taken a mobile phone from her son and turned it in to the police, because it had 
been stolen. She wanted to protect her son, while at the same time teach him a 
lesson and return the phone to its rightful owner. However, the elements of the 
offence of handling stolen goods had been met. The Court of Appeal however held 
that by acting as she did, she furthered the goal of the offence, namely the 
prevention of people benefi ting from the crime of another. In other words, she 
435 ‘Het ontbreken van materiële wederrechtelijkheid.’
436 Strijards 1987, pp. 48–49; Dolman 2006, p. 315 and Annotator van Veen in HR 3 July 1972, NJ 
1973, 78. As a second category, the defence has also been raised (to no avail) by the defendant 
who was forced to commit the offence because of a higher interest, based on his conscience or 
political reasons, see Bosch 2008, p. 170 and Wolswijk 1998, p. 244.
437 HR 27 June 1932, NJ 1933, 918.
438 Mevis 2006, p. 630.
439 Kelk 2005, pp. 139 and 142.
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acted contrary to the law, but not contrary to the purpose of the criminalization 
and was therefore justifi ed based on the absence of wrongfulness.440
Just like necessity, the defence is hardly ever accepted because it undermines 
the validity of the norm, or because an alternative like an exemption procedure has 
not been used.441 In the time there still existed a general prescription, the law 
provided for a procedure, granting an exemption from military service on 
conscientious grounds. If the defendant did not use this possibility, courts had an 
easy job of re jec ting necessity for the refusal to take part in military service or to 
obey orders.442 Third, the defence fails if the conduct was not adequate to serve the 
prevailing interest. From that point of view, acts of civil disobedience are the most 
ineffective form of resistance.443 It should be emphasized that the defence is often 
pleaded but hardly ever accepted by courts.444 It is unpopu lar amongst Dutch 
scholars,445 who have argued to alternatively acquit the defendant in these cases by 
expanding the scope of necessity or by creatively interpreting the offence defi nition.
In England, it is also recognized that sometimes the goal of a law can best be 
achieved by breaking its letter.446 “It requires clear and unambiguous language 
before the courts will hold that a statutory provision was intended to apply to cases in 
which more harm will, in all probability, be caused by complying with it than by 
contravening it.”447 In the Netherlands, the defence also operates as a failure of proof 
defence when the offence charged is result based, since the defendant asserts there 
has not been an infringement of the protected interest.448 It has been argued that such 
a creative, restrictive interpretation of offence elements should also be applied to 
offences in which the conduct is central and where concrete harm does not have to be 
caused. This enables the court to acquit the defendant without reference to the 
controversial defence of absence of wrongfulness.449 Restrictive interpretation is said 
to be the better option because it avoids a confl ict of norms, rather than solve it.450
Another alternative to the recognition of a specifi c defence is to neglect the 
difference and treat these cases as necessity. In England, cases in which the 
defendant argues he serves the protected interests better by violating the criminal 
norm are also considered in the context of necessity. Consider the case in which the 
440 Hof Arnhem 6 April 2009, LJN:BI1487. In contrast, see HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 464, 
where the conduct of the defendant was less laudable.
441 HR 9 November 1999, NJ 2000, 145 and HR 16 January 1979, NJ 1979, 210; Wolswijk 1998, pp. 
245–248 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 287 and 336.
442 HR 17 May 1988, NJ 1989, 230 and HR 9 September 1986, NJ 1987, 259.
443 HR 24 March 1987, NJ 1987, 705 and HR 30 January 1990, NJ 1990, 445.
444 Fokkens & Machielse, note 7 on Wederrechtelijkheid.
445 AG van Dorst in HR 27 June 1995, NJ 1995, 711; AG Wortel in HR 4 December 2007, 
LJN:BB5377 and de Hullu 2006, p. 339.
446 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 716 and Williams 1953, pp. 567 and 569.
447 Glazebrook 1972, p. 93.
448 Fokkens & Machielse, note 7 on Wederrechtelijkheid and Wolswijk 1998, pp. 244–246.
449 De Hullu 2006, pp. 336–339; de Hullu 2009, pp. 348–351; Strijards 1987, pp. 72–75 and Kelk 
2005, pp. 136–151.
450 Dolman 2006, pp. 314–315. See also de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 50–51.
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accused was found in illegal possession of a fi rearm. He sought to justify this by 
asserting that he had taken the gun from someone who told him he wanted to use it 
on a person. He asserted the value of saving life over the letter of the gun-control 
laws, while at the same time furthering the ultimate goals of gun laws, namely 
keeping weapons out of the wrong hands.451
Legal interests can also belong to the same legal subject or exist in different risks 
to the same legal interest. Consider that a fi reman has to throw a child out of a burning 
building (into a safety net) to save it from certain death, but in doing so risks severe 
injury. Necessity is applied in Germany to these cases although most German scholars 
prefer to solve such cases under presumed consent.452 The application of necessity to 
a case where strictly speaking no interests are in confl ict, begs the question whether 
this should be a condition for the application of necessity.453 Dutch courts preclude 
necessity in cases where the protected interest is the same as the interest the violated 
provision aims to serve.454 This can be overcome by making the interests involved 
very specifi c, creating a confl ict of interests. Euthanasia, for example, could be 
assessed under necessity by creating the confl icting interest of ‘quality of human 
life’.455 In the example of the child in the burning building, the interests of bodily 
integrity can be juxtaposed with that of life. It can be concluded therefore that the 
defence of ‘lack of material wrongfulness’ is a relic of the past and superfl uous.
5. CONSENT
An offence, consented to by the victim does not bring about criminal liability. 
When the person concerned waives the protection of his legal interest, he should not 
be considered a ‘victim’. There is no violation of his legal interests, no confl ict of 
interests, no sacrifi ce of interests for a greater good. Therefore, it is often submitted 
that consent is not a justifi cation.456 The wrong is not justifi ed; there is no wrong at 
all. The person who consents is not wronged: volenti non fi t iniuria.457
The same conclusion is also substantiated in a formal way. Consent often applies 
to non-ideal offences that include wrongfulness as an express offence element. 
Tech nically, consent therefore negates an offence element and acquits the defendant 
451 R. v. Pommell [1995] EWCA Crim 7 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 714–715.
452 Beulke 2008, p. 111 and 28 July 1970 BGH JZ 1973, 173. Like Roxin 2006, pp. 772–773 and 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 679–680.
453 De Hullu 2006, p. 339 submits that with the evolution of necessity into a reasonable and careful 
consideration of interests, this distinction no longer has to be made. Pompe had also argued in 
favour of extending necessity, see annotator Taverne in HR 27 June 1932, NJ 1933, 918.
454 See for example, Hof Leeuwarden 11 March 2010, LJN:BL7271.
455 Strijards 1987, pp. 50–51. Compare Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1992] 
UKHL 5.
456 Ashworth 2006, p. 318 and Roxin 2006, pp. 545–555. Compare de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, 
pp. 50–51.
457 Remmelink 1996, p. 933. The maxim can be traced back to Ulpian: “Nulla iniuria est, quae in 
volentem fi at”, see Roxin 2006, pp. 539–540.
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because the offence defi nition is not fulfi lled.458 However, other justifi cations also 
opera te as failure of proof defences. As noted, self-defence also formally negates a 
charge of intentionally infl icting wrongful bodily injury, or any reckless or negligent 
offen ce for that matter. No one has questioned that self-defence is a justifi cation.
It will be argued that consent can operate as a justifi cation and as a failure of 
proof defence. General principles can be deduced, which give meaning to the 
element of wrong fulness, irrespective of whether it is implied or express included 
in the offence. Some differences exist when consent operates as a failure of proof 
defence, which will be presented after discussing the rationale and conditions of 
consent as a justifi cation.
5.1. Rationale
The justifi catory force of consent is most often grounded in the victim’s autonomy 
or individual right to self-determination.459 When the victim approves of the 
defendant’s actions, this is viewed as a waiver of protection by the law.460 Similarly, 
it is argued that the legal order need not protect interests that have been consciously 
given up.461 It is agreed that the victim can only waive protection regarding indivi-
dual legal interests. Consent can therefore not justify offences that (also) protect 
public legal interests.462 Therefore, those that argue that almost all offences also 
aim to protect public legal interests, submit there can be almost never be a waiver of 
protection. Accordingly, they reject the defence.463
In a similar way, a liberal perspective on consent can be juxtaposed with a 
moralistic one. An extreme liberal approach would allow consent to apply to all 
offences, whereas from a more paternalistic perspective, consent needs to be 
limited with a view to public policy.464 On the one hand, moralism is not a proper 
basis for the deployment of criminal law in a modern plural democracy. On the 
other, even hardcore liberals concede that there are cases where the Government 
must intervene. Consider the case of the ‘Rotenberg cannibal’, who killed, 
slaughtered and ate his consenting victim.465
458 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 60.
459 Roxin 2006, pp. 541, 558 and 582; Fletcher 1975, p. 305; Ormerod 1994, pp. 938–939 and 
Strijards 1987, p. 70.
460 Bohlander 2009, p. 82; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 595 and Fletcher 1975, p. 305.
461 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 593. See Strijards 1987, p. 69.
462 Beulke 2008, p. 127.
463 Strijards 1987, pp. 68–69 and Nieboer 1991, p. 259. See Roxin 2006, pp. 539–540.
464 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 685–686 and Ashworth 2006, p. 318. See Nieboer 1991, pp. 259–
260.
465 22 April 2005 BGH NJW 2005, 1876; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 701–703 and Ormerod 
1994, p. 939.
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5.2. Criteria
Consent is limited by several cumulative conditions. As follows from a moralist 
perspective, the act consented to must not violate public policy. The rationale of 
autonomy explains why the actor must be the sole disposer over the individual legal 
interest that is at stake and third, that the consenting party must be capable to give 
his consent. Mistakes on behalf of the victim are usually reproached to the 
defendant, because only foreseen consequences can be consented to.
The cumulative conditions of consent often overlap. Consider that the victim 
consen ted to a fi ght with the defendant, as a result of which he died. Under the fi rst 
condition, the victim cannot consent to his killing because that offence also serves a 
public interest. Secondly, consent can be rejected because the seriousness of the 
harm violates public policy. As a third stumbling block to acceptance of the defence, 
the victim would have probably not have consented if he knew this would be the 
consequence of the challenge. Even if he consented to the possibility of serious 
injuries, it is unlikely he would consent to his death. In legal comparison, this 
overlap mitigates the different approaches to individual conditions. Even if one 
condition would be fulfi lled in one State but not in another, the plea is likely to fail 
in that State under a subsequent condition too.
5.3. Waived interests
The application of consent is limited to those legal interests where the legal order 
creates the possibility for the protected person to use his right to self-determination 
to abdicate legal interests. In short, consent is limited to offences that aim to protect 
individual interests and to cases where consent does not violate public policy.466
5.3.1. Individual legal interests
From the rationale of individual autonomy, it follows that the consenting party can 
only waive legal protection if he is the only bearer of the interest that is affected. 
For consent to apply, it is required that the pertinent offence only aims to protect 
an individual interest. The person concerned has no title to give consent when it 
concerns the violation of a legal interest that is public, even if he is directly 
concer ned by the act. For example, perjury, fraud and double marriage can be 
consented too, but remain criminal, since the offence aims to protect public 
interests.467
466 Beulke 2008, p. 127–128; Bohlander 2009, p. 83 and Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 11 on Boek I 
Titel III Inleidende opmerkingen.
467 14 May 1970 BGHSt 23, 261; 22 April 2005 BGH NJW 2005, 1876; Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, p. 594; Roxin 2006, pp. 555–556 and Beulke 2008, p. 128.
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Often, an offence aims to protect not only an individual but also a public legal 
interest.468 In that case too, the consent of the person directly concerned does not 
justify the offence. For the defence to apply, the consenting person must be the only 
bearer of the interest.469 In other words, the consent can negate the infringement of 
the individual interest, but it cannot affect the concomitant violation of the public 
aspect of the offence. For example, killing on desire is still criminal because it 
violates the public interest of sanctity of life.470 In the case against the Rotenberg 
Cannibal, consent did not apply because the prohibition to kill also serves a public 
legal interest that the victim cannot abdicate.471
Exceptions to the limitation are made if the public aspect of the interest that is 
violated is relatively trivial, like in a false accusation. If the individual aspect of the 
offence is dominant and the offence is not very serious, like insult, the undeniable 
freedom of the individual to determine, within certain limits, which suffering he 
wants to bear must bring about that consent applies.472
5.3.2. Public policy limitations
Even if the offence is considered to merely serve individual interests, it cannot 
always be consented to as public policy concerns may override the consent of the 
party concerned. Consider again the act of killing on desire: human life is an 
individual legal interest, but the taboo on taking human life outside situations of 
self-defence brings about that consent cannot apply.473 If consent could apply to 
homicide, killing on desire would not have been drafted as a specifi c offence.
If the conduct leads to the death of the consenting party, or if it creates a 
concrete endangerment to that party’s life, the threshold of public policy is 
exceeded.474 Consent was therefore rejected in the case where the defendant 
argued that the victim had asked to be tied to a bed and poured with gasoline, 
after which she was asked to play with a lighter. It was held that even if this 
consent was accepted as credible, it could not negate a conviction for killing the 
victim.475 The weight attached to the sanctity of human life in England and 
Germany explains why the scope of necessity, duress and consent is limited. The 
lack of such an explicit limitation in Dutch law refl ects a more pragmatic 
approach, evidenced by the lack of a priori restrictions to necessity and duress 
and the legalization of euthanasia. Nevertheless, consent to being killed in other 
situations is legally irrelevant too.
468 Kelk 2005, p. 152 and Krey 2002, pp. 8–9.
469 14 May 1970 BGHSt 23, 261.
470 HR 27 November 1984, NJ 1985, 106 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 594.
471 22 April 2005 BGH NJW 2005, 1876.
472 Kelk 2005, p. 152 and Roxin 2006, pp. 556–557.
473 §§216 and 228 of the German Criminal Code; Bohlander 2009, p. 83 and Beulke 2008, p. 128. 
Compare article 3:40 of the Dutch Civil Code.
474 20 November 2008 BGH NJW 2009, 1155 and Roxin 2006, pp. 560–561.
475 20 June 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 583.
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In principle, severe and irreversible injuries can also not be consented too.476 
The restric tion of the individual right to self-determination is warranted because it 
helps gene ral prevention. It also helps society to protect individuals against 
themselves, since victims tend to rely heavily on public funds.477 In this context, 
the scope of con sent is limited the most in England, which is not surprising given 
the general emphasis on public policy in English criminal law. The rule under 
English law is that con sent cannot be a defence when the harm intended or infl icted 
is ‘actual bodily harm’ or worse.478 Actual bodily harm need not involve any injury 
of any signifi  cance.479
Hence, when two people agree to fi ght in England, their consent does not negate 
a charge of assault when actual bodily harm is the result.480 In contrast, it is 
accepted in Germany that people can consent to fi ghts that do not result in serious 
injuries.481 Apparently, public policy does not militate against this fact. It is unlikely 
that such a defence would acquit the defendant in the Netherlands.482 Even if it 
would, in order to ground liability, it could be argued that this offence of affray 
(also) aims to protect a public legal interest that cannot be consented to.
It has been suggested in England to apply a wider scope of consent by including 
harm that falls short of serious injury.483 However, the aforementioned difference is 
put into perspective if we consider that public policy considerations cannot only 
limit but also extend the scope of consent. On the one hand, the seriousness of the 
harm is at odds with applying consent, but on the other, lawful or legitimate reasons 
for committing an offence can compensate this, allowing the consenting party to 
waive legal protection nonetheless.484 More can be consented to in the pursuit of 
acceptable goals. Even serious bodily harm can be consented, explaining why 
patients can consent to complex medical operations, tattooing and violent sports.485 
The purpose of conduct can compensate the seriousness of the offence in all 
Member States under investigation. It is therefore impossible and unnecessary to 
identify an absolute threshold on the seriousness of the harm in the context of the 
public policy restriction.
476 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 697 and Roxin 2006, pp. 559–560.
477 Roxin 2006, pp. 560–561.
478 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 686–687.
479 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 696. Bodily harm under sections 20 and 47 of the Offences Against 
the Persons Act 1861 even includes psychiatric injury and its effect, see R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA 
Crim 1103.
480 Attorney General’s Reference No. 6 of 1980 [1981] EWCA Crim 1.
481 See 8 May 1990 BGH NStZ 1990, 435 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 648.
482 Peters, A.A.G. 1966, pp. 142–143 however mentions such a non-published decision of a Dutch 
Court of Appeal of 1964.
483 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 701–702.
484 R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. Spencer 2004, p. 448 suggests that even if one may not 
consent to the deliberate infl iction of harm, the victim may consent to running the risk of that 
harm.
485 Roxin 2006, p. 559; R. v. Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75; R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and 
Allen 1994, pp. 187 and 192.
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What act is considered to be unacceptable to the legal order used to be 
determined quite paternalistic. Only generally accepted morals were held to be 
valid. For example, sado-masochistic activities were held to violate these public 
morals and could not be consented to.486 If the reasons for acting seemed 
inappropriate to the legal order, consent could not apply.487 This moralizing 
approach is however increasingly abandoned and the weight has been shifted to the 
more objective criterion of seriousness of the harm or danger.488 Sado-masochistic 
motivations do not vitiate the consent of the person concerned: this is only vitiated 
if the act creates a concrete danger to life.489 This approach leaves more room for 
the individual right to self-determination and free sexual development. However 
unreasonable the interference may be to the average person, consent is valid as long 
as no serious harm is infl icted upon the consenting party.490
It can be argued that although English law also focuses on the severity of the 
harm, the England judiciary still takes the most paternalistic approach. After all, in 
contrast to the German case mentioned above, a group of homosexuals engaging in 
consen sual sado-masochistic activities were convicted in 1993 of infl icting serious 
bodily injury. Consent was held not to be a defence to the charges of assault, despite 
the fact that the acts were carried out in private and no permanent injuries were 
sustained, “because public policy required that society be protected by criminal 
sanctions against a cult of violence which contained the danger of the proselytization 
and corrup tion of young men and the potential for the infl iction of serious injury.”491 
Before the ECtHR, the defendants argued that their rights under art. 8 ECHR had 
been violated. However, the ECtHR dismissed the complaint by ruling that it is a duty 
of the State to criminalize violent conduct in order to protect public health. Like the 
Court of Appeal confi rmed in another case, it considered that serious violence does 
not become a lawful activity because it enables the actor to achieve sexual 
gratifi cation.492
The conviction of the men attracted much criticism. The case has been explained 
by reference to the underlying fear of judges that applying consent to the case would 
imply approval of the conduct.493 By comparing it with the case in which the 
defendant burned his initials into his wife buttocks with her consent, it has been 
argued that English law is internally inconsistent and occasionally irrational. 
486 3 January 1928 RG JW 1928, 2229 and 12 October 1928 RG JW 1929, 1015.
487 23 February 1940 RGSt 74, 91 and 29 January 1953 BGHSt 4, 24.
488 Roxin 2006, pp. 565–567; Beulke 2008, p. 130; Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 11 on Boek I Titel 
III Inleidende opmerkingen.
489 26 May 2004 BGHSt 49, 166; 11 December 2003 BGHSt 49, 34; Beulke 2008, p. 130 and Roxin 
2006, p. 566.
490 2 December 1976 BGH NJW 1978, 1206 and Roxin 2006, p. 562.
491 R. v. Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75.
492 R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 
appl. nos. 21627/93, 21826/93 and 21974/93, 20 January 1997. See also Simester & Sullivan 
2007, p. 700 and K.A and A.D. v. Belgium, appl. nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99, 17 February 2005.
493 Ashworth 2006, p. 319.
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Although medical assistance was needed, the husband could rely on his wife’s 
consent. The court held that there are recognized exceptions to the rule that consent 
cannot apply to infl icting bodily injury. A comparison was made to tattooing, the 
respect for the privacy of the matrimonial home emphasized.494
In any event, it has become clear that the English approach to consent differs 
from the German approach. The English approach is to vitiate consent to all degrees 
of bodily injury, unless it is committed for a lawful purpose, whereas the Germans 
only vitiate consent to serious bodily injury if it is not committed for a lawful 
purpose. In other words, consented injuries are either ‘wrongful, unless’ or ‘lawful, 
unless’.495 The different starting points bring about that the scope of consent is in 
fact most restricted in England. Results will however not be very different in the 
majority of cases, because the principle rule is that dangers or actual infringements 
to the bodily integrity can be consented to. The more laudable the purpose of the 
conduct or the overall situation, the more serious the danger or harm may be. 
Finally, the condition of public policy is by defi nition highly normative and 
casuistic, making it diffi cult to deduce general principles from the extreme cases 
that have been compared.
5.4. Capacity
The consenting party must possess the capacity to consent. He must have the 
necessary intellectual and moral maturity to make a free and informed decision and 
that he understands the nature and consequences of what he is consenting to.496 First 
of all, an element of personal capacity can be distinguished, related mostly to the 
abstract ability to make decisions. Especially when the consenting party is minor or 
suffering from a mental disorder, this narrow meaning of capacity can be questioned. 
Sane adults can also be incapable of giving their consent, for example, when they are 
in a coma. In cases like this, German doctrine applies the fi ction of presumed consent.
The diffi cult and possibly stigmatizing question on whether the victim is capable 
to give his consent is often left undecided by simply grounding the rejection of 
consent in not fulfi lling other conditions. For example, the question of whether the 
victim of the Rotenberg Cannibal was capable to consent to his killing and eating 
was left undecided, since the defence could already be rejected by arguing that the 
494 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 686 referring to R. v. Wilson [1997] QB 47.
495 Compare §228 of the German Criminal Code, translation by Bohlander 2008, p. 153: 
“Whosoever causes bodily harm with the consent of the victim shall be deemed to act lawfully 
unless the act violates public policy, the consent notwithstanding.”
496 Section 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 685; 7 September 
1998 BayObLG NJW 1999, 372; Bohlander 2009, p. 84; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 275 and Beulke 
2008, p. 128.
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prohibition to kill and to desecrate a corpse also serve a public legal interest that the 
victim cannot abdicate.497
In addition, a more concrete element of being correctly informed on the scope of 
the consent is required. In order to be capable to give consent, the consenting party 
must have been properly informed so it can be said that he foresaw the act and its 
consequences. Mistakes due to insuffi cient or incorrect information will negate 
consent. Moreover, the consent must have been voluntary. If he was coerced in 
some way, the consent is not free. Any force, deception or error negates the 
voluntariness of consent.498
5.4.1. Intellectual and moral maturity
Capacity in a narrow meaning requires that the consenting party has the intellectual 
and moral maturity to oversee the consequences of actions. In general, adults that 
are properly informed are assumed to have capacity, unless there is reason to 
assume otherwise. As long as the person concerned is capable to give consent, this 
does not have to be reasonable. For instance, medical treatment may be refused, 
even if it leads to death.499 By contrast, certain persons are unable to waive the 
protection of the law. If the person involved is mentally abnormal or a minor, 
scepticism on the validity of consent is appropriate.500 In sexual offences against 
vulnerable persons, for example, the consent of the victim is made irrelevant by an 
irrebuttable presumption that the victim is incapable to give his or her consent 
freely and responsibly.501
There exists a strong relationship with the capacity to be held blameworthy or to 
commit crimes, which is clear in the context of insanity and infancy. However, the 
capacity to consent does differ from the lacking capacities in insanity or infancy.502 
In contrast to infancy, usually no absolute threshold of age applies. The capacity to 
give a free, informed consent depends also on the individual maturity and the 
reasonableness of the consented act. When the consequence may be serious, the 
minor will generally need to be older to be able to give his consent. This can be 
compensated again if the purpose is legitimate like in medical surgery.503 The 
497 22 April 2005 BGH NJW 2005, 1876. Similarly, see 7 September 1998 BayBoLG NJW 1999, 
372.
498 Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 11 on Boek I Titel III Inleidende opmerkingen.
499 Re C. (Adult: refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. See also 19 October 1971 BVerfG 32, 98.
500 Kelk 2005, p. 152.
501 Roxin 2006, p. 557; R. v. C. [2009] UKHL 42 and section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
By contrast, in recital 10 of the preamble of Directive 2011/93 of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual absue and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and 
replacing Framework Decision 2004/68, OJ 2011 L 335/1, the disability itself does not 
automatically constitute the impossibility to consent.
502 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 595–596 and 22 January 1953 BGHSt 4, 88.
503 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 695–696; Elliott and de Than 2007; 10 February 1959 BGHSt 12, 379; 
Roxin 2006, p. 574; Bohlander 2009, pp. 85–86 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 594–596.
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capacity to consent is also related to, but not similar to the capacity to conclude 
legal acts under civil law.504
Nevertheless, in certain areas of law, special rules on the capacity to consent 
apply, often constituting of a specifi c age.505 In English law, a minor under 13 years 
cannot consent to sex, even if the partner is also a minor. The scope of statutory 
rape is therefore wide. The 15-year-old boy who had consensual intercourse with a 
12-year-old girl was convicted of statutory rape.506 This approach can be contrasted 
with the more fl exible Dutch approach. In the Netherlands, the sexual abuse of 
minors can be justifi ed by consent. This is not easily accepted, but it does apply 
when the parties involved are both minors. The smaller the difference in age, the 
more likely the consenting intercourse will not be held to be abuse.507 The Union 
leaves this issue to the discretion of its Member States.508
5.4.2. Presumed consent
In German law, the doctrine of presumed consent operates as a justifi cation sui 
generis,509 based on customary law. It constitutes a legal explanation of cases where 
no liability follows despite the fact that the person concerned did not consent. 
Consider emergency cases where the patient is unconscious and in dire need of 
medical treatment.510 The doctor is justifi ed to operate if he may presume the 
patient would consent if he could. These cases must be distinguished from cases of 
consent by a representative, such as consent of a parent on behalf of a minor. Both 
deal with persons who are incapable of giving their consent, but the inability to give 
consent in presumed consent is of a more temporary nature.511 Clearly, presumed 
consent cannot apply if the person concerned had already made known what he 
wanted if he would end up in the situation he is in.
The right to self-determination brings about that presumed consent may only be 
applied in dire circumstances. It can only apply if it is impossible to receive a 
504 R. v. Hinks [2000] UKHL 53; 7 September 1998 BayObLG NJW 1999, 372 and Bohlander 2009, 
pp. 84–85. See §§104 and 107 of the German Civil Code and articles 3:32 and 3:34 of the Dutch 
Civil Code.
505 Roxin 2006, p. 578 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 596–597. For example, the sexual 
offender must, amongst others, be 25 years to consent to voluntary castration, which can 
mitigate his sentence in German law, see section 2(3) of the Castration Act (Kastrationsgesetz).
506 Section 5 Sexual Offences Act 2003 and R. v. G. [2008] UKHL 37. She had told him she was 
fi fteen, but the element of age is strict. The conviction is less controversial if it considered that 
the girl argued she did not consent. See also G. v. the UK, appl. no. 37334/08, 30 August 2011.
507 Article 247 of the Dutch Criminal Code; HR 24 June 1997, NJ 1997, 676; Kelk 2005, p. 153 and 
de Hullu 2006, p. 338.
508 Article 8 of Directive 2011/93, mentioned above.
509 25 March 1988 BGHSt 35, 246; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 275 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 602.
510 Bohlander 2009, pp. 88–89; Beulke 2008, p. 131 and Kuhlen in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 333. 
Compare Mevis 2011, p. 554.
511 Roxin 2006, pp. 578–580 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 596–598.
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genuine consent and when a later operation, when desired, would seriously limit the 
chances of saving an important interest of the patient. For example, a doctor had to 
perform a Caesarean section and had asked the patient beforehand, if she wanted to 
be sterilized at the same time. She had refused. The doctor, however, due to 
complications during surgery, feared that renewed pregnancy might have lethal 
consequences and sterilized anyway. The German Supreme Court rejected 
presumed consent because the risk of future lethal consequences was only small 
and could be prevented by contraceptives. Moreover, a future operation, to which 
she could consent, would not have presented an increased risk for the patient.512
The weight of the right to self-determination also brings about that the presumed 
consent of the person concerned must be established by reference to his individual 
interests, needs, wishes and values. It is a judgment of probability on his hypo-
thetical will, not an objective evaluation of what is best for a reasonable person like 
in necessity. The reasonable person will only be taken as a starting point if there are 
no individual desires known and no concrete indications to the contrary. Unlike the 
defence of necessity, it is therefore not about an objective evaluation, but about an 
ex ante judgment of probability on the hypothetical will of the party concerned. 
Just like an actual consent, this need not be reasonable.513
By contrast, in England, medical treatment upon incompetent patients and 
compe tent but unconscious adults is justifi ed by necessity under a rationale of best 
interests. For example, a court decided that the sterilisation of a mentally retarded 
sexually active woman would be in her best interests.514 It does not seem possible to 
presume consent. For example, a man lapsed into a coma and died. Shortly before 
his death, a sample of his sperm was collected to be used for insemination. 
However, in the absence of a written consent of the donor, the responsible authority 
prohibited this. Fortunately for the wife, she could rely on the Union right to 
freedom of services to be inseminated in a Belgium clinic.515 In the Netherlands, 
these cases are also solved by an objective standard. If medical intervention is 
reasonably necessary given the circumstances, wrongfulness will be negated based 
on the rights that come with a doctor’s profession.516
This approach does not clearly distinguish the defence from necessity. That 
justifi cation is about the objective general benefi t. The autonomy of the patient is 
only taken into account as a factor in the weighing of interests. By contrast, consent 
is based on the autonomy of the person concerned. Hence, by treating these 
512 4 October 1999 BGHSt 45, 219; Roxin 2006, p. 826; Beulke 2008, p. 131; Bohlander 2009, pp. 
88–89 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 602–603.
513 This also brings about that the fact that it later turned out that the party concerned would have 
not consented does not make the surgery wrongful. It is about the assessment ex ante. See 
4 October 1999 BGHSt 45, 219; 25 March 1988 BGHSt 35, 246; Roxin 2006, pp. 594 and 823–
825; Beulke 2008, pp. 131–132 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 602–603.
514 F. v. West Berkshire HA [1989] 2 WLR 1025; Chan & Simester 2005, p. 127 and Rogers 2001, 
pp. 517–518.
515 R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687.
516 See Mevis 2011; Kelk 2005, pp. 157–160 and de Hullu 2006, p. 337.
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situations as presumed consent, the subjective will of the person concerned is given 
most weight. Nevertheless, presumed consent is hardly ever relevant. It cannot 
apply to the mentally incompetent patients in the aforementioned cases, because 
they cannot consent at all. These cases must be dealt with under necessity in 
Germany too. Moreover, in most cases, the objective presumption that someone 
wants to be operated will turn out to be correct, therefore not generating any 
dispute. Disputes are most likely to arise in cases where people would have rejected 
surgery based on their religious beliefs if they could have expressed their will. In 
any event, doctors who operate on these persons in emergency situations should not 
be held liable.
5.4.3. Free and informed consent
The consenting party can only be deemed to have been capable to waive legal 
protection of his interest, if he made the decision voluntarily and in full knowledge 
of the relevant facts and circumstances. The object of consent is the act and its 
consequences. The consenting party must have a correct perception of this.517 
Possible consequences must at least be taken for granted by the party concerned; he 
cannot consent to some risk he does not know or trusts will not occur.518 For 
example, he may have consented to a lesser harm of bodily injury, but not to the 
risk on, let alone occurrence of death. After discussing the role of regulated 
activities, I will discuss the different ways in which the free and informed decision 
may come under pressure.
In some contexts, the law assumes what the consenting party foresaw. When 
bodily injuries are for example incurred in the context of violent sports like boxing, 
it is assumed that the party concerned foresaw and consented to this possibility.519 
In non-violent sports like football, it is also accepted that the participants to some 
extent expect to be harmed. The rules of the pertinent game or sport form an 
important regulating principle. In all Member States, serious fouls on the playing 
fi eld have led to a trial on the question whether criminal liability is warranted. On 
the one hand, the intentional or reckless infl iction of bodily injury in non-violent 
sports constitutes a grave foul and is therefore not consented to.520 On the other 
hand, it is accepted that the participants of the activity consented to violations of the 
rules of the game that the participants take into account, which are based on inter 
alia over eagerness, excitement, absence of consideration, stupor, imperfect game 
technique or failing control over the body. Injuries are accepted as consented to 
517 Article 3(2) CFR; 22 January 1953 BGHSt 4, 88 and 12 October 1999 BGH NStZ 2000, 87.
518 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 594.
519 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 697–699.
520 HR 22 April 2008, NJ 2008, 375.
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when they are a typical and thus foreseeable consequence of playing the game or 
within its bounds of tolerance.521
The perception of the consenting party can be distorted for many reasons. 
Amongst others, a free and informed decision can be absent due to mistakes, 
deception, coercion, provocation or intoxication.522 Regarding intoxicated mistakes, 
the consenting party must possess the necessary ability to judge and peace of mind 
to oversee the scope of his declaration and to weigh the pros and cons. This allows 
the German judge to reject consent in drunken challenges to fi ght,523 mitigating the 
aforementioned difference that in England and the Netherlands, consensual fi ghts 
would already be excluded under the other conditions. In general, it is logical that 
the more complex and far-reaching the consent of the party concerned is, the more 
likely it will be affected by mistakes.
Informed consent presupposes that a doctor is clear about the necessity, goal and 
risks of surgeries.524 Therefore, when the doctor lied to the patient about the actual 
need for surgery, namely to remove an instrument that had been left behind in the 
patients body after the last surgery, he was liable for infl icting bodily injury.525 Not 
every misconception of the patient will vitiate his freedom to choose, as errors 
about accompanying circumstances are irrelevant. The exact demarcation is case-
specifi c.526 Secondly, ignorance on behalf of patients due to improper information 
also need not vitiate consent if it is established that he patient would have also given 
his consent if he had properly been informed.527 Similarly, in English law, the 
appropriation of theft is not ‘dishonest’ if the actor took something away believing 
the other would consent if he knew of the appropriation and its circumstances.528
In the perspective that only misconceptions on ‘essential’ elements of the 
activity consented to may vitiate consent, it can also be argued that sexual 
intercourse with a prostitute does not become rape because the defendant did not 
pay.529 By contrast, there was a mistake on the essential nature of the activities in 
the case where a woman believed she was medically examined for breast cancer, 
when in fact it was the other party’s purpose to gratify his sexual needs.530 
521 3 August 1961 BayObLGSt 1961, 180; Berkl 2007, pp. 115–117; HR 20 February 2004, 
LJN:AO1239; HR 22 April 2008, NJ 2008, 375; Kelk 2005, p. 153; R. v. Barnes [2004] EWCA 
Crim 3246 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 697–699.
522 R. v. Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804; Fokkens & Machielse, note 10 on Wederrechtelijkheid and 
Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 11 on Boek I Titel III Inleidende opmerkingen.
523 22 January 1953 BGHSt 4, 88 and 12 October 1999 BGH NStZ 2000, 87.
524 28 November 1957 BGHSt 11, 111; 10 February 1959 BGHSt 12, 379; 1 February 1961 BGHSt 
16, 309 and Hof Amsterdam 16 December 2010, LJN:BO7707.
525 20 January 2004 BGH JR 2004, 469.
526 29 June 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 34; Bohlander 2009, p. 86; Beulke 2008, p. 129; Roxin 2006, pp. 
581–587 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 599.
527 This is called hypothetical consent in Germany, see 15 October 2003 BGH JZ 2004, 799; Beulke 
2008, p. 132; Roxin 2006, pp. 590–592 and Kuhlen in Schünemann a.o. 2001, p. 333.
528 Section 2(1b) Theft Act 1968. See also section 5(2a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
529 R. v. Linekar [1994] EWCA Crim 2 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 694.
530 Spencer 2007, p. 491.
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Furthermore, the consent to sex is not vitiated when the defendant failed to disclose 
he was infected with a sexu ally transmitted disease.531 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the victim did not consent to grievous bodily harm by being infected with HIV as a 
result of unprotected sex.532
Force or threats that exclude the freedom of choice clearly vitiate consent.533 
More controversial is whether lesser forms of coercion also invalidate consent. 
Whereas some refer to a relatively high threshold that is similar to the threat of 
duress or the threat in offences of coercion,534 others argue that if a deception can 
vitiate consent, lesser degrees of coercion surely must negate consent as well.535 In 
England, pressure falling short of physical harm, such as non-physical threats or 
circumstances may suffi ce to vitiate consent.536 Again, the demarcation of relevant 
from irrelevant limitation to the freedom of choice is case-specifi c.537
In some cases, the law presumes that coercion of some kind precludes a free 
consent. For example, the English Sexual Offences Act 2003 creates rebuttable 
presumptions that consent should be vitiated in case of the use of force or when the 
complainant was asleep or unconscious. The presumption that consent is not given 
freely can also not be refuted in cases where the defendant impersonates a person 
known personally to the complainant.538 In Framework Decision 2004/68 on 
combating the sexual exploitation of children, the consent of a child “shall not be 
considered valid, if for example superior age, maturity, position, status, experience 
or the victim’s dependency on the perpetrator has been abused in achieving the 
consent.”539 In the Directive on traffi cking in human beings, the consent of victims 
to any offence of human traffi cking is irrelevant.540 There is an irrebuttable 
presumption that the victims are in a situation in which they cannot choose freely.
5.5. Affi rmative or failure of proof defence
As explained earlier in this chapter, it can become controversial whether a defence 
should be considered as a failure of proof or affi rmative defence. Regarding consent, 
531 R. v. EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945.
532 R. v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and R. v. Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706.
533 Bohlander 2009, p. 88 and Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 11 on Boek I Titel III Inleidende 
opmerkingen.
534 Roxin 2006, pp. 588–589.
535 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 599–600.
536 R. v. Olugboja [1981] EWCA Crim 2. See also Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 689–691.
537 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 599–600.
538 Sections 75–76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. See also Spencer 2007, p. 491.
539 Framework Decision 2004/68 of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, OJ 2004 L 13/44.
540 Article 2(4) of Directive 2011/36 of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating traffi cking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Framework Decision 2002/629, OJ 2011 
L 101/1.
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this controversy is very clear.541 Consent can negate offence elements of wrongful-
ness, culpa and even elements such as ‘offensive’. For example, the operator of a 
cinema was charged with an offence against the public decency for showing a 
porno graphic movie. The Dutch court held that when people have been warned 
about the explicit content of a movie and wish to view it nonetheless, their consent 
negates the offensiveness of the conduct.542
It is accepted that consent operates as a failure of proof defence to negligent 
offen ces. This is logical because culpa absorbs the justifi cation. Consent thus deter-
mines whether someone acted negligently.543 There is however no consensus on 
how this opera tes in detail. It can be questioned whether consent extends the scope 
of the allowed risk or whether under a principle like self-endangerment, the result 
should not be attributed to the defendant if the risk or harm was consented to by the 
party concerned.544 The latter view is popular in Germany.545 For example, when 
the actor supplied the victims with narcotics, they may be assumed to have 
consented to the risks in using it. If those risks materialize, they cannot be attributed 
to the actor. However, the consent is also only valid if it is based on a correct 
perception of the rele vant facts by the victim. The defendant, who (inadvertently) 
supplied pure heroine to a person asking for cocaine, was therefore held liable for 
(negligently) causing the ensuing death.546
A minority argues that consent should always be considered as a failure of proof 
defence. It is argued that consent should not be considered to be a justifi cation 
because there is no confl ict of interests. The waiver of legal protection simply brings 
about that there is no infringed interest.547 As argued before, by focusing on the 
legitimate purpose of the activity that is consented to, consent can also be seen as a 
confl ict and weighing of interests. A patient accepts the pain and risks of surgery 
because it is a lesser evil than letting his illness deteriorate. Even if this view is 
rejected, consent can be labelled a justifi cation under a dualist rationale of superior 
and absent interest.
5.5.1. Distinguishing feature
Prevailing opinion in Germany and the Netherlands holds that in some cases, 
consent negates the offence whereas in other cases, it justifi es the offence. The 
guidelines developed in the beginning of this chapter also apply here. When an 
541 R. v. Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 607–608; Livings 2007; Mevis 
2006, p. 630; Dolman 2006, p. 314 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 319.
542 HR 28 November 1978, NJ 1979, 93.
543 HR 31 October 2006, NJ 2007, 79 and Mevis 2006, p. 630.
544 Roxin 2006, pp. 568, 820 and 1098–1102.
545 14 February 1984 BGHSt 32, 262; 20 November 2008 BGH NJW 2009, 115; Berkl 2007 and 
Beulke 2008, pp. 257 and 342.
546 29 April 2009 BGH NStZ 2009, 504.
547 Like Roxin 2006, pp. 545–555 and Ashworth 2006, p. 318. See Beulke 2008, p. 125 and Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, p. 592, who reject this view.
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offence includes wrongfulness in its offence defi nition, it implies that consent 
operates as a failure of proof defence rather than a justifi cation. If the character of 
the offence is however that something is done against the will or without permission 
of the party concerned, consent operates as a failure of proof. For example, the 
absence of consent is usually an offence element in offences against the property. 
By contrast, if the offence element of wrongfulness is not essential to the offence, 
like in the offence of infl icting bodily harm, consent can only justify the offence.548
This approach is also evident in the German doctrine on offi cial authorisation, 
which can be considered to be a specifi c manifestation of consent. A doctrinal 
distinction is made between authorized conduct that is not as such materially 
forbidden, like driving. This even has social use and is made subject to authorization 
only to ensure the actor abides by the proper standards. On the other hand, there is 
the authorisation of conduct, which is materially forbidden as such and thus 
constitutes an exemption to a general ban on the basis of some higher-raking 
interest, like manufacturing weapons of war. Authorisations in the category of 
prima facie legal conduct negate the offence defi nition whereas authorisations of 
the second category operate as a justifi cation.549
5.5.2. Defensive purpose
The distinction is relevant because the conditions of consent as a failure of proof 
defence are more lenient than those of the consent as a justifi cation. First of all, the 
general ramifi cations of defences that operate as a failure of proof apply. As 
mentioned, if consent operates as a failure of proof defence, a mistaken belief in 
consent can negate intention and the defendant need not be aware of the 
permission.550 From this difference relating to the defensive purpose, an implication 
specifi c to consent is accepted in Germany. It is argued that if the defendant must 
know of the consent, this brings about that the victim must have made his consent 
externally known, which can range “from actual desire on the one hand to reluctant 
acquiescence on the other,”551 On the contrary, since this awareness is irrelevant 
when consent operates as a failure of proof, the person concerned need not have 
made his will known.552
548 Beulke 2008, pp. 125–126; Bohlander 2009, pp. 77 and 214 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 336–337. See 
Roxin 2006, pp. 540–548.
549 Bohlander 2009, pp. 89–90 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 605.
550 3 October 1978 BayObLG NJW 1979, 729 and Beulke 2008, p. 127.
551 R. v. Olugboja [1981] EWCA Crim 2. The will may be expressed to a third party, but the 
acquiescence must be distinguished from quite submission or surrender, see also R. v. Bree 
[2007] EWCA Crim 804; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 689; Williams 1953, p. 611; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 598; Beulke 2008, p. 130 and Roxin 2006, pp. 570 and 579–580.
552 3 October 1978 BayObLG NJW 1979, 729 and Beulke 2008, p. 127.
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5.5.3. Capacity to consent
German scholars add another difference specifi cally related to consent. The 
requirement of having the capacity to consent is much more lenient when it operates 
as a failure of proof defence. What is required is a voluntary, ‘natural will’, which 
can also exist with infants and the insane that lack the capacity to justify an offence 
by consent. For example, the absence of consent is implied in the offence element 
‘abducted’. Even an insane person can consent to being abducted and negate this 
offence.553 Since a mere natural will is generally less sensitive to errors, deceptions 
are less likely to vitiate consent when it operates as a failure of proof defence. It is 
even argued that defi ciencies in the will by coercion, deception or mistake are 
irrelevant to the failure of proof defence.554
5.5.4. Contextual approach
Some scholars argue that the required degree of capacity depends on the legal 
interest as to which the consent relates and the other circumstances of the case. As 
mentioned, this is also the approach when consent operates formally as a justifi ca-
tion. Therefore, even if consent operates as a failure of proof, more than a natural 
will could be required. For example, a natural will suffi ces to negate offences of 
coercion and theft and can therefore be given by a child or insane person. In 
contrast, they need to have a better understanding of what they are consenting too 
in offences like insult and privacy violations.555
This contextual approach is gaining ground, mostly because the classifi cation of 
consent as a failure of proof or affi rmative defence is controversial. In Germany, 
there exists controversy on the categorisation of offences like insult, bodily injury 
and damaging goods.556 One could even argue that consent operates in different 
ways in the same offence. After all, the infl iction of bodily injury constitutes a 
prima facie wrong, as to which the absence of consent is no essential element. 
However, it would be inappropriate to argue that the doctor who operates with 
consent is justifi ed. In fact, no court in the Member States under investigation 
would hold that an offence is fulfi lled.557
The approach is an example of how the conditions of consent are increasingly 
treated in a contextual way, with regard to the legal interest to which it relates, or 
553 13 May 1969 BGHSt 23, 1; Beulke 2008, p. 127 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 82–83.
554 Roxin 2006, p. 542 and 815–816; Bohlander 2009, pp. 82–83 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
pp. 592–593.
555 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 592–593 and Roxin 2006, pp. 572–574.
556 Roxin 2006, pp. 551–553. See also Beulke 2008, p. 126.
557 Roxin 2006, pp. 552–553. Compare Mulder in Balkema a.o. 1995, pp. 275–276 and Mevis 2011, 
pp. 549–552.
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the circumstances under which the defendant acts,558 rather than by reference to its 
formal operation to the charge. The legal interest involved, the character of the 
offence and the question whether consent relates to conduct that is prima facie legal 
or not, are similar criteria to properly distinguish consent as a failure of proof 
defence from the justifi cation.
5.6. Conclusion
In conclusion, the operation of consent and its ramifi cations remains controversial. 
This is not problematic however. First, there is consensus on the essence of consent 
and secondly, most of the differences are put into perspective. The different 
approaches to conditions do not necessarily lead to different outcomes, because the 
conditions are very case-specifi c and overlap. For example, even if persons can 
consent to bodily injuries incurred by fi ghting, the defence can still be rejected 
because an intoxicated victim lacked the capacity to consent. It can also be rejected 
because of the seriousness of the harm, either under public policy or based on the 
argument that even if the victim consented to the possibility of injuries, it is 
unlikely he would consent to such serious injuries.
As far as the operation of consent as an affi rmative or failure of proof defence is 
concerned, the differences are also put into perspective. In the exceptional cases 
where the defendant is ignorant of the consent, prosecution or punishment is 
unlikely to follow, regardless of its operation. After all, there is objectively no harm. 
Conversely, a putative justifi cation must be reasonable to preclude liability, but as a 
failure of proof defence, unreasonably assuming that the victim consented can also 
still amount to negligence liability, if available.
Finally, the general defence of consent is not explicitly regulated, whereas 
special manifestations of consent, such as in the context of medicine, have been 
regulated. These specifi c regulations take into account all the special circumstances 
of that context. Nonetheless, the general principle of consent, as a failure of proof or 
affi rmative defence, is fl exible enough to do justice to the differing contexts. At the 
same time, it remains coherent enough to be considered a general principle of 
criminal law. It recognizes that someone’s interests may be sacrifi ced, based on the 
autonomous will of that person. In principle, the general welfare or legal order need 
not be furthered, but the limitations of public policy also safeguard that the legal 
order may not be harmed.
558 Westen 2008A, pp. 568–573. He gives the example of rape. In some circumstances, the sexual 
intercourse is already a prima facie wrong, regardless of the consent.
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CHAPTER X
EXCUSES
This chapter will also start with a discussion of the rationale(s) of excuses, followed 
by the meaning and requirements of its mirror image blameworthiness. 
Subsequently, it will be argued what self-defence-excess, duress, superior orders, 
mistake of law and insanity should look like in a general part of criminal law for 
the EU. Already in the previous chapter, I identifi ed and discussed a due-diligence 
like excuse that is based on the fact that blameworthiness is an implied element of 
every crime, including offences of strict liability.
1. RATIONALE
Excuses follow from both retributive and preventive theories on punishment. First 
and foremost, they are the manifesta tion and guarantee of the principle that there 
can be no punishment without guilt. Excuses have been created to make sure that 
those defendants, who cannot be blamed for their wrongdoing, should not be 
punished.
Secondly, the application of excuses serves a preventive purpose by 
communicating that the criminal law has been violated. This defendant is merely 
excused for committing the wrongful offence. The defendant is distinguished from 
the general popu la tion, and he can thus be spared condemnation and punishment 
without under cutting the general condemnatory and deterrent functions of criminal 
law.1 It may even be argued that the threat of punishment does not operate as a 
deterrent to the excused. Consider the defendant who was threatened by death to 
commit an offence. On the other hand, it has also been argued that the infl iction of 
punishment on the excused serves to strengthen the conformity to law of everyone.2 
In this perspec tive, by not making any exceptions to the infl iction of punishment 
upon committing an offence the prohibition and its deterrent effect are strengthened. 
Those who seek to limit the scope of specifi c excuses often advance this competing 
claim.
Different monistic theories of excuses have been advanced. Character theories 
can be distinguished from theories that centre excuses on the inhibited capacity to 
act or choose. The basic claim of an excuse within the character theory is that 
‘although I did it, I was not really myself’. In the normal case, the committing of a 
wrongful act refl ects a reproachable disposition that is hostile towards the legal 
order. The application of an excuse precludes this inference from the act to the 
1 Robinson 1982, pp. 226 and 229. It can also be argued on a deontological approach, see Kant in 
Fletcher 1998, p. 84.
2 Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 19 and 40–45 and Fletcher 1978, pp. 813 and 816.
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actor’s character.3 The theory has been attacked as punishing people not for what 
they did but for whom they are. Criminal liability should be about acts rather than 
character. The defendant must be punished for what he did, not for what he is or has 
become.4
It can be rebutted, however, that under this theory, we are not judging the whole 
character, but that we are inferring character from a single deed. The theory is not 
over-inclusive, because bad character does not warrant criminal responsibility when 
no wrong has been committed. Secondly, if a wrong has been committed but the 
defendant has not shown in any way bad character, he can also not be criminally 
liable. What matters is not just the conduct or just the choice to engage in such 
conduct, but the character traits that can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct.5
Framed in another way, an excuse represents a limited, temporal distortion of 
the actor’s character. If the defendant has undergone a fundamental shift in 
character for which he is not responsible, the actions performed as a consequence of 
that shift do not refl ect suffi ciently badly upon his settled character. For example, 
excessive reactions to an attack in a state of despair do not refl ect on the defendant’s 
settled character. Actions performed when intoxicated do not refl ect on the 
defendant’s settled character as actions performed sober. Nonetheless, the defendant 
has no excuse if he was responsible for his shift in character, which is the case when 
he voluntarily intoxicated himself and possibly, when he provoked the attack.6
The basic claim of an excuse within the capacity or choice theory is ‘I did it but I 
could not have done otherwise. I had no real choice.’7 In other words, the defendant 
was incapable to conform to the norms of the legal order.8 As noted, the inability to 
act or choose otherwise need not be absolute. That would already preclude the 
voluntariness of the act. Excuses are said to relate to the moral or normative 
voluntariness of the conduct.9 One is entitled to an excuse if the opportunities for 
doing otherwise than breaching the criminal law were unfairly diminished. The law 
cannot ask of anyone more than they can be legitimately expected to do, either 
intellectually or emotionally.10
The two theories seem to perfectly fi t excuses like duress and self-defence-
excess. The capacity and choice theories preclude other defences as excuses. For 
example, offences committed because of political, cultural or religious convictions 
spring from the actor’s character, not from the distorting effect of surrounding 
3 Fletcher 1978, p. 799; Tadros 2005, p. 293 and Beulke 2008, p. 151.
4 See Krey 2003, pp. 14–15; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 203 and Beulke 2008, p. 140.
5 Tadros 2005, p. 29; Fletcher 1978, p. 800; Duff 2002, p. 152 and Horder 2006A, p. 118.
6 Fletcher 1978, p. 802 and Tadros 2005, pp. 297 and 305–306.
7 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 12 and Dressler in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 276–277.
8 Horder 2006A, p. 9 focuses on the reasons for the defendant’s actions. Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 
11 and 33 focuses on the lack of control.
9 Fletcher 1978, pp. 802–803. See also Ashworth 2006, p. 224 and Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), pp. 
20–21 and 30.
10 Bohlander 2009, p. 115. See also de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, pp. 44–45 and Politoff & 
Koopmans 1991, p. 193.
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circum stances. A cultural defence or civil disobedience therefore does not excuse 
the actor. They refl ect his settled character. These offences are voluntary in the 
deepest sense. One is compelled by their character rather than compelled by 
circumstances.11
Other excuses, like mistake of law and its derivates, like (incompetent) superior 
orders and putative justifi cations, do not seem to fi t so nicely in any to the two 
theories. These defences excuse because of unavoidable ignorance of the criminality 
or wrongfulness of the conduct. Another theory of excuses could therefore focus on 
the injustice of punishing unavoidable violations of the law.12 Nonetheless, the 
theories come a long way in explaining these types of excuses. First, due to his 
ignorance, the wrongful conduct is not exemplary of the defendant’s normal law-
abiding disposition. Secondly, the requirement that only unavoidable mistakes 
excuse the defendant refl ects that the defendant did everything the law could 
legitimately expect him to do.
As a third category of excuses, insanity can be mentioned. It is clearly an 
excuse of incapacity, but under the capacity theory, insanity is not always an 
excuse. Only if the disorder was transient rather than permanent, can the offence 
committed under the infl uence of a mental disorder be said not to refl ect on the 
defendant’s settled character. Under the theory of choice, insanity does not qualify 
as an excuse. The defendant had no choice to act differently because of his 
disorder, but this is a circumstance internal to the defendant. When discussing 
insanity, it will be argued that insanity should sometimes be seen as an exemption 
rather than an excuse.
The rationale of excuses can also be drafted in a manner that includes all three 
categories. Blameworthiness is grounded in the capability of humans to choose 
freely and correctly between right and wrong.13 The latter ability to distinguish right 
from wrong, the insight of wrongfulness, is an element of blameworthiness. 
Excuses should therefore be understood as denying the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions and the capacity to act accordingly. 
The inclusion of the insight of wrongfulness makes clear that unavoidable mistakes 
of law are included. The capacity to act accordingly refers to both external and 
internal reasons for not being able to comply with the norms.
2. BLAMEWORTHINESS
Being held blameworthy means you are the proper object of a socio-ethical 
reproach.14 The reproach is based on the subjective relationship of the actor to 
the wrongful conduct, which focuses on its volitional aspects. If the particular 
11 Fletcher 1978, p. 806.
12 Fletcher 1978, pp. 805–806.
13 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194.
14 Fokkens & Machielse, notes 1 and 3 on Schuld.
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defendant could reasonably avoid the offence, he is blameworthy.15 
Blameworthiness is connected to moral considerations, which will often coincide, 
but it remains a legal, not a moral concept. On the one hand, this means that the law 
does not demand heroism from defendants. Acting morally blameworthy is 
insuffi cient for criminal liability. On the other hand, particularly in the regulatory 
fi eld of law, there can also be criminal liability without any moral 
blameworthiness.16
It has already been explained that blameworthiness should be distinguished 
from mens rea. The latter was explained to be an analytical tool of the offence that 
encompasses fault elements and its related principles. It is true that fault elements, 
like intention, increase the reproach that can be made to the defendant. However, 
blameworthiness deals with an aspect of liability that is more fundamental. Even 
crimes of strict liability require that the defendant is blameworthy. It is an absolute 
principle of criminal law, allowing for no exceptions, that the blameless may not be 
punished. This is the lower limit of criminal liability.17 The principle of no 
punishment without guilt therefore refers not only to factual guilt, but more 
importantly, to the rule that there can be no punishment without normative guilt, 
without blameworthiness.
This interpretation is in line with the case-law of the European and Dutch courts 
and not contrary to English case-law.18 In German law, however, the principle of 
guilt is said to encompass more. First of all, it is said to preclude strict liability. 
This interpretation of the principle implies that liability may not be based on 
anything less than negligence. The dogma would thus literally hold that there can 
be no punishment without negligence: nulla poena sine culpa must be taken 
literally.
The correct view differs. Although the subjective part of culpa consists of 
blame worthiness, it has also been explained that the reproach of culpa goes further. 
Culpa must be lata, serious, whereas any degree of blameworthiness suffi ces for 
criminal liability.19 In practice, this is shown when the defendant caused a casualty 
in traffi c. Even if the reproach is not severe enough to ground negligence for this 
killing, he may still be convicted of the strict offence of dangerous driving.20
Furthermore, the principle of guilt is interpreted so broad in Germany that it 
gives rise to a principle that punishment may not exceed the degree of 
blameworthiness. The latter implied that if an excuse is rejected, but the fulfi lment 
of its essential conditions has reduced the level of blameworthiness, this must be 
taken into account by mitigating the sentence. An example is the obligation to 
15 See also Leijten in Groenhuijsen, Mulder & Remmelink 1992 and Beulke 2008, pp. 139–140.
16 Beulke 2008, p. 140 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 16–17.
17 Mevis 2006, p. 612.
18 See V.2.3.5.
19 See IV.6.5. and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 110–114 and 141–143.
20 Articles 6 and 5 of the Dutch Road Traffi c Act 1994 (WVW) respectively and Fokkens & 
Machielse, note 1 on Schuld.
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mitigate the punishment of the person who committed the offence under the 
infl uence of a mental disorder, which was however not severe enough to deny his 
responsibility for the offence completely. Although all courts tend to mitigate the 
sentence when a defence is fulfi lled to some extent, yet rejected, only in German 
law, an obligation for courts to mitigate exists when it concerns an excuse.21 In 
discussing insanity, this principle will be discussed in more detail. Finally, the 
principle is also said to preclude the liability of legal entities.22 This issue is dealt 
with in a related research project.23
The principle is paramount in German criminal law and given constitutional 
status by the Constitutional Court, who fi rmly anchored it in the constitutional 
rights of human dignity, the free development of one’s personality and the principles 
of ‘Rechtsstaat’.24 The Constitutional Court has gone even so far to hold that supra-
national law cannot alter the principle. EU law must therefore be interpreted in line 
with the principle.25 From such a point of view, the more limited application of the 
broader principle, evident in the expansion of crimes of strict liability and the 
rejection of punishment according to guilt, can be described as erosion or 
undermining of the principle.
However, this development should be seen as the manifestation of a dynamic 
principle in a changing society, in which views on responsibility also change. For 
example, individual responsibility by natural persons is no longer exclusive. 
Concerns of dealing effi ciently with high numbers of violations and protecting 
particularly vulnerable interests warrant strict liability. Finally, an obligatory 
mitigation of punishment along the lines of reduced blameworthiness is at odds 
with a continued hardening of society and the criminal justice system, which 
focuses predominantly on the seriousness of the harm or danger caused.26
Moreover, it can be argued that the force and application of the principle of guilt 
has also been expanded. For example, the expansion of strict liability offences has 
increased the reliance on the principle. It is irrelevant for the defendant to argue that 
he lacked the intent or negligence in violating the norm, because this is not required 
by these offences. By doing away with fault, more emphasis rests on blameworthi-
ness as the minimum requirement of a subjective connection between act and actor. 
The defendant can only be exculpated by making probable an excuse. In a professio-
nal context, for example, the defendant is therefore likely to plead a due diligence 
defence, arguing he did everything that could reasonably be expected of him. The 
21 Tiedemann in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 13–15 submits that in Spain the fulfi lment of the essential 
conditions of a defence also leads to obligatory mitigation.
22 See Krey 2002, pp. 96–99 and Streng 2007, p. 153. See also Nieboer 1991, pp. 39–40.
23 See Keiler 2012, forthcoming.
24 Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the German Constitution; 26 February 1969 BVerfGE 25, 269; 
25 October 1966 BVerfGE 20, 323; 24 October 1996 BVerfGE 95, 96 and Renzikowski 2000, 
p. 488.
25 30 June 2009 BverfG 2 BvE 2/08.
26 See Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on Schuld; Stolwijk 1999 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 
9–10.
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acceptance of these defences by most notably Dutch courts thus shows a compen-
sating trend. This function of blameworthiness as a leftover category to exculpate 
explains the continued importance of the principle of guilt.
3. SELF-DEFENCE-EXCESS
Self-defence is a justifi cation limited by proportionality. If the defendant exceeds 
these limits, he can still be excused under self-defence-excess. Since this excuse is 
not recognized in England, its functional equivalents in English law will also be 
discussed. I will conclude that not these equivalents, but the excuse should be 
included in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
Two forms of the excuse can be distinguished. In intensive excess, the degree of 
necessary force is exceeded. For example, the attacked person uses a knife or 
fi rearm to defend himself when the attack could have also been averted with his 
fi sts.27 The other form deals, not with proportionality, but with the necessity of the 
attack, which usually ends after the attack. In extensive excess, the defendant either 
continues after the attack has ended or only reacts after the attack has ceased.28 
Consider the defendant who continued or even only started to kick the aggressor 
when he was no longer a threat, lying injured on the ground. Extensive excess is not 
accepted in Germany, but it will be explained that the scope of excess does not 
differ considerably.
3.1. Rationale
Self-defence-excess presupposes a situation of self-defence. It has therefore been 
argued that the excuse can be based on a rationale like the protection of the legal 
order, just like the justifi cation. On the other hand, it can be argued that the defence 
exceeds the rationales of self-defence. In extensive excess, the autonomy of the 
attacked person and the legal order are no longer in need of defence. In intensive 
excess, the lack of proportionality is also at odds with the legal order as a whole. 
The rationale for self-defence-excess thus differs from that of self-defence. Hence, 
the exceeding of the scope of lawful defensive force cannot be justifi ed.29 Dogmati-
cally, the defendant cannot be justifi ed because this would preclude others from 
defending themselves against him. If the attacked person exceeds the limits of 
lawful defensive force, the original aggressor and third parties on behalf of him, 
may act in self-defence against that person.
The rationale of excess is based more on general theories of excuse grounded in 
reasonableness and comprehensibility. The question is what we could reasonably 
27 Bohlander 2009, pp. 121–122; Beulke 2008, pp. 155–157 and Roxin 2006, p. 998.
28 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 27 and HR 4 March 2008, NJ 2008, 158. The latter is sometimes 
distinguished in Dutch law as ‘late excess’, see de Hullu 2006, p. 306.
29 Roxin 2006, p. 994.
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expect of the defendant in that situation. The defendant deserves consideration 
given the psychologically exceptional situation he is in, which strongly diminished 
his capacities to act otherwise.30 Its character is therefore one of excuse, which is 
widely recognized,31 although some have argued it is better to view excess as a 
defence on its own without categorizing it as a justifi cation and excuse.32 The 
wrongful character of the excessive force and the reproach against the actor are 
diminished to an extent that punishment is no longer appropriate.33
An additional rationale for excess is that acting in self-defence should not be 
too risky. If the defendant exceeds the limits of the justifi cation for understandable 
reasons, he should not be punished. The general interest is served if the defender 
does not have to worry too much about the legal consequences of his actions. 
Without it, citizens might be less willing to help each other. With the availability 
of excess, the risk of self-defence is therefore attributed to the aggressor.34 
Further more, punishment would not be in line with special and general 
preventive goals. There is no such need to deter the actor by punishing him, 
because he acted due to fear caused by the attack and the victim is not an 
innocent party.35
3.2. Criteria
For intensive excess to excuse the defendant, self-defence should have been 
necessary although the limits of proportionality were exceeded. Secondly, this 
excee ding must have been a consequence of the state of mind, which in itself should 
have been a consequence of the unlawful attack. The criteria of self-defence thus 
also apply to the excuse. If a situation of self-defence did not exist, because the 
attack was not wrongful or the interest attacked not within the scope of legitimate 
interests, the excuse can also not apply. The defence must also have been necessary 
in order to invoke intensive excess.36
30 De Hullu 2006, pp. 307–309; Fokkens & Machielse, note 10 on art. 41; de Jong D.H. & Knigge 
2003, p. 175 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
31 Machielse 1986, p. 678 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 669.
32 Like AG Machielse in HR 12 April 2005, NJ 2005, 364. See also de Hullu 2006, p. 309; Knigge 
1993, p. 36 and Roxin 2006, pp. 991–994. The wording of the defence in the Dutch and German 
Criminal Codes leaves room for debate.
33 Machielse 1986, p. 675 and Beulke 2008, p. 155. See Roxin 2006, p. 993.
34 Fokkens & Machielse, note 10 on art. 41; de Jong D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 175 and Bohlander 
2009, p. 122.
35 Roxin 2006, pp. 992–993.
36 HR 20 September 2005, NJ 2006, 104; HR 7 February 2006, NJ 2006, 508; HR 27 May 2008, NJ 
2008, 510 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 307–308.
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3.3. Necessity
In extensive excess, Dutch courts often distinguish two periods. Usually, the use of 
force during the attack is justifi ed by self-defence, but the use of force committed in 
the period after the attack has ended is only excused.37 Extensive excess is 
problematic in light of the necessity require ment. If the attack has ended, the 
defence is no longer necessary. This makes it more controversial and therefore 
explains why it is not recognized in Germany. However, this problem is overcome 
by requiring that a situation of self-defence must have existed at one point in time. 
For excess to apply, there should be or have been a situation of self-defence.38 
Accordingly, the Dutch Supreme Court quashes judg ments that imply that there can 
be no excess if the situation of self-defence has ended.39
In Germany however, the judiciary constantly precludes the excuse in these 
situations, arguing that only an actual situation of self-defence can be exceeded. For 
excessive self-defence to apply the attack must still be wrongful; a situation of 
necessity must exist.40 However, the recognition of extensive excess in Germany is 
not that far away, if we consider that courts apply a broad scope of imminence that 
includes situations of extensive excess into intensive excess. They accept that the 
imminence of an attack continues until its defi nitive termination. When a repetition 
of the attack might be feared, the attack is still imminent and the force is judged as 
intensive excess.41 Moreover, necessity is approached quite lenient in general. The 
defence is not precluded because the defendant could have withdrawn by fl eeing or 
the precautionary calling in the police.42
If the attack has defi nitively ended, the defendant cannot be excused, even if he 
did not realize the attack had ended. In that case however, the lenient German rules 
of mistake apply that negate intentional liability. After all, extensive excess and 
puta tive self-defence are not easy to separate. Extensive excess also has the 
character of a mistake. Due to emotions caused by the attack, the defendant does 
not realize the attack has ended or fears it is not over yet. In German law therefore, 
the defensive force that continues after the attack has objectively ended will not be 
held to be inten tional. The negligent liability that remains can be negated because 
fear and other affects can play a role in assessing the mistake as unavoidable.43 The 
37 See, for example, HR 27 May 2008, NJ 2008, 510.
38 HR 18 May 1993, NJ 1993, 691; Strijards 1987, p. 96; Rozemond 2006, p. 109 and Fokkens & 
Machielse, note 12 on art. 41.
39 Like in HR 4 March 2008, NJ 2008, 158. Lower Courts still often omit to address the possibility 
of extensive excess, see Blomsma & Klip 2009.
40 23 January 2003 BGH NStZ 2003, 599; 13 November 2008 BGH NStZ-RR 2009, 70; Roxin 
2006, pp. 998–999 and Beulke 2008, p. 156.
41 24 October 1919 RGSt 54, 36; 11 July 1986 BGH NStZ 1987, 20; 24 October 2001 NStZ 2002, 
141 and Roxin 2006, p. 999.
42 15 November 1994 BGH NStZ 1995, 177 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
43 24 October 2001 BGH NStZ 2002, 141 and Roxin 2006, p. 999.
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defendant in a situation of extensive excess will therefore be exculpated under both 
Dutch and German law.
In choosing the proper approach to the similar outcome, it should be taken into 
account that the German rules on putative defences have already been rejected in 
favour of one simple rule of excusing the actor who makes a reasonable mistake 
about the facts underlying a justifi cation. This exculpation should thus be the result 
of including extensive excess in the excuse. One yardstick should apply to extensive 
excess and the similar putative self-defence. Moreover, there are no good reasons to 
apply a different approach to extensive in regard to intensive excess either. Just like 
many German scholars argued, it is for example incorrect to submit that the 
required psycho logical pressure is absent when the attack has ended. In fact, the 
psycho logical situation is similar to that of intensive excess.44
3.4. State of mind
The exceeding of the limits of proportionality must have been a consequence of a 
relevant state of mind, which in itself should have been a consequence of the 
wrongful attack. The required states of mind can be distinguished into sthenic and 
asthenic feelings. Asthenic affects are passive feelings like fear, confusion and 
desperation that paralyze powers and make people weak, whereas sthenic emotions 
are active like anger, rage and indignation.45 The defence in the Netherlands covers 
both categories, whereas German law excludes the latter category.46 The German 
provision on excess enumerates the asthenic affects that can give rise to the defence, 
whereas the Dutch provision uses a more generic term to include both types of 
emotion in all manifestations. The German scope of excess thus seems smaller as it 
does not encompass ‘sthenic’ affects like rage and anger, but I will explain the 
difference is mitigated in numerous ways.
German scholars often ground the exclusion of sthenic affects on the belief that 
it might set free latent feelings of aggression. Moreover, aggressive emotions gene-
rally are considered more dangerous and should therefore be restricted for the sake 
of the protection of (the aggressor’s) legal interests. By contrast, fearful emotions 
are exemplary, not incendiary and are therefore to be treated more mildly.47 A 
comparison can be made with the English defence of ‘loss of control’, discussed 
below. Although its predecessor could also apply to cases where the defendant had 
44 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 671–672; Beulke 2008, p. 156 and Roxin 2006, pp. 999–1000. 
See also Motsch 2003, pp. 92–101.
45 Remmelink 1996, p. 326.
46 Fokkens & Machielse, p. 286, note 13 on art. 41; Machielse 1986, p. 682; 3 February 1993 
BGHSt 39, 133; Beulke 2008, p. 155; Bohlander 2009, p. 122 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 670. In German law, sthenic affects can only in exceptional cases excuse the defendant under 
insanity, see 12 December 1996 BGH NStZ 1997, 232.
47 Roxin 2006, pp. 992 and 995.
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lost his temper, the current defence will almost only be successful when the 
defendant acted out of fear or panic.
Nonetheless, the difference between the Dutch and German defence is seriously 
mitigated because of the German rule that sthenic affects may also play a role, as 
long as the asthenic emotion is still also causal for the excessive use of force.48 
Conversely, it will be explained below that in Dutch law, many sthenic affects, such 
as unreasonable anger and revenge are also excluded. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned German rules on mistake can also apply to mistakes caused by rage 
and anger, negating even negligence liability when the mistake was unavoidable.49 
Finally, the so-called ‘heat of passion statute’ of §213 of the German Criminal Code 
brings about a mandatory sentencing scheme of one to ten years of imprisonment 
for killings committed in provoked rage.
Starting with the fi rst mitigation of the difference, in both States a criterion of 
double causation applies. The attack should have caused the affect and subsequently, 
the affect must be the cause of the exceeding of the limits of self-defence.50 This 
causal connection is strictest in the Netherlands, where it has been held that the 
excess should be the direct consequence of the affect, meaning that it was of over-
riding importance. If the excessive force, like hitting and kicking an aggressor who 
is lying on the ground, was not caused by an emotion like fear as a result of the 
attack, but simply out of feelings of aggression, induced by alcohol, not the attack, 
the excuse will be rejected.51 In Germany, the attack must not necessarily be the pre-
domi nant cause of the loss of control as it suffi ces that it is co-causal for the 
exceeding.52 Moreover, this loose connection is accepted easily under in dubio pro 
reo.53
The inclusion of sthenic affects in Dutch law is also mitigated because Dutch 
courts often reject the defence when sthenic affects like revenge and hostility played 
a role. If those feelings already existed before the attack, the attack itself is not 
considered to be the main cause of those feelings. Courts can thus easily reject the 
defence by referring to a long-term confl ict that existed between aggressor and 
defendant.54 It is also held that the exceeding of proportionate force is not mainly 
caused by a relevant state of mind when the defendant displayed rational and 
48 Roxin 2006, pp. 995–997.
49 Bohlander 2009, p. 122 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
50 HR 13 June 2006, NJ 2006, 343; Fokkens & Machielse, note 13 on art. 41; Kelk 2005, p. 291; 
Strijards 1987, pp. 96–97 and de Hullu 2006, p. 308.
51 Hof Amsterdam 22 March 2001, NbSr 2001, 5. See also HR 13 June 2006, NJ 2006, 343; HR 
22 January 2008, RVDW 2008, 171 and HR 31 March 2009, NJ 2009, 177.
52 21 March 2001 BGH NStZ 2001, 591; Bohlander 2009, p. 122; Beulke 2008, p. 155; Roxin 2006, 
pp. 995–997 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
53 Roxin 2006, p. 996. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
54 De Hullu 2006, p. 308. HR 31 March 2009, NJ 2009, 177; Hof Leeuwarden 4 May 2009, 
LJN:BI3144 and Rb. Utrecht 1 October 2008, LJN: BF7595.
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purposive behaviour, either during the excessive use of force or immediately 
following it.55
A long timeframe between the attack and the defensive force will lead to a 
rejection of the defence in both States.56 The approach of Dutch courts is however 
the strictest. Some time in between is allowed, but in general, the excused force 
should have started (almost) immediately after the causing of the given state of 
mind.57 Consider the defendant who was attacked at the entrance of his house by 
someone with a large knife. He went upstairs to get a samurai-sword, which took at 
most fi fteen seconds. The Court of Appeal judged that this timeframe ruled out that 
the excessive violence – the use of the sword – was caused by an emotional state of 
mind as a direct result of the attack.58
Co-causal or predominant cause, it is accepted that the degree of the affect must 
be severe, because it must have caused the defendant to exceed the limits of self-
defence. The normal psychological processes must be seriously inhibited due to the 
attack. There must be such an extent of emotion that the defendant could only cope 
with the situation in a substantially diminished way.59 The comparison with the 
excuses of insanity and the partial defence of diminished responsibility forces itself 
upon us.60 The difference is that for excess to apply, the affect should be caused by 
the attack itself, not because of the psychological condition of the defendant. This 
means that individual characteristics such as a short fuse or a paranoid disposition 
will preclude the application of the excuse, unless they only played a subordinate 
role in causing the disproportionate reaction.61
The criterion of a ‘subordinate role’ again allows for normative leeway. For 
example, the woman who stabbed her ex husband to death was diagnosed as 
borderline with very dependent traits and could not even remember the stabbing 
anymore. She was excused anyway, as it was held that the state of mind was 
primarily caused by the attack of her ex husband.62 In another case, a group of 
drunken people had entered a closed restaurant, which was run by a family. When 
55 HR 27 May 2008, NJ 2008, 510. AG Vellinga disagreed, submitting that a state of mind, like 
fear and anger are reconcilable with rational and purposive behaviour. Moreover, defensive 
mechanisms require controlled behaviour in order to be effective. See also HR 7 December 
1999, NJ 2000, 263 and HR 8 April 2008, NJ 2008, 233, where the defendant calmly conversated 
after the excessive use of force.
56 Roxin 2006, pp. 1000–1001.
57 De Hullu 2006, p. 308.
58 HR 16 September 2008, LJN: BD1728. See also HR 12 April 2005, NJ 2005, 364. HR 13 June 
2006, NJ 2006, 343 can be contrasted with this case.
59 16 August 1994 BGH NStZ 1995, 76; 30 May 1996 NStZ-RR 1997, 65; Roxin 2006, p. 996 and 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 670.
60 See R. v. Martin [2001] EWCA Crim 2245.
61 29 May 1991 BGH NStZ 1991, 528; HR 12 December 2006, NJ 2007, 245; Machielse 1986, pp. 
683–686; Strijards 1987, p. 99; de Hullu 2006, p. 312; Siesling & Ten Voorde 2007, pp. 554–555 
and Kelk 2005, p. 291.
62 Hof Den Haag 24 November 2005, LJN:AV1104. See also Rb. Almelo 31 March 2009, 
LJN:BH9975 and by contrast, Rb. Utrecht 1 October 2008, LJN: BF7598.
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the group started to injure members of his family, the defendant stabbed a person 
of a group. It was assumed he acted because of an emotional state of mind caused 
by this attack, even if this state of mind could have existed before or have been 
ampli fi ed by the family history. The family had fl ed Azerbaijan during the war 
there.63
In determining what room exists for individual characteristics, the question is 
what we could expect from the defendant and what excess is acceptable?64 We can 
expect more from some and less from others. The excuse can be rejected because 
the speci fi c defendant should have restrained himself. For example, a prison guard 
could not rely on the defence. Considering his profession, he should not have reacted 
to the blow in his face by punching the victim in the head after he was restrained on 
the fl oor.65 The lack of control that made the defendant exceed the limits must have 
been caused by a ‘socially accepted cause’,66 and it must be grave enough to allow 
for such an excessive use of force. For example, the stealing of your purse is no 
reason to ‘lose it’.67 In this way, the difference with German law that preludes 
sthenic affects is mitigated too. Anger can qualify as a relevant state of mind, but 
the excuse will be rejected if the anger was unreasonable.
In conclusion, the simplest and therefore preferred approach is not to limit the 
defence in type of affects that can qualify, but to set a threshold of severity. This 
open approach, which was also taken in the context of self-defence, where it was 
decided not to restrict that defence a priori to certain interests, leaves room to take 
into account the special circumstances of the case in deciding to reject or accept the 
excuse. Just like the causal require ment, this provides the trier of a criminal case 
with considerable discretion, allowing him to take into all circumstan ces of the 
case. This explains why the defendant that was defending his disabled brother is 
treated more leniently than the drunken actor who infl icted severe injuries upon his 
enemy.68
3.5. Proportionality
The use of force in intensive excess is disproportionate, so self-defence does not 
apply. If the abovementioned conditions are met, the actor can nevertheless be 
excused. Proportionality demarcates the justifi cation from the excuse. It determines 
where self-defence ends and excess begins. The criterion is, as always, assessed 
normatively. Abstract guidelines are therefore hard to give. Depending on the 
circum stances, the use of deadly force against an unarmed aggressor can be propor-
63 Rb. Utrecht 24 June 2008, LJN: BD5317.
64 De Hullu 2006, pp. 307–308.
65 Hof Den Haag 25 February 2009, LJN:BH4016.
66 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 27.
67 See Rb. Amsterdam 6 March 2008, LJN:BC5916.
68 HR 13 June 2006, NJ 2006, 343.
Excuses
 431
tionate or disproportionate.69 The defendant can be justifi ed or excused. The line 
can become vague, allowing a lot of discretion to the court, which is criticized for 
giving rise to seemingly arbitrary judgments.70
The court can also hold that the force was so disproportionate that the defendant 
cannot be excused.71 In other words, proportionality also forms the upper limit of 
self-defence-excess. In the case where a senior man grabbed the defendant by the 
testicles, the defendant hit the man on the head with a heavy vase, as a result of 
which he died. The Dutch Supreme Court in effect held that the attack of the man 
may have caused the defendant to exceed the limits of what is proportional, but this 
was so disproportionate that it could not excuse.72
3.6. Partial defences in English law
Self-defence in an excusatory form is not available in England, which is remarkable 
when compared to other Anglo-American countries. For example, in Australia, 
excess used to be recognized as a partial defence, reducing murder to manslaughter. 
The excuse was deemed necessary to refl ect, in comparison to the ‘regular 
murderer’, the lesser degree of blameworthiness of the accused who, in order to 
defend himself against an attack, exceeds the amount of proportionate force 
required to avert the attack and thereby kills the aggressor.73 Nevertheless, the 
English Court of Appeal,74 the UK Privy Council75 and the House of Lords76 
considered the doctrine and explicitly rejected it. In 1987, the Australian High Court 
themselves rejected the doctrine, because it was too complex.77
The Australian High Court held that it remained open for the defendant to plead 
provocation, a defence discussed below, and secondly, that if the intent to kill or 
cause serious bodily harm was lacking, he can only be held liable for manslaughter, 
not murder. This reasoning was also adopted in England.78 If the second argument 
is understood as that intent can be negated by good motives, this must be rejected. 
Intent is neutral; the moral enrichment of intent should be rejected.79
In the case where the House of Lords rejected the availability of excess, a soldier 
shot three bullets at a car driving at high speed towards a control point, because he 
feared the car would hit one of his fellow soldiers. A fourth bullet hit and killed a 
69 HR 8 April 2008, NJ 2008, 233; Hof Arnhem 31 March 2009, LJN:BH9163; Hof Arnhem 21 May 
2008, LJN:BD2016 and Hof Leeuwarden 9 April 2009, LJN:BI2091.
70 Machielse 1986, p. 685 and Buruma 2005, pp. 445–446.
71 See, for example, 4 August 2009 BGH NStZ 2010, 82.
72 HR 8 April 2008, NJ 2008, 312.
73 Viro v. The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88. See Ormerod 2005, p. 342.
74 R. v. McInnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600.
75 R. v. Palmer [1971] AC 814.
76 R. v. Clegg [1995] UKHL 1.
77 Zecevic v. DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645. See Sangero 2006, pp. 298–302.
78 R. v. Clegg [1995] UKHL 1 and Law Commission 2004, p. 75.
79 See IV.2.4.1. and Kaye 1997, pp. 452–453.
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passenger of the car. It turned out however that he only shot this fourth bullet when 
the car had passed them, thus in a situation that no longer subjectively or reasonably 
qualifi es as one of self-defence. In Dutch law, this could be a situation of extensive 
excess. The question for the House of Lords was not whether excess could be excuse 
but whether excess should be recognized as a partial defence, reducing murder to 
manslaughter. This was rejected in favour of the English all or nothing approach of 
either justifying the actions of the accused under self-defence or not.80
Murder in English law is the unlawful killing of someone with an intention to 
cause death. The most serious form of homicide also includes the killing of someone 
with the mere intention to infl ict grievous bodily harm. Murder is punished with 
manda tory life imprisonment. Nowadays, life is no longer life, but the convicted 
person will in principle serve at least fi fteen years in prison.81 In cases where the 
victim dies as a result of disproportionate defensive force, the unavailability of 
excess thus brings about that the defendant receives a harsh sentence. To avoid this, 
the limits of proportionality in self-defence have been stretched relatively wide.
The circumstance that English law does not require the mistake in putative self-
defence to be reasonable can also be viewed in this perspective. The law allows 
such force to be used as is reasonable in the circumstances as the accused believed 
them to be, whether reasonably or not. If the defendant was ignorant that the attack 
ended, he is therefore acquitted for applying the force that would have been 
proportionate if he had been correct. In other words, this lenient approach on 
putative self-defence covers most cases of extensive excess. By holding that the 
disproportionate violence was a result of a misjudgement of the severity of the 
attack, courts can also include some cases of intensive excess.
In situations that exceed these stretched limits of self-defence, the defendant 
however only has two options to try to evade the life sentence, namely by pleading 
two partial defences that reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter.82 The fi rst of 
these defences that only apply to murder is called loss of control. Loss of control is 
the successor of provocation, which has concomitantly been abolished. The second 
partial defence to murder is diminished responsibility. Even though they do not 
negate criminal liability and only apply to murder, these partial defences perform a 
function comparable to excess and their conditions are similar to excess.
3.6.1. Loss of control
With the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the defence of provocation under section 3 
of the Homicide Act 1957 was replaced in October 2010 by the very similar defence 
80 R. v. Clegg [1995] UKHL 1.
81 Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. See Ashworth 2006, p. 253 and Law Commission 
2004, pp. 26–27.
82 The defences can also be legitimized from a more instrumental, crime control perspective, by 
considering that they also help to prevent jurors from acquitting altogether in hard cases, see 
Law Commission 2004, pp. 85–88.
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of loss of control.83 The old and new defence are therefore discussed simulta-
neously, whilst identifying the differences. The English Government by and large 
followed the Law Commission’s proposals regarding the reform of provocation. The 
term loss of control denotes best that the actor had enormous diffi culty in exercising 
self-control.84 The defence partially has the character of an excuse.85 It is a 
concession to human frailty, or even a moral warrant for retaliation in anger.86
The defence has been said to consist of two tests. A fi rst, subjective test requires 
that the killing was the result of loss of self-control, and the loss of self-control was 
caused by a qualifying trigger like an attack or a provocation. Just as in excess, a 
criterion of double causation applies.87 The new defence no longer uses the word 
provocation but narrowly lists as a possible ‘qualifying trigger’ thing(s) said or 
done which constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused 
the defendant to have a justifi able sense of being seriously wronged.88
The striking of the term ‘provocation’ already indicates that the defence has 
shifted away from partially condoning anger. The new defence excludes from it 
killing after losing one’s temper or outrage due to sexual infi delity. At the same 
time, it is broadened by including fear of serious violence infl icted by the victim on 
the defendant or someone else as a qualifying trigger of the loss of self-control.89 
The Law Commission had advocated this, in order to enable abused women and 
people who exercise excessive force in self-defence with a defence.90 Acting out of 
panic for (further) aggression thus seems to be the strongest evidence that the 
defendant should be able to rely on excess or loss of control in all three Member 
States.
The loss of self-control is a state of mind that leads the defendant to kill whereas 
this is disproportionate. Self-control can be described as a “faculty (…) that enables 
persons to do what they judge best in the face of strong inclinations to the 
contrary.”91 In order for the defence to apply, the provocation must have given rise to 
violent inclinations and it must have undermined the self-control, which would 
otherwise have refrained him from acting in that way. Like the emotion in excess, 
the loss of self-control must be very severe. In theory, the loss of self-control must be 
complete. A reduction is insuffi cient, which is what is meant when it is said someone 
83 Section 56(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
(Commencement No. 4, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2010.
84 Horder 1992, p. 161.
85 Holton & Shute 2007, p. 70; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 369 and Horder 2005, p. 124.
86 Horder 1992, pp. 20, 56, 160 and 194–195.
87 Holton & Shute 2007, p. 59.
88 Section 54(1)(b) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
89 Section 55(3), (4) and (5) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
90 Law Commission 2006, pp. 78 and 88–89. See also Holton & Shute 2007, pp. 72–73. In section 
59 of its Draft Criminal Code, the Law Commission 1989, p. 68 proposed to include excessive 
force as a separate partial defence alongside provocation.
91 Holton & Shute 2007, p. 55.
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‘snapped’.92 Just like the emotion in excess, rational or purposive behaviour 
and time in between the provocation and the killing can indicate there was no 
such loss of self-control or that is was not causal for the murder.93 Loss of self-
control is also inconsistent with motives of revenge or punishment.94 Just as in the 
Netherlands, (premeditated) revenge killings can be distinguished from provoked 
killings when “there had not been time for the blood to cool and for reason to resume 
its seat.”95
Nevertheless, it follows from case law that a delayed reaction does not always 
preclude the defence.96 Research has shown that despite clear indications of preme-
di tation or less severe forms of provocation, juries reached a verdict of man-
slaughter. This thus goes further than excess. One has to keep in mind however that 
a rejection of the defence would bring about the mandatory life sentence for murder. 
Especially if the defendant is a ‘battered woman’, who has been abused by the 
victim for years, the requirements of the defence were therefore stretched in order 
to be able to be more fl exible in sentencing.97 In the new defence, any temporal 
limitation has been struck.98
A second, more normative test requires that the loss of self-control was under-
standable, similar as in excess. The defence of provocation required that the provo-
cation must be enough to make a reasonable man do as the defendant did.99 The 
reaso nable man standard has been made more specifi c in the new defence of loss of 
control, predominantly by codifying case-law. It is presumed the provoked person 
normally has a certain level of self-control. The defendant is compared to the person 
of his sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the 
circum stances he was in.100 Persons who lack suffi cient self-control – such as a 
habitually aggressive or violent person – will not be able to avail themselves of the 
defence,101 just as they would not be able to rely on self-defence-excess if this was 
the main cause of the excessive use of force.
Just as in excess, there is only limited room to take into account individual 
characteristics. Factors that affect the gravity of the provocation can be relevant, but 
92 Holton & Shute 2007, pp. 51–58, 61–63 and 70–71 and Tadros 2005, p. 303.
93 Horder 1992, p. 68 and Horder 2005, p. 125. Compare R. v. Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932.
94 Section 54(4) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009; R. v. Ahluwalia [1992] EWCA Crim 1 and 
Holton & Shute 2007, p. 63.
95 Ashworth 2006, p. 265. In Dutch law, premeditation is usually accepted if the defendant had some 
time to refl ect on his intentions. If there was some time to refl ect, excess is automatically rejected, 
see Hof Arnhem 1 October 2008, LJN: BF3995 and Hof Amsterdam 21 April 2009, LJN:BI1783.
96 R. v. Ahluwalia [1992] EWCA Crim 1 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 355–356.
97 Horder 2006A, pp. 148–149; Horder 2005, pp. 123–125; Mitchell 2007 and Law Commission 
2006, pp. 80–81. The defence is even available if the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated, see 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 368 and Ormerod 2008, pp. 504–505.
98 Section 54(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009; Holton & Shute 2007, p. 64 and Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 355.
99 Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957.
100 Section 54(1)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
101 Holton & Shute 2007, pp. 58–60 and Ashworth 2006, p. 267.
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characteristics that affect the defendant’s level of self-control more generally are 
almost all irrelevant. An example of such a relevant factor is an impotent person 
who is being teased about his condition, or a black man being called a ‘nigger’.102 
Only gender and age are characteristics that may affect in law the defendant’s level 
of self-control.103 People who have less self-control because of some psychological 
or psychiatric condition will have to rely on the defence of diminished 
responsibility.104
The concept of killing in provocation is familiar to Dutch and German law too. 
In the Criminal Code that applied in the Netherlands before 1886, when the current 
Code entered into force, killing and the infl iction of injuries was excused if 
provoked by serious violence of another.105 When the current Dutch Code was 
drafted, provocation had originally been proposed as a mitigating factor, reducing 
the maximum penalty for intentional killing by half. Similar as the English defence, 
it was also perceived as a concession to human frailty and included a requirement 
of double causation.106 However, the Minister withdrew it after debate in Parliament, 
because the distinction between what was and what was not provocation remained 
too vague.107 Moreover, with the enactment of self-defence-excess, provocation 
became superfl uous for the most part.
As mentioned before, German law does include a rule on provoked killings, 
which mitigates the difference with the Dutch defence of excess that anger and 
other sthenic affects are excluded as causes of the excessive force. Paragraph 213 of 
the Criminal Code applies if the defendant killed because he was angered by the 
injuries or serious insults of the victim towards himself or a relative. In that case, 
the defendant can be punished with at least one and at most ten years of 
imprisonment. Similar as the English defence and self-defence-excess, it also 
includes a require ment of double causation108 and the provocation need not be the 
only factor to cause the state of mind.109 In contrast to excess, the provocation may 
102 DPP v. Camplin [1978] UKHL 2; Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] UKPC 23; Virgo 
2005, p. 533; Elvin 2006, p. 820; Tadros 2005, pp. 350–352 and Ashworth 2006, p. 273. This 
distinction is not always easy to make, as is evident in for example R. v. Mohammed [2005] 
EWCA Crim 1880, see Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 370.
103 Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] UKPC 23, codifi ed in Section 54(1)(c) of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, overruling R. v. Smith (Morgan) [2000] UKHL 49, which also 
allowed for depression to be taken into account.
104 Elvin 2006, pp. 828–829; Law Commission 2006, pp. 85–87 and Ashworth 2006, p. 271.
105 Article 321 of the Code reads: “Le meurtre, ainsi que les blessures et les coups sont excusables, 
s’ils ont été provoqués par des coups ou violences graves envers les personnes.” Machielse 1986, 
p. 678 called this a mitigating factor.
106 Smidt 1881AI, p. 429. In contrast, a complete loss of control was not required, but the affect 
should make it diffi cult for the defendant ‘to control his will.’
107 Smidt 1881AI, pp. 428–434 and Smidt 1881A, p. 380. See also Machielse 1986, pp. 609 and 637.
108 Eser 1981, p. 431.
109 14 July 1977 BGH NJW 1977, 2086.
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have happened at an earlier point in time. It has been held that a state of mind due to 
provocation can last for several hours.110
In comparison to English sentencing, German law also applies mandatory 
sentencing to homicide. This means that if §213 does not apply, the defendant who 
killed intentionally will at least be incarcerated for fi ve years and for life if the 
motives qualify the act as murder.111 However, §213 also applies to ‘an other wise 
less serious case of intentional killing.’ This broad category is designed for all those 
cases where another sentencing regime is warranted. It can be based on cases 
falling short of provocation or general defences, cases where the victim can be 
reproached in some way and even acting with mere conditional intent.112
3.6.2. Diminished responsibility
Just like loss of control, the major rationale for diminished responsibility is the 
mandatory life sentence for murder.113 It is however far less popular than loss of 
control, for it stigmatizes the defendant as not being sane. The defence is only a 
concession to abnormal human frailties.114 Even more important, the partial 
defence can have the paradoxical effect that the defendant can be deprived of his 
freedom for a longer period of time than when he had been convicted for murder. If 
the convicted person’s disorder is seen as a continuing threat for the public, he may 
be incarcerated for a very long time or institutionalized.115
The amended version of the defence, also in force as of October 2010, demands 
that the abilities to understand the nature of one’s conduct, to form a rational 
judgment and to exercise self-control are substantially impaired.116 Required is a 
recognized medical condition, which gives the experts opinion more weight than 
before.117 The scope of abnormality was and still is wider than that of insanity under 
English law.118 For example, included in the old and new version of the defence is 
110 Eser 1981, p. 431.
111 §§212 and 211 of the German Criminal Code respectively.
112 Schönke & Schröder 2010, note 1 on §213 and Eser 1981, p. 432. See, for example, the tragic 
case in 5 December 2007 BGH NStZ 2008, 338.
113 Ormerod 2008, p. 514 and Law Commission 2004, p. 85.
114 Horder 1992, p. 162.
115 See Law Commission 2006, pp. 95–96.
116 Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Law Commission 2006, pp. 102–103. The 
Law Commission’s proposal was only not followed in regard to their suggestion to include 
developmental immaturity as a ground for partial exculpation.
117 The infl uence of experts was already quite large, but it remains an issue for the jury. Consider 
that serial killer Peter Sutcliffe (the “Yorkshire Ripper”) was convicted of murder by the jury, 
notwithstanding the unanimous expert evidence on his paranoid schizophrenia. See Quick & 
Wells 2006, pp. 520–521.
118 Ormerod 2008, pp. 511–512 and Ashworth 2006, p. 278. See also Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), 
p. 192.
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also ‘irresistible impulse’.119 A test of double causation also applies. The defendant 
must have killed because his mental faculties were substantially impaired as a result 
of an abnormality of mental functioning due to a recognised medical condition. The 
abnormality need not be the predominant cause; it only needs to be an operative and 
more than trivial cause.120
The partial defence not only fi lls the gap left by the unavailability of excess. In 
English law, there also is no defence of partial insanity, or diminished capacity, as I 
call it.121 This all-or-nothing approach in insanity makes this partial defence relevant 
in homicide cases falling short of complete insanity. Diminished responsibility does 
not require that capacities are totally impaired, merely that they are substantially 
impaired.122 It can therefore be concluded that if English law would recognize partial 
insanity and excess, like German and Dutch law, there would be hardly any use 
anymore for diminished responsibility. Only in a few cases would the mandatory 
life sentence be perceived as a sentence that is too harsh in the circumstances.
To many English scholars and practitioners, the better solution would be to do 
away with the mandatory sentence altogether. After all, if it were not for the 
mandatory sentence, English courts could take into account the lesser reproach in 
mitigation. Both the limits of self-defence and the partial defences have been 
stretched to their limits to avoid the life sentence.123 In general, the more discretion 
the judiciary has in sentencing, the less it will feel necessitated to stretch legal 
principles.124 After all, in the end, any sentence imposed must be proportionate.125 
The partial defences have been dubbed a ‘half-hearted concession’ to the need to 
provide more fl exibility in senten cing because of the mandatory penalty for 
murder.126 If the mandate of the Law Commission had included a reconsideration of 
the mandatory sentence, its propo sals would have probably looked differently.127 
Law Commissioner Horder favoured the abolition of the manda tory life sentence 
for murder, and thus also the two partial defences.128
119 Ormerod 2008, p. 510; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 657–659 and Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), 
p. 202. Irresistible should not be taken literally in an absolute sense, see R. v. Byrne [1960] 3 All 
ER 1.
120 Virgo 2003, pp. 541–542.
121 See X.7.5.5.
122 Law Commission 2006, pp. 109–110.
123 Ashworth 2006, p. 263. Pleas of both partial defences falling short of acceptance may however 
be taken into account as mitigating factors under Schedule 21(11) of the Criminal Justice Act.
124 An example from German Law is the case where a former spy was charged with two murders. In 
order to avoid the mandatory sentence for principals, the Court held that the defendant was 
merely an aider of the KGB, who was the real principal, see Bohlander 2009, p. 162. The Dutch 
judiciary relatively has the most discretion, being only limited in the maximum punishment that 
can be imposed.
125 The principle of proportionate sentences is a general principle of EU law, laid down in 
article 49(3) CFR. Fixed penalties may violate this principle, see Klip 2012, p. 325.
126 See Horder 2005, pp. 139–140; R. v. Kingston [1994] UKHL 9 and Mitchell 2007, p. 341.
127 Power 2006, pp. 871–872.
128 Horder 2005, pp. 123–140. See also Horder 2006A, pp. 96–98 and Horder 1992, pp. 186–197.
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The partial defences thus only apply to murder. The defendant may however 
have exceeded the limits of defensive force also with less serious consequences. If 
the defendant uses disproportionate force against the aggressor, who as a result 
suffers serious injuries, the defendant cannot rely on any defence. On the one hand, 
this can be taken into account in sentencing, but on the other hand this fails to 
recognize that the blameless defendant may not be punished. If the defendant could 
not reasonably act differently than he did, it would violate the principle of guilt to 
convict him, even if his sentence is signifi cantly mitigated. The blameless may not 
be punished, and it would also be at odds with the principle of guilt to convict that 
defendant without punishing him. Criminal liability stigmatizes the blameless 
defendant as a criminal, as a murderer. For a general part of criminal law for the 
EU, the more principled approach of a general defence of self-defence-excess is 
therefore to be preferred.
4. DURESS
The availability of a defence of duress is the acknowledgment that there may be 
instances where the defendant was under such a pressure that he could not 
reasonably be expected to abide by the law. The defence has a strong normative 
component. The defendant must not only be unable to resist the pressure, neither 
should he resist that pressure.
Traditionally, these situations arise when the defendant was threatened that if he 
did not commit a certain offence, he or someone close to him, would be killed or 
serious ly injured. In practice, the defence is often raised against charges of perjury 
and against charges of collaborating in some way with (enemy) armed forces.129 
Duress can however also arise out of circumstances, similar as in necessi ty. 
Whereas the application of necessity implies that on an objective evalua tion of all 
things considered, the defendant did the right of permissible act, duress concerns 
agent-specifi c reasons for acting.130 The offence is merely excused because the 
committing of the wrongful offence by the defendant is understandable in the 
specifi c circumstances.
4.1. Rationale
The rationales for duress are manifold. Under a character-based rationale, the 
conduct in duress does not refl ect the personality of the actor.131 More often, duress 
is based on a general theory of capacity and choice, holding that the defendant could 
129 As far as the legal systems under investigation are concerned, the collaboration with armed 
forces generally concerns WWII. More modern cases can be found in international criminal 
law, see ICTY Judgment, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96–22-A Ch., 7 October 1997.
130 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254. See also Horder 1998, p. 160 and Bohlander 2006.
131 Dolman 2006, p. 151.
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not act differently in the situation.132 This is also called the rationale of 
psychological pressure. Duress concerns cases where the actor through external 
circumstances is abnormally coerced in his freedom to choose, as a result of which 
he cannot be expected to act in conformity with the norm. The abnormal 
psychological pressure negates the reproach of blame worthiness or diminishes this 
to an extent insuffi cient for punishment.133
It is often said that the pressure, arising from circumstances or threats, overbore 
the actor’s will. However, this is hardly ever the case. The choice must be coerced, 
but it remains voluntary.134 The relative pressure of duress brings about that the 
defen dant could not be expected to act differently. This is contrasted with the 
absolute pressure in for example involuntary acts, where the defendant could 
literally not act differently and is therefore said not to have acted at all. Threats of 
third parties could always be resisted, but to require so would imply that the law 
requires heroism from its subjects. It is therefore agreed that in duress, the ‘will’ 
remains free, but the motive is not free. Coactus attamen voluit.135 Literally: 
although I was forced, I wanted what I did.136 Related to this rationale is the view of 
the defence as a concession to human frailty in cases where virtually no one can be 
expected to act differently. The law cannot demand self-sacrifi ce or heroism from 
people.137
It is also argued that because the human urge to self-preservation is irresistible, 
the law cannot infl uence the defendant to act differently. Criminal law should not be 
applied against the person who will not be infl uenced by it. The threat of 
punishment will not be able to change the actor from acting differently, as was 
already illustrated by the example of the plank of Carneades. The actor will choose 
the possibility of a death penalty in the near future over a certain and imminent 
death. In other words, duress excuses the actor because special deterrence is 
ineffective against him. Punishment is also not expected to change the behaviour of 
others. Paradoxically, this implies that the stronger the temptation or pressure to 
commit a crime, the stronger the law’s threat should be in order to counter-
balance.138
This rationale is necessary to explain duress because the rationale based on 
choice or psychological pressure does not suffi ce. A single focus on the pressure on 
132 Ashworth 2006, p. 224 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 676.
133 Dolman 2006, p. 156; 26 April 1932 RGSt 66, 222; 11 November 1932 RGSt 66, 397; Bohlander 
2009, p. 123; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 701 and Roxin 2006, pp. 964–966 and 1014.
134 DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] UKHL 5; Ashworth 2006, p. 225; Horder 2006A, pp. 
90 and 95; Roxin 2006, pp. 965–966 and Dolman 2006, pp. 97–99 and 320.
135 Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on art. 40 and Remmelink 1996, p. 926.
136 Mulder in Groenhuijsen, Mulder & Remmelink 1992.
137 Bohlander 2009, p. 123 and Dolman 2006, p. 317.
138 Remmelink 1996, p. 298; Pompe (1928) in Kelk 2008A, p. 14; Roxin 2006, pp. 964–965; Krey 
2002, pp. 106–107; R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Finkelstein 2001, pp. 280–281; Fletcher 1998, 
p. 84; Fletcher 1978, p. 825; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 665 and Williams 1953, pp. 596 and 
600.
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the defendant fails to recognize the norma tive requirement of duress that the 
defendant should not have resisted the pressure. The rationale of psychological 
pressure does not explain why duress is limited or precluded in situations of prior 
fault, when the defendant has to bear a danger because of his (offi cial) position or 
when he made an avoidable mistake. A police offi cer may have been just as unable 
to resist the pressure as any other person. The psychological pressure in these 
situations is the same, regardless of whether the situation was actually present or 
only in the mind of the actor. Neither is the limitation of interests that can be saved 
logical from the perspective of this pressure.139
A middle ground, popular in Germany, explains excuses like duress by a double 
diminishment of blameworthiness. The blameworthiness of the defendant is not only 
diminished because he could reasonably not act differently, it is also diminished 
because the actor saves a legal interest. This saving limits or counterbalances the 
wrong of the offence and thereby indirectly the blameworthiness.140 It is supposed to 
explain some of the aforementioned features that could not be explained by a pure 
psychological rationale, but not all. Moreover, it suffers from some fallacies. For 
example, why should the so-called diminished wrong be assessed merely by 
reference to the interest the actor saves? It is very well possible that he has caused 
more harm by sacrifi cing a much more valuable interest.141
Like in necessity, the restricted scope of duress can also be explained by fear 
that a broader scope of compulsion defences may cause anarchy and erosion of the 
prohibitive norms.142 It is feared that the defence has great potential for abuse and 
runs counter to the goal of protection of the legal interests of innocents.143 It will 
become clear that these fears are particularly infl uential in England. They outweigh 
the aforementioned consideration that the urge to self-preservation is irresistible, as 
a result of which duress cannot apply to a charge of murder. In the Netherlands too, 
it can be said that the judiciary is very reluctant to accept the defence of duress, and 
that whereas it is raised quite often, it is hardly ever accepted.144
An additional fear is that by excusing the defendant, so-called ‘quasi-
justifi catory effects’ arise. There exists an important communicative difference 
between justifi ca tions and excuses. It is feared that the public does not always 
appreciate this. It is feared the public will interpret the excuse as a justifi cation, a 
judicial declaration that what the defendant did was right and that if others do this 
139 Roxin 2006, pp. 965–966, 972, 977–978, 987 and 1015–1016. See also Schönke & Schröder, H. 
2006, pp. 627–628 and 702.
140 Krey 2003, pp. 24–25. See also Roxin 2006, p. 966; Moos 2004, p. 898 and Schönke & Schröder, 
H. 2006, pp. 627–628 and 701.
141 Roxin 2006, pp. 966–967. The rationale should therefore assess whether the wrong is diminished 
by reference to both the served and sacrifi ced interest. This would also explain a proportionality 
requirement.
142 Sangero 2006, pp. 109, 119 and 162.
143 ICTY, Joint Separate opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case 
No. IT-96–22-A Ch., 7 October 1997, §75.
144 Kelk & Kool 2004A, p. 103.
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in the future, they will not be criminally liable. This fear is said to become realistic 
in recurring situations, like in medical contexts, considering that the medical 
profession tends to keep itself up to date on relevant legal developments.145
This fear played an important role in the case against Dudley and Stephens, 
which occurred in a time when ships still regularly perished in open water. It was 
feared that an acquittal for any reason would have been seen as a vindication of 
their cannibalism, with the risk that others sailors would believe they are allowed 
do the same. Thus, the men were convicted but granted a pardon.146 Against this, it 
can be argued that situations of duress are characterized by the fact that the actor is 
not infl uenced by the prohibition or its punishment. Neither is punishment said to 
have a general deterrent effect.147 It may be questioned whether the fear is 
legitimate, as the general public may very well understand the basic difference 
between a justifi cation and an excuse. This communicative difference is already 
encompassed in the wording of the two categories of defences. It can be emphasized 
by explicitly excusing the defendant or justifying the act, rather than simply 
acquitting him, as is the case in Dutch verdicts.148
In conclusion, duress can be explained by reference to varying rationales and 
perspectives. Duress consists of both a psychological and normative rationale, 
evident by the existence of a psychological and a normative limb in the Dutch 
concept of duress. The psychological pressure seems to be the most characteristic 
feature of duress; the most important reason to excuse the defendant. However, a 
normative aspect is also needed to fully comprehend the (limits of the) defence.
4.2. Sources
In article 8 of Directive 2011/36, a special form of duress is recognized. It excludes 
punishment of victims of traffi cking in human beings for offences which they have 
been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being traffi cked. In a more 
general form, duress is recognized in all legal systems under investigation. English 
law distinguishes two forms of duress; fi rst, duress by threats, also called duress 
per minas, which is duress in response to threats from another person and second, 
duress by circumstances, where the pressure to avert dire consequences arose from 
other than human conduct.149 Both are developed in case-law. An old-fashioned 
subcategory of duress under common law is marital coercion. It used to be a 
145 Gardner, S., 1986, pp. 431–434 and Fletcher 1978, pp. 824–825.
146 Gardner, S., 1986, pp. 434–436; Fletcher 2007, pp. 321–324 and Simpson 1984, in particular pp. 
240–241. The case is generally referred to in the context of necessity, but it is submitted that the 
claim of the Dudley and Stephens was in fact the excusatory claim of duress, see Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 719 and Fletcher 1973, p. 373.
147 The conviction of the defendant cannot encourage others, see Gardner, S., 1986, pp. 437–438.
148 An alternative would be to simply make the reasons for acquittal explicit in the judgment.
149 Ashworth 2006, p. 219; Ormerod 2005, pp. 297–298; Blackstone 1769 (reprint 1979), p. 30; 
Williams 1953, p. 592 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 666.
Chapter X
442 
presumption that any crime committed by a wife in the presence of the husband 
was done under coercion of the husband. At present, the wife has to prove this 
coercion, although moral and emotional pressures suffi ce.150 The Law Commission 
was right in recommending its abolition.151
The distinction of duress by threats and duress by circumstances was also made 
in German and Dutch law, although they are now both treated under the heading of 
duress. The pressure must arise from something external of the person, but this can 
be of human or other origin. Duress thus covers what in England is called duress by 
threats and duress by circumstances.152 In Germany, ‘Nötigungsnotstand’, similar 
to duress by threats, used to be a special defence in the old Criminal Code. It is still 
sometimes separated from other forms of ‘excusable necessity’ to emphasize that 
the actor is brought into distress by a third party. Both forms are however covered 
by the current provision on duress and therefore the same conditions apply.153
4.3. Criteria
On a fi rst glance, the national formulas of duress seem to differ, but it will become 
clear that the criteria of duress are quite similar in all Member States. The defendant 
committed the offence because he was impelled by an imminent danger or threat to 
impor tant legal interests, such as his life and limb. Therefore, he could not be 
expected to have acted differently. Like in other defences, prior fault and the special 
position of the defendant infl uences the scope of duress. So does proportionality, 
which places an upper limit on what offence can be excused in comparison to the 
threat.
Like self-defence-excess relates to self-defence, duress relates to necessity. The 
criteria of duress largely follow those of necessity. Some will be repeated shortly, 
but mostly only the differences will be highlighted. It has been submitted that the 
criteria are of less absolute application than in necessity, because duress only 
excuses the defendant,154 but it will become clear that some conditions are also 
stricter in the context of duress, like the role of prior fault.
The criteria of duress are therefore also discussed under two limbs of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. An alternative categorization would be to consider 
the conditions under a psychological and a normative limb. This is the dominant 
approach in the Netherlands, where it is argued that duress requires a pressure of 
150 Section 47 Criminal Justice Act 1925; Law Commission 1977, p. 18; Ashworth 2006, pp. 228–
229; Blackstone 1769 (reprint 1979), pp. 28–29 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 677–678.
151 Section 42(6) Draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, pp. 61 and 230 and Law Commission 
1977, pp. 17–18.
152 Dolman 2006, pp. 176–177 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 116 and 124–125.
153 Beulke 2008, pp. 153–154; Bernsmann 1996, pp. 180 and 187 and Roxin 2006, pp. 755–756. The 
Supreme Court also already held that both had the same rationale, see 11 November 1932 RGSt 
66, 397.
154 Kelk 2005, pp. 267 and 278.
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such a nature that the defendant could not resist it and neither should he have 
resisted it.155 Like in culpa, ‘could’ and ‘should’ denote a subjective and normative 
limb.156 The individual defendant is excused for committing the offence because he 
could not resist the pressure and a reasonable person in his shoes should have also 
not resisted, taking into account other normative factors such as his (offi cial) 
position and prior fault. In other words, the actor must have insuffi cient control to 
act differently and this lack of control must be caused by something that is generally 
accepted as such a cause.157
In England, a similar two-staged test is applied. The fi rst part of the direction on 
duress deals with the question whether the defendant was impelled to act as he did 
because of the fear that otherwise he would be seriously injured or killed. If that 
question is answered affi rmatively, the subsequent question is whether a ‘sober 
person of reasonable fi rmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant,’ would 
have also been impelled to commit the offence.158 By separating the issue in two 
stages, it is clear that after it has been established that the defendant could not resist 
the pressure, normative considerations enable the assessment of whether or not he 
also should not have resisted that pressure. In Germany, such a normative second 
stage is laid down in a test of what can legitimately be expected of the defendant. A 
difference is that in Germany, the (academic) focus of normative considerations is 
on duties to take the danger based on offi cial position or special relationships. The 
English focus on the yardstick of the reasonable person, more specifi cally which 
individual characteristics should be taken into account.
Against the categorization into a psychological and normative limb, it can be 
argued that it is too imprecise. After all, every excuse can be argued to consist of a 
psycho lo gical and normative part. For example, in self-defence-excess, the 
defendant must have also been pressured by the attack to commit the offence, while 
normative aspects give the excuse its limits. Secondly, it can also be argued that the 
normative question overshadows the psychological. For example, in German law 
there is a tendency to accept that the defendant could not resist the pressure if a 
threat was made to life and limb of a relative. In other words, when a special 
relationship between persons is established, the psychological pressure in concreto 
does not have to be established.159
It is also argued more in general, that for the defence to apply, it is only required 
to establish that the defendant should not have acted differently. After all, the defend-
ant literally ‘could’ always act differently. By contrast, the coercion needs to be 
 understandable, not absolute. For example, a woman was very ill and according to the 
155 HR 30 November 2004, NJ 2005, 94.
156 In culpa, the normal order is to assess fi rst what the actor should (not) have done. Subsequently, 
it is considered whether the individual defendant could meet this standard. In duress, the order is 
reversed.
157 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 23; Rozemond 2006, p. 77 and de Hullu 2006, p. 283.
158 R. v. Graham [1981] EWCA Crim 5 and Law Commission 2006, pp. 112–113.
159 Roxin 2006, p. 976 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 705.
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doctor, she should not be disturbed in her sleep, but the neighbour’s singing bird kept 
her awake. When the neighbour refused to take the bird in the house, the woman’s 
husband felt pressured to kill it. He could have acted differently, but the application of 
duress implies he should not have acted differently in these circumstances.160 In 
 conclusion, any categorization of criteria has its disadvantages and uncertainties. 
Regardless of which dichotomy is applied, debate is possible as to which category a 
criterion belongs. Like in self-defence and necessity, subsidiarity and proportional-
ity are distinguished here for analytical purposes.
4.4. Subsidiarity
Duress requires that the defendant could not be expected not to commit the offence 
because he was impelled by an imminent danger or threat to the life or limb of 
himself or persons close to him. This includes a lot of criteria. Successively, it will be 
discussed which interests can be protected under duress, which sources can trigger a 
pressure, what the relationship of this pressure should be with the offence and how 
imminent the threat, the danger, or better, the need to commit the offence must be. 
Then, the general requirements of adequacy and subsidiarity, already discussed in 
the context of necessity, will be discussed, after which normative limitations arising 
from special positions, relationships and prior fault will come to the fore.
4.4.1. Legitimate interests
Like in self-defence, two approaches can be taken as to the endangered interests 
that qualify for duress. Either the interests that can be protected under duress are 
limited or they are not. In England and Germany, the interests that may be protected 
are limited to the most serious ones. The danger that is averted must be directed 
against life, limb or personal liberty of the defendant or that of a relative or a person 
who is close to him. The narrowly defi ned enumeration of interests is explained by 
reference to its exceptional character, the fear of undermining the authority of the 
law and its psychological rationale, which presupposes that only the gravest threats 
can compel the defendant to break the law.161
Analogous extension to other interests has been rejected: a threat to property or 
reputation is insuffi cient. The interests must determine the physical existence of the 
human. Obviously, threats to life qualify; the scope of ‘limb’ is up for more debate. 
Usually it is argued the threat should be one of serious physical injury.162 Some 
160 Dolman 2006, pp. 185 and 189 and van Bemmelen 1955, pp. 149–152.
161 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Ormerod 2005, p. 298; Bohlander 2009, pp. 123–124; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 702 and Roxin 2006, p. 972.
162 Law Commission 2006, p. 113 and Fischer, T. 2009, p. 314. Psychological interferences are 
excluded, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 702, even if this is understood to be (grievous) 
bodily harm under the English Offences Against the Person Act 1861, see Ormerod 2005, p. 298.
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even submit this must be comparable to a threat to life.163 Others are more lenient, 
arguing that the danger to the bodily integrity may not be minor, which would the 
case when the threat constitutes a simple blow.164 Infringements or threats thereof 
to physical freedom can also give rise to duress in Germany. However, lawful 
infringements on this freedom need to be countered with legal alternatives. In the 
absence or exhaustion of legal remedies, the infringement needs to be taken.165
The threat must be directed against the defendant personally, his family, 
someone close to him or a person for whom he has responsibility or for whom the 
situation makes him responsible.166 The group of persons ‘close to the actor’ seems 
more limited in Germany by focusing on a lasting and current relationship, similar 
to relatives. Close friends, colleagues, neighbours and the ex-girlfriend are therefore 
excluded.167 From the perspective of the psychological rationale, this limitation 
seems un warran ted. Whereas blood is thicker than water, a person may be more 
compelled to save his best friend than the family member he never met. In fact, one 
may also be compelled to save other persons, and the law should not discourage 
citizens from helping each other. What if persons threaten that they will seriously 
injure children if the defendant does not comply with their demands? It would be 
very understandable if the defendant were to succumb to the threat, even if he did 
not know the children personally. In my opinion, duress should not be precluded in 
such cases.168
The contrary approach is not to exclude any interests from being protected under 
duress a priori, but to limit the scope of the defence through the other conditions, 
such as proportionality. The most popular approach in the Netherlands is to fi rst 
consider the subjective impression of the threat to the actor. In contrast to its French 
roots, duress in Dutch law is no longer limited to the threat of specifi c legal 
interests.169 It is clear however that the more serious and personal the nature of the 
threat, the more likely the actor could in fact not resist. Secondly, the subsequent 
normative question is whether the defendant should have resisted. The defendant 
will therefore also not be excused for committing a serious offence if he was 
compelled to do so due to mere moral pressure.170
163 Bohlander 2009, p. 124 and Beulke 2008, p. 151.
164 11 November 1932 RGSt 66, 397; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 702 and Roxin 2006, p. 973.
165 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 702–703 and Roxin 2006, pp. 973–975. Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale in DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] UKHL 5 was uncertain whether 
‘unjustifi ed imprisonment’ should be included in duress.
166 Ashworth 2006, pp. 221–222; Ormerod 2005, p. 300; Law Commission 2006, p. 113; Simester & 
Sullivan 2007, p. 673; Fokkens & Machielse, note 2 on art. 40; Beulke 2008, p. 151 and Fischer, 
T. 2009, p. 314.
167 Roxin 2006, pp. 975–976 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 705.
168 Compare the case discussed by Tieks 2012, pp. 74–77.
169 Originally, the danger or threat also needed to concern the defendant or persons close to him, 
see Fokkens & Machielse, notes 2 and 17 on art. 40. As a result, the emphasis is on the intensity 
of the effect of the pressure, like fear or desperation, on the defendant.
170 Dolman 2006, pp. 97–99, 177–178, 187, 191 and 320–321.
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Hence, the difference between the two approaches is mitigated, just as in self-
defence. There will hardly be a difference in outcome.171 Even if the object of the 
threat easily qualifi es as a legitimate interest, the defence can still be rejec ted under 
the limb of proportionality or normative considerations regarding sub si diarity. Like 
in English and German law, the defendant can for example be required to resist the 
threat that his leg will be broken as this not necessarily compels the reasonable 
person to kill.172 In all legal systems, the rule is that the more serious the crime 
coerced to commit, the more irresistible the threat needs to be.173
It is therefore unwarranted to fear that this approach will lead to the acquittal of 
the defendant in cases where this is unacceptable. By contrast, there may be 
instances where the application of duress is warranted, but impossible because the 
threat does not relate to life or limb. Only this approach enables the excusing of the 
defendant who was threatened that an object of great personal value, like a painting 
of his deceased mother, would be destroyed if he did not assist in stealing a large 
diamond. Not excluding legal interests from the defence a priori enables fl exibility 
and fair outcomes. The approach emphasizes the mutual relationship between the 
different conditions, which is also clear in other defences, and aligns it closer to its 
cognate necessity.
The approach also does justice to the essence of duress and excuses. Duress is 
about the irresistibility to withstand the pressure. It is not the danger itself that 
amounts to duress, but the impression it makes on the actor. He is excused because 
the threat of punishment could not change his conduct. By allowing any legitimate 
interest to be protected by duress, we correctly focus on the psychological pressure 
the threat has on the defendant. Excuses in general also deal with the question what 
could be expected of this specifi c defendant, not with an average citizen. Duress is 
not limited to what most people would consider irresistible forms of coercion, but 
tailored to the specifi c defendant. The fact that normative considerations put a limit 
to the extent in which the norm can be modifi ed to the specifi c defendant does not 
change this, whereas these normative conditions make sure that, all things 
considered, the defendant made a choice for which he cannot be blamed.
4.4.2. Source of the danger
The threat or danger need not originate from human action necessarily; it can also 
originate from objects or nature.174 The pressure need not be actual force or the 
threat thereof. Circumstances can also amount to an irresistible pressure.175 Any 
force, urge, threat or pressure to which a legal subject cannot offer resistance 
171 See the illustrations of Tieks 2012, pp. 67–70.
172 Ormerod 2005, p. 299; Roxin 2006, p. 973 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 702.
173 R. v. Abbott [1977] AC 755 and Horder 2006A, p. 95.
174 Bohlander 2009, pp. 124–125; Beulke 2008, p. 152; Roxin 2006, p. 969; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 314 
and Dolman 2006, pp. 177 and 318.
175 Dolman 2006, p. 318.
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suffi ces.176 In the past, Dutch and German law distinguished between the defendant 
who was coerced by another person and the defendant who acted under circum-
stances that arose outside of human conduct.177 As noted, English law still distin-
guishes duress by threats from duress by circumstances by the origin of the 
pressure.
The two forms of duress in English law have the same conditions, save for the 
so-called condition of nomination. In contrast to duress by circumstances, the threat 
must be aimed at coercing the defendant to commit a particular offence. Robbing a 
bank would for example not qualify under duress by threats if the defendant was 
merely coerced to pay back money by a notorious criminal, who threatened to kill 
him if he would not pay within a specifi c timeframe.178 Others argue that 
nomination should not be a requirement.179 The fact that the nature of the source is 
no longer relevant in the Netherlands and Germany can explain why nomination 
also appears to be irrelevant.
Still relevant in all Member States however, is the condition that the pressure 
should originate from an extraneous source. Any coercion that arises from 
characteristics of the defendant himself does not qualify for duress.180 For example, 
the defendants who were having suicidal thoughts because of their imprisonment 
were not excused for breaking out of prison.181 In another case, by contrast, the 
defendant broke the law because of fear that his wife would otherwise commit 
suicide. Duress was accepted because the suicidal tendencies were external to the 
defendant.182
In a European context, the concept of force majeure also only applies to 
“circumstances, extraneous to the operator concerned.”183 Circumstances are 
hardly ever extraneous because they need to be outside the actor’s control in a 
material or physical sense or otherwise situated outside his sphere of 
responsibility.184 For example, in one case, a substantial amount of oil had been lost 
by a broken pipeline and could not be retrieved. Article 14 of Directive 1992/12 
allows for the exemption of excise duties for mineral oils that have gone lost as a 
result of, inter alia, force majeure. Given the fact that the company had control over 
the pipelines, the AG held that force majeure would probably not apply, leaving this 
for the national judge. The ECJ held that, although the fact that an undertaking is 
176 Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on art. 40.
177 Roxin 2006, p. 969 and Dolman 2006, pp. 176–177.
178 Ashworth 2006, p. 220 and Ormerod 2005, p. 305. In contrast, the coercion to commit a robbery 
would be specifi c enough; it need not specify what bank.
179 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 669.
180 Ormerod 2005, p. 301; Law Commission 2006, p. 113; Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 305–306; Roxin 
2006, p. 1007; Holland 1989, pp. 265–267; Dolman 2006, p. 323 and Mevis 2006, pp. 620–621.
181 R. v. Andrew Rodger and Keith John Rose [1997] EWCA Crim 1760.
182 R. v. Martin (Colin) [1988] EWCA Crim 2.
183 18 December 2007, Case C-314/06, Société Pipeline Méditerranée et Rhône [2007] ECR I-12273, 
§23.
184 Idem, §40.
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responsible for an installation does not rule out force majeure, the defence would 
probably fail because of the lack of due diligence in supervising and checking the 
safety of the pipelines.185
Regardless of some exceptions, existential urges of consciousness and doctrinal 
persuasions can therefore only be acknowledged as excuses sui generis.186 In 
Germany, defendants will not be punished for acts of conscience under article 4 of 
the Constitution that holds the freedom of faith and conscience as inviolable.187 In 
the Netherlands, appeals to necessity or duress are often accompanied or substituted 
by the claim that a conviction for an offence of for example insulting someone 
would violate the freedom of speech under article 10 ECHR.188
The external condition also brings about that overreactions as a result of physical 
or mental disorders cannot qualify as duress and can only be accepted within the 
framework of insanity.189 For example, in a seemingly typical case of battered 
women syndrome, the defence was rejected as the defendant was judged partially 
insane.190 However, duress is also accepted in cases where the psychological 
condition of the defendant is an important cause of the offence. In two similar 
cases, the son had been involved in the killing of his tyrant father. Both defendants 
were excused under duress. The fi nding that the defendants neither could nor should 
have acted differently was partially grounded in the personality of the defendants as 
a result of years of abuse.191
Like in self-defence-excess, there must be a causal connection between the 
external event and the pressure, as well as between the pressure and the offence.192 
The actor committed an offence because he could not reasonably resist the pressure 
and this lack of control must be caused by something that is generally accepted as 
such a cause.193 The cases above can be explained by the rule, similar as in excess, 
that as long as any internal condition does not overshadow the external cause of 
coercion, duress can be accepted.194 The pressure in duress often consists of a 
185 Idem, §37 and the opinion of AG Kokott of 18 July 2007.
186 Dolman 2006, p. 209; Strijards 1987, pp. 89–91; Holland 1989, p. 287 and Roxin 2006, p. 1007. 
As an exception, duress was accepted to the charge of insulting the Crown Prince in Hof 
Amsterdam 29 March 2004, NbSr 2004, 161. The defendant felt coerced to direct attention to the 
possible role played by the Prince’s future father-in-law during the military regime in Argentina.
187 Roxin 2006, p. 1007 and 20 December 1960 BVerfGE 12, 45.
188 Rejected in Hof Amsterdam 29 March 2004, NbSr 2004, 161, see above, where duress was 
accepted. The claim of a violation of art. 10 ECHR was accepted in Hof Amsterdam 28 April 
2011, LJN:BQ2981.
189 Strijards 1987, pp. 94–95 and Dolman 2006, p. 181. For example, kleptomania is rejected as a 
psychological pressure in Hof Arnhem 13 March 2009, LJN:BH6016.
190 Kelk 2005, p. 272.
191 Rb. Maastricht 20 February 2001, NbSr 2001, 299 and Hof Amsterdam 26 September 2000, NJ 
2000, 746. See also Hof Den Bosch 18 February 2009, LJN:BH3824.
192 Strijards 1987, pp. 91–93 and Nieboer 1991, p. 268.
193 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 23 and Rozemond 2006, pp. 76–77.
194 R. v. Z. [2003] EWCA Crim 191; Ormerod 2005, pp. 301–302; Law Commission 2006, p. 114 
and HR 13 June 1989, NJ 1990, 48.
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combination of internal and external factors.195 In addition, it is possible to view the 
conduct of the victims above as the external cause of the internal malfunctioning.
The condition of the external cause is also put into perspective by taking into 
account individual characteristics of the defendant in assessing duress. Since duress 
is about a pressure which the defendant reasonably could and should not resist, he is 
compared to the reasonable person. The question is what can reasonably be required 
of the defendant and to what extent he should have resisted the urge to commit the 
offence charged. First of all, the pressure need not be absolute or insurmountable. 
The defendant is not compared to the diligentissimus pater familias or persons of 
special virtue: heroism is not required.196 Instead, the defendant is merely compared 
to ‘a sober person of reasonable fi rmness, sharing the characteristics of the 
defendant.’197
Certain characteristics of the defendant should be taken into account when 
assessing whether or not he should have resisted the pressure. In England, 
characteristics such as pregnancy, age, gender and even ‘recognized’ mental disorders 
are taken into account.198 In the Netherlands, age also limits what can legitimately be 
expected of a person. The case where a 17-year old boy was being sexually abused by 
an older man is often mentioned. He wanted to end the abuse when he got a girlfriend, 
but the man wanted to hear nothing about it and threatened to tell his parents. In 
despair, the boy attacked the man with an axe, seriously injuring him. He was 
excused on grounds of duress, taking into account the childlike nature of the boy.199 
Besides age, the Dutch judge takes into account the defendant’s education, 
personality, societal status, development and so on.200
On the other hand, the external cause condition and the standard of the 
reasonable person militate against modifying this person with too many individual 
charac teristics. It has been argued that reasons for (overre)acting that lie in the 
personality of the defendant, such as a timid, susceptible or vulnerable character 
should be exclu ded as internal sources and dealt with by insanity.201 Thus, charac-
195 Holland 1989, pp. 267–268 and 272–273 and 278; Kelk 2005, pp. 264 and 269–272.
196 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 677; Ormerod 2005, p. 310; de Hullu 2009, pp. 293–294; Dolman 
2006, pp. 97–99 and Kelk 2005, p. 266.
197 R. v. Graham [1981] EWCA Crim 5.
198 R. v. Bowen [1996] EWCA Crim 1792; Ashworth 2006, p. 221; Ormerod 2005, pp. 307–308 and 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 671.
199 Rb. Rotterdam 3 April 1941, NJ 1941, 665, mentioned in Kelk 2005, p. 268 and Holland 1989, 
p. 259.
200 HR 6 December 2011, LJN:BR1146; Strijards 1987, pp. 93–94; de Hullu 2006, p. 284 and 
Dolman 2006, p. 193.
201 R. v. Bowen [1996] EWCA Crim 1792; Ashworth 2006, p. 221; Ormerod 2005, pp. 307–308; 
Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 671 and Dolman 2006, pp. 178, 181 and 319. In contrast, Stam & 
ten Voorde 2009 argue in favour of more room to take into account disorders, like post-traumatic 
stress disorders into duress.
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teristics, which bear on the defendant’s capacity to withstand duress, including 
mental disorders, increasingly tend to be excluded.202
4.4.3. Imminent danger
The concept of danger and its imminence are almost identical to those in 
necessity.203 Again, it is not so much about the imminence of the danger as about 
the imminence of the need to act. Even if the threat will not be executed 
immediately, the need to commit the offence can be imminent, like when the 
defendant was coerced to give false evidence in trial. The danger was present at the 
time the defendant had to testify.204 The imminence requirement is lenient because 
it is directly related to the question whether or not alternatives were open to the 
defendant. If the threat is not reasona bly expected to be carried out immediately or 
almost immediately, it can be argued that the defendant could have taken evasive 
action like getting offi cial help.205 For example, in cases where the defendant was 
the victim of domestic abuse, duress is usually rejected, not because the danger was 
not imminent, but because alternatives have not been used.206
4.4.4. No other means of aversion
The criminal offence must be capable of ending the danger and at the same time, be 
the least intrusive means. The conditions are similar to those in necessity.207 It is 
not required that the defendant is certain the danger will be ended by committing 
the offence, but it should be capable of ending the danger, because one should 
reconcile oneself to the inevitable.208 Secondly, the defendant’s actions must 
constitute the least intrusive means of all alternatives. There must have been no 
evasive action the defendant could reasonably take, such as going to the authorities. 
For example, the person who is threatened by death not to testify against a criminal 
can attempt to receive offi cial protection. When the danger can only be averted by 
interferences with interests of third parties, the lightest should be chosen and they 
202 As proposed by the Law Commission 2006, pp. 129–130. Ormerod 2005, p. 308 signals a move 
towards the proposal of the Law Commission. See also R. v. Bowen [1996] EWCA Crim 1792: 
“In most cases it is probably only the age and sex of the accused that is capable of being 
relevant.”
203 Bohlander 2009, p. 124; Beulke 2008, p. 152 and Roxin 2006, pp. 969–970.
204 R. v. Hudson and Taylor [1971] EWCA Crim 2 and 5 March 1954 BGHSt 5, 371. See also 15 May 
1979 BGH NJW 1979, 2053.
205 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Law Commission 2006, p. 113; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 669; 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 703 and 712; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 314; Hof Den Bosch 20 June 
2001, NbSr 2001, 230 and de Hullu 2006, p. 283.
206 12 July 1926 RGSt 60, 318 and 25 March 2003 BGHSt 48, 255.
207 21 May 2005 BGH NStZ 1992, 487; Bohlander 2009, p. 125; Beulke 2008, p. 152 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 703.
208 Roxin 2006, p. 966; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 706 and Dolman 2006, p. 191.
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should only go as far as necessary. For example, the defendant can also refuse to 
testify rather than to commit perjury.209
The question of what alternatives the defendant should have used is infl uenced by 
the question of how promising the means were. If one’s life or limb is endangered, 
the defendant should not be reproached for using the more promising means. 
Moreover, alternatives have in practice proven not to always be effective. For 
example, in case of domestic abuse, the police cannot always help, a woman might 
be reluctant to leave her children and the abuser sometimes fi nds the victim in a 
woman’s refuge centre.210 Only if there truly was no alternative at all, it can be said 
that the defendant could not act differently. However, this is not required. Duress is 
not vis absoluta, it is vis compulsiva. It is only required that there was no reasonable 
alternative.
The duty and possibility to investigate alternatives depends on the nature of the 
offence. The more serious the offence one is coerced to commit, the more the actor 
should carefully weigh alternatives.211 This also depends on the severity of the 
danger. The less severe the danger, the more the actor should be diligent in trying to 
fi nd another way out.212 The circumstances of the deliberation are important, such 
as the available time to refl ect, and the question whether this could be done in 
peace. The yardstick is what a reasonable person could be asked to do. Reasonable 
short comings or mistakes in the duty to test alternatives are covered by duress, not 
puta tive duress.213
Consider the case where a person woke up in the middle of the night to see two 
people he vaguely knew in the process of killing the owner of the house. Terrifi ed 
they would kill him too, he complied with their demand to become part of the 
killing and strangled the man. The coercers had thought this would prevent him 
from talking to the police, but he did in fact report it to the police. As it was 
uncertain who killed the man, he was convicted for attempted killing. The German 
Supreme Court however quashed the decision. It held that the coerced person 
generally has a duty to evaluate to the best of his ability all alternatives in order to 
apply the least intrusive. Even stricter tests are required when the infringement of 
an interest is very serious. However, in extreme cases, such a careful test cannot be 
required. It is essential whether the actor had the opportunity to contemplate and 
whether alternatives are very likely to come to mind or in contrast, did not come up 
at all. The Court took into account that the defendant was still intoxicated, just like 
the attackers, which also implied a greater danger towards the defendant. He found 
himself surprised in an extremely threatening situation. In exceptional cases, the 
209 26 April 1932 RGSt 66, 222. Compare 5 March 1954 BGHSt 5, 371 and R. v. Hudson and Taylor 
[1971] EWCA Crim 2.
210 Roxin 2006, pp. 970–972 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 309–310.
211 29 March 1963 BGHSt 18, 311 and Roxin 2006, p. 971.
212 Beulke 2008, p. 152.
213 Beulke 2008, p. 154; R. v. Graham [1981] EWCA Crim 5; Ormerod 2008, p. 329 and Ashworth 
2006, p. 222.
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actor may be required to risk his own life, but not in this case where the life of the 
victim would have probably also been lost if the defendant had refused to carry out 
the demanded act.214
Just like in necessity, there can be situations where the defendant has to take the 
danger even if the offence is the least intrusive or only means of avoiding the 
danger. Again, this includes situations in which the legislator already foresaw the 
danger and created limited room for exceptions to the prohibition, for example by 
means of an exemption procedure. It also includes situations in which legal 
remedies were to no avail. For example, the defendant may not use force to end the 
unlawful deprivation of freedom by public offi cials.215 These normative consi-
derations are explicitly positioned as an aspect of subsidiarity in Germany under the 
heading of ‘Zumutbarkeit’. They are taken into account to assess whether the 
offence was necessary or that he could be required to act in conformity with the 
violated norm. It ‘can legitimately be expected’216 of someone to take the danger if 
he caused the danger himself or if it arose out of a special legal relationship or 
duty.217
There may be other situations where the defendant has to take the danger. The 
defendant may be under a legal obligation to suffer the danger. This is usually based 
on a position or offi ce, which requires the subject to protect individuals and the 
common good, such as police and fi remen, doctors, sailors, and so on.218 The 
dangers one is required to take must be related to the profession or duties of the 
actor.219 The exact scope of the obligation must be found through reference to the 
purpose of the respective offi ce, in other words, the interest that the offi ce protects 
and the dangers typically concerned with its exercise. There is no general duty iden-
ti cal to all these positions.220 Moreover, the actor is not required to accept lethal or 
life-threatening harm, even if the danger is specifi c to the offi ce. Dangers that go 
above and beyond what could be expected and which sacrifi ce is grossly 
disproportionate in relation to the saved interest are not to be taken. Heroism is 
never required. The restriction requires a duty to accept dangers, but not to 
consciously sacrifi ce one’s life.221
214 21 May 1992 BGH NStZ 1992, 487.
215 Roxin 2006, p. 980 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 703 and 709–710.
216 Compare Dressler in Shute & Simester 2002, p. 278: “The defence of duress requires us to 
determine what conduct we (…) may legitimately expect of our fellow threatened humans.”
217 §35(1) second sentence of the German Criminal Code; Beulke 2008, p. 152; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 704–706 and Roxin 2006, p. 971.
218 Bohlander 2009, p. 127–128; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 316; Roxin 2006, p. 979 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 708–709.
219 14 June 1938 RGSt 72, 246; Roxin 2006, p. 980 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 709.
220 Bohlander 2009, pp. 127–128 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 709.
221 Roxin 2006, p. 980; Bohlander 2009, p. 125; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 709 and Dolman 
2006, pp. 204–205. Fischer, T. 2009, p. 316 and Pawlik 2004, p. 1053 exclude the soldier; he can 
be required to sacrifi ce his life.
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A similar duty to take the danger can also be grounded in familiar relationships, 
such as those of a husband towards his wife and children. It can also follow from 
joint risky ventures and resistance groups in totalitarian states.222 During WWII, a 
mem ber of the Dutch resistance was coerced to give up several of his co-members, 
who died in imprisonment. If he would not help the occupiers, two children would 
be tortured. Although more could be expected of him, the pressure was accepted as 
that he could and should not have acted differently.223
It has become clear that the scope of a defence can be extended as well as limited 
by modifying the yardstick of the reasonable person through the taking into account 
of individual characteristics of the defendant. We expect less from the victim of 
domestic violence than from a police offi cer.224 Apparently, the focus in German 
law is on such characteristics that limit duress, whereas in English and Dutch law, 
relatively more attention is paid to those features that extend the scope of what 
could be required of the defendant.
4.4.5. Prior fault
A duty to take the danger can also be grounded in prior fault. In England, this is 
usually discussed in the context of people joining a criminal enterprise or becoming 
indebted to drug dealers who have a violent reputation. As a rule, duress is 
precluded when, because of the voluntary association with criminals, the defendant 
foresaw or should have been able to foresee the risk of being subjected to any 
compulsion by threats of violence.225 It used to be required that the foresight or 
foreseeability of coercion related to the crime of the type with which he is charged 
or an offence of the same or similar character.226 Later however, any compulsion 
was held to suffi ce, further limiting the scope of duress under the infl uence of the 
public policy argument that association with criminals should be discouraged and 
that people in criminal organizations should not benefi t from the defence.227
In Germany, a strict approach also seems to be taken. After all, the law explicitly 
states that prior fault brings about that the actor should take the danger, leaving 
open only the possibility of mitigation. The person who shot a border guard when 
he was caught attempting to fl ee the GDR was not excused under duress, because 
he could foresee the danger he got himself into by attempting to fl ee whilst being 
222 Roxin 2006, p. 985; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 710–711 and Dolman 2006, pp. 204–205.
223 De Hullu 2006, pp. 284–285.
224 Mevis 2006, p. 620 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 6 on art. 40.
225 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 and R. v. Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 1726. See Ashworth 2006, 
p. 223; Ormerod 2005, p. 304 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 672. See also ICTY, Separate 
and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96–22-A Ch., 
7 October 1997, §§16 and 50.
226 R. v. Baker and another [1999] EWCA Crim 913 and R. v. Z. [2003] EWCA Crim 191. See also 
Law Commission 1977, pp. 13–14.
227 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Leverick 2006, p. 11 and Ormerod 2005, pp. 341–342. Criticized 
as “unacceptably wide” by Ibbetson 2005, p. 531.
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armed.228 However, it can be deduced from German case-law that not all forms of 
prior fault will preclude the defence. When comparing the situations where the 
courts required the defendant to suffer the danger to himself with the situations that 
were held to be outside of what could legitimately expected of the defendant, the 
pattern that is to be discerned, is that duress is more likely to be rejected if the 
defendant is in some way involved in the origin of the danger or collaborated with 
the source of the danger, such as joining a criminal organization.229 The mere 
causing of a danger does not suffi ce to preclude duress. This causing must in some 
way be blameworthy or unreasonable, or else the person who gives an incriminating 
testimony would also have to bear the ensuing threats by the persons affected by 
it.230
Some German scholars differentiate, holding that the intentional causing of a 
situation of duress will preclude the defence, whereas in lesser forms of prior fault, 
the specifi c circumstances of the case matter, such as the degree of the fault, the 
danger and the consequences of the offence. Dutch law also takes such a nuanced 
approach.231 As was accepted already in the context of self-defence, prior fault is 
nowadays treated in Dutch law as a corrective mechanism that may, but need not 
preclude the defence.232 It is only assessed after the other conditions of duress have 
been established. For example, the defendant had gone to the house of her 
ex-boyfriend, who had left her for someone else. When a fi ght broke out, she took a 
knife and killed him. The Dutch Supreme Court quashed the rejection of the 
defence based on prior fault, submitting that this reasoning did not preclude that she 
had acted under duress.233
This approach to assess the legal consequence of prior fault according to the 
degree of the fault and all the circumstances of the case is most consistent with the 
effect of prior fault in the context of other defences. It also fi ts in best with treating 
prior fault under the criterion of what can legitimately be expected of the defendant, 
like in German law. In the end, that question also takes into account all 
circumstances.234 The scope of prior fault in English law neglects important 
normative distinctions, again because of fears of sending the wrong message. There 
is no reason to assume the nuanced approach will have that consequence.
228 6 July 2000 BGH NJW 2000, 3079.
229 Bohlander 2009, pp. 125–126.
230 Bohlander 2009, pp. 126–127; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 707 and Roxin 2006, pp. 981–
982. Beulke 2008, p. 152 argues that the conduct that gives rise to the danger must be objectively 
wrongful.
231 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 707–708. HR 9 June 1987, NJ 1988, 318; HR 13 June 1989, NJ 
1990, 48; HR 10 October 1995, NJ 1996, 356 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 9 on art. 40.
232 In many trials following WWII, the prior fault of joining the enemy armed forces precluded the 
availability of a defence for orders given afterwards.
233 HR 13 June 1989, NJ 1990, 48; HR 30 November 2004, NJ 2005, 94; Kelk 2005, p. 282; de Hullu 
2006, pp. 295–296 and 330 and Rozemond 2006, pp. 77–80 and 151.
234 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 315.
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4.5. Proportionality
Duress can excuse the actor who saved his life at the expense of multiple lives. 
Duress can also excuse the actor who killed to prevent serious bodily injury. A 
strict test of proportionality therefore does not seem to be required. Necessity 
requires the evil avoided to be considerably greater or at least clearly greater than 
that infl icted, whereas duress merely requires that the offence is not disproportionate 
to the threat averted. Duress does not require that the defendant did the right thing: 
his actions merely need to be understandable. On the other hand, some 
proportionality is required because of the normative character of duress and the 
general preventive goals of punishment it is said to uphold. For example, killing in 
order to prevent reparable bodily injury cannot be excused.235
Duress and necessity on the one hand, and self-defence and self-defence-excess 
on the other hand, are distinguished by proportionality. The use of force that went 
beyond the degree necessary to avert a wrongful attack can be excused under self-
defence-excess. Cases that are not covered by necessity due to a disproportionate 
relationship between the sacrifi ced and the saved interest can be excused under 
duress. In essence, both defences excuse the defendant because he could not be 
expected to restrain himself. In self-defence-excess this is due to a wrongful attack. 
In duress, this is due to the threat or circumstances.236 Secondly, both duress and 
self-defence-excess are limited by placing an upper limit on proportionality. When 
the use of force or aversive measures goes beyond this upper limit, the wrongful 
attack or pressure can only be taken into account in sentencing.
An important difference is that the justifi cation of self-defence, like the excuse 
duress, also merely requires that the use of force is not disproportionate. The excuse 
of self-defence-excess can even apply to disproportionate responses to wrongful 
attacks. In terms of disproportionate conduct, more can therefore be excused under 
self-defence-excess than under duress. The difference is explained by the fact that 
in self-defence, the force is directed against the source of the wrongful attack, not a 
third party. Secondly, by defending an individual legal interest, the legal order is 
defended too.
It is generally accepted that duress is an excuse.237 The actor has not served the 
clearly prevailing interest. The interference is not lawful or socially useful but 
socially harmful and wrongful.238 Controversy on the categorization of duress can 
be explained by the fact that in case-law, the distinction between necessity and 
235 Ormerod 2005, p. 324; Law Commission 1993, p. 63; Roxin 2006, pp. 980–986; Bernsmann 
1996, p. 185; Beulke 2008, p. 155; Roxin 2006, pp. 985–986 and Strijards 1987, pp. 92–93.
236 Compare the English defence of loss of control in X.3.6.1.
237 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Ormerod 2005, p. 298; 3 March 1930 RGSt 64, 30; Roxin 2006, 
pp. 963–965 and explicitly laid down in §35 of the German Criminal Code.
238 Roxin 2006, pp. 963–964.
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duress as justifi catory and excusatory is not always explicitly made.239 Secondly, 
situations of necessity are treated in England often as situations of duress (by 
circumstances).240 Most important in this context, is that there are instances where 
the defence comes closer to a justifi cation. This is the case when there is great 
disparity between the threat and what is required, for example when an actor is 
compelled under a threat of death to give the key of a safe. In these cases, one may 
be inclined to say the defendant is justifi ed.241
The more the proportionality of the defendant’s conduct approaches that of 
necessity, the more likely it is seen as a justifi cation. Particularly in cases where the 
proportionality of the conduct is self-evident, it is common for duress to be based 
on the view that what the defendant did was in fact a reasonable response to extreme 
pressure.242 Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that although the paradigm 
cases of the justifi cation and the excuse are clear and the theoretical borders strict, 
borderline cases put the distinction in perspective. They warrant the view that the 
distinction between necessity and duress and perhaps even between justifi cation 
and excuse is gradual.
There is, however, an important reason not to equate these instances of duress 
with necessity. For example, if the defendant would be coerced under threat of death 
to break a window, this might seem justifi ed, but that would imply that the owner 
cannot act in self-defence, that he has to take the harm. In order to allow the owner 
to defend his interest, the coerced actor must be considered as excused. The owner 
would be allowed to act in self-defence against the person coerced with death, who 
is therefore excused, but this right would be seriously limited with a view to the 
situation that person is in.243 Hence, just like the different fault elements, duress 
and necessity can be placed on a continuum, but they should be considered as 
separate general principles of criminal law with their specifi c character and 
consequences.
The weighing of interests is conducted very similar as in necessity. The judge 
has to take into account the threatened and infringed legal interest as well as the 
nature, degree and gravity of the danger. For example, a very uncertain danger of 
bodily harm will not likely excuse certain death of another. Similarly, the expected 
success of the means used to avert the danger plays a role.244 The weighing of legal 
interests is primarily objective, but there is room for the actor to attach more weight 
to his own interests than those of others. Since duress is about agent-specifi c 
239 De Hullu 2006, p. 281. In addition, article 40 of the Dutch Criminal Code is said to include both 
necessity and duress.
240 Law Commission 2006, pp. 112 and 125.
241 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 666; Law Commission 2006, p. 125; Clarkson 2004, p. 85; Roxin 
2006, pp. 755–756; Machielse 1986, p. 526 and Holland 1989, p. 263. By contrast, Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 693.
242 Ashworth 2006, p. 224.
243 Beulke 2008, pp. 153–154 and Roxin 2006, p. 756. This approach is similar to that of self-
defence against infants and insane aggressors see IX.3.5.2.
244 Dolman 2006, pp. 189–191 and Roxin 2006, pp. 985–986.
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reasons for acting, there is more room for these considerations than in necessity. It 
is a rule of general experience that someone is more likely to be pressured to save 
his own interests.
The greater the weight given to the other criteria of duress, the less important 
the condition of proportionality becomes. Proportionality is less likely to become a 
stumbling block to accepting duress if the interests that can legitimately protected 
are already limited to the most serious ones of life and limb. Most offences are not 
disproportional in relation to these protected interests. Even the offence of homicide 
is not disproportional if the defendant killed in order to save his own life or that of a 
relative. Only in England, a different perspective is taken on this issue, which will 
be discussed below. It has already been explained that in the Netherlands, where the 
interests are not limited, normative considerations including proportionality play a 
more important role in limiting the defence.
A second example concerns the conditions that are encompassed in Germany 
under the heading of what can legitimately be expected of the defendant. Under this 
heading of subsidiarity, grossly disproportionate actions are excluded from duress 
by positioning it as a reason to require the actor to take the danger.245 For example, 
in the aforementioned case where the defendant shot and killed a GDR border 
guard, the Supreme Court held that the defendant should have taken the danger 
because he knew the risk in trying to fl ee the GDR. He should however have also 
taken the danger, given the importance of the border guard’s life. The manner in 
which he tried to avert the danger to his family when discovered was so 
disproportionate that he should have resisted the pressure to commit that offence.246
The following two subsections deal with the questions whether duress should 
also apply to homicide and torture. Both issues can be approached from the point of 
view that holds it impossible to take torture and homicide into account in a weighing 
of interests. In other words, these actions can never be excused under duress as they 
are absolutely prohibited. No exception can be made; any balancing is taboo.
4.5.1. Murder
In discussing joint risky ventures in the context of necessity, it was already made 
clear that in Germany and England, the sanctity of human life brings about a 
prohibition on the weighing of human lives. If this taboo would not exist, a slippery 
slope argument is that an innocent person could be sacrifi ced so his organs could be 
used to prolong the lives of others. However, in cases where the victim was doomed 
anyway, the taboo seemed less self-evident. It was concluded that the killing of 
innocent persons in cases of joint risky ventures should not amount to criminal 
245 In the German concept of self-defence, disproportionate conduct is excluded from the defence 
too, offi cially not by a requirement of proportionality, but by so-called socio-ethical limitations 
on self-defence, grounded amongst others in special relationships or prior fault, see IX.3.5.4.
246 6 July 2000 BGH NJW 2000, 3079. Nevertheless, he only received a sentence of one year of 
imprisonment.
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liability. The application of an excuse, like duress, may be favoured over that of a 
justifi cation as it communicates merely that the defendant should not be blamed for 
sacrifi cing the victim.
The rule that duress cannot apply to murder denotes the signifi cance of the taboo 
in English law. The limitation is considerable, given the broad scope of murder in 
English law, which includes the intentional infl iction of grievous bodily harm 
resulting in death. Unlike other legal systems, the English legal system makes no 
concession to human frailty and requires a heroic self-sacrifi ce. Like in necessity, it 
was feared that otherwise this would provide criminals with a formidable defence, 
leaving the innocent victims without protection. Thus, under no circumstances, the 
law should recognize that anyone has the liberty to choose that one innocent citizen 
should die rather than another.247 Blackstone is often cited: “And therefore though a 
man be violently assaulted, and hath no other possible means of escaping death, but 
by killing an innocent person; this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for 
he ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent.”248
There are numerous references of ancient and contemporary authority against 
recognizing a defence to murder, based on the sanctity of life and the desirability of 
dealing with hard cases by executive discretion, like in Dudley and Stephens. The 
rule was explicitly recognized in the 1985 case of Howe,249 overruling Lynch.250 In 
the case of Lynch, as interpreted by the House of Lords in Howe, duress was said to 
apply in cases of murder, not to the actual killers, but it would apply to aiders and 
abettors. The difference can be explained by the mandatory life sentence that 
follows when duress is precluded to a charge of murder. This sentence was probably 
considered too harsh for aiders and abettors, who are convicted for murder, just like 
the actual killer. Therefore, in order to avoid this, they could rely on duress in 
relation to murder. Compare that in German law, murder is also punished with a 
mandatory life sentence. If the defendant is an aider or abettor, the life sentence 
may be mitigated.
Nevertheless, holding that there is no reasonable justifi cation for leaving the 
distinction in tact, in Howe, the House of Lords saw themselves placed before the 
choice of extending the defence to all participants, or withholding the defence of 
duress to any party otherwise guilty of murder. After considering that the latter was 
the generally accepted view before Lynch and fi nding that the reasons for this 
exclusion were still applicable, the House of Lords ruled that duress was no defence 
247 R. v. Howe [1986] UKHL 4; Ashworth 2006, pp. 227 and 275 and Ormerod 2005, p. 312.
248 Blackstone 1769 (reprint 1979), p. 30. However, Blackstone 1769 (reprint 1979), p. 186 also 
argued in discussing the case of Carneades that the universal principle of self-preservation 
brings about that the defendant who preserves his own life at the expense of another man’s 
should be excused.
249 R. v. Howe [1986] UKHL 4. See Ashworth 2006, pp. 151 and 275 and Ormerod 2005, p. 312.
250 DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] UKHL 5. See also Section 42(2) of the draft Criminal 
Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 60 and R. v. Abbott [1977] AC 755, where the Privy Council 
ruled the defence was unavailable to the charge of murder.
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to murder. If a change regarding the current law was to be made, this should be 
done by Parliament.
English law seems inconsistent, as duress is also not applicable to attempted 
murder,251 but it is applicable to incitement and conspiracy to murder.252 It is also 
probably not applicable to (some forms of) treason,253 and conspiracy.254 The rule is 
also striking in comparison to the partial defences of diminished responsibility and 
loss of control. Partial defences only apply to murder, reducing the charge to 
manslaughter. Why should the person who is coerced to preserve innocent life 
receive a life sentence for murder, whereas the person who killed because of loss of 
self-control is only liable for manslaughter?255 The impossibility to raise duress 
against a murder charge explains why the killing of persons who abused the 
defendant, usually the wife or child, over a long period of time, is treated under the 
partial defence of loss of control.256 This is however an unsatisfactory compromise, 
not enabling the complete acquittal of those defendants that would be excused under 
Dutch and German law.
Currently, it is questioned in England whether the rule against the application of 
duress to murder still exists. Although in the case of the conjoined twins, only 
Brooke LJ squarely based his decision on grounds of necessity,257 the ruling is often 
interpreted as that a necessity plea is now possible to a charge of murder.258 
Necessity and duress by circumstances are considered interchangeable defences in 
English case-law, which implies authority to apply duress to murder as well.259 The 
courts however still preclude duress to murder, admitting that this may lead to 
undesirable results. For example, a thirteen-year-old boy who participated in a 
murder with his father out of fear for his violence could not rely on duress.260 In any 
event, most English scholars have argued in favour of making available duress to 
murder.261 The Law Commission has retracted its previous proposal to treat this as 
251 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 665 and 670; Law Commission 2006, p. 112 and Ormerod 2005, 
pp. 297 and 313.
252 Ormerod 2005, p. 313.
253 R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 665; Law Commission 2006, p. 112; 
Law Commission 1977, p. 16 and Ormerod 2005, p. 297.
254 R. v. Abdul-Hussain [1998] EWCA Crim 3528.
255 Compare Horder 2006A, p. 93 and Law Commission 2006, p. 124.
256 See X.3.6.1.
257 Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 254 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 720.
258 Ormerod 2005, p. 324. ‘Sometimes,’ according to Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 721. Ward LJ 
emphasized in Re A. (Children) [2000] EWCA “the unique circumstances for which this case is 
authority.” Rogers 2001, p. 517 submits that it is likely however that in a future case this case 
will be used as authority.
259 It is submitted that the claim of the men in Dudley and Stephens was in fact the excusatory 
claim of duress by circumstances, see Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 719 and Fletcher 1973, 
p. 373.
260 R. v. Wilson [2007] 2 Cr App R 31. He could only rely on a partial defence.
261 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 670 and Law Commission 1977, pp. 8, 14 and 16 and Law 
Commission 2006, p. 14.
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a partial defence to murder262 and now tries to strike a compromise by advocating 
in favour of its availability coupled with a reversed burden of proof.263
Exceptions to the right of life are considered to be exclusively listed in article 2 
ECHR. The only defence that can exculpate the defendant for infringing the right to 
life seems to be self-defence: a life may only be sacrifi ced if this is absolutely 
necessary to avert an unlawful attack. Therefore, neither necessity, nor duress 
seems to qualify as an exception to article 2 ECHR. However, I know of no cases in 
which a State was convicted for excusing the defendant who killed in duress. In 
contrast, article 2 strengthens the conclusion that the right to life is not absolute. It 
may therefore be concluded that article 2 does not preclude intentional killing in 
situations of duress or necessity.
In the Netherlands and Germany, duress is not precluded against a charge of 
homicide. Whether the defendant will be excused depends on the circumstances, 
such as the nature of the threat. All circumstances are taken into account in a 
balancing exercise, after which a judgment follows on the question whether the 
defendant could legitimately be expected not to kill the victim. Clearly, duress is 
only accepted to a murder charge in extreme circumstances. Since the right to life 
is so important, even more restraint is required from the defendant.264 Hence, 
whereas there will not be many instances where the intentional killing of a third 
party will be excused, there are no convincing reasons to exclude duress from 
homicide a priori. If joint risky ventures are considered as instances of duress, they 
present good examples why the defence should be available. It was explained in that 
context that the law should not and cannot require heroism. Moreover, omitting to 
sacrifi ce the doomed victim leads to unacceptable results when all involved may 
perish.
4.5.2. Ticking bomb scenarios
Fuelled by terrorist attacks and counter-measures, since the last decade much 
debate has been taking place on whether or not there are situations in which torture 
should be allowed. What if a bomb will go off and the person who knows its 
location refuses to tell where it is? Should it be allowed to torture this person in 
order to prevent the killing of many innocent victims? For our purposes, we will 
limit the debate regarding these ticking bomb scenarios to the question of whether 
or not the person who tortures the terrorist can be excused by duress. In the end, the 
question boils down to whether or not exceptions can be made to the prohibition of 
torture. In other words, the question is whether duress can be raised against torture.
The above-mentioned ticking bomb scenario is usually hypothetical, although 
similar situations have occurred in practice. Different variations to the hypothetical 
exist, prompting one to be clear on the scenario that is used. In this discussion, a 
262 See Law Commission 2006, pp. 14 and 111, also rejected in R. v. Howe [1986] UKHL 4.
263 Law Commission 2006, pp. 133–137.
264 See HR 6 December 2011, LJN:BP9394, in which case the defendant killed a very young child.
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timed bomb is placed somewhere, unknown to the authorities. It will explode within 
a short amount of time, killing many civilians, unless a bomb squad deactivates it. 
The terrorists have warned the authorities that a bomb will explode, without making 
demands that need to be fulfi lled to stop the explosion. The location remains 
unknown, but the authorities know that a suspect they currently have detained 
knows the location of the bomb. In order to make him disclose the location of this 
bomb, the order is given to torture him. Shortly after the torture has commenced, 
the suspect confesses the location of the bomb, which is deactivated just in time.
The strongest hypothetical will be taken as a starting point, which means all facts 
that are uncertain in reality are assumed. It is assumed that the suspect in fact knows 
the location of the bomb; that he discloses this because of torture; that it would 
otherwise not be known where the bomb had been located; that the suspect does not 
stall time by giving false locations; that the torture does not leave any permanent 
physical damage and so on. This enables us to focus on other arguments, of which in 
the end, the absolute prohibition on torture seems to carry most weight.265
This hypothetical makes the case in favour or torture very strong, sidelining 
many arguments that would otherwise be raised against the use of torture. In 
practice, it will however hardly ever be possible to exclude these uncertainties. The 
suspect may thus have been tortured to no avail because he gave incorrect 
information or worse, because he had nothing to do with it. By accepting the 
inevitable uncertainties, serious spill-over effects are risked that may even fuel hate 
and terrorism. Even after eliminating uncertainties on information and 
effectiveness, dangerous slippery slopes remain by relaxing the absolute prohibition 
on torture. In the war on terror, torture has been institutionalized by some States. It 
may even be used for lesser threats and against other persons, such as the terrorist’s 
wife or child: once a principle has a price, all that is left is the bargaining.266
A second level of the debate deals with which defence should or should not 
apply. In general, the more one is tempted to morally legitimize torture, the more 
one is inclined to apply a justifi cation. By arguing in favour of an excuse, the act 
itself is condemned.267 The contrasting view is to hold the defendant liable and 
punish him. In between these extreme positions, solutions have been advanced like 
holding the defendant liable, but to mitigate his punishment or to not punish him at 
all either by judicial or executive discretion.268
Some emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the State and the 
individual defendant, usually to argue that only the State is precluded to torture.269 
The argument that by torturing the terrorist one in fact sacrifi ces the ideals and 
265 Ginbar 2008, introduction and Ohlin 2008, p. 271 both applied the same method.
266 See Kutzj 2007, p. 255.
267 Like in joint risky ventures, it has also been argued that the defendant should not be held 
criminally liable without reference to a justifi cation or excuse.
268 Respectively Gaeta 2004 and Gross 2004. See the case against Daschner mentioned below.
269 Gaeta 2004 and Klip 2007A, p. 349. Compare Spronken 2011, p. 49 and section 134 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. The distinction can also be related to the aforementioned view in 
Germany that human rights treaties like the ECHR only lay down obligations to States.
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beliefs one seeks to protect is strongest in respect to the State as an actor. I already 
explained that in holding the Air Security Act null and void, the German 
Constitutional Court left open the possibility that the individual who shot down a 
hijacked airplane might be excused. A distinction can be made between the ex post 
application of defences and the ex ante operation of legal provisions or policy 
regarding these scenarios.270 In general, the application of legal provisions that 
would apply ex ante is favoured.271
If the defendant was ordered by a state offi cial to torture the suspect, it may be 
questioned whether he can be acquitted based on the defence of superior orders. 
However, both the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment explicitly preclude this. Self-defence has been advanced 
as the correct solution,272 as the bomb also constitutes an (usually) immediate and 
wrongful attack. This solution has however also been rejected because something 
which is absolutely forbidden can never be a proportionate means of self-defence.273
Duress is advanced because the application of an excuse makes clear that torture is 
wrong.274 As became clear in the context of joint risky ventures, the application of an 
excuse avoids controversial questions on the weighing of lives versus the human 
dignity of the terrorist. Secondly, duress focuses on the fact that a great dilemma 
coerced the defendant to act as he did. The application of duress can become 
problematic when the condition is applied strictly that the threat or danger must relate 
to someone close to the actor like a relative.275 However, I already rejected such a strict 
approach. Duress thus seems to be the best candidate for exculpating the defendant.
If it is accepted that the conditions of a defence like self-defence or duress can 
apply to the ticking bomb scenario, it can still be deliberated on a third level, 
whether it should be allowed to make exceptions to the prohibition of torture by 
excusing the defendant under duress. Human dignity, which includes the right not 
to be tortured, can be considered an absolute or non-derogable right that may not be 
infringed. Therefore, it is argued that it cannot be weighed against other interests 
that are protected, such as the lives of the innocent people who would be hit by the 
bomb.276 This also seems to be the approach taken by the ECtHR, based on the fact 
270 Kadish 1989B.
271 Roxin 2006, p. 757; Kinzig 2003, p. 808; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 693; Ginbar 2008, 
p. 341; Robinson 1989, p. 190 and Dershowitz 2002, p. 477, the latter who has argued in favour 
of ‘torture warrants.’
272 Erb 2005.
273 Roxin 2006, pp. 706–708; Roxin in Arnold a.o. 2005, p. 465; Jessberger 2005, p. 1072; Kinzig 
2003, p. 811 and Polzin 2008, p. 173.
274 Ambos 2008 and Ohlin 2008 therefore favour the ex post application of an excuse over the ex 
ante abstract relaxation of torture. See also See Shany 2007, p. 862.
275 Ohlin 2008, pp. 296–297 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 667–668.
276 Roxin 2006, pp. 770–772 and Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 289–290.
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that article 3, like other anti-torture provisions, is considered an absolute injunction, 
unlike for example, the right to life under article 2 of the ECHR.277
The ECtHR had the chance to rule on the admissibility of torture in a similar 
situation. In the case of Gäfgen,278 the claimant had been threatened to be tortured. 
In order to fi nd out the whereabouts of the child abducted by Gäfgen, a German 
police commissioner named Daschner ordered the threat and, if that would have 
been necessary, execution of torture. Gäfgen had confessed to the abduction but 
refused to tell where the child was. Therefore, Daschner feared that if the abducted 
child was not set free within limited time, he might suffocate. After some threats 
with physical injuries had been made, Gäfgen confessed where he had kept the 
child. Upon arrival, it turned out however, that Gäfgen had already killed the child. 
This demonstrated that the strongest argument against torture is that one can never 
be certain that it will be effective. Daschner was convicted as guilty, but only 
received a fi ne and a conditional prison sentence.
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, overruling the Fifth Chamber, held that the 
conviction of Daschner was not suffi cient redress for Gäfgen, who could therefore 
still claim to be the victim of a violation of article 3.279 The trial as a whole was 
however considered to be fair by both Chambers, since the evidence made under 
threats was excluded and his conviction based primarily on his confession during 
trial. In a dissenting opinion, the slippery slope aspect of this reasoning was 
identifi ed, namely that a State could accept the conviction of an individual agent in 
order to secure a conviction. To avoid this, all evidence obtained as a result of the 
pressure should be excluded. The ECHR may have given the impression that 
inhuman or degrading treatment is allowed under specifi c circumstances.280 
Nevertheless, the case presents no authority for excusing the person who feels the 
irresistible urge to torture a suspect. In fact, Daschner was not exculpated. The 
judgment focused on the allowance of evidence obtained under pressure, not on the 
criminal liability of Daschner.281
Perspectives that do excuse or even justify the torturer emphasize the 
importance of the confl icting interests of the innocent victims. They juxtapose the 
terrorist’s right not to be tortured with the victim’s right to security. The human 
dignity of the terrorist is contrasted with the human dignity of the victim to put its 
absolute character in perspective.282 It can also be argued that, like the doomed 
victim in a joint risky venture, the terrorist is the source of the peril. He is even 
277 See also article 4 CFR.
278 Gäfgen v. Germany, appl. no. 22987/05, 30 June 2008 and 1 June 2010.
279 The mere threat of torture was also held to qualify under article 3. A fortiori, a separate category 
of ‘torture-light’ or ‘other forms of degrading treatment’ cannot be argued to fall outside the 
scope of the absolute prohibition. Compare Shany 2007, pp. 856–857 and 868.
280 Spronken 2011, pp. 48–49.
281 Just like in A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71. See 
also Weigend in Buruma a.o. 2008.
282 See Erb 2005, pp. 593–599; Brugger 2000, pp. 669–676 and Wagenländer 2005, pp. 155–170 and 
199–201. Compare Isensee 1983.
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culpable because he chose to be the source of the danger.283 Finally, a strict 
prohibition may in fact be the reason why detainees are tortured in secret. 
Governments do torture. The idea is that regulating torture would limit these harms 
by institutional oversight.284
In conclusion, despite utilitarian sympathies, I believe that the defendant who 
tortured in the aforementioned ticking bomb scenario should be held criminally 
liable. It is very likely that someone could not resist the pressure, but the defence of 
duress is normative, requiring that in the end, the defendant was also not required 
to resist the pressure. The absolute injunction on torture brings about that he should 
have resisted. From a legal point of view, the absolute injunction militates against 
any other solution than criminal liability. No defence can apply. Morally, there are 
very good reasons for the absolute prohibition. Practically, the dangers of legalizing 
torture in whatever form are just too great. In the end, much more would be 
sacrifi ced than gained.
This does not mean that the person who tortured must be severely punished. The 
extreme pressure on the defendant that would qualify under duress can, as always, 
operate in a mitigating way. A middle ground has to be found between doing justice 
to the diminished blameworthiness of the defendant on the one hand and the risk 
that a too lenient punishment would be experienced as a licence to torture or a price 
worth paying on the other. The former perspective should however be most 
important so that the individual offender is not used as a means, to become an 
example for others.
5. MISTAKE AS TO THE LEGAL PROHIBITION
A mistake of law does not exculpate. This ‘ignorantia juris neminem excusat’,285 is 
the principle rule in all Member States. However, exceptions to this rule have been 
accepted, most clearly in Germany, but even in the English legal system, which is 
commonly believed to still rigidly apply the maxim. It will be argued that an 
excusable, that is, unavoidable mistake as to the legal prohibition can excuse the 
defendant.
The availability of the excuse follows from the principle that only the 
blameworthy may be punished. Mistakes of law should negate criminal liability if 
the defendant cannot be blamed for the error. The contrasting view that these 
mistakes can affect fault is rejected. In principle, the insight of the illegality or 
wrongfulness of one’s conduct is an element of blameworthiness, not part of dolus, 
recklessness or culpa.
283 See Moore 1989, p. 323; Ambos 2008, p. 277 and Ohlin 2008, p. 305.
284 See Shany 2007, p. 854; Dershowitz 1989, p. 192 and Dershowitz 2000, p. 477.
285 Blackstone 1769 (reprint 1979), p. 27. Williams 1953, p. 384 uses the terms ‘ignorantia juris non 
excusat’, Stuckenberg 2007, p. 341 the terms ‘error iuris nocet.’
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After demarcating the category of mistakes that can be considered to excuse the 
defendant, the arguments in favour and against the excuse will be discussed. In the 
third section, it will be explained when a mistake can be deemed to be unavoidable 
and thus excuse. These requirements coincide with those that can be deduced from 
EU case-law on the principle of legality.
5.1. Two categories of mistakes
In the previous chapter, it was explained that what is commonly called a mistake of 
law can be better termed a mistake as to the legal prohibition. This was defi ned as 
an informational fl aw relating to the existence, sense, purpose, scope or application 
of the legal norm that underlies the charge. The defendant is fully aware of the 
factual circumstances of his conduct, but erroneously believes this to be lawful. 
Since the term mistake of law is so common and because it facilitates reading, I 
will use both terms in one meaning. The mistakes discussed here can involve 
anything from a minor mistake on the meaning or scope of an offence to complete 
ignorance of a norm.286 Usually in practice, the defendant argues that he relied on 
(semi-)offi cial information which proved to be wrong, on provisions from another 
jurisdiction or on the moral judgment of a minority of the population.287
The label ‘mistake as to the legal prohibition’ can also be used to distinguish 
those mistakes that do not relate to the offence defi nition. As noted, there is no 
general requirement that mens rea should relate to the criminalization. It does not 
have to be proven the defendant knew what he did was criminalized. Specifi cally, 
dolus need not relate to the wrongfulness of illegality of the conduct. However, 
some offences deviate from the normal case. In some non-ideal offences, the 
offence description requires knowledge on a point of (civil) law.288
I already discussed how mistakes on a legal entitlement to property can negate 
the intention in offences that relate to its appropriation or destruction. If 
wrongfulness is an essential element of the offence, fault must relate to it. Any 
mistake on the element is a mistake on the offence defi nition.289 For example, the 
defendant who was ignorant of the necessity of a permit to export cows did not have 
the required fault for conviction of that offence. The absence of a permit is an 
essential element of the offence, because it gives the otherwise lawful conduct its 
criminal character.290
Secondly, the law provides for extraordinary rules on mistakes on legal aspects 
in the context of specifi c offences.291 For example, in German law, the defendant 
286 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 161–162.
287 Arzt 1976, p. 662.
288 See IV.2.4.6.
289 See IV.2.4.7.
290 26 June 1996 BayObLG NStZ-RR 1996, 341 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 366. See 
IX.5.5.
291 Spencer in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 444–445.
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need not know the offi cer’s conduct is lawful in order to be liable for resisting them. 
The law does however provide for a defence in the case the defendant made an 
unavoidable mistake on the lawfulness of the offi cer’s actions and he could not, 
under the circumstances known to him, have been expected to use legal remedies to 
defend himself against the erroneously perceived unlawful act.292
A general defence of mistake of law may operate beyond these two 
manifestations of mistakes on legal aspects.293 It thus encompasses mistakes on the 
scope or application of the prohibition that are irrelevant to the offence defi nition. 
Just like mistakes on defences, these mistakes on legal aspects are external to the 
offence defi nition and can only excuse the defendant when they were unavoidable. 
To emphasize, two categories of mistakes exist. The fi rst relates to an offence 
element, the second to the implied element of blameworthiness. Whether we should 
call the second category ‘mistakes of law’, ‘mistakes as to the legal prohibition’ or 
‘mistakes on elements external to the offence defi nition’ is less important than its 
condition: only when the defendant cannot be blamed for the mistake, will he be 
excused.
That a mistake of law can excuse is accepted in the Netherlands and Germany, 
but not until the nineteen fi fties.294 German Criminal Code has codifi ed the 
defence.295 In the Netherlands, it is treated, just like putative defences, as a specialis 
of the defence ‘lack of all blameworthiness’.296 By contrast, utilitarian legal systems 
like the English remain very reluctant to let defendants benefi t from a mistake of 
law. The maxim that such mistakes do not exculpate is therefore still the strongest, 
and English courts have not offi cially accepted the defence. Only the fi rst category 
of mistakes is acknowledged. Hence, a mistake of law can only preclude liability if 
it negates the fault element of an offence or if the law so provides.297
In the absence of explicit exceptions created by the legislator,298 there is hardly 
any room to let mistakes as to the legal prohibition exculpate in England. However, 
there is some support for such a defence,299 and as will be described, English law 
includes some functional equivalents to the defence, such as reliance on abuse of 
process when public authorities gave rise to the mistake.300 A second approach that 
puts the absence of the defence is the tendency to treat mistakes on legal aspects, 
292 §113(4) of the Criminal Code. See Beulke 2008, p. 320 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 94–95.
293 Compare section 21 of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 52.
294 HR 22 November 1949, NJ 1950, 180 and 18 March 1952, BGHSt 2, 194. Before that time, 
mistakes on non-criminal law could also exculpate.
295 §17 of the German Criminal Code and §11(2) of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG). See 
Fischer, T. 2009, p. 120.
296 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 77–80; Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 161–162 and Vellinga, W.H. 
1982, pp. 162–163.
297 Section 21 of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 52.
298 See for example the limited exceptions in section 21 of the Theft Act 1968 and 5(2) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971.
299 Williams 1953, p. 387; Ashworth 2006, pp. 232–234 and Ashworth 2011.
300 Spencer in Tiedemann 2002, pp. 444–445.
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especially if they concern civil law, as mistakes on the offence defi nition, thereby 
simply negating mens rea.301 Finally, reasonable mistakes generally reduce the 
sentence of the defendant.302
It can be argued that German courts have also based their preferences regarding 
mis take of law on pragmatic policy considerations. Like the English courts 
mentioned above, German courts can also be said to manipulate the categorisation 
of mistake of fact or law with a view to the desired end result. Notwithstanding 
German doctrine’s effort to strictly demarcate and theorize the two categories, the 
smooth change between the categories has enabled courts to choose as they please 
without having to fear that their judgments would be quashed. Regardless of the 
distinctions that have been applied in German law, of mistakes on civil and criminal 
law; on mala in se and mala prohibita; on fact and law; on the offence defi nition 
and the legal prohibition, there was always consensus that the outcome was correct. 
It is therefore probable that the fi nal question is and has always been, also in 
Germany, on the worthiness of punishment.303
5.2. Rationale
Since the principle rule is that mistake of law is no excuse, it is appropriate to take the 
rationales against such an excuse as a starting point of discussion. First of all, the 
mistake questions the legal order and the self-evidence of the norm greatly. The 
criminal law is an objective code of ethics, which must prevail over individual 
convictions.304 The taking into account of individual insights in law and duty violates 
legal certainty, legality, the state authority and so on. If a defendant would be acquitted 
because he thought the law were thus and so, the law actually becomes thus and so.305
A second rationale is the utilitarian argument that it is desirable to encourage 
knowledge of the law rather than to promote ignorance of it.306 By not excusing the 
mistaken defendant, people may be encouraged to get to know the law, omitting 
behaviour, which they doubt might be illegal, just as strict liability offences are said 
to encourage carefulness.307 The exclusion of an excuse is therefore coupled with a 
duty to know the law. It used to be argued that everybody is presumed to know the 
301 Lim Chin Aik v. the Queen [1963] AC 160; Smith, A.T.H. in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 1097–
1100 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 624–627. In line with prevailing opinion in the Member 
States, Ormerod 2008, p. 289 submits however that this is wrong, because awareness of 
wrongfulness is not part of mens rea.
302 Ashworth 2011, p. 11.
303 See 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194; Tischler 1984, pp. 354–366 and Arzt 1976, pp. 647–650.
304 Ormerod 2005, p. 121.
305 Alldridge 1986, p. 48.
306 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728, Ashworth 2006, p. 233; Williams 1953, p. 385 and Stuckenberg 
2007, pp. 469–470.
307 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 462 and 488–491.
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law, but this has long been generally rejected.308 In this perspective, the ignorance 
of the law as such is reprehensible.309
It can be argued that the assumption that everybody knows the core criminal 
norms is plausible. They refl ect widely shared cultural, societal and religious morals 
so that only an insane, or ‘exotic’ person can honestly be mistaken on these 
norms.310 However, this does not apply to the great amount of regulatory law that 
has been created in the last century.311 It is a fi ction to assume knowledge by 
publication, not only because of the number of legislation but also because most of 
them play no role in citizen’s lives. Moreover, these rules can be very technical and 
are therefore often already diffi cult for lawyers. Instead, a duty to know the law is 
accepted, particularly in relation to norms that are of relevance to the actor.312 
Accordingly, the defendant is still culpable for failing to ascertain the law before 
embarking on a course of conduct, especially if that conduct is specialized and 
aimed at gaining profi t.313
Third and more pragmatically, one can point at the danger of abuse of such a 
defence314 and the diffi culty to disprove ignorance.315 The enforcement of legal 
norms is feared to become ineffi cient if everyone would argue they did not know 
the wrongfulness of their actions. The prosecutor would have a hard time proving 
awareness.316 This concern has been advanced as an important explanation for the 
general irrelevancy of mistakes of law in England.317 By contrast, it has been 
submitted that experience has shown that the knowledge of wrongfulness is not so 
hard for the Prosecutor to prove. Secondly, requiring a mistake of law to be 
reasonable invalidates the fears of abuse and promoting ignorance.318
Excusing a mistake of law has been positioned as a necessary corollary of taking 
serious a criminal law system based on blameworthiness.319 A legal subject should 
only be convicted if he was able to see the wrongfulness of his conduct and thereby 
had a chance and choice to avoid the criminal conduct. It would be unjust, unfair 
and also useless to punish he who does not know and should not know he is 
308 Williams 1953, p. 385.
309 Smith, A.T.H. in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 1114–1115.
310 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 452 and Arzt 1976, pp. 647–648. Ignorance that the conduct is wrong is a 
condition of insanity in English law.
311 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728; de Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 101, de Hullu 2006, p. 345 
and Kelk 2005, pp. 223–224.
312 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 451–460 and 467–469; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728; Ashworth 2006, 
p. 233 and Arzt 1976, pp. 650–651. See IV.2.4.6.
313 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728. See also Kelk 2005, p. 210 and 225.
314 Williams 1953, p. 385.
315 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 728; Ormerod 2005, p. 121 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 
156–157.
316 Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 464–465.
317 Youngs 2000, pp. 339 and 344.
318 Ashworth 2011, p. 3.
319 Youngs 2000, pp. 339 and 344; Fletcher in Eser, Hassemer & Burkhardt 2000, p. 238; Vellinga, 
W.H. 1982, p. 52; Holland 1989, pp. 254–255.
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committing a criminal offence.320 The defendant who makes an unavoidable 
mistake did not choose to act unlawful and is therefore not disloyal to the legal 
order.321 The defendant need not have intended to act against the norms of the legal 
order, but when he did not know and could not know his conduct was illegal, he 
should not be blamed for this. Accordingly, insight of wrongfulness is viewed as an 
aspect of blameworthiness.
5.3. Only an unavoidable mistakes excuses
Everyone is supposed to know the law, so the absence of knowledge is the 
exception.322 Every excuse is by nature exceptional. Hence, the mistake must be 
excusable in order to excuse. Only the defendant who acted in excusable ignorance 
as regards the legality of his actions will be acquitted.323 A reasonable mistake 
would probably also suffi ce, but it does not refl ect the exceptional nature and 
limited scope of the excuse. Therefore, a mistake as to the legal prohibition must be 
unavoidable or invincible324 to exculpate the defendant. The criterion is normative, 
not factual, and refers to the question whether the defendant can be reproached for 
his ignorance.325
By framing the defence in a more positive way, criminal liability can be said to 
require insight of wrongfulness. It is recognized in Germany and the Netherlands 
that the insight of acting wrong or the consciousness of wrongdoing is neither 
irrelevant nor part of intention. It is an element of blameworthiness, and the lack of 
insight of wrongfulness, when unavoidable, negates the blameworthiness for 
committing the criminal offence.326 The dogmatic foundation of the defence as an 
aspect of blameworthiness is most evident in German law. In the Netherlands, this 
is simply accepted and largely undisputed as a given. The legal debate concentrates 
only on the scope of excusable mistakes.
What is required from this insight of wrongfulness? It does not suffi ce that the 
defendant knows his conduct is morally reprehensible, but the defendant also need 
not have knowledge of the (specifi c) legal provision or its criminal (rather than 
320 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 156–157; Arzt 1976, p. 651 and Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 482–484.
321 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194.
322 Bohlander 2009, p. 119.
323 HR 23 May 1995, NJ 1995, 631.
324 Arzt 1976 uses the distinction vincible-invincible. In 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194 the language 
used is that when the mistake was invincible (unüberwindlich), the offence or conduct was 
unavoidable (nicht vermeidbar).
325 Stuckenberg 2007, p. 455 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 366. Ashworth 2011, p. 6 favours 
a lesser negligence-based standard.
326 18 March 1952 BGHSt 2, 194; 6 December 1956 BGHSt 10, 35; 25 February 1998 BVerfG 1 BvR 
299/89; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 121 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 52. ‘Unrechtseinsicht’ and 
‘Unrechts bewusstsein’ respectively.
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administrative) character.327 The insight is given with the knowledge that the 
harming of a specifi c legal interest is wrong. For example, insight of wrongfulness 
exists when the person who knowingly received stolen goods thought he would only 
be criminally liable if he had bought them. After all, the actor knows that he is 
harming the legal interest of property, which is protected by that offence.328
5.3.1. Duty to gain insight
To establish criminal liability, the defendant needs to recognize or at least be able to 
recognize the general wrongfulness of his actions.329 The standard of unavoidable 
mistakes does not bring about a duty to know the law, but an obligation nonetheless 
to perform or inform himself to the best of his ability.330 Gaps in one’s knowledge 
can be remedied and the defendant must therefore have duly exerted his 
conscience.331 The threshold of avoidability is therefore high. The defendant must 
have applied all of his intellectual and moral powers and consult experts if need 
be.332 Only if this also did not make him appreciate the unlawfulness of his actions, 
the error was insuperable, the crime unavoidable.333
Important is whether the actor could have been able to gain knowledge on the 
wrongfulness by refl ecting or inquiring, taking into account the circumstances, his 
social status, role and individual capacities, including experience and education.334 
For instance, in general, the actor is expected to be able to know the relevant norms 
of conduct that falls within his profession.335 Relevant knowledge that is lacking, he 
is expected to acquire. He can be reproached for failing to have done so. Consider 
the case in which the defendant was held responsible for causing the drowning of 
327 18 March 1952, BGHSt 2, 194; 25 June 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 13797; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 121; 
Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 362; Beulke 2008, p. 163 and Christian & Others v. The Queen 
(The Pitcairn Islands) [2006] UKPC 47. In 8 March 1993 OLG Stuttgart NStZ 1993, 344 the 
defendants could not rely on the belief that the manipulation of the speedometers was merely an 
administrative offence.
328 Beulke 2008, p. 163 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 362. See also 19 May 1999 BGHSt 45, 
97.
329 18 March 1952, BGHSt 2, 194 and 25 June 2008 BGH BeckRS 2008, 13797.
330 Kessler in Borgers, Koopmans & Kristen 1998, p. 89; 2 February 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 364 
and 27 January 1966 BGHSt 21, 18. Even if the advice received would have been incorrect, the 
defendant can still not be excused. The omission to consult is a violation of duty of care and 
makes the mistake of law blameworthy.
331 Conscientious objections do not qualify as a mistake of law because the actor very well knows 
he is violating the norm, see Holland 1989, pp. 298–299.
332 Youngs 2000, p. 342 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 120–121.
333 18 March 1952, BGHSt 2, 194 and Bohlander 2009, pp. 20–22. See also 17 May 1984, Case 
83/83, Estel NV v. Commission [1984] ECR 2195, §35.
334 28 June 2005, Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C208/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk 
Rørindustri and others v. Commission [2005] ECR I-5425; Cantoni v. France, appl. no. 17862/91, 
15 November 1996; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 123 and Beulke 2008, p. 165.
335 Van Anraat v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 65389/09, 6 July 2010, §81; Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 199 
and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 367.
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two children in the pool he was exploiting. Their deaths were caused by a lack of 
adequate supervision, a duty that was clearly stated in legal rules. The court held 
that the defendant could not be excused because he was ignorant of these rules. 
Instead, he should have informed himself about the applicable rules and/or searched 
advice from an expert.336 Inexperience therefore limits the requirements set on the 
actor, but only to the point that there can not be said to be any prior fault in getting 
involved inexperienced.337
Depending on circumstances, the actor may be required to gain information 
from a public authority, a counsel, an expert, or even to consult case-law.338 Courts 
almost always consider a mistake of law avoidable if the actor took no steps at all to 
inform himself concerning the legal situation, whilst having the opportunity to do 
so.339 By contrast, reliance on erroneous yet reasonable information is the paradigm 
example of unavoidable mistakes of law.340 The information relied on must be 
reasonable to excuse the defendant. This often means that the ignorant defendant 
should have consulted an expert or authoritative person, on which advice they can 
reasonably rely.341 By informing oneself on the legality in this way, the defendant 
generally has fulfi lled its duty, making any mistake excusable.342 The ECJ held that 
where the ignorant defendant acted in good faith to determine the arrangements 
applicable, Member States are free to preclude an excuse under the error iuris nocet 
doctrine. Nonetheless, the promotion of fundamentals freedoms can bring about 
that the sanction imposed on him should at least be mitigated.343
5.3.2. Offi cial advice
In general, Dutch and German courts allow defendants to rely on advice or 
information given by offi cial authorities, whereas scepticism is demonstrated when 
defendants argue they relied on the incorrect advice of a lawyer. This advice is less 
likely to be accepted as reasonable, which is obvious considering the subjective role 
of the lawyer. The dilemma is that usually, people seek advice in good faith from 
lawyers, expecting this to be reliable, whereas others may only seek to hide behind 
336 HR 22 August 2006, NJ 2006, 484. See also Hof Den Haag 3 June 2005, LJN:AY4771 and 
3 December 1995 BGH NStZ 1996, 236.
337 Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 122–123.
338 Cantoni v. France, appl. no. 17862/91, 15 November 1996; Fischer, T. 2009, p. 124; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 368–369 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 77–80.
339 If the defendant did not have the opportunity to fi nd out, the mistake will be held unavoidable 
and excuse him, see HR 26 April 1977, NJ 1978, 200; HMG 6 October 1978, NJ 1979, 1; 
Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 198–199 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 159.
340 Arzt 1976, p. 671.
341 HR 18 March 2003, NJ 2004, 291; HR 13 December 1960, NJ 1961, 416; 13 September 1994 
BGHSt 40, 257 and 15 December 1999 BGH NStZ 2000, 307.
342 2 February 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 364.
343 12 July 2001, Case C-262/99, Paraskevas Louloudakis v. Elliniko Dimosio [2001] ECR I-5547, 
§76.
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insincere lawyers.344 The result of this dilemma is that the advice of a lawyer is not 
by mere force of the profession trustworthy.345
The Dutch Supreme Court identifi ed several factors to assess whether the 
defendant could reasonably rely on the advice, such as the independence and 
impartiality of the advisor, the specifi c expertise of the advisor, the complexity of 
the subject matter on which advice is being sought, the manner and circumstances 
in which the advice was sought and the position of the defendant himself.346 In 
English law, however, a mistake of law based on legal advice never seems to be able 
to exculpate the actor.347
In contrast, all courts considered are more lenient towards defendants who rely 
on the authority of public offi cials, offi cial statements, judicial decisions and 
toleration.348 For example, the defendant should be able to reasonably rely on the 
head of police when he incorrectly told the defendant he possessed the correct 
papers for driving a motorcycle.349 In another case, the defendant was allowed to 
rely on a notifi cation from the Ministry of Justice concerning the handing in of 
illegal weapons. Since his fi rearm was not included on the list of illegal weapons, 
he thought it was allowed.350 The ECJ held relevant a mistake on the legality of the 
undertaking’s actions since it could not be ruled that this mistake was induced by a 
communication from the Commission.351 The statement of an offi cial need not be 
made explicit. A defendant may also rely on a long-standing tolerating of his 
conduct by offi cial authorities, including the Commission.352
Advice and information of public authorities also generally precludes liability in 
England, although not by means of the excuse that is mistake of law. In England, 
insight of wrongfulness is not connected to blameworthiness. Such dogmatic 
reasoning is absent, which can again be explained by the lack of a general 
recognition of blameworthiness as a third pillar of criminal liability. Instead, if the 
advice or information of the offi cial authorities led or contributed to the error of the 
defendant, the proceeding against the defendant can be stayed, based either on a 
344 Arzt 1976, p. 673. See also Fokkens & Machielse, note 5 on Schuld and Kelk 2005, p. 226.
345 15 December 1999 BGH NStZ 2000, 307.
346 HR 4 April 2006, NJ 2007, 144. Compare 15 December 1999, BGH NStZ 2000, 307; Fischer, T. 
2009, p. 124 and Beulke 2008, p.165. An example of a German case in which the defendant was 
excused for relying on advice of a lawyer ob the scope of an offence is 8 November 1965 NJW 
1966, 1227.
347 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 624.
348 Only when the public authority was clearly incompetent or tells the defendant so is he required 
to gain information elsewhere, see 2 February 2000 BGH NStZ 2000, 364.
349 HR 22 November 1949, NJ 1950, 180.
350 HR 23 May 1995, NJ 1995, 631.
351 16 December 1995, Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113–114/73, Suikerunie and others v. 
Commission [1975] ECR 1663.
352 12 November 1987, Case 344/85, Ferriere San Carlo v. Commission [1987] ECR 4435; HR 
24 October 1961, NJ 1962, 37 and HR 14 April 1987, NJ 1988, 60.
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reliance argument, ‘good faith’, the doctrine of estoppel or ‘abuse of process’.353 
The underlying principle of trust that expectations raised by a Government should 
reasonably be fulfi lled, unless there are strong reasons not to, is also acknowledged 
in the Netherlands as a procedural principle that can take away the right of the 
Public Prosecutor to prosecute.354
5.3.3. Unpublished legislation
A relatively uncontroversial category of unavoidable mistakes concerns the 
situation in which the defendant was unable to have known the provision, because it 
was not yet published. In all legal systems under investigation, liability can only be 
based on rules that have been properly published before the crime took place. A 
Dutch court has even accepted that the defendant could not reasonably know the 
new rules, because they had not yet been published in the professional literature.355 
If new legislation enters into force in Germany, the standard of avoidability is also 
somewhat relaxed unless the purpose of the law is abundantly clear from the mere 
wording.356
It is a defence in England for an accused charged with an offence created by a 
statutory instrument to prove that at the time of the offence, the instrument had not 
been published, nor reasonable steps taken to bring its contents to the notice of the 
public of the accused.357 If the defendant would be punished, this would be at odds 
with the principle of legality, given the conceptual similarity of this situation with 
retroactive application of the law.358 In both cases, the defendant could not know the 
law tempore delicti. Where the continental sources refer to the principle of guilt as 
bringing about the exculpatory function of mistakes of law, English law generally 
only refers to the principle of legality.359
In the European context, mistakes of law are also generally considered in the 
context of legality. Hence, legal acts that bind individuals cannot be upheld against 
that individual if they have not been made publicly available.360 The difference is 
that liability is precluded because that would violate the principle of legality. In 
deciding whether the defendant may be held criminally liable, it is assessed whether 
the criminalization was foreseeable. The ECtHR has held that article 7 ECHR is 
“satisfi ed where the individual can know (…) what acts and omissions will make 
him criminally liable.”361 The conditions to satisfy the requirements of legality are 
353 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 627–628, Ashworth 2006, pp. 235–236; Westen 2007, p. 243 and 
Ormerod 2005, p. 294.
354 Koopmans 2007, pp. 38–41.
355 Remmelink 1996, p. 383 and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, p. 197.
356 Bohlander 2009, p. 121 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 369.
357 Section 3(2) of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, see Ormerod 2005, p. 294.
358 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 627–628.
359 See also Ashworth 2011 and VII.1.1.
360 26 November 1998, Case C-370/96, Covita AVE v. Elliniko Dimosio [1998] ECR I-7711, §27.
361 Kononov v. Latvia, appl. no. 36376/04, 17 May 2010, §185.
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identical to that of the principle of guilt. In cases where a Dutch or German court 
will hold the mistake to be unavoidable, the ECJ and ECtHR will generally hold 
that the criminalization was not foreseeable. Under both approaches, criminal 
liability is not upheld against the defendant, since that would violate the 
fundamental human rights of guilt or legality.
5.3.4. Other considerations
I will end this section on the scope of unavoidable mistakes by listing some more 
factors that are relevant to the question of avoidability. First, the character of the 
pertinent norm is important. The further away the prohibition is from the core of 
criminal law, the less strict the requirements of avoidability should be.362 Second, 
courts are clearly also more lenient when it concerns omissions, such as in the case 
of a woman who did not know she had a legal obligation to report her husband’s 
plans for committing robbery.363
Finally, the time spent in a Member State can be of importance for the foreign 
defendant, when the law of his mother country does not criminalize the conduct.364 
For example, an Italian, working temporarily in Germany, shot protected birds. 
This was illegal in Germany, but not in Italy. The mistake was deemed unavoidable 
and the defendant excused.365 In contrast, similar considerations have been held to 
be irrelevant to the question of liability in English law.366 It can be doubted whether 
other courts will be so lenient too. Should the German student, who consumed an 
alcoholic beverage in public in Maastricht, be excused because that is not a crime in 
Germany? Can the defendant not be said to be under a duty to get to know the law 
of the country he studies in? However, is this still a reasonable duty when one 
travels and crosses numerous Member States?367
5.4. Conclusion
By excusing only in exceptional circumstances the defendant who made an 
unavoidable mistake, a compromise is struck between the arguments in favour and 
against the relevancy of mistakes of law. In this way, most arguments against the 
relevance of mistakes of law to criminal liability can be countered. First of all, the 
excuse requires informing oneself of the scope and content of the law. This duty 
362 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 367–368; Bohlander 2009, pp. 120–121 and Badar 2005, 
p. 243. See also van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 77–80.
363 Arzt 1976, p. 677.
364 Fischer, T. 2009, p. 123. By contrast, a mistake is easily held to be avoidable if the offence was 
punishable under the law of the foreigner’s country too, like in 19 May 1999 BGHSt 45, 97.
365 Unreported case mentioned by Arzt 1976, pp. 674–675.
366 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 624, referring to a nineteenth century case, where a foreigner 
committed the offence of buggery, which was not an offence in his own country.
367 See Peristeridou 2013, forthcoming.
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encourages citizens to get to know the law. The diligence in assessing the 
lawfulness of one’s conduct demonstrates loyalty to the values of the legal order. 
The obligation to perform to the best of one’s ability replaces the incorrect 
assumption that everyone knows the law. A mistake of law is not blameworthy in 
itself, it is only so when the defendant could have known the law. As submitted 
above, the ability to know the law can be grounded in the criminal nature of the 
norm and the Garantenstellung of the defendant.
The threshold of avoidability has been deduced mostly from German law, but 
the Dutch law follows its basic principles. The threshold is even higher in 
England,368 implying that the mistaken defendant will be less likely to escape 
liability there. Nonetheless, it has become clear that the paradigm examples of 
unavoidable mistakes, those based on offi cial advice or caused by the lack of 
publication of the pertinent norm, will not lead to criminal liability in any of the 
Member States under investigation.369 Even if a mistake of law is not explicitly 
recognized as such, English law includes functional equivalents to reach the same 
or a similar outcome. Similarly, even though it is uncertain whether the European 
Commission also acknowledges this defence, there is a tendency to solve these 
cases by the principle of opportunity.370 In contrast, it can be presumed that the less 
paradigm cases of mistakes of law will usually lead to criminal liability in all legal 
systems discussed, even if the defendant’s chances are – again – best in Germany.
The advantage of recognizing mistake of law as an excuse is that it does not 
affect the validity of the norm. The mistake confi rms the norm by merely excusing 
the defendant. Second, the exceptional character of an excuse emphasizes that 
insight of wrongfulness is usually given: the threshold of accepting an unavoidable 
mistake is high. Third, the normative framework of the excuse allows for a nuanced, 
normative assessment of the blameworthiness of the defendant. Fears that the 
defence would be abused, accepted too often or that the prosecutor could not 
disprove ignorance are therefore unwarranted, evidenced by practice in Germany 
and the Netherlands.
If it is recognized that the unavoidable mistake negates blameworthiness and 
that blameworthiness is an implied element of all crimes, these mistakes of law 
need to excuse the defendant. Merely mitigating the defendant’s sentence, as is 
often the case in England, does not suffi ce. The principle of guilt applies to all 
aspects of criminal liability, including the wrongfulness of one’s actions. If 
unavoidable mistakes would be irrelevant, the blameless defendant would be held 
criminally liable.
Excusing the defendant is consistent with the other rules on mistakes. The 
general rule applicable to all mistakes, including those on the offence defi nition and 
defences, is that unavoidable mistakes at least excuse. For example, the defendant 
368 Bohlander 2009, p. 119. In other words, insight of wrongfulness is established easier and negated 
more diffi cultly.
369 See also section 2.04(3) of the Model Penal Code and article 122–3 of the French Penal Code.
370 Vogel in Tiedemann 2002, p. 134.
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can even be acquitted of a strict offence when he made an excusable mistake. 
Secondly, putative defences are often considered to be or treated as if they were a 
mistake of law. Third, the defence of superior orders, discussed below, is considered 
to be a specialis of mistake of law, negating liability for those who make an 
excusable mistake on the lawfulness of orders. Since those manifestations of 
mistake of law can exculpate, why should a ‘normal’ mistake of law be irrelevant to 
criminal liability? Finally, considering that it is neither feasible nor desirable to 
strictly separate the different categories of mistakes, one general rule for all 
mistakes on aspects external to the offence defi nition is preferred.
6. SUPERIOR ORDERS
A defendant who erroneously relies on the lawfulness of a superior order can be 
excused under the defence of superior orders. The often-used term ‘superior orders’ 
seems incomplete, because it does not refer to the unlawful nature of the order. It 
fails to distinguish between the excusatory and the justifi catory form of the defence. 
After all, if the order had been lawful in reality, not just from the perspective of the 
defendant, the defendant would be justifi ed for committing an offence by obeying 
the order. It appears to be more precise therefore to refer to unlawful superior 
orders.
6.1. Superior orders as a justifi cation
The justifi cation of lawful superior orders is only recognized explicitly in the 
Netherlands,371 which explains why the excuse of superior orders is not labelled 
more extensively as ‘wrongful’, ‘unlawful’ or ‘incompetent superior orders’ in 
England and Germany. It may be assumed that the defence is so self-evident in those 
States, that it was not considered necessary to create a specifi c defence. After all, 
the justifi cation states the obvious. If a person commits an offence because he is 
obliged to do so because of a superior order of greater weight, he is not punishable.372 
The key question deals with the border between the excuse and criminal liability.
In the Netherlands, it has also been argued that the justifi catory defence is 
superfl uous. Just like the similar defence that justifi es the person who committed an 
offence because of the execution of a contrasting legal duty or public task,373 it has 
been persuasively argued that defendants can also escape criminal liability based 
on other legal grounds. Amongst others, both justifi cations can be seen as a 
371 Article 43(1) of the Dutch Criminal Code.
372 Nieboer 1991, p. 256. See Kelk 205, p. 297 for an example of the legal duty justifi cation.
373 Article 42 of the Dutch Criminal Code.
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specialis of necessity.374 The actor is in a confl ict of duties, of which he can only 
execute one. This similarity is an argument to reject the specifi c justifi cations.375
Secondly, the offence defi nition can be interpreted to exclude the conduct from 
the scope of the offence. This can be based on the legislator’s purpose of excluding 
conduct by offi cials based on legal duties or superior orders from the scope of the 
offence.376 Moreover, in non-ideal offences, the express element of wrongfulness 
can simply be negated because of the legal duty or order, which implies that the 
actor was not acting ‘without right’.377 Third, the legal duty or superior order is 
often already taken into account in the decision to prosecute.378 As argued above, a 
govern ment should not be allowed to prosecute a person for doing what it told him 
to do.379
In sum, it is therefore logical that the justifi cations hardly ever appear in case-
law.380 Dutch scholars generally have accepted that the justifi cations are 
un necessary, but see no objection to their existence from the perspective of clarity 
of legislation.381 Even though the Dutch legislator recently proposed to extend the 
defence of legal duty in order to make sure that public authorities and legal entities 
can also rely on it when criminal liability is extended to the public domain,382 it is 
safe to conclude that these two justifi cations will not be missed in a general part of 
criminal law for the EU, evidenced by English and German practice.
6.2. Rationale
Like the justifi cations mentioned above, the rationale of the excuse of superior 
orders is grounded in the starting point that conduct on authority or order of the 
government should not be criminal. Subordinates must be able to rely on the 
correctness of orders.383 The excusatory form of the defence in particular also 
374 HR 20 September 1976, NJ 1977, 49 and de Hullu 2006, pp. 320 and 323.
375 By contrast, it is argued that the defence of a legal duty differs from necessity, because it does 
not require a correct weighing of interests. Instead, the focus of that defence is on the 
competence of the actors. Therefore, the test is not whether the offence was necessary, but 
whether it could reasonably be deemed necessary, according to Knigge 1993, p. 32. In Germany 
too, offi cials are allowed a margin of error in the exercise of their duties, provided they acted 
with due diligence, see Roxin 2006, pp. 789–792.
376 Strijards 1987, pp. 65–67; Kelk 2005, p. 296 and Nieboer 1991, p. 255.
377 Kelk 2005, p. 296.
378 De Hullu 2006, p. 318 and van Rest 1991, p. 1. See also Knigge 1993, p. 31.
379 See van Rest 1991, pp. 85–86.
380 De Hullu 2006, p. 31 and Strijards 1987, p. 67.
381 De Hullu 2006, p. 320. The justifi cation of legal duty has been labelled a product of 19th century 
legalism, an inheritance of the French infl uence on Dutch law, see Remmelink according to 
Kelk 2005, p. 296 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on art. 42.
382 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30 538, no. 6. Both proposals seem to have been put on hold.
383 De Hullu 2006, p. 322 and van Rest 1991, p. 129.
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serves a practical purpose of promoting obedience to public orders.384 The reason 
for this scheme lies in the hierarchy between superior and subordinate, in which the 
former should have the fi nal say. When the subordinate could refuse fulfi lment in 
case of any doubt or objections, this would cripple state authority.385 In the context 
of offences committed by armed forces, the defence also helps to reduce 
responsibility to a narrow circle of people, namely those who issued the orders.386 
Under the abolished doctrine of ‘respondeat superior’, a soldier was granted a 
limitless defence for all conduct ordered by a superior offi cer.
However, due to the experiences of the two world wars, these rationales have 
been watered down. The promotion of lawfulness has become more important at 
the expense of the promotion of obedience. Certain crimes like crimes against 
humanity should be combated with all means. Therefore, individuals have become 
criminally responsible for war crimes too, denying them to hide behind illegal 
orders. Hence, the contrasting approach is to require that a soldier must weigh every 
order and refuses to carry out illegal acts, or do so on his own risk. Soldiers are 
only obliged to obey lawful orders.387
The problem with this strict approach is that an investigation into the legality 
of orders is often not only undesirable but also impossible.388 Even if there is an 
opportunity to weigh the order against countervailing interests, the defendant is 
sometimes put before an impossible choice. For example, it used to be argued that 
it is a harsh position ‘for the soldier to either disobey and be shot by a court-
martial, or obey and be hanged by a judge’.389 Generally, disobedience is no longer 
punished by death and the subordinate should also be able to escape liability for 
disobedience by making probable the unlawfulness of the order.390 However, the 
harsh position may still occur in some military or criminal organizations.391
In order to fi nd a compromise between these competing interests, a limited 
defence of superior orders is generally accepted. On the one hand, the individual is 
expected to recognize the unlawfulness of the most serious crimes. He is supposed 
to refuse to carry out orders to do the manifest illegal. On the other hand, it is 
recognized that the individual is not always capable to judge the legality of his 
384 Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 3 on Bevoegd en onbevoegd gegeven ambtelijk bevel; van Rest 
1991, p. 127; Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on art. 43 and Williams 1953, pp. 392–393.
385 Roxin 2006, p. 795, Bohlander 2009, p. 94; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 618 and Kelk 2005, 
p. 299.
386 Williams 1953, pp. 392–393.
387 Eden 1991, pp. 641–643.
388 Kelk 2005, p. 299 and Eden 1991, pp. 641–643.
389 Dicey in Williams 1953, p. 389 and Eden 1991, p. 641. Of course, things have changed now, but 
on both sides of the equation so that the dilemma remains.
390 Or the reasonable belief in the unlawfulness of the order, see art. 131 and 132 of the Dutch 
Military Criminal Code (Wetboek van Militair Strafrecht).
391 See for example, ICTY Judgment, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96–22-A Ch., 
7 October 1997.
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actions. Given the importance of obedience, the defendant should be able to rely on 
the legality of that order when it turns out he made an unavoidable mistake.
The defence is included in the Dutch Criminal Code,392 whereas German law 
has regulated the concept through case-law and several legislative instruments.393 It 
can be seen as a species of mistake of law. The defendant who relies on the excuse 
after all also makes an unavoidable mistake on the legality of his actions. It is 
therefore no surprise that the defence is in principle unavailable in English law.394 
Again, the authority of the law outweighs the arguments in favour of the defence. It 
is a constitutional principle in English law that offi cials cannot suspend the 
operation of the law.395
Nevertheless, defendants in England have again been able to escape liability by 
denying mens rea. The order can for example function to show that the defendant 
was acting reasonable, negating negligence.396 In cases where insubordination 
would bring about harm to the subordinate, the defendant may also claim duress.397 
This possible overlap of superior orders with duress is accepted outside England 
too.398 However, when the defendant is executing an illegal order because he fears 
what will happen if he refuses, he is not mistaken on the legality of the orders. He 
can therefore not rely on superior orders.
6.3. Scope
The defence is most often discussed in the context of orders given to soldiers by their 
superiors. It can however also apply to other public offi cials who have been ordered 
by their superiors. More controversial is whether citizens can also rely on the defence 
vis-à-vis public offi cials.399 The incidental subordination of a random citizen is 
accepted in the Netherlands.400 For example, the public prosecutor can also issue 
392 Art. 43(2). See also art. 38 of the Dutch Military Criminal Code (Wetboek van militair 
strafrecht) and art. 11(3) of the Dutch Act on International Crimes (Wet Internationale 
Misdrijven).
393 See, §63(2) of the law on Federal Public Offi cials Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz); §11(2) of the 
Soldiers Act (Soldatengesetz); §5(1) of the Military Criminal Law Act (Wehrstrafgesetz); §3 of 
the International Criminal Code (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch); §7(2) of the Immediate Force Act 
(Unmittelbarer Zwang-Gesetz), §97(2) of the Execution Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz) and §30(3) of 
the Civic Service Act (Zivildienstgesetz).
394 R. v. Clegg [1995] UKHL 1 and Ormerod 2006, p. 458.
395 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 679 and Wallerstein 2010, p. 120.
396 Ormerod 2008, p. 357. See also Eden 1991, pp. 641 and 647–648 and Green 1976, pp. 30–31.
397 See R. v. Howe [1986] UKHL 4 and Wallerstein 2010.
398 Kelk 2005, p. 299. Compare the ICTY Judgment, Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96–
22-A Ch., 7 October 1997.
399 Bohlander 2009, pp. 91–92 submits that only public offi cials rely on superior orders, whereas 
private citizens can rely on ‘offi cial authorizations.’
400 HR 3 May 1988, NJ 1989, 165; Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on art. 43 and de Hullu 2006, 
p. 321.
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orders to telecom services.401 The emphasis is on the offi cial capacity of the issuer of 
the order. The authority must stem from public law, not a private agreement.402
In fact, an excuse similar to this defence has been accepted in the context of 
strict liability offences in the Netherlands and Germany. The excuse was partially 
grounded in the subordinate position of the defendant vis-à-vis his private master. It 
has been held that since this would jeopardize his livelihood, the defendant could 
not be required to check the lawfulness of his master’s orders to distribute diluted 
milk or to drive a horse cart with a horse that was diffi cult, if not impossible to 
handle. The offence was therefore unavoidable.403
6.4. Criteria
In the excuse of superior orders, the defendant erroneously believes he is entitled to 
commit an offence because of the superior order. This mistake cannot be reproached 
to him, because it was unavoidable. The nature of excuses is that it could not be 
expected of the defendant to choose or act differently. In other words, only if the 
offence was unavoidable, the defendant should be excused. As a mistake of law, it 
will not easily be deemed unavoidable. Depending on the circumstances, the actor 
has a duty to check and weigh the lawfulness of his actions.
The mistake on the lawfulness of the order can relate to different issues, such as 
the competence of the issuer, the balancing of (confl icting) interests and the 
fulfi lment of the order’s conditions.404 If the mistake relates to the competence of 
the issuer, it can be excusable when the incompetent order normally falls within the 
scope of things, of which the issuer is competent to order the subordinate. For 
example, although the order from the public prosecutor to arrest someone is 
unlawful because not all legal conditions are met, this order still is within the scope 
of subordination of the police offi cer.405 This would be different if a security guard 
gave the order. Everyone is assumed to know that this person is never competent to 
issue such an order, which makes it possible to hold such a mistake avoidable.
Secondly, the mistake can relate to the balancing of the perpetrating a crime on 
the one hand versus disobedience on the other. The order to commit a criminal 
offence does not make the order incompetent or wrongful as such. After all, the 
commission of a crime always runs counter to the letter of the law, but can be 
lawful, all things considered. If the interest of complying with the order is greater 
than that of complying with the criminal law, the order is justifi ed, because it is 
‘lawful’, ‘not wrongful’ or in Dutch terms, ‘competent’.406 For example, an 
401 Kelk 2005, p. 298.
402 Fokkens & Machielse, note 1 on art. 43 and van Rest 1991, p. 89.
403 HR 14 February 1916, NJ 1916, p. 681 and 23 March 1897 RGSt 30, 25. See IV.6.5.
404 Van Rest 1991, pp. 122 and 209–210 and van den Bosch in Remmelink 1987, p. 65.
405 Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on art. 43.
406 In contrast, many provisions in German law, which are drafted identically, imply that the 
committing of a criminal offence based on a superior order can only excuse. See for example 
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infi ltrator can be justifi ed if the interest of public health and the criminal 
investigation are more important than the reasons against committing the 
offence.407
The excuse discussed here deals with those situations where the defendant made 
an incorrect assumption that the order was lawful, for which he can be reproached. A 
paradigm example of such a blameworthy mistake is the mistake that the order to 
rape someone is lawful. Even if the subordinate believes he is thereby shortening the 
war and minimizing casualties, this can never be considered a lawful act. Sometimes, 
certain crimes are explicitly precluded from the defence. German law and the Rome 
Statute, for example, state that genocide and other crimes against humanity cannot 
be excused under superior orders.408 The exclusion avoids any discussion on the 
weighing of competing interests and the blameworthiness of mistakes.
Third, the issuer can erroneously believe the conditions to give the order are 
met.409 If the subordinate knows the issuer is mistaken, he needs to inform his 
superior. If he suspects the order may be unlawful, a duty to investigate arises, 
similar as in mistake of law. The subordinate is under an obligation to raise his 
doubts to his superior. However, if the superior confi rms the lawfulness of the 
order, he must in principle carry out the order.410 Regardless of whether the order 
turns out to be unlawful, the subordinate has met the duty, so he cannot be held 
criminally liable.411 For private citizens, this implies for example, that when 
someone without a driver’s licence is told by a police offi cer to move a vehicle 
because it is parked incorrectly, he must inform the offi cer. If the police offi cer 
persists, the defence should be available.412
The subordinate is therefore in principle not required to assess the legality of 
orders given to him. The focus of the defence is on the competence of the orders, 
rather than the weighing of interests. It would clearly be ineffi cient and undesirable 
if the subordinate would check whether all the conditions of an order are met and 
whether the superior made a correct valuation of all interests. This only changes 
when the circumstances raise doubts and thereby require additional investigation on 
the lawfulness. In German law therefore, the subordinate may in principle rely on 
an order, unless he positively knows it is unlawful or if it would be so glaringly 
§11(2) of the Soldiers Act (Soldatengesetz).
407 Van Rest 1991, p. 110.
408 Article 33(2) Rome Statute; art. 11(3) of the Dutch Act on International Crimes (Wet 
internationale misdrijven) and §63(2) of the German Federal Public Offi cials Act 
(Bundesbeamtengesetz). See also art. 2(3) of UN treaty on torture of 10 December 1984.
409 Van den Bosch in Remmelink 1987, p. 65.
410 §63(2) of the law on Federal Public Offi cials Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz). See Beulke 2008, 
p. 158 and 31 January 1964 BGHSt 19, 231.
411 Compare that if the offi cial advice turns out to be incorrect, the defendant has also met the duty 
required to rely on a mistake of law.
412 Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on art. 43 and van Rest 1991, pp. 109–110 and 145.
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obvious that any diligent civil servant would have been expected to notice it.413 In 
that case, the ignorance of the wrongfulness is blameworthy.
The condition of an unavoidable mistake can be deduced from the ‘manifest 
illegality principle’.414 This principle, which strikes a compromise between 
promoting obedience and lawfulness, is laid down in article 33 of the Rome Statute 
and can also be found in the British Manual of Military Law.415 Although English 
law does not acknowledge the defence, it has been argued too that a military offi cer 
should have a defence if he did not know the order was illegal and it was not so 
manifestly illegal that he ought to have known it.416 If the defendant was ordered to 
commit an offence that was blatantly illegal, he will be unsuccessful in claiming 
that he made an unavoidable mistake on the lawfulness of the order. Even a 
confi rmation of the lawfulness of the order by the superior does not relieve him of 
his own personal responsibility.417
Like any putative justifi cation, the mistake must be excusable, which means that 
is must be understandable to the average person.418 An objective yardstick is 
therefore applied, requiring that the mistake should not only be honest, but also 
reasonable.419 Blind, uncritical execution of an order that should raise suspicion as 
to its lawfulness at least, cannot qualify.420 Some Dutch scholars have however 
argued that no more than a subjective test is required. In favour of such a test, it can 
be argued that a subjective test would distinguish the defence from other putative 
justifi cations. If the yardstick would be objective, the added value of the excuse may 
be doubted.421
Whereas this is true, I do not agree that the defence should be subjective. The 
excuse of superior orders is in fact no more than a specifi c codifi cation of a mistake 
on the facts giving rise to the defence of lawful superior orders. Like any putative 
justifi cation and like any excuse, the yardstick must be normative. It would be 
inconsistent to apply a different yardstick for this particular putative justifi cation. A 
deviation cannot be grounded in the aim of the defence to promote obedience,422 
since that is not its only rationale. Just like its more general category of mistake of 
law, which includes all putative justifi cations, the competing rationales of the 
defence have been consolidated into the ground rule that only excusable, that is, 
unavoidable and understandable mistakes will excuse the defendant.
413 Bohlander 2009, p. 93 and Beulke 2008, p. 157.
414 Eden 1991, p. 644.
415 Eden 1991, p. 648.
416 Ormerod 2005, p. 328.
417 The explicit exclusion of crimes like genocide also avoids any discussion inherent in the German 
rule that a confi rmation of the unlawful order makes it binding to the subordinate.
418 Strijards 1987, p. 116.
419 See Green 1976, pp. 238–241.
420 Kelk 2005, p. 299; de Hullu 2006, p. 323 and van Rest 1991, pp. 137–138, 142–143 and 210.
421 Knigge 1993, pp. 32 and 37; Fokkens & Machielse, note 4 on art. 43 and van Rest 1991, pp. 132–
135.
422 Knigge 1993, p. 32.
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6.5. Conclusion
The defence of superior orders is a species of and operates under the same 
conditions as other mistakes of law. Then why was this specifi c putative justifi cation 
codifi ed? The mistake in regard to a superior order is the only putative justifi cation 
explicitly regulated by the Dutch Criminal Code.423 Its codifi cation can be explained 
by purposes of legality. By explicitly setting the limits of the excuse, it is made 
clear that manifestly illegal acts will always be punished. Legal subjects are warned 
that they cannot simply rely on an order, and that they are required to investigate 
the lawfulness of the order under circumstances.
Nevertheless, if the excuse of mistake of law is accepted, including putative 
justifi cations, there is no need to regulate unlawful superior orders. The difference 
with other putative justifi cations is that the offi cial authority issuing the order is 
partially responsible for the mistake. As a result, the threshold of an unavoidable 
mistake may be easier met. Nevertheless, the simple condition of excusable or 
unavoidable mistakes is both fl exible and clear enough to reach just outcomes. Even 
if codifi cation of the defence is desired, it is submitted that foreseeability, certainty 
and consistency would be better furthered by drafting the defence in a simple 
matter as an excusable mistake on the lawfulness of the order. The concept is 
scattered in German and to a lesser extent also in Dutch law over several provisions, 
some of which are contradictory and formulated needlessly complex. Instead, the 
defendant should simply be excused if he erroneously believed he was entitled to 
commit an offence because of the superior order and this mistake cannot be 
reproached to him.
7. INSANITY
Insanity is a defence that exculpates the defendant who, at the time of committing 
the offence, due to a mental disorder, did not have the capacities to be held 
responsible in law.
7.1. Rationale
Insanity has a twofold rationale. On the one hand, it guarantees that those that are 
not responsible for their actions are not punishable. On the other hand, it enables 
that the public is protected against those defendants. The latter rationale is 
remarkable in comparison to other defences and will be discussed fi rst. In all three 
States, the insane defendant can be compulsory admitted to and/or treated in a 
423 Strijards 1987, p. 116 and de Hullu 2006, p. 344. Van Rest 1991, pp. 176–178 and 212 calls this 
systematically inconsistent.
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mental hospital.424 This has been an important reason to create the insanity defence 
in England. If the insane would simply be acquitted, they would have to be set free, 
possibly committing other offences.425 By framing insanity as an excuse, Dutch 
and German courts can impose measures upon these perpetrators of wrongful acts. 
As will be explained later, measures can be imposed to excused defendants.
Measures that can be imposed upon the mentally disordered include the 
deprivation of the defendant’s freedom for an indefi nite time.426 As long as the 
danger remains and/or treatment is necessary, the defendant can be detained in a 
mental hospital. This brings about that by pleading an insanity defence, the 
defendant risks being detained in a mental hospital for the rest of his life.427 Even if 
he is not detained indefi nitely, he is likely to be deprived of his freedom for a longer 
time than if he would have been convicted and imprisoned.428 Most defendants 
therefore view these measures as a punishment worse than prison.429
If the stigma inherent in being labelled insane is also taken into account,430 the 
abolitionist argument against the insanity defence is unwarranted. Defendants 
generally do not feign a mental disorder to escape imprisonment. By contrast, they 
are more likely to accept a guilty plea or feign sanity to escape the feared 
measures.431 The insanity defence is only rarely raised and hardly ever accepted. 
After all, only in cases where the death penalty may be imposed or the defendant is 
certain to be incarcerated for life, can the defendant benefi t from faking a mental 
disorder.432
The rationale of public protection also explains the tendency to hold the 
obviously insane as fully responsible, only to facilitate a long prison sentence. Since 
424 Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983; art. 37 and 37a of the Dutch Criminal Code and §63 of 
the German Criminal Code.
425 R. v. Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9 and Ashworth 2006, p. 101.
426 See art. 38e of the Dutch Criminal Code; §67d of the German Criminal Code and section 41 of 
the Mental Health Act 1983.
427 Ashworth 2006, pp. 206–207. Although acceptance of the defence in England no longer results 
in the mandatory indefi nite detention in a special hospital of the defendant, unless and until the 
Home Secretary ordered release, the risk of indefi nite detention still deters defendants from 
pleading insanity, see also Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 643; Mackay, Mitchell & Howe 2006, 
p. 400 and Ormerod 2008, p. 278.
428 The average time of treatment in cases of compulsory admission is about 8,5 years according to 
the Dutch Ministry of Justice. See also Perlin in Botkin, McMahon & Francis 1999, p. 48.
429 Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 99–102; Peters, A.A.G. 1966, p. 239 and Groenhuijsen in 
Groenhuijsen, Mulder & Remmelink 1992, p. 5.
430 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 643 and Ormerod 2005, p. 257. For example, it is often argued 
that ‘battered women syndrome’ should be accepted within the framework of self-defence of 
duress, because treating it as a plea of insanity would be demeaning and stigmatizing on the 
woman, see Dressler in Shute & Simester 2002, pp. 276–281 and Wannop 1995, pp. 253 and 
268–272.
431 Ashworth 2006, pp. 101 and 206–207; Ormerod 2005, p. 257 and Perlin in Botkin, McMahon & 
Francis 1999, p. 53.
432 Norrie 2006B, p. 196 and Buchanan 2000, p. 67. In England, the defendant therefore also is more 
likely to feign a disorder in order to escape a murder charge based on diminished capacity.
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the nineteen thirties, Dutch law enabled the compulsory admission to a mental 
hospital, but the confi dence of the courts in these measures remained low until the 
nineteen-sixties. As a result of this, long prison sentences were still given to the 
mentally impaired.433 The fear that the perpetrator would commit other crimes has 
been dominant in shaping the insanity defence in all three Member States. As 
explained later, the distinction between insanity and automatism is made in England 
by establishing whether there is a risk of recurrence. If there is such a risk, insanity 
is accepted to enable measures to prevent recidivism.
However, the defence is not always a necessary condition of incapacitating the 
criminally insane. Certainly nowadays, measures can also be taken regardless of a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The compulsory admission to a mental 
hospital can follow after application of insanity, a conviction and even without a 
criminal trial having taken place.434 Particularly in England, the effi cient disposal 
of the defendant is considered much more important than labels such as ‘not guilty 
by reason of insanity’435 or a simple acquittal. The fl exibility of the English legal 
system for example enables that people, whose insanity defence failed, can still be 
transferred from prison to a mental hospital.436
Since an insanity defence is not strictly necessary for public protection, the other 
rationale, based on the capacities of criminal responsibility should be considered 
most important. The criminal legal system is directed at human beings as subjects 
of the law. Goals of prevention and retribution can only be served if these subjects 
have basic capacities of understanding and controlling their conduct. These 
capacities give agents the possibility and choice to stay outside the realm of criminal 
liability. Moreover, criminal law cannot communicate to those who do not 
understand the norms. The basic capacities presuppose that there can be 
communication between the legal system and the defendant.437
The fact that a human being has certain capacities makes it possible to hold him 
responsible under the criminal law. In order to be subjects of the criminal law, human 
beings must possess basic capacities. They deal with the question whether the actor 
can be a subject of the law, which is a precondition of holding the actor criminally 
liable. The agent is liable for causing harm, but he can only be held accountable in 
the fi rst place, because he possesses the capacities to be a subject of the law. These 
preconditions do not deal with the question whether the actor committed the offence 
433 HR 10 September 1957, NJ 1958, 5; HR 12 November 1985, NJ 1986, 327; Hofstee in Remmelink 
1987, pp. 198–199 and 209–212 and Kelk & Kool 2004B.
434 Stree in Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 935; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 655; Norrie 2006B, 
pp. 195–196; Williams 1953, p. 314–315; de Kogel & Nagtegaal 2006, p. 50 and the Dutch Act on 
the special commitment in psychiatric hospitals (Wet BOPZ).
435 Section 2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 and sections 1 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Unfi tness to Plead) Act 1991. In procedures before a Magistrate’s Court, the 
unamended common law applies. The result of a successful defence is a simple acquittal, see 
Ormerod 2005, pp. 256 and 268.
436 Norrie 2006B, pp. 195–196 and Section 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
437 Tadros 2005, pp. 136–137; Ormerod 2005, p. 4 and Ashworth 2006, pp. 26–27 and 247.
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and can be blamed for this, but with the more fundamental question whether the 
actor can even be held responsible under criminal law. A human being normally 
possesses these capacities, which warrants the assumption of the law that acts are 
voluntary and actors are sane. Insanity is the negation of the latter assumption. It will 
be explained that not much is needed to meet the threshold. Hence, only in very 
exceptional circumstances shall a perpetrator be held not punishable.438
7.2. Related issues
In order to understand the concept and context of insanity, some things have to be 
explained. These do not directly determine the scope of the insanity defence, but 
they are highly relevant in understanding its scope and rationale.
7.2.1. Two-lane approach
Measures are separated from punishment in the Netherlands and Germany by a 
so-called two-lane approach. Punishment can be infl icted upon the punishable; 
measures can be ordered against the (partially) irresponsible. Blameworthiness 
warrants retribution and thereby punishment, whereas preventive considerations are 
taken into account in measures. The negation of blameworthiness by insanity 
precludes punishment, but a measure can be imposed if it has been established that 
the defendant committed a wrongful offence. Measures thus fi ll the gap created by 
the inability to punish the insane.439
Recently, the ECtHR rejected this formal distinction of measures and 
punishment in German law, holding that the measure of preventive detention can 
constitute a punishment under articles 5 and 7 of the Convention.440 As explained 
before, European criminal law applies an autonomous concept of what is 
punishment, correctly focusing more on the effect and nature than on the label. 
Compulsory institutionalization and treatment can be experienced as a sanction 
graver than the mere deprivation of liberty by imprisonment. If these measures can 
be seen as a punishment, the principle of guilt also militates against ordering such 
measures against the excused. The two-lane approach is an attempt to bring the 
incapacitation of dangerous but insane perpetrators in line with criminal theory.
438 Tadros 2005, pp. 139 and 370; Ormerod 2008, p. 269; Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 643 and 
730; Roxin 2006, pp. 911–914, 964 and 1014; Bohlander 2009, pp. 17 and 22–23; Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 13 and 126 and de Hullu 2006, p. 104.
439 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 138; Krey 2003, pp. 20–21; Beulke 2008, p. 138; Hofstee in 
Remmelink 1987, pp. 199–200 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 99–102.
440 M. v. Germany, appl. no. 19359/04, 17 December 2009 and Haidn v. Germany, appl. no. 6587/04, 
13 April 2011. After these decisions, the German Constitutional Court revised its earlier opinion 
and held the preventive detention unconstitutional, see 4 May 2011 BVerfG NStZ 2011, 450. The 
legislator was given two years to adapt legislation. In the mean time, the persons in preventive 
detention are not set free.
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7.2.2. Punishment according to guilt
In German law, the distinction of punishment and prevention is relatively strict. 
Another example of this is the recognition of the maxim of punishment according 
to guilt. This holds that the defendant must be punished according to the degree of 
blameworthiness for the offence: the punishment may not exceed nor fall short of 
the degree of blameworthiness of the actor.441 Blameworthiness determines the 
lower and upper limit of punishment. Only in between those limits, are preventive 
purposes taken into account.442
Whereas prevailing opinion in the Netherlands and England also subscribes to 
the basic principle that there can be no punishment without blameworthiness, it 
does not object that the degree of punishment may exceed the degree of 
blameworthiness.443 As a rule, the level of blameworthiness is a factor in sentencing 
in those States too, but it does not oblige to mitigation. In other words, whereas 
there is consensus amongst the three States that blameworthiness is an absolute 
minimum condition for punishment, it is controversial to what extent it also dictates 
the level of punish ment.444 It is uncontroversial that blameworthiness legitimizes 
punishment and that retribution is the distinguishing feature of punishment.445 
However, in Dutch and even more so in English law, preventive considerations also 
play an important role in establishing the appropriate punishment.446 Union law 
requires proportionality between the offence and sanction.447 If the degree of 
blameworth iness is considered to (co-)determine the gravity of the offence, 
punishment should be made dependent on this level of guilt. Nevertheless, Union 
law seems to allow for similar discretion because in establishing the appropriate 
penalty, regard must be taken to the objectives pursued by it.448
7.2.3. Unfi t to plead
The defence of insanity is related to the procedural matter of being fi t to plead or fi t 
to stand trial.449 The latter is about the competence to stand trial. It deals not with 
441 §46 of the German Criminal Code. See Krey 2002, pp. 96–97 and 112–113; Streng 2007, p. 153 
and Jescheck in Thaman 2002, pp. xxxix-xl.
442 27 October 1970 BGHSt 24, 132; Krey 2002, pp. 114–123 and Streng 2007, p. 155.
443 HR 24 July 1967, NJ 1969, 63; HR 12 November 1985, NJ 1986, 327; Fokkens & Machielse, note 
10 on Schuld and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, p. 193. I infer that this is not accepted in England 
from my inability to fi nd a source that either confi rmed or refuted this.
444 In Germany, these aspects are labelled as ‘Strafbegründungschuld’ and ‘Strafbemessungsschuld’ 
respectively, see Beulke 2008, p. 139 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 203.
445 Hofstee in Remmelink 1987, pp. 202 and 212 and Van Bemmelen 1959, p. 17.
446 Pompe 1935, pp. 7–8; Hofstee in Remmelink 1987, p. 202; Mooij in Raes & Bakker, F.A.M. 
2007, p. 32 and Politoff & Koopmans 1991, pp. 99–102.
447 Art. 49(3) CFR and 21 September 1989, Case C 68/88, Greece v. Commission [1989] ECR 2965.
448 Opinion of AG van Gerven of 5 December 1989, Case C-326/88, Hansen & Søn [1990] ECR I-2930.
449 Art. 16(1) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; §§205 and 206a of the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure; s. 4 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 644.
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the question of sanity at the time of the commission of the offence, but with sanity 
at the time of the trial. It is therefore not a substantive defence that negates the 
blameworthiness of the actor or wrongfulness of the offence charged.450 It can 
merely suspend or stay the proceedings against the defendant when it is established 
that the defendant does not understand the charge or the course of the trial, or is 
incapable to participate sensibly in the trial and instruct his lawyer.451
The threshold is strictest in the Netherlands, where the defendant is only held to 
be unfi t to plead when he does not understand the tenor of the charges brought 
against him.452 Moreover, the concept only applies to those defendants that became 
insane after the commission of the offence.453 The concept is broadest in England. 
More weight is attached to the defendant’s capacity to defend himself. This can be 
explained by, amongst others, the relative inactivity of the trier of fact in such an 
adversarial legal system.454
The proceedings are suspended because people who are unfi t to stand trial 
cannot be given a fair trial. The defendant lacks the equality of arms to refute the 
public prosecutor. To try and punish these persons would be sort of a trial in 
absentia.455 On the other hand, the victims and society will not be done justice, as 
long as the proceedings are suspended. It can also be argued that the defendant is 
withheld a trial and that his freedom is restrained without a decision in iura 
regarding the question whether or not he committed the offence and whether this 
can be attributed to him.456 This can explain why in English law, the jury decides 
whether the defendant fulfi lled the actus reus if he is found unfi t to plead. If the 
jury fi nds that the defendant did not commit the actus reus, he is simply acquitted.457
The defendant who is found unfi t to plead is committed in a psychiatric hospital. 
The difference with the person held to be insane is that the treatment of this person 
is aimed at making him fi t to stand trial.458 In practice, the high threshold of a 
fi nding of unfi tness to plead implies that those persons will never be able to plead, 
so they are kept in the hospital for a very long time.459 In German law, the 
450 Ormerod 2008, pp. 272 and 278 and Bal & Koenraadt 2004, pp. 1–2.
451 8 February 1995 BGH NJW 1995, 1973; 24 February 1995 BVerfG NJW 1995, 1951; Ormerod 
2005, p. 251 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 645.
452 Art. 16(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; HR 5 February 1980, NJ 1980, 104 and Bal & 
Koenraadt 2004, p. 45.
453 Hof Amsterdam 27 August 2010, LJN:BN5666 and Bal & Koenraadt 2004, pp. 24–29 and 
38–41. For defendants who were already suffering from a mental disorder tempore delicti, other 
procedural guarantees apply, such as full representation by a lawyer. See art. 509a-e of the 
Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
454 See also Bal & Koenraadt 2004, pp. 74–75.
455 Compare §231a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.
456 Bal & Koenraadt 2004, p. 3.
457 S. 4(5) and 4a of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 645; 
Ormerod 2005, pp. 255–255 and Ormerod 2008, p. 274.
458 Art. 16(2) of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
459 Bal & Koenraadt 2004, p. 2.
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distinction between the suspension and complete staying of proceedings is made 
explicitly.460
7.3. Criteria
The conditions of the insanity defence461 differ in the Member States under 
investigation; yet in essence require that the offence should be attributable to the 
mental disorder. This means that fi rst of all, it needs to be established that the 
defendant was suffering from a mental disorder when he committed the offence. 
The national defences give different enumeration of disorders that can qualify 
under insanity. Although this limitative enumeration seems to have been an attempt 
to limit the evolving infl uence of psychiatry on liability,462 it will become clear that 
nowadays in practice, almost all disorders that are medically recognized can qualify 
under the defence.
Secondly, it is assessed whether the disorder should be deemed the legal cause of 
the offence. This question is partly psychological, for it takes into account the state 
of mind of the defendant, generally through the assessment of expert advice on how 
the disorder has affected the defendant. The defence is made more specifi c in 
English and German law by requiring that the mental disorder has substantially 
impaired the defendant’s capacities to be held responsible. Cognitive, evaluative 
and volitional capacities can be distinguished, some of which qualify under English, 
some of which qualify under German law.
The second question is however also a legal, normative, question, whereby more 
factors are relevant than the pertinent disorder and the affect it presumably had on 
the defendant. For example, there may be countervailing reasons against accepting 
the defence, such as the prior fault of getting in a situation where the defendant lost 
his mind. Moreover, the judge is not bound by the expert advice and has the fi nal 
say.463 The Dutch defence emphasises the importance of the normative aspect by 
focusing on ‘attribution’.
Again, it will become clear that of the three States under investigation, the scope 
of the defence is most narrow in England, whereas it is the widest in Germany. The 
English rules on insanity originate from the case in 1843 against Daniel M‘Naghten 
who attempted to assassinate the British Prime Minister, but fi red a pistol at the back 
460 §§205 and 206a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.
461 Art. 39 of the Dutch Criminal Code; §20 of the German Criminal Code and R. v. M’Naghten 
[1843–1860] All ER Rep 229.
462 Lackner in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 916–917.
463 Machielse & Remmelink in Fokkens & Machielse, notes 11–12 on art. 39; van Leeuwen 1986, 
pp. 6–9 and 23; 22 October 2004 BGH NStZ 2005, 329; Roxin 2006, pp. 899–900 and Schönke 
& Schröder, H. 2006, p. 386. Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 648 argues that although at least two 
medical practitioners are required to reach an insanity verdict in England, they use legal, not 
medical criteria.
Chapter X
490 
of his secretary, who died fi ve days later.464 Following the public outcry as a result of 
his acquittal based on insanity, the House of Lords gave some guidelines to limit the 
defence. The reluctance to allow insanity as an excuse and the desire to incapacitate 
dangerous perpetrators has always shaped the English doctrine on insanity. Again, 
this reluctant and pragmatic approach will make the English defence interesting to 
compare with the more principally grounded defence in for example German law.
7.4. Mental disorder
It is obvious that in order to be labelled insane, the defendant must have suffered 
from a mental disorder. This ‘mental disorder’ has been formulated in many 
different ways in national law. In England for example, section 1(2) of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 defi nes a mental disorder as “any disorder or disability of the 
mind”. The common law defence of insanity, by contrast, refers to a ‘disease of the 
mind’. The Dutch criminal code refers to two manifestations of mental abnormality 
and the German even to four. Such extensive categorization makes the different 
mental disorders that may qualify under insanity more concrete. However, it will be 
argued that for a general part of EU criminal law, a simple reference to a mental 
disorder will suffi ce.
7.4.1. The origin of the disorder
It is common to separate disorders according to their origin. In national law, 
congenital and physical origins have been distinguished. The distinction between 
disorders present from birth and those acquired later in life has been common in 
Anglo-American law since the Middle Ages.465 Dutch law separates a ‘pathological 
disorder’ from the ‘arrested development of the mental faculties’. The latter 
category includes those cases of idiocy and imbecility that are congenital or 
originated at a young age. By contrast, a pathological disorder is believed to occur 
later in life.466 In the German defence, a separate category of disorders also refers to 
the arrested development of mental faculties.467
The abovementioned separation in Dutch law also aims to distinguish deviations 
that have a physical origin from those that do not. In German law, a similar 
distinction used to be made. Under the old Criminal Code, disorders that could not 
be traced back to bodily defects could not excuse. It was feared that the fl oodgates 
would be opened if other disorders would be included. Nevertheless, this category 
was included as a possible disorder by the German judiciary and it is now included 
464 R. v. M’Naghten [1843–1860] All ER Rep 229.
465 Buchanan 2000, p. 85.
466 Kamerstukken II 1979/1980, 11 270, no. 12 pp. 12–14; de Hullu 2006, p. 326 and Kelk 2005, 
p. 257.
467 Bohlander 2009, p. 134.
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in the current legal provision. After all, disorders need not have a biological origin 
to impair the capacities for criminal responsibility.468 The dichotomy of physical 
and mental is outdated,469 and even if a biological origin of a disorder cannot yet be 
detected, this does not mean the disorder does not exist.470
The origin of the disorder may be relevant to the question whether man is 
biologically or genetically determined to commit crime. If human action is causally 
determined, rather than based on free will and choice, no one could ever act 
differently than he in fact does. It would also be improper to punish people for these 
actions. The three legal systems consistently avoid this debate by simply assuming 
the indeterminist perspective, that man has free will. It is not argued that man has 
free will, but as long as the contrary has not been proven, he is treated as if he has 
free will. Raising the insanity defence implies that the assumption is rebutted in a 
concrete case.471
Therefore, for insanity to apply, the origin of the disorder, as far as a condition 
of a biological or congenital origin is no longer relevant. This seems to make the 
distinction superfl uous. Nonetheless, the underlying rationale of the distinction still 
operates, because if the disorder has a biological origin, it is accepted easier that it 
has severely impaired the defendant’s capacities not to commit the offence. 
Disorders that have no biological origin only exculpate by exception.472 English law 
is in line with this synthesis, as any internal disorder, which affected the faculties of 
memory, reason or understanding can qualify. It is immaterial whether the disease 
had a mental or physical origin, whether it was curable or not, or whether it was 
temporary or permanent.473
However, the English defence requires that the disorder must have originated 
from within the defendant. Defects that are caused by a factor external to the 
defendant are excluded from insanity as (sane) automatism. The latter term is used 
in England to denote involuntary acts like sleepwalking, refl exes and situations of 
vis absoluta and are contrasted with insanity, also called insane automatism. In 
effect, the distinction of internal and external factors is fuelled by the pragmatic 
fear that defects originating from an internal factor are of a more continuous 
character and may therefore recur, whereas an external factor usually has a transient 
effect. Treatment of the perpetrator is believed necessary in order to prevent this 
recurrence and since automatism does not allow for the taking of measures, insanity 
is the appropriate outcome. Thus, when a person is sleepwalking and commits 
468 Roxin 2006, pp. 887–888 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 387–389.
469 Strijards 1987, p. 82 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 3 on art. 39.
470 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 387.
471 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 730; Fletcher 1978, p. 802; Ashworth 2006, 26–27 and 247; Kelk 
2005, pp. 168 and 253; Beulke 2008, pp. 138–139; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 203–206 
and Fischer, T. 2009, pp. 68–70.
472 Roxin 2006, pp. 901–902 who rejects this, submitting it should be about the severity of the 
disorder, not its origin.
473 R. v. Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; R. v. Sullivan [1984] AC 156 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 649.
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violence, the primary concern of courts is to avoid this from happening again, 
resulting in a fi nding of insanity.474
Because insanity includes paradigm cases of automatism, including epilepsy, it 
has been criticized as excessively broad.475 Moreover, the distinction leads to 
absurd differences in the context of diabetes. Diabetes can result in automatism 
when the defendant becomes hypoglycaemic, because taking insulin without 
suffi cient food is regarded as an external factor. By contrast, it can also result in 
insanity when the defendant becomes hyperglycaemic because he failed to take 
insulin, resulting in the internal condition of a high blood sugar level.476
Epileptic and hyper- or hypoglycaemic seizures as well as sleepwalking should 
be addressed under the voluntary act requirement, like in Dutch and German law. 
Treating these actors as insane is not in line with objective medical expertise and 
thus problematic with a view to fair labelling and art. 5 ECHR when measures are 
ordered against these persons that deprive them of their liberty.477 Recurrence 
could also be prevented by medicines. It is therefore to be applauded that in more 
recent judgments of lower English courts, automatism is accepted for 
sleepwalking.478 The distinction between internal and external origin of the 
disorder should therefore be rejected. The origin of the disorder can be of infl uence 
to other conditions, such as the manner in which the defendant’s capacities are 
impaired, but it should not be relevant to preclude disorders.
7.4.2. Affect and intoxication
A second category in German law deals with a ‘profound consciousness disorder’. 
This is a limitation of the consciousness of oneself or one’s surroundings and thereby 
a limitation of self-determination.479 In practice, it can be distinguished in an affect 
or intoxication. An affect is “an explosive reaction based on an extreme emotional 
state where no deliberate decision-making occurs anymore, for example, extreme 
rage, hate, shock, panic or fear.”480 Dutch law excludes from insanity such affects. 
These states of minds can be taken into account in self-defence-excess.481 The 
impossibility to take into account under self-defence-excess in German law sthenic 
affects, like revenge and rage, thus explains this wider scope of insanity in part.
474 Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; R. v. Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92; 
Hill v. Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; Ashworth 2006, pp. 100–101; Buchanan 2000, p. 101 and 
Ormerod 2005, p. 260.
475 Ormerod 2005, p. 264 and Ormerod 2008, pp. 279 and 286.
476 R. v. Quick [1973] QB 310 and R. v. Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9 respectively. See also Ashworth 
2006, p. 208 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 649–651.
477 Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 6301/73, 24 October 1979; Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 33 and Ashworth 2006, pp. 209–210.
478 Ormerod 2008, p. 282 and Mackay & Mitchell 2006, p. 903.
479 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 388.
480 Bohlander 2009, p. 133.
481 De Hullu 2006, p. 326 and Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 39.
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Nevertheless, the theoretical possibility that an affect qualifi es as a disorder 
under the defence, does not mean insanity will also be accepted. A complete 
exculpation is limited in German case-law only to very extreme cases of affects, 
which must after all be ‘profound’. The ‘normal’ primitive and explosive reactions 
do not qualify. Factors that may lead to acceptance are a short duration with a 
sudden beginning and end, a confused way of thinking, incoherent conduct and 
(partial) loss of memory. The fi nal decision on the acceptance of insanity therefore 
depends on the other conditions and all the circumstances of the case.482
Similarly, intoxication may qualify in German law as a disorder that can lead to 
the acceptance of insanity, but it will hardly ever excuse the defendant. In practice, 
affects and intoxication are most often only mitigated under the defence of 
diminished capacity, which will be discussed below.483 In the Netherlands and 
England, intoxication is not explicitly mentioned as a cause of disorder.484 Even 
though it is accepted that intoxication may qualify under insanity, it was already 
explained that the defence is generally precluded based on the prior fault of getting 
voluntarily intoxicated.485 By contrast, the German emphasis on the principle of 
guilt brings about that the defendant must have been blameworthy tempore delicti. 
If this was not the case, the defendant is excused, however great the reproach is for 
the preceding intoxication.
Nevertheless, the different approaches hardly ever lead to different outcomes. In 
Germany, the excuse is rejected if the intoxication was not severe enough to qualify 
for the complete defence. If it amounts to diminished capacity, to be discussed below, 
the facultative mitigation is generally not applied. Secondly, under an actio libera in 
causa, liability has been grounded in an earlier point of time.486 Finally, when the 
defendant is excused for the crime committed, he can still be held liable for the 
offence of ‘Rauschtat’ and punished with up to fi ve years of imprisonment.487 The 
result is that an intoxicated defendant will hardly ever benefi t from his intoxication.488
7.4.3. Other disorders
Other disorders like neuroses, perversions and personality disorders are categorized 
in Germany in a fi nal category of ‘other serious mental abnormalities’.489 Included 
482 18 September 2002 BGH NStZ-RR 2003, 8; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 389–390 and 
Roxin 2006, p. 894.
483 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 412. This should not be confused with the English partial 
defence to murder of diminished responsibility.
484 In the original proposal of the Dutch defence insanity, intoxication was also listed as a possible 
cause leading to the defence. After lively discussion, an amendment was accepted that removed 
this cause from the defence, see de Hullu 2006, p. 324 and van Kalmthout 1998, p. 104.
485 R. v. Quick [1973] QB 310. See V.3.5.
486 Bohlander 2009, p. 134 and Roxin 2006, p. 895.
487 §§323a of the German Criminal Code and 122 of the Administrative Offences Act (OWiG).
488 See V.3.5.
489 Bohlander 2009, p. 135 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 398–399. Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 656 propose to include any other serious mental disorder in the English insanity defence.
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can be paedophilia, pyromania, kleptomania, extreme jealousy and so on.490 It may 
be feared that such a wide scope of possible disorders may lead to a defence that 
excuses all. However, it is again clear that only very severe disorders will qualify.491 
Usually, the defendant is argued to have been able to exercise restraint and that he 
was therefore still able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.492
7.4.4. Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no need to create categories or to limit the condition of 
mental disorder. It does not matter whether the disorder is said to have a biological 
origin, whether it exists since birth or whether it was temporary or lasting. One 
could there fore simply refer to the categorization of disorders made in ICD-10 and 
DSM-IV, which already carries great weight.493 On the other hand, those 
categorizations have not been made with a view to exculpate but with a view to 
treat. Included are therefore also disorders that would never lead to the application 
of insanity, such as premature ejaculation and non-dependent vitamin abuse.494
This does not have to be a problem, if it is considered that the establishment of a 
mental disorder is not the only condition that needs to be fulfi lled to accept insanity. 
In fact, the disorder must have also affected the offender at the time of committing 
the offence in a manner that makes it relevant to the defence of insanity. First of all, 
a mental disorder is only relevant as to the effect on the actions that underlie the 
offence charged; there is no such thing as general insanity.495 In order to make sure 
that the defence says something about the actor in relation to the act, rather than 
merely something about the actor, the defendant must therefore have suffered from 
the disorder tempore delicti. Secondly, the mental disorder must have also 
substantially impaired the capacities to be held responsible in criminal law. If this 
was not the case, the complete defence does not apply. The ways in which a disorder 
needs to infl uence these capacities are discussed now.
7.5. Capacities
The capacities that can be impaired by a mental disorder are distinguished into 
three categories. Evaluative and cognitive capacities require that the actor has the 
490 Roxin 2006, pp. 897–898.
491 23 September 2009 BGH NStZ-RR 2010, 7.
492 Roxin 2006, pp. 898–899.
493 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 399. ICD-10 refers to the latest, tenth edition of the 
International Statistical Classifi cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems. DSM-IV refers 
to the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
494 Buchanan 2000, pp. 95, 110 and 123.
495 Bohlander 2009, pp. 132 and 117; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 403; Bosch 2008, pp. 167 and 
203; Tadros 2005, pp. 324–328 and section 35(2) draft Criminal Code Law Commission 1989, 
p. 59 and 222.
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ability to reason and distinguish right from wrong. He must be able to refl ect on and 
understand the nature of his acts and have basic moral insights. Volitional capacities 
entail that the actor is able to control and direct his behaviour, that he is capable to 
develop and execute reasonably complex plans of action.
All States under investigation aim to explain the offence by reference to the 
disorder. In England and Germany, the offence is explained through the impairment 
of the defendant’s capacities. This effect of the disorder is the connection between 
disorder and offence, bringing about a two-staged test. For example, the defendant 
committed the offence because he did not know what he did was wrong. He did not 
know what he did was wrong because he suffered from a mental disorder.
By contrast, Dutch law directly seeks to explain the offence by reference to the 
disorder. There is no specifi c effect required. As a result, more attention is paid to 
the required degree of causation between the disorder and the offence.496 Secondly, 
an additional condition of attribution applies. A disadvantage of the lack of 
references to incapacities is that it neglects that insanity is a defence of incapacity 
by virtue of mental disorder. I will now fi rst explain the two alternatives in German 
and English law.
In German law, the offender is excused when the mental disorder made him 
incapable of appreciating the unlawfulness of the actions or to act in accordance 
with this appreciation. In English law, the defence applies if the defendant was 
unaware of the nature and quality of his act(s) or if he did not know tempore delicti 
that he was committing something, which is wrong.
7.5.1. Evaluative capacities
The two alternatives in German law are generally described as that the defendant 
lacks the capacity of insight and restraint. The former is the evaluative capacity to 
appreciate the wrong or unlawfulness of the act. This is similar to the second 
alternative under English law, that the defendant did not know he was committing a 
wrong.497 In both States, it has therefore been pointed out that this alternative 
overlaps with the defence of mistake of law. Given that a mistake of law also 
excuses, it may even be perceived as superfl uous.498 However, the alternative in 
insanity highlights the special position of the offender compared to the sane actor 
who made an intellectual mistake.499 The mistake of law made by the insane is 
unavoidable because he suffered from a mental disorder, not because, let’s say, an 
offi cial authority misinformed him. Most importantly, excusing the defendant in 
496 Particularly on the question whether this should be one of mere simultaneity. See Bosch 2008, 
pp. 167, 173 and 203; Mooij 2004, p. 1085; van Leeuwen 1986, pp. 6 and 20 and Strijards 1987, 
pp. 82–84.
497 Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 39.
498 17 November 1994 BGH NStZ 1995, 183; Roxin 2006, p. 900; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, 
p. 386–387 and 400–402 and Williams 1953, p. 327.
499 Bohlander 2009, p. 116.
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these situations under a mistake of law would not allow the court to impose 
measures upon him in the same criminal procedure.500
The capacity is also accepted if the defendant knows that what he does formally 
violates the law, but he believes to act under some higher moral authority.501 The 
scope of the fi rst alternative is thus very narrow. For example, in cases where the 
defendant acted out of a ‘divine command’, or thinking he was someone else, the 
defendant still knows that what he is doing is wrong. The effect is that the clearly 
insane, such as a person suffering from severe schizophrenia or a multiple 
personality disorder, will not be declared legally insane.502 Given that English law 
on insanity also does not include another alternative effect to accommodate these 
cases, like the impairment of volitional capacities described below, it has been 
argued that the English defence requires reform.503
7.5.2. Cognitive capacities
The second alternative in English law, that the defendant is unaware of the nature 
and quality of his act(s), is very narrow in scope too. The ignorance on the conduct 
must relate to physical aspects of the circumstances and consequences attending his 
conduct in order to qualify. For example, the defendant thinks he is cutting a loaf of 
bread when he is in fact killing someone.504 This criterion therefore considerably 
overlaps with the failure of proof defences relating to fault elements, arguing for 
example that dolus is lacking because the defendant made a mistake.505
In Dutch law, it is accepted that when the defendant does not understand the 
nature of his actions and consequences at all, intent will be negated. This occurs 
however only in very exceptional circumstances, such as states of acute 
disassociation.506 Pragmatically, this is because the negation of the fault element 
leads to an acquittal and precludes the court from ordering measures against the 
defendant.507 Dogmatically, even if the defendant believes he is an avenger of evil, 
he still appreciated that he was killing another man with an axe.508 Hence, just like 
500 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 387.
501 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 652; Ormerod 2005, p. 263 and Williams 1953, p. 325. Ormerod 
2008, p. 286 submits that some juries do however accept the defence in cases where the 
defendant does believe it was not morally wrong.
502 Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 643 and 652–654 and Ormerod 2005, p. 265.
503 Ormerod 2005, p. 264; Ormerod 2008, pp. 279 and 286; Williams 1953, p. 328 and Tadros 2005, 
pp. 324–328.
504 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 651 and Ormerod 2008, p. 285.
505 Williams 1953, pp. 318–321.
506 Stevens & Prinsen 2009. See, for example, Rb. Assen 12 June 2002, LJN:AE3911 and Rb. 
Leeuwarden 31 October 2002, NbSr 2002, 321.
507 HR 22 July 1963, NJ 1968, 217; HR 14 December 2004, NJ 2006, 448; HR 19 June 2007, NJ 
2008, 169; HR 9 December 2008, NJ 2009, 157; de Hullu 2006, p. 218; Kelk 2005, p. 258; de 
Jong, D.H. & Knigge 2003, p. 112 and van Dijk, A.A. 2008, pp. 299–301.
508 Hof Den Bosch 6 January 2009, LJN:BG8922.
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the aforementioned examples of divine command will not qualify under this limb of 
English insanity defence,509 they will not preclude intent in the Netherlands.510
In English law, it is also recognized that when the defendant does not understand 
the nature and quality of his actions, this may already affect the question of whether 
or not the defendant had the required intent for the offence.511 However, the 
cognitive incapacity is treated as a form of insanity to highlight the specifi c reason 
for the mistake and most importantly, to enable measures to be imposed upon the 
defendant.512 If a mistake as to the offence defi nition is accepted, but this originates 
from a disease of the mind, the defendant can only be held to be insane. The 
approach in Germany seems to be that such mistakes also at best excuse the 
defendant.513
Regardless of whether the cognitive capacities affect the fault of the offence or 
are relevant under the insanity defence, it is clear that this capacity will hardly ever 
be deemed to have been absent. It is so fundamental that it when it is absent, we are 
most likely dealing with a person suffering from such a severe mental disorder, that 
he will not be able to function in everyday life. He is most likely already in a mental 
hospital.
7.5.3. Volitional capacities
The second alternative under German law deals with the incapacity of the defendant 
to act in accordance with the norms of the legal order. It applies if the defendant was 
unable to resist his urges. It makes clear that a perpetrator can know that what he 
does is wrong, but is unable to restrain himself and act accordingly. The difference 
with duress is that the origin of the irresistible pressure lies within the defendant. In 
duress, the origin of the pressure lies in a factor external to the defendant.514
In German law, the capacity of restraint is not easily rejected. The threshold is 
only met when all of the defendant’s powers could still not bring about a motivation 
to act in conformity with the norm. Similar as in conditional intent, when the 
offence involved is one of very serious injury or death, there is even a stronger 
509 Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 651.
510 Van Dijk, A.A. 2008, p. 299.
511 R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court ex parte K [1997] QB 23 is criticized for holding that 
insanity is based solely on the absence of mens rea. In English law, insanity can also be based on 
the ignorance of wrongfulness. Moreover, the view of the court led to the obviously incorrect 
fi nding that insanity is no defence to offences of strict liability, see Ormerod 2008, p. 289; 
Ashworth 2006, p. 208 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 178 and 652.
512 Ormerod 2005, p. 263 and Williams 1953, pp. 322 and 326.
513 11 November 1952 BGH NJW 1953, 111; 9 July 1957 BGH NJW 1957, 1484 and 24 June 2008 
BGH BeckRS 2008, 13794.
514 See Strijards 1987, p. 35. The distinction in the origin of disorders, in contrast to the origin of 
the pressure, was rejected above. The mental disorder can arise by an internal or external 
factor. For instance, post traumatic stress syndrome is the result of an external cause such a 
combat in war. The pressure the defendant however feels as a result of the disorder is always 
internal.
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presumption that the defendant could resist the impulse.515 In Dutch law too, the 
foundation of insanity has been argued to be the psychological freedom to be able 
to choose not to commit a crime and to be able to act accordingly.516 If the defendant 
could not inhibit his conduct or control it, insanity may apply. This is perceived as a 
less fundamental ability than being aware of what one is doing, which would negate 
intent.517
The capacity of restraint resembles what has been called an irresistible impulse 
test in Anglo-American law.518 This test has been proposed to be included in the 
English defence of insanity as an additional alternative criterion. If desires are 
suffi ciently strong for an agent of good character not to be capable to resist them, 
the defendant ought to be provided with a defence.519 However, this test has always 
been rejected because it is feared that it is extremely diffi cult or even impossible to 
distinguish between an impulse which is irresistible because of insanity and one 
that is irresistible because of greed, jealousy and so on.520 Another fear is that it is 
impossible to distinguish between an irresistible impulse and an impulse, which 
was merely not resisted by the defendant.521 This perspective can also explain the 
restricted scope of the English defence of duress.
By contrast, an irresistible impulse has been adopted in the English defence of 
diminished responsibility.522 As explained, this is a defence only to murder, resulting 
in a conviction for the lesser offence of manslaughter when it is accepted. This defence 
applies when the defendant’s mental faculties were substantially impaired as a result 
of an abnormality of mental functioning due to a recognised medical condition. It 
differs from the test in the German concept of insanity because the threshold is not so 
high. The impulse need not be absolutely irresistible. It is suffi cient that the defendant 
had substantially more diffi culty controlling it than someone not suffering from a 
mental condition.523 By including this irresistible impulse, the scope of the defence is 
wider than that of insanity, and thus provides for a defence in borderline cases that fall 
short of insanity.524 However, the defence only applies to murder.
In conclusion, this limited recognition of the irresistible impulse by virtue of a 
mental disorder in the context of murder and its recognition in German and Dutch 
criminal law point at the acceptance of irresistible impulse in insanity. There are no 
515 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 401–402 and Roxin 2006, pp. 899–900.
516 Mevis 2006, pp. 618–619.
517 HR 9 March 2010, NJ 2010, 160.
518 Fokkens & Machielse, note 8 on art. 39.
519 Tadros 2005, pp. 341 and 346 and the Royal Commission on capital punishment, according to 
Ormerod 2005, p. 269.
520 Ormerod 2005, p. 266. See also R. v. Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1 and Williams 1953, pp. 292, 330–
331 and 342–346.
521 Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), p. 202.
522 Ormerod 2008, p. 288 and 510 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 657–659.
523 R. v. Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1; Ormerod 2008, p. 511 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, pp. 657–
659.
524 Ormerod 2008, p. 512; Ashworth 2006, p. 278 and Hart 2008 (reprint 1967), p. 192.
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good reasons to preclude insanity in a general part of criminal law for the EU in 
cases where the perpetrator could not resist the impulses resulting from his mental 
disorder, provided it is established that he could not resist the impulse at all, given 
his mental condition.
7.5.4. Attribution
Three categories of capacities have been identifi ed, of which at least one must be 
substantially impaired in order to accept insanity. These are fi rst, the cognitive 
capacity to be aware of the nature of one’s conduct, second the evaluative capacity 
to appreciate the criminal relevance of this conduct and fi nally, the volitional 
capacity to restrain oneself from contrasting urges or to choose freely. These three 
aspects coincide with the medical questions on the relevance of the disorder on the 
offence.525
The English defence is further limited by another condition, namely that of a 
‘defect of reason’. In order to exculpate, it must be shown that the defendant’s power 
of reasoning was substantially impaired and that that was the reason for his failure 
to recognise the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong.526 This condition 
can be traced back to an outdated focus of insanity on conduct displaying a lack of 
reason. It makes the defence too narrow because there can be instances where the 
defendant is perfectly capable to reason, but his volitional capacities are 
substantially impaired nonetheless.527
By contrast to the specifi c impairment of capacities, Dutch law directly seeks to 
explain the offence by reference to the disorder. The three capacities have also been 
identifi ed in the Netherlands as conditions of sanity.528 Nevertheless, the defence 
only deals with the question whether the offence should be attributed to the 
defendant, given the fact it was committed under the infl uence of the mental 
disorder. Conduct, which cannot be attributed to the actor due to a mental disorder, 
cannot be punished. The criterion of attribution makes clear that the assessment of 
the defence is in the end a legal, normative decision.529 This much is also accepted 
in the other two States.530 For example, in England, the greater the fear of 
recidivism, the more likely a fi nding of insanity will follow.
A judge can, but is not required to excuse the defendant. The most clear-cut 
example of when a judge would not excuse, are cases of prior fault. If the defendant 
525 Van Leeuwen 1986, pp. 19–21 and Cleiren & Nijboer 2008, note 3f on Boek I Titel III Niet-
toerekenbaarheid.
526 Tadros 2005, pp. 332–333. See R. v. Sullivan [1984] AC 156.
527 Norrie 2006B, p. 177.
528 Van Hamel in 1927 according to Kelk 2005, p. 257.
529 De Hullu 2006, p. 323–329; Stam & ten Voorde 2009, p. 545 and Fokkens & Machielse, notes 
10–11 on art. 39. Application of the defence is therefore also termed non-attribution, ‘niet-
toerekening.’
530 Roxin 2006, pp. 899–900; Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 386 and Simester & Sullivan 2007, 
p. 648.
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is to blame for becoming mentally disordered, there might be a causal connection, 
but the defence will be rejected.531 Consider the Dutch case of the defendant who 
became so paranoid as a result of the taking of cocaine that he killed his 
grandmother. The court not only held that it was general experience that this 
substance is dangerous and can affect the will, but also held that the defendant 
already experienced strange effects from the taking of cocaine before. A prior fault 
reasoning was therefore easy to construe.532
The Royal Commission on capital punishment has proposed a similar test in 
England. That Commission proposed to simply leave it to jury to determine if the 
defendant was suffering tempore delicti from a mental disorder to such a degree 
that he ought not to be held responsible.533 It can be argued however that the 
problem of such an open defence is that it does not give any direction to determine 
responsibility. The test begs the question when the disorder is of a degree that it 
ought to negate responsibility.534
The answer is when it signifi cantly impairs the capacities of the defendant to be 
held responsible in law. Suffering from a mental disorder is not the same thing as 
lacking the capacities to be held responsible in criminal law. A comparison can be 
made with the voluntary act requirement, which relates to the same basic capacities 
to be held responsible in law. The act is only deemed involuntary when the absolute 
minimum of capacities for responsibility in criminal law is absent.535 Only 
behaviour, which is uncontrollable, or which proceeds from severely impaired 
consciousness is deemed involuntary.536 The act requirement is accepted when a 
residual element of control remained.537
Again, this test of signifi cant impairment may be criticized as giving insuffi cient 
direction, but it is submitted that such a simple phrasing of the defence is most 
appropriate, allowing for the court to rely on the latest medical expertise, whilst 
retaining the fi nal say. Insanity should apply when at the time of committing the 
offence, due to a mental disorder, the defendant did not have the capacities to be 
held responsible in law. The defence should not give more direction, for in the end, 
insanity is a normative, legal question. Insanity should therefore not be straight 
jacketed into a tight legal defi nition. Secondly, a demand to give more direction 
apparently would fail to appreciate the complexity of the decision inherent in 
deciding whether someone can be held responsible to the law. The retroactive 
establishment of mental disorders and its effect on the capacities of the defendant 
tempore delicti is a very diffi cult enterprise. Moreover, it is diffi cult to quantify the 
531 De Hullu 2006, pp. 325 and 328–329; Kelk 2005, p. 253 and van Netburg 1994, p. 11.
532 HR 9 June 1981, NJ 1983, 412. See also Rozemond 2006, p. 75. He did, however, only receive a 
punishment of two years imprisonment.
533 Ormerod 2008, p. 291.
534 Compare Buchanan 2000, p. 94 on the product test that used to be applied in US law.
535 See Tadros 2005, pp. 139 and 370 and Roxin 2006, pp. 964 and 1014.
536 Ashworth 2006, p. 99 and Simester and Sullivan 2007, p. 105.
537 Ashworth 2006, p. 100; Ormerod 2005, p. 272; Ormerod 2008, p. 271 and Simester and Sullivan 
2007, pp. 105–107.
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effect of a mental disorder on the capacities of the defendant. It is easier to identify 
that the disorder affected a capacity than to identify the point at which that 
defendant can no longer be said to be responsible.538
7.5.5. Diminished capacity
The latter issue brings up the question what to do when the defendant’s capacities 
have been impaired by the disorder, but not to the extent of legal irresponsibility. 
The disorder was for example not severe enough or it did not have such a severe 
effect on the defendant to conclude he should not be excused. In these cases, courts 
can decide to take into account the partial impairment of the pertinent capacities as 
mitigating. These cases are much more common that the application of the complete 
defence of insanity.539 Many defendants suffer from personality disorders, which 
generally only qualify under the defence that is called ‘diminished capacity’.540
Mitigation follows because the defendant who was not completely sane bears 
less blame for the offence than a sane actor ceteris paribus. The punishment may be 
mitigated accordingly. At the same time, the dangerousness of the defendant 
expressed by the offence warrants treatment, which may be ordered on grounds of 
the verdict of partial insanity. In practice, a sentence of years of imprisonment is 
combined with a compulsory admission and treatment in a mental hospital.
In the Netherlands and Germany, the defendant can rely on the defence of 
diminished capacity. In Germany, this is made explicit in §21 of the Criminal Code. 
In the Netherlands this is accepted too, notwithstanding that the Dutch Code does 
not imply this and the legislator did not envisage it.541 In English law, insanity is 
considered an all-or-nothing defence. The aforementioned defence of diminished 
responsibility only applies to the offence of murder. Despite this difference, in all 
three Member States, the defendant can only be excused when he can rely on the 
complete defence of insanity. Like any defendant who falls just outside the confi nes 
of a complete defence, the sentence of the defendant can and is usually diminished, 
provided the judge has that discretion.542 The defence of diminished capacity 
therefore does not qualify as a defence under the conditions set out in the beginning 
of this chapter. It is merely a ground for mitigation.
In Germany, the mitigating effect of diminished capacity has received the most 
attention. First of all, the Supreme Court requires lower courts to investigate the 
possibility of diminished capacity and to motivate suffi ciently when rejecting it.543 
538 Buchanan 2000, pp. 77–80.
539 De Hullu 2006, p. 332 and Roxin 2006, p. 902.
540 Mooij 2004, p. 1085. The term is taken from the translation of §21 of the German Criminal Code 
on www.iuscomp.org.
541 De Hullu 2006, p. 259.
542 Attorney-General’s Reference no. 37 of 2004 [2004] EWCA Crim 1854; Beulke 2008, pp. 143–
144; Roxin 2006, p. 902 and de Hullu 2009, p. 292.
543 See for example, 8 December 2009 BGH NStZ-RR 2010, 105.
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Secondly, the mitigation is facultative, like in any other situation where the 
defendant just falls short of the conditions of a defence. However, it has been argued 
that the maxim ‘punishment according to guilt’ brings about that the refusal to 
mitigate must be the exception.544
Only German law explicitly provides for the possibility to mitigate the sentence 
when the threshold of an excuse is not met. Besides this diminished capacity, the 
German Criminal Code holds that when the defendant cannot rely on duress 
because he should have accepted the danger or when he made a mistake of law that 
was avoidable, the sentence may be mitigated.545 If the maxim were taken seriously, 
one would expect an obligatory mitigation in these cases where the defendant is less 
blameworthy than the general offender. However, this facultative mitigation is 
interpreted as a confi rmation that mitigation in cases of lesser blameworthiness 
should be the rule.546
7.6. Exemption or excuse
In German law, the insanity defence is fi rmly anchored as an excuse. First of all, the 
defence is said to negate the ‘capacity to be held blameworthy’.547 Secondly, the 
defence is based on the principle of guilt and the related punishment according to 
blameworthiness. The insanity defence thus excuses the defendant. Diminished 
capacity is translated as diminished blameworthiness and results in a mitigation of 
punishment. In English and Dutch law, the insanity defence is also usually 
categorized as an excuse, which therefore negates the blameworthiness of the actor 
when accepted.
However, insanity is perhaps better labelled as an exemption. Exemptions are 
distinguished from excuses as ‘non exculpatory defences’, or ‘out-and-out denials of 
responsibility’.548 After all, in order to be subjects of the criminal law, human 
beings must possess basic capacities. The agent is liable for causing harm, but he 
can only be held accountable in the fi rst place, because he possesses the capacities 
to be a subject of the law. Insanity negates the assumption that the defendant 
possesses these capacities. These preconditions of criminal responsibility do not 
deal with the question whether the actor committed the offence and can be punished 
544 This refusal may only be based on countervailing considerations of blameworthiness, such as 
prior fault in getting into a state of diminished capacity, see 26 May 2004 BGH NStZ 2004, 619; 
Roxin 2006, pp. 906–907 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 415–417.
545 See §§17 and 35(1) and (2) of the German Criminal Code.
546 In the Corpus Juris of Delmas-Marty 1997, p. 66, the avoidable mistake of law had to be 
mitigated, whereas the Corpus of Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 192 refers to facultative 
mitigation.
547 ‘Schuldfähigkeit’, see §20 of the German Criminal Code. In classic doctrine, it was called 
Zurechnungsfähigkeit, see Beulke 2008, pp. 316–317. Toerekenings(vatbaarheid) is still used in 
Dutch law.
548 Robinson 1982 and Horder 2006A, p. 9 respectively.
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for this, but with the more fundamental question whether the actor can even be held 
responsible under criminal law. From the aforementioned viewpoint of the 
framework of criminal liability as a ladder, the pertinent question is whether we 
should try to climb the ladder at all. In other words, dogmatically, the issue of 
responsibility precedes that of wrongdoing and blameworthiness. Whereas an 
excuse denies accountability or blameworthiness, an exemption denies something 
more fundamental, namely responsibility. Excuses concern defendants who are not 
to blame for their conduct but who have the capacities to be fully responsible. An 
exemption denies that the perpetrator is a person who can be held responsible under 
the law.549
Insanity thus resembles legal concepts such as infancy and immunity. In 
extreme cases, the insane can be equated to animals.550 It is therefore common in 
Anglo-American law to categorize insanity as an exemption.551 Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer, Advocate General at the ECJ, also argued “the intrinsic grounds include 
those for exonerating a defendant who lacks the indispensable requirements for 
accountability (grounds relating to lack of criminal responsibility, such as being 
under age or mental disorder).”552 Insanity and diminished capacity are also 
labelled as exemptions in the annex of Decision 2009/316.553
Infants are not accountable, because their capacities have not matured. The 
criminal law operates with a presumption of irresponsibility, based on the infant’s 
lack to distinguish properly between right and wrong. The minimum age of criminal 
responsibility ranges from ten years in England, twelve years in the Netherlands, to 
fourteen years in Germany.554 Those under that age are categorically assumed to 
lack the capacities to be held responsible in law. When children are older, their 
(evaluative) capacities are assessed. In German law, juveniles between fourteen and 
eighteen can be held liable if they have the maturity to appreciate the consequences 
549 Tadros 2005, pp. 124, 136–139 and 370 and Fletcher 1985, pp. 958–959.
550 Tadros 2005, p. 134. See also Leverick 2006, pp. 22–23 and Husak 2005, p. 297.
551 Ashworth 2006, p. 241; Horder 2006A, p. 9; Gardner, J. 2007, pp. 131–132; Westen 2006, p. 348; 
Duff 2007, pp. 284–290; Leverick 2006, pp. 21–22 and Tadros 2005, pp. 116, 124 and 370. See 
Fletcher 1985, pp. 836 and 958–959; Husak 2005 and Beulke 2008, p. 313. Section 50 of the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1983 labels infancy as an irrebuttable presumption of 
irresponsibility.
552 Opinion of AG Colomer of 8 June 2006, C-150/05, van Straaten v. the Netherlands and Italy 
[2006] ECR I-9327, §65.
553 Decision 2009/316 of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS) in application of art. 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315, OJ 2009 
L 93/33. I substituted ‘diminished responsibility’ with ‘diminished capacity’ in order to avoid 
confusion with the English partial defence.
554 Section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1983, articles 486–487 of the Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure and §19 (1) of the German Criminal Code respectively. The yardstick is the 
age tempore delicti, see Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 381. The ECtHR has held that the 
minimum age of ten years need not violate article 6, although many have argued in favour of a 
higher threshold, see S.C. v. UK, appl. no. 60958/00, 15 June 2004.
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of their actions and are capable of recognising the unlawfulness of their conduct.555 
This middle ground is no longer applied in Dutch and English law, but the Dutch 
judge used to investigate whether the child understood the wrong of its behaviour.556 
In English law, a rebuttable presumption of irresponsibility for children until the 
age of fourteen existed. Now abolished, this doli incapax allowed the child to be 
tried if the prosecution could prove it knew the behaviour was seriously wrong.557
Both infancy and insanity deal with an objective situation of irresponsibility. 
Unlike defences, no subjective requirement is required of being aware that its 
conditions are fulfi lled. No mistake on the application of the defence can be 
relevant.558 By categorizing infancy and insanity as exemptions, one can 
conceptually separate between blameworthiness on the one hand, which is negated 
by excuses, and the capacities necessary for criminal responsibility on the other. 
The rationale for exculpating the insane perpetrator differs from that of excusing 
sane perpetrators. He is not exculpated because he met the standard of what could 
reasonably be expected of him in the given situation. Rather, he is exculpated 
because he is unable to meet the standard of the law at all.
Insanity has been distinguished from other excuses by prevailing opinion in 
Germany as well. ‘Normal’ excuses do not negate the reproach of blameworthiness, 
but abstain from this reproach due to empathy for the situation of coercion or 
confl ict. In other words, the effect of an excuse like duress is that it limits the degree 
of blameworthiness to a degree that falls short of the threshold for criminal liability. 
By contrast, insanity completely negates blameworthiness, just like infancy and 
unavoidable mistake of law.559 In Dutch law, it is recognized too that a mental 
disorder can precede the question on blameworthiness, because insanity can negate 
intention.
However, even though in the Netherlands and Germany, infancy has generally 
been discussed in close connection with insanity,560 infancy is generally treated as a 
ground barring prosecution, and insanity as an excuse.561 An advantage of treating 
insanity as an excuse seems to be that it facilitates the establishment of accessorial 
liability. An excuse only operates personal, so it would not affect the liability of 
other perpetrators or accomplices. By contrast, if it is held that the insane actor 
555 §3 of the Juvenile Court Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz). See Beulke 2008, p. 144.
556 Art. 38 (old) of the Dutch Criminal Code; Strijards 1987, p. 34; Pompe 1935, p. 101 and de Hullu 
2006, p. 105.
557 Ashworth 2006, p. 203; Simester & Sullivan 2007, p. 663–664 and Ormerod 2005, p. 296. 
Abolished by Section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; CPS v. P. [2007] EWHC 946 and 
R. v. T. [2008] EWCA Crim 815.
558 See VII.5.7.
559 Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, pp. 626–627 and 701; Beulke 2008, p. 150 and Roxin 2006, pp. 
913, 964–966, 987 and 1014. See also Beulke 2008, pp. 313 and 316–317 and Schönke & 
Schröder, H. 2006, p. 158.
560 §19 of the German Criminal Code on infancy precedes the provision on insanity. See also de 
Hullu 2006, pp. 104–105; Strijards 1987, pp. 33–35 and Knigge 1983, p. 11.
561 Articles 467–468 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; de Hullu 2006, p. 106; Nieboer 
1991, pp. 233–235; Roxin 2006, p. 912 and Schönke & Schröder, H. 2006, p. 381.
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cannot commit an offence, comparable to a six-year-old, there is no wrongful attack 
to derive liability from to the persons who have aided or instigated his conduct. 
Nevertheless, the instigator could be held liable under the concept of perpetration 
by means.562
A second advantage of the perspective that insanity only affects the blame-
worthi ness is that the conduct of the insane perpetrator is wrongful and can be 
averted by self-defence. If the insane cannot legally commit a wrongful attack 
because he is no subject of the law, this would preclude self-defence against him. 
Nevertheless, as explained before, defensive force of a third party could also be 
based on necessity. It can also be said that the insane defendant is not punished 
because insanity is framed as an excuse. The blameless cannot be punished. 
Nevertheless, by viewing it as an exemption, the same result would be reached. 
After all, the irresponsible are also unpunishable.
Finally, it is logical to prioritize the issue of responsibility over the issue of 
liability. The agent is only liable for causing harm, if he can be held accountable in 
the fi rst place, because he possesses the capacities to be an addressee of the criminal 
law.563 However, since defendants prefer to be acquitted on other grounds, insanity 
is often only assessed after it has been established that the defendant has committed 
a wrongful act.564 In that order of assessing liability, insanity resembles more an 
excuse.
It is submitted that insanity can be both an exemption as well as an excuse.565 It 
can even be a failure of proof defence if it is accepted that the disorder is the reason 
why the defendant did not foresee.566 If the insanity is suffi ciently severe such as to 
deny the responsibility of the defendant altogether, it is an exemption. If that is not 
the case, insanity can still play a role in the realm of excuses by answering the 
question whether the defendant could have acted differently.567 Furthermore, the 
character of the defence is infl uenced by the specifi c capacity that is impaired by 
the disorder. When cognitive capacities such as being aware of the nature of one’s 
conduct are impaired, the defence looks more like an exemption. When a volitional 
capacity, the ability to choose is impaired, the defence resembles most an excuse 
like duress.568
562 In other words, by ‘innocent agency’, ‘mittelbare Täterschaft’ or ‘doen plegen’. Another solution 
can be found in article 5.04 of the Model Penal Code, which simply holds that the irresponsibility 
of the other is immaterial to the liability of the solicitor, see the American Law Institute 1985.
563 Fletcher 1985, pp. 958–959.
564 In the Netherlands, it has thus often been argued the defence should be assessed last, see Dolman 
2006, p. 316 and 321; Fokkens & Machielse, note 5 on Uitsluiting en verhoging van strafbaarheid 
and Vellinga, W.H. 1982, pp. 155–156. See also Horder 2006A, pp. 102–103.
565 Tadros 2005, p. 322.
566 Robinson 1982, pp. 205–206. See also the reference to Dutch law above.
567 Tadros 2005, p. 372 and Duff 2007, p. 286. See also Westen 2008A, p. 581.
568 In other words, insanity is an exemption when an analogy is made with infancy, but an excuse 
when an analogy is made with duress, see Fletcher 1978, p. 836.
Chapter X
506 
If the defendant permanently suffers from a very severe disorder, this has the 
character of an exemption. The defendant is never a proper addressee of the law. If 
the disorder was of a transient nature, it has more of an excusatory character. After 
all, under the capacity theory, only if the disorder was transient, can it be said that 
the defendant’s conduct does not refl ect on his settled character.569 Finally, the 
character of insanity depends on which aspect one focuses. By focusing on the 
condition of impaired capacities, the requirement that fundamental capacities must 
be negated to accept insanity, its character of exemption is strongest.570 By focusing 
on the requirement that the disorder must have affected the actions underlying the 
offence charged, it becomes clear that insanity is not some general statement on the 
actor’s responsibility, but that is says something about the act in relation to the 
actor, which therefore resembles more the structure of excuses.
569 Tadros 2005, p. 134 submits that status-responsibility (which an exemption negates) cannot 
simply be determined at the point when a person acts, as it persists over time. Attribution-
responsibility (which an excuse negates) is determined in relation to the pertinent event. I reject 
this narrow scope of exemptions. After all, exemptions like infancy and immunity are judged 
according to the pertinent offence as well.
570 Beulke 2008, p. 139 and Duff 2007, pp. 289–291.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
1. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
I have submitted what mens rea and defences in a general part of European criminal 
law should look like. These general principles of European criminal law have been 
constructed out of the fragments of substantive criminal law of the European 
Union, including the ECHR and its case law. In order to complete this puzzle of a 
general part, I identifi ed more pieces by looking at the legal systems of its Member 
States. The decision, which pieces would fi t in the puzzle, was determined by 
conditions such as consistency, coherency and enforceability.
This decision was greatly facilitated by the considerable consensus of 
investigated legal systems: mens rea and defences are, for the most part, quite 
similar every where. For instance, in each of these legal systems, negligence leads to 
criminal liability and self-defence acquits the defendant. Moreover, the rationales 
underlying these legal principles are more or less identical. This considerable 
consensus greatly facilitated the synthesis, which is built upon the common ground 
of the pertinent legal systems. It would have become very diffi cult to identify the 
general principles of mens rea and defences for EU criminal law if many signifi cant 
differences would have been identifi ed. In fact, in many regards, the differences 
between the Member States are getting smaller and smaller. For example, the law 
on self-defence in the Netherlands and Germany is clearly moving towards each 
other. The traditionally wide scope of self-defence in German law is limited more 
and more, whereas the traditionally stricter scope of self-defence in Dutch law is 
clearly broadened in recent years.
It became clear that many of the different views on what general principles 
should look like do not necessarily coincide with national borders. Certainly, strict 
liability is most controversial in Germany and therefore completely rejected in law. 
Never the less, strict liability is controversial in every Member State. As a result, one 
can fi nd more or less the same arguments in favour of and against strict liability in 
every Member State. The same conclusion can be drawn in other contexts. 
Concerning the question whether or not it should be allowed in law to torture 
terrorists, or shoot down hijacked airplanes, the same arguments are made in 
favour and against it in all legal systems under investigation. It can thus be 
concluded that a common European criminal doctrine is very much alive. This has 
been evolving since the end of the nineteen seventies, when legal comparison and 
international scholarly cooperation on substantive criminal law started to become 
more popular.1
1 See for example Fletcher 1978.
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It is clear that all Member States share the same fundaments of criminal law; all 
face the same dilemmas in searching for an appropriate balancing of the interests of 
the individual defendant and public security. The Union is built on the fact that all 
Europeans share similar traditions and values, it is founded on a considerable 
degree of similarity between States, citizens and culture.2 Certainly, criminal law 
refl ects the basic values, customs and choices of any given society, which brings 
about signifi cant differences. However, in the larger perspective, the European 
societies have much more features in common. This is the result, not only of the 
approximation of some minimum rules relating to the general part of substantive 
criminal law by the ECJ and ECtHR, but also from the aforementioned scholarly 
cooperation, paralleled by an ongoing strengthening of judicial and police 
cooperation in criminal matters and cross-fertilisation of European with national 
criminal law.
The conclusion is thus also that a general part of EU criminal law can be made. 
Given the great similarities between national legal concepts, only a few signifi cant 
differences exist, requiring a fundamental choice. It will come as no surprise that 
most of these differences concern a clash of English law with its continental 
counterparts. These differences concern the contrasting fault elements of dolus 
eventualis and recklessness, the question whether liability requires proof of mens 
rea as to each and every single offence element, and a more general difference 
regarding the scope of defences. They refl ect the different legal cultures and can 
therefore also be explained by these national peculiarities. I will explain the three 
differences and shortly summarize how a choice was made. By explaining the 
differences, general conclusions on the legal systems under investigation and the 
general part of criminal law of the EU will become clear. Following this, I will 
summarize the answer to the main question of this research, what mens rea and 
defences should look like in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
1.1. Recklessness instead of dolus eventualis
From studying the fault elements in the legal systems under investigation, it can be 
concluded that the most serious and the least serious fault elements are very similar. 
The national differences really only concern the causing of side-effects by actions, 
the realization of risks of which the defendant is aware. The Dutch and German 
legal systems apply dolus eventualis to ground liability in these cases, the lowest 
form of intent. The Latin term is used to refl ect that the concept follows from a 
merger of different national concepts and is a candidate to be applied in a general 
part of criminal law for the EU.
2 Compare the recital of Framework Decision 2008/947 of 27 November 2008 on the application 
of the prin ciple of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the 
supervision of proba tion measures and alternative sanctions OJ 2008 L 337/102: “This 
presupposes that there is an understan ding of freedom, security and justice on the part of the 
Member States which is identical in its essential elements (…).”
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This concept of dolus eventualis is alien to English law. Instead of distinguishing 
intent from negligence, English law creates a fault element that is located in 
between intent and negligence, namely recklessness. It is functionally equivalent to 
dolus eventualis, but at the same time very different as it is not a form of intent. 
Recklessness is a broader concept that also includes the Dutch and German fault 
elements of conscious negligence and its aggravated form, luxuria. For a general 
part of criminal law for the EU, a choice was made for recklessness, a choice in 
favour of three instead of two major categories of fault. In a general part of criminal 
law for the EU, the accused who foresees that his actions may lead to a side-effect 
should not be held liable for intending to bring this about. Instead, we should hold 
him liable for recklessly causing side-effects.
In short, the choice in favour of recklessness followed from the requirements of 
con sis tency and fair labelling. The use of recklessness keeps dolus within proper 
limits. The functional equivalent, the extended concept of dolus eventualis is 
rejected because it distorts the meaning of intent, it is very different from dolus 
directus and indirec tus and it leads to inconsistent outcomes. Fault should not be 
distinguished based on attitude, but based on awareness. This refl ects the difference 
in culpability better and is easier to prove in practice. Together with its explicit 
normative elements, recklessness is best equipped to deal with foreseen side-effects 
in this day and age. I will readdress this choice when I describe all fault elements 
below.
1.2. Strict liability
Secondly, German criminal law does not allow for liability without proof of a fault 
element like intent or negligence. This can be contrasted with the popularity of 
strict liability in the Netherlands and England. Many arguments in favour of strict 
liability have been vitiated and many arguments against strict liability have 
correctly been raised. Moreover, there are many alternatives to striking fault as an 
element of an offence defi nition. Nonetheless, the choice was made not to preclude 
strict liability altogether, in line with the case-law of the ECJ and ECtHR.
The principle of guilt as interpreted by the ECtHR does not militate against 
strict liability. In contrast, the German injunction on strict liability follows from a 
broader interpretation of that principle as literally meaning nulla poena sine culpa: 
no punishment without (at least) negligence. I called this the fault requirement. The 
principle is given constitu tional status in Germany. The German Consti tu tio nal 
Court has even gone as far to hold that EU law cannot alter such a principle and 
must therefore be interpreted in line with it. This interpretation is rejected however, 
because the more limited approach of the ECtHR carries more weight in the 
synthesis. The constitutional tradition of one Member State is not given absolute 
weight, because otherwise all that could be established are lowest common 
denominators.
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Secondly, that broad interpretation in German law neglects the difference 
between fault and blameworthiness. It has been explained that blameworthiness 
should be distinguished from mens rea. The latter is an analytical tool of the offence 
that encompasses fault elements and its related principles. If one fails to make this 
distinction, as in some English cases, the negation of blameworthiness by an excuse 
risks being interpreted as a negation of fault, leading to inconsistency in judging 
similar cases. The interpretation of an excuse as a denial of intention is wrong, 
because the fact that the defendant was coerced under duress to injure someone 
does not negate the fact that he intended to injure someone. For example, even 
though terrorists coerced him, John did intend to kill the police commissioner.
It is true that fault elements, like intention, increase the reproach that can be 
made to the defendant in comparison to a negligent offence. However, 
blameworthiness deals with an aspect of liability that is more fundamental. Even 
crimes of strict liability require that the defendant is blameworthy. It is an absolute 
principle of criminal law, allowing for no exceptions, that the blameless may not be 
punished. This is the lower limit of criminal liability. The principle of no 
punishment without guilt therefore refers to the rule that there can be no punishment 
without blame worthiness.
Even though there are good reasons to always require some fault in an offence 
defi nition, it would be inaccurate to state that such a principle is widely recognized 
in the EU.3 Fault may be the standard, but strict liability is certainly no longer the 
exception in Dutch and English criminal law. This is allowed by the ECJ and 
ECtHR and should be seen as the manifestation of a dynamic principle in a 
changing society, in which views on responsibility also change. For example, 
criminal law now deals with a much wider scope of violations of norms than it used 
to. Concerns of dealing effi ciently with high numbers of, for example, traffi c 
violations may warrant strict liability.
Functional equivalents to strict liability are offences of endangerment, fall back 
or basic offences, duties to prove that the norms have been complied with and 
reversed onuses. These alternatives can also give rise to doctrinal objections, 
questioning whether the reasons for criminalization are legitimate and whether the 
presumption of innocence is not violated. An alternative that can give the same 
benefi ts at an apparently lesser cost to the fair administration of justice is requiring 
culpa and reversing the burden of proof. If a result is made strict because it is 
foreseeable, then requiring culpa, possibly even by presuming it, would also lead to 
liability, whilst having the advantage that it could acquit those who could not 
foresee the result. After all, if the crime were one of strict liability, the claim that 
the risk was unforeseeable is not a defence. Only a due diligence defence could 
preclude a conviction. Nevertheless, strict liability is not always based on a 
foreseeable relationship between conduct and result. It is also used to simply 
alleviate the enforcement of offences and to ensure the greatest level of protection 
3 Like Delmas-Marty & Vervaele 2000, p. 35 and Delmas-Marty 1997, p. 64.
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for vulnerable interests such as those of young children. Culpa (praesumptus) 
therefore not always appears to be a suffi cient alternative to do away with strict 
liability.
The question of whether or not strict liability and its equivalents of reverse 
onuses should be allowed in European criminal law is a matter that is to be assessed 
in the context of every offence. The case against strict liability is stronger in relation 
to serious offences with severe penalties. As a rule, an element that gives the 
offence its character must not be made strict. However, other considerations also 
need to be taken into account, like the ease for the defendant to prove something. 
Even if the element is essential to the offence, the defendant can be required to 
prove that he, for example, did something whilst being licensed to do so. In general, 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial should be weighed against the interests of the 
criminal justice system in securing convictions. Since many offences in European 
criminal law are of a regulatory nature or aim to protect vulnerable interests, the 
use of strict offence elements may very well be legitimate.
The manner in which the ECtHR carries out this weighing of interests is 
insuffi cient, because it only sets minimum requirements. Faced with only the option 
of holding a violation of article 6 ECHR or not, the Court feels pressured to approve 
of strict practices. Instead, courts should also be able to interpret an offence or 
burden of proof in conformity with fundamental rights. By conform interpretation, 
which is common to the ECJ and English courts, courts have at their disposal more 
options to strike the appropriate balance between the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of effi cient enforcement of criminal law. If possible, the court should read 
in fault elements or defences or lower the burden of proof put on the defendant. In 
conclusion, strict liability and its alternatives may be used in European criminal 
law, but only when it is established that this is necessary, because lesser alternatives 
do not suffi ce. If lesser alternatives do suffi ce, courts may be able to reinterpret the 
offence in such a way.
1.3. The scope of defences
A third important difference is that the scope of defences in England is generally 
much more restrictive than in Germany or the Netherlands. After all, unlike in the 
other two Member States, the excuses self-defence-excess, mistake of law and 
superior orders are unavailable in England. Moreover, necessity, duress and insanity 
are much stricter in scope in English than in Dutch and German law.
This difference can be explained by the sceptical approach of English law to 
defences and general principles of law. First and foremost, fears persist that accep-
ting some defences and extending others would deteriorate the authority of the 
norms and the legislator. It is feared that defences will be abused, hampering 
effi cient prosecution of criminals. English law recognizes that there are cases in 
which the defendant should not be punished severely or not at all, but prefers to 
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enable this by procedural means, such as prosecutorial discretion, by sentencing or 
by granting the convicted person a pardon.4
In addition, there exists a more general reluctance of English law to apply 
general principles of criminal law. The preference on the specifi c over the general is 
clearly visible in the tendency of English law to rely on specifi c measures rather 
than to deal with cases by general defences. Instead of leaving exceptional matters 
to a coherent and comprehensive set of defences, the legislator often tends to draft 
offences very detailed, already making explicit any available defence by including 
it into the criminalization. As a result, there is less room for general defences.
Another reason for the restrictive scope of defences is the circumstance that 
wrong ful ness and blameworthiness are not fi rmly anchored as prerequisites of 
liability in English criminal law. By fi rmly anchoring these implied elements in 
criminal theory as absolute conditions of criminal liability, the number and scope of 
existing defences would certainly augment. It follows that reducing the sentence of 
the excused defendant is insuffi cient, as criminal liability should not be imposed at 
all. If it were acknowledged that the insight of the illegality of one’s conduct is an 
element of blameworthiness, the recognition of mistake of law as an excuse would 
follow. Moreover, if the distinction between justifi cation and excuse would be 
appreciated better, some of the paranoia regarding defences would be taken away. 
For instance, excusing the defendant for making an unavoidable mistake of law 
does not entail an approval of those actions, or a statement that those actions are in 
fact lawful. Instead, the excuse denotes that the defendant is only excused for his 
wrongful actions. An excuse thereby reinforces the norms.
The unavailability of self-defence-excess, mistake of law and superior orders is 
partially counterbalanced by functional equivalents. A relatively broader scope of 
jus ti fi ed self-defence and putative self-defence, as well as the availability of two 
specifi c defences that can reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter mitigate the 
unavai lability of self-defence-excess. A mistake of law cannot excuse the defendant 
in England, but this is counterbalanced by the fact that in paradigm cases of mistake 
of law, such as mistakes based on incorrect advice of offi cial authorities, the procee-
dings against the defendant, if instituted at all, will be stayed. Secondly, mistakes 
on aspects of civil law are sometimes held to negate mens rea. Superior orders is a 
species of mistake or law, and therefore also no excuse in England. Never theless, 
Courts sometimes acquit defendants by negating mens rea or by accepting a related 
defence like duress, if the defendant by his disobedience would risk injuries.
These features of English law can however be criticized. First of all, the legal 
concepts that fi ll the gap are almost all inconsistent with criminal doctrine. Since 
intention is neutral, since intention is generally not required as to the illegality of 
the conduct, it is inconsistent to negate this when the defendant was ignorant of the 
norm or mistaken on the legality of an order by a superior. Another example is that 
4 Ashworth 2006, pp. 239–241 and Husak 1989, p. 512.
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if a mistake on the facts giving rise to self-defence need not be reasonable, no 
difference can be made between actual and putative self-defence.
Secondly, the partial defences of loss of control and diminished responsibility 
and other means of mitigating the sentence fail to recognize the importance of 
criminal liability and its difference with sentencing. If the conduct was not 
wrongful or the defendant not blameworthy, this should be refl ected in criminal 
liability. The commu nicative function of criminal law requires the conviction to 
distinguish between the guilty and the excused. Excused conduct should not be 
punished at all and does not deserve the stigma of a criminal conviction, even if the 
convicted person is not punished. Criminal liability can therefore be defi ned as the 
punish ability of a responsible actor for committing an offence. It implies that the 
defen dant’s conduct is not justifi ed and the defendant not excused. Sentencing by 
contrast is the valuation of the seriousness of a specifi c criminal offence, taking 
into account the actor, his state of mind and his motives.
Third, leaving the circumstances with the executive violates the division of state 
powers. Criminal liability is a matter of adjudication. The defendant should not be 
left at the mercy of administrative discretion. He is entitled to have liability debated 
in an open court. An open debate on liability in court is also in the interest of the 
victim and the public, who will better understand the reasons for or against liability. 
The decision can be controlled by a higher or Supreme Court and everyone else, 
thus furthering consistency and hence fairness.
Fourth, even if the English approach would be accepted, the availability of 
prosecu torial discretion and discretion sentencing does not provide for suffi cient 
protection of the defendant. Whereas harsh outcomes can be neutralized or 
mitigated in other ways, in many cases the defendant is still punished whilst he 
would not have been liable under Dutch or German law. Fuelled by deterrence, 
English law favours to send out a strong signal that the law is so and so over 
concerns of individual fair ness. This is however at odds with more retributive views 
on punishment. Moreover, prosecutorial discretion can only afford some relief in a 
legal system that enables such discretion. In contrast, the scope of defences is thus 
much more important in a system that operates on the principle that the prosecutor 
is required to bring charges for every crime.
From the perspective that criminal law must be enforceable, many of the fears 
that gave rise to the restrictive approach have been defused by looking at the 
practice of Dutch and German law, where no such fears materialized. Fears of abuse 
are overestimated, because it is overlooked that the threshold of for example 
excusing the defendant under a mistake of law is very high. Secondly, the concern 
that people are encouraged to remain ignorant of the law by recognizing the defence 
is unfounded. If the defendant failed to make suffi cient enquiries on the lawfulness 
of his conduct, his ignorance will not be excused. Third, the concern that accepting 
the defence in a case sends a wrong signal to the public. As noted, excusing the 
defendant for making an unavoidable mistake of law does not invalidate, it rather 
reinforces the norm.
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English scholars are well aware of this and less reluctant to a broader role for 
general defences. Even English Courts have recognized the problems of the restric-
tive approach to defences.5 In more recent cases, they have become more adventu-
rous therefore in extending the scope of defences, signalling a possible trend that 
would result in a move towards the other two Member States under investiga tion. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the general part of criminal law for the EU should 
have a broad range of possible defences, comparable with Dutch and German law.
In Dutch and German law, the scope of defences is quite similar. There are a few 
more defences recognized in Dutch law, which on closer inspection are however 
super fl uous as more specifi c variations of general defences like necessity. Secondly, 
the taboo on killing persons outside the scope of self-defence is not as strong in the 
Netherlands as it is in Germany and England. This is evident by the possibility to 
raise necessity and duress against a charge of intentional killing.
Nevertheless, German law has the widest scope of defences. For example, 
traditionally, self-defence does not require proportionality. In legal comparison, it 
could therefore be argued that the wide scope of German defences insuffi ciently 
regards the interests of the victims of crime. It follows from the positive obligation 
of the State to safeguard the right to life under article 2 ECHR that disproportionate 
force may not be justifi ed in self-defence. The wide scope of defences not only 
follows from the broad conditions of defences. The lenient approach as to in dubio 
pro reo also signifi cantly favours the defendant concerning the acceptance of 
defences. The least amount of doubt on the actual facts may lead a Court to take 
hypothetical facts that are most favourable to the defendant as a starting point. This 
can lead to absurd assumptions and thereby outcomes that are diffi cult to agree 
with.
As regards most issues in this research, Dutch law can be located in between the 
pragmatic approach of English law and the dogmatic approach of German law. 
Dutch law adheres to the importance of dogmatic criminal law and accepts most of 
the dogmatic principles one can fi nd in German law. However, it draws a line where 
dogmatics threatens to violate an appropriate outcome or lead to absurd legal 
approaches.6 As evident in dealing with intoxicated actors, Dutch law quite pragma-
tically establishes criminal liability without even addressing possible doctrinal 
problems. This middle position makes Dutch law tempting for any compromise, as 
long as simplicity and enforceability are considered as no less important criteria 
than consistency.
The infl uence of German criminal law on the outcome of this research has 
nevertheless been signifi cant. This can be explained by the fact that much of the 
general principles discussed in this research have important roots in Germany. 
Moreover, the more elaborate the discussion on general principles becomes, the 
more one looks at the details of an issue, the more likely only German law has 
something to say about it. After all, an important feature of German law is to 
5 R. v. G. [2003] UKHL 50 and R. v. Pommell [1995] EWCA Crim 7.
6 Compare Stratenwerth in Eser & Fletcher 1988, pp. 1072–1073.
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elaborate thoroughly on all possible legal questions, real or hypothetical. If these 
German perspectives were consistent with the general concept developed by 
comparing all legal sources, they simply complemented and elaborated the general 
principle of European criminal law. English criminal law has also left its mark on 
the synthesis. It did so in a signifi cant way by favouring a third fault element of 
recklessness over the watered down form of intention called dolus eventualis.
2. MENS REA
Although often equated with fault elements, mens rea refers also to the principles 
that determine the application of these elements, such as the correspondence prin-
ciple. It is an analytical tool to pigeonhole offence elements and criminal doctrines 
into a subjective category, as opposed to a category of more objective offence 
elements.
2.1. Rationale
By requiring mens rea, the legal subject is recognized as an autonomous, sensible 
person, who can be held accountable for the choices he makes. From a historical 
perspective, requiring fault for criminal liability can be explained as a counter 
reaction to liability that is merely based on harmful outcomes. It must be seen as a 
protective principle that aims to exclude from criminal liability those persons who 
cannot be reproached for the criminal act they committed. A man is only guilty 
when his mind is also guilty. In other words, the wrong expressed by a criminal 
offence consists not only of the act or consequence, but also by the concomitant 
state of mind.
The development of mens rea allowed criminal law to be made more rational, 
grounding liability and thereby punishment in retribution and deterrence, which 
have been introduced in the second chapter as criteria of this synthesis. Both views 
on punishment value the subjective connection between act and actor. The more 
culpable the actor is, the stronger the case for retribution and deterrence becomes. 
For example, the intentional actor deserves to be punished more severely and is 
assumed more likely to reoffend. Since a negligent actor may also reoffend, it is 
warranted to criminalize culpa too. All other things being equal, the reproach 
against the negligent actor, expressed in punishment, is nonetheless always of a 
lesser degree. By contrast, it is widely accepted that punishment that is merely 
based on unfortunate outcomes is neither deserved nor useful for deterrence. Mens 
rea is thus a precondition for retributive and deterrent criminal law. Strict liability 
is based only on pragmatic reasons of effi cient enforcement.
Providing an overarching rationale of mens rea is made diffi cult by the 
circumstance that fault elements have interrelated, yet different rationales. The 
rationale of intention must explain why the intentional actor is punished more 
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severely than the negligent one. At the same time, intention is considered the 
paradigm form of crimi nal conduct. ‘An offence which was not committed 
intentionally’, like negligen ce, is the exception to the rule, particularly in European 
criminal law.7 Consequently, lawyers seek to justify the use of negligence as a 
legitimate exception to or by identifying common rationales with intention.
Due to its paradigm nature, it is tempting to refer to the rationale of intention as 
that of mens rea in general. The importance of mens rea for criminal liability is 
obvious when the evilness evident in the person who kills with dolus directus is 
contrasted with the person who caused someone to die but through no fault at all. 
However, mens rea includes many other fault elements. It is hard to establish a 
general rationale, as the maxim actus reus non facit mens sit rea also does not tell 
us what kind of fault is required. From a perspective that tries to identify the 
minimum criteria of a rule, it would be understandable to refer to mens rea’s lower 
limit, which is culpa. In that perspective, the rationale of mens rea could also be 
determined by focusing on the reasons against strict liability.
More is achieved by combining these different approaches and by identifying 
common ground. The person who acts intentionally has a great degree of control 
over the criminal outcome. He deserves the most severe punishment because he 
knows what he is doing and chooses to fulfi l the offence defi nition. This 
autonomous choice refl ects hostility towards the legal interests of the other and the 
legal order. In negligent acts, the perpetrator also possesses, albeit to a more limited 
degree, the possibility to control the act, to avoid the result. The perpetrator was not 
aware that he created a risk, but given his individual capacities he is reproached for 
not using his faculties where he could. It can even be said that by not adverting to 
the possibility that the legal interests of others would be violated, he expresses 
indifference towards them.
In sum, mens rea is punished because it denotes a suffi cient degree of control 
over and choice for his actions, which to some also shows that he is insuffi ciently 
motivated by the interests of his fellow citizens to a degree that is worthy of moral 
indignation. By requiring mens rea, it is safeguarded that the defendant is only held 
liable if he had the capacity and opportunity to do otherwise. The law treats people 
as subjects who choose their own acts and are only punished for their culpable 
choices. The retributive reproach against the individual defendant is grounded in 
his mens rea. As noted, it would be unfair to punish the defendant who cannot be 
reproached for what he did. Moreover, it would have little use. Neither this 
defendant, nor other persons are deterred from committing similar acts if it is a 
matter of luck. Without mens rea, without any degree of control, the legal subject is 
not infl uenced by the law to adapt his behaviour. In other words, both retributive 
and preventive goals of punishment can only be fulfi lled if criminal liability and 
punishment follow upon establishing mens rea.
7 See 26 May 1981, Case C-157/80, Criminal proceedings against Siegfried Ewald Rinkau [1981] 
ECR 1395.
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Culpa is generally considered a legitimate fault element for criminal liability. 
Those that reject culpa as a suffi cient kind of mens rea are most likely to argue 
against this common ground, emphasizing the differences with dolus. It could be 
argued that only the subjective part of culpa, that is hardly relevant in practice, is 
really a form of mens rea. Culpa is hardly compatible with mens rea as a state of 
mind, as subjective elements, relating to the mental psychological area and the 
conceptual universe of the actor. This would allow us to defi ne mens rea in a 
straightforward way as a principle that enables that “criminal liability should be 
imposed only on persons who are suffi ciently aware of what they are doing and of 
the consequences it may have, that they can fairly be said to have chosen the 
conduct and its consequences.”8 For a general part of criminal law however, such a 
narrow defi ni tion of mens rea would not refl ect the practice of the Member States. 
In fact, even if mens rea is the rule for criminal offences and for very good reasons, 
strict liability is possible too.
The differences between fault elements, ranging from very psychological to 
very normative, make it extremely hard to draw general conclusions relating to all 
of them. It seems almost inevitable that a general rationale focuses on either its 
higher or lower limit. A rationale is doomed to be either general yet vague, or to be 
more specifi c but not applicable to all fault elements and doctrines discussed in this 
chapter. This may be accepted as less problematic if it is recalled that mens rea is 
merely an analytical tool, a legal tool to pigeonhole legal criteria and doctrines.
Of greatest importance are the different fault elements themselves. A system 
that would use one single fault element of for example, negligence, leaving 
distinctions of culpability to sentencing, must be rejected. The distinction between 
fault elements is fundamental to communicate differences in moral reproaches. 
Criminal liability is one of the most fundamental communicative tools to reaffi rm 
the norms and to express condemnation. The degree to which punish ment is 
warranted and necessary is refl ected by the degree of culpability, the kind of fault. 
The intentional actor is more culpable and thus deserves more punish ment. More-
over, criminal liability is not only a tool, but also a right, a safeguard. Requiring 
intention for criminal liability ensures that only those persons who chose the 
criminal act are punished. In some cases, requiring merely culpa is also acceptable 
from a retributive and deterrent point of view, and in yet other cases, there can be 
good reasons to do away with proof of fault altogether. The context of mens rea is 
important. The appropriate fault element always depends on the actus reus, the 
interests of the defendant and the interests of society.
2.2. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
Mens rea has become even more diffi cult to grasp in modern society. The dicho-
tomy of actus reus and mens rea used to coincide with the dualist view, strictly 
8 Ashworth 2006, p. 158.
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sepa ra ting mind from body, which has been largely rejected by now. Fault and 
conduct can often not be separated. As noted, negligence is not a state of mind. The 
psychological aspects of other fault elements are put under pressure by the manner 
in which they are proven. What is left is a collection of legal concepts and principles 
that are considered to belong to mens rea or the subjective side of the offence, 
because we are accustomed to the categorization and it facilitates legal analysis. 
Although distinctions have turned out to be relative and borders fl uent, this does not 
necessitate their abolition. The separation of the objective from the subjective still 
applies to most criminal legal concepts. Attempt, for example, belongs to neither 
category yet also to both, including objective and subjective elements.
In addition, it appears that the dichotomy still has normative force. By forcing 
the applier of law to categorize offence elements, it forces him to consider whether 
an act indeed does not make a man guilty unless his mind is also guilty. The 
exercise of categorization enables us to see whether an actus reus and a mens rea 
exists, and if not, to take appropriate steps, like to read in such elements. Criminal 
law is therefore founded on the assumption that no punishment should follow unless 
the defendant committed a harm, which can be subjectively attributed to him. The 
maxim also implies an interrelationship, expressed in the principle of 
correspondence. The rules of this principle can only be applied by fi rst assessing 
what is actus reus, what is mens rea.
The interrelationship seems to have changed. Whereas actus reus and mens rea 
should in principle still be proven for criminal liability and correspond, extensive 
interpretations and exceptions have loosened this relationship. The number of occa-
sions in which actus reus and mens rea are not cumulative but alternative criteria of 
criminal liability have increased, most notably with the rise of strict liability. In 
many instances, the relationship of actus reus and mens rea can thus be charac te-
rized as one of ‘communicating vessels’. This means that when there are hardly any 
objective elements required to hold someone liable, more should be required from 
the subjective elements of the offence defi nition to ensure that the liability of the 
defendant is warranted and vice versa. For instance, close or direct conse quences 
can facilitate the inference of a fault element like intention. When someone is shot 
from close range, it is easily accepted that the results caused were intended.
From the perspective of this research, the trend in criminal law is to ground 
criminal liability less on morally defective choices and more on the harm caused. 
This objecti vist infl uence in criminal law is not only evident by making offence 
elements strict, it is no less clear in the procedural context. Fault elements are 
proven by means of objective evidence such as conduct and circumstances. Finders 
of fact increasingly rely almost exclusively on the external manifestation of conduct. 
Objective and normative approaches even gain ground where it concerns ‘genuine 
psychological’ state of minds like intention. So-called rules of general experience 
were exposed as means to attribute intention normatively. They are camoufl aged as 
objective knowledge that is supposed to reveal the defendant’s subjective 
knowledge, but they are highly infl uenced by considerations such as the harm 
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involved. From the perspective of other principles than mens rea and defences, 
more subjec tivist tendencies can be discerned. For example in attempt, liability may 
increa sing ly be linked to the actor’s intention rather than actual actions. Both 
tenden cies manifest a trend towards the extension of the scope criminal liability 
and the facilitation of its proof.
2.3. Fault elements
Finally, I will summarize the fi ndings on what fault elements should look like in 
Euro pean criminal law and make some concluding observations. Three fault 
elements can be distinguished: dolus, recklessness and culpa. Dolus encompasses 
those results that were wanted or known to occur with almost absolute certainty. 
Reckless is the actor who was aware of unreasonable risks. Negligent is the actor 
who was unaware of unreasonable risks.
The most serious fault element, paramount for criminal liability as it expresses 
the greatest degree of control and choice over the fulfi lment of the offence defi nition 
is dolus. The most serious form of this intention concentrates on the will of the 
actor to bring about a certain result. An example of this dolus directus is the case 
where the actor detonates a bomb in a small fl ying aeroplane, because he wants to 
kill the pilot. A slightly less serious form of intent is dolus indirectus. Conduct is 
also deemed intentional if the actor knows it will almost certainly bring about 
consequences that he does not desire or primarily aim at. A textbook example is the 
person who blows up the aforementioned aeroplane in order to collect the insurance 
money. He does not want the pilot to die, but he knows this is a certain result of the 
bomb exploding, barring some unforeseen intervention. Dolus is indirectus because 
the actor does not aim directly at the killing of the pilot and crew, but at another 
goal that does not form part of the offence defi nition, the payment of insurance.
These examples deal with consequences. If dolus relates to circumstances, it is 
common to refer to knowledge. Dolus can thus be defi ned as acting “with respect to 
i) a circumstance when he hopes or knows that it exists or will exist; ii) a result 
when he acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.”9 In essence, dolus directus is about wanting; indirectus 
is about knowing. The two forms of dolus are equated because they are morally 
indistinct. Moreover, it turned out, that although they are conceptually each other’s 
mirror image, they are at times hard to separate. This is possible nonetheless by 
applying a test of failure, or by distinguishing between means and side-effects. For 
the person who wants to collect the insurance money, the death of the pilot and 
crew of the airplane he blows up is not a necessary condition. If they survive, he 
would not consider his plans as failed.
The lowest standard of fault, culpa, is about a normative failure to advert to and 
avoid a certain risk, which in fact materialised. It communicates the reproach that 
9 Section 18(b) of the draft Criminal Code, Law Commission 1989, p. 51.
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the actor has violated a duty of care that caused harm, whereas he should and could 
have foreseen and avoided this. An example is serious carelessness by a person 
responsible for maintenance of an aircraft, which crashes as a result. A lesser kind 
of fault does not exist, but offences can also be strict. Strict liability was discussed 
above.
In between dolus indirectus and culpa, the question is what foresight of side-
effects should amount to. The choice was between the continental dolus eventualis 
and the English recklessness. I have criticized dolus eventualis and made 
suggestions to alter the concept, with a view to either ‘improve’ the law or to 
explain the outcomes in practice. In addition, these suggestions also made clear 
how recklessness differs and could be a better alternative. For example, in 
eventualis, the defendant must be aware of both the risk and the fact that it is 
considerable. However, the awareness of the risk is often inferred from the objective 
chance, the foreseeability of the risk. This led me to suggest that if theory is to 
follow practice, eventualis should not require subjective awareness of a considerable 
risk. Recklessness strikes a middle ground and requires awareness of a risk, but its 
valuation as considerable or unreasonable is conducted normatively. This approach 
is comparable to the practical approach to dolus eventualis, which would make 
theory consistent with practice.
By considering examples of the different degrees of intention, it became clear 
that there is a signifi cant difference between dolus directus and indirectus on the 
one hand, and dolus eventualis and conscious negligence on the other. There exists 
a fundamental difference between intending harm and foreseeing risks: the former 
is more culpable than the latter. Furthermore, both directus and indirectus require a 
high degree of either wanting something or knowing something, whereas these 
elements are only present in a very diluted form in eventualis. In addition, the 
rationales of punishing dolus directus and indirectus, like the great degree of 
control over and choice for the outcome are also only present to a small extent in 
eventualis. It has more in common with conscious negligence, which also deals 
with the foresight of risks. The supposed difference between the two, accepting the 
risk and trusting everything will be alright, does not follow clearly from case-law.
Dolus eventualis distorts intent in both a legal and linguistic manner. Much 
more than indirectus, dolus eventualis strains the legal and colloquial meaning of 
intent as acting in order to bring about. In using eventualis to prove the defendant 
intended the damage he caused, we in fact prove far less than what we blame him 
for. We prove that the defendant was aware of and reconciled himself with a lethal 
danger, but we hold that he intended to cause death. This discrepancy of proof and 
label is unfair to the defendant. In other words, the intentional creation of danger 
should be punished less severely than the intentional violation of a legal interest. 
Intention should be distinguished from foresight by creating three kinds of fault, 
rather than two.
As a tertium quid in between dolus and culpa, recklessness criminalizes the 
foresight of unreasonable side-effects. It is also about knowledge, but distinguished 
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from dolus indirectus by the degree of the likelihood of that side-effect occurring. 
Conceptually, another advantage of applying reckless ness is that the distinction 
with culpa is also strictly drawn by awareness. By doing away with conscious 
negligence, culpa no longer includes the confl icting concepts of awareness and 
ignorance. Culpa is (reprehen sible) ignorance. The defendant is reproached because 
he should and could have foreseen what the reasonable man would have foreseen. 
This strict distinction furthers a consistent legal framework with foreseeable 
outcomes.
It can therefore be concluded that fault is about volition, knowledge or 
reproachable ignorance, the latter which is often equated as foreseeability. Fault can 
be very subjective but also very normative. In general, it can be concluded that 
mens rea has become more normative in the last century. The normative concept of 
risk in reck less ness fi ts in perfectly with modern risk society, as do negligent 
offences, which are increasingly popular. Intention is also infl uenced by normative 
considerations. More and more scholars have argued in favour of a normative fault 
element to criminalize the foresight of legally relevant risks. I agree in favour of a 
normative fault element, but one of recklessness rather than intent. In doing so, a 
strict distinction can be made with dolus, which can, depending on the national 
perspective, remain subjective or become more subjective again.
As far as circumstances are concerned, recklessness can also be applied. 
Reckless knowledge should apply when the defendant knows there might be a risk 
that a prohibited circumstance is present, but refrains from checking it. This should 
be distinguished from actual knowledge. The English concept of wilful blindness is 
at odds with this strict separation. Just as dolus eventualis is often held to suffi ce for 
knowledge, English law has also deemed it appropriate to equate suspicion with 
knowledge, if that suspicion is coupled with a deliberate failure to use readily 
available and effective means that he knows of to resolve the suspicion. Whereas 
such a perpetrator may be very culpable indeed, it is submitted that this degree of 
culpability should be treated as a serious form of reckless knowledge, and to be 
taken into account in sentencing.
As an alternative to rejecting dolus eventualis in favour of recklessness, this 
fault element should be proven in a moderate objective manner, which would 
overcome many of the problems identifi ed in proving intentional charges. This 
second best option is provided, since it can be expected that the restriction of intent 
and the creation of another fault element may give rise to resistance in many 
continental legal systems. In addition, it is likely that England will not participate in 
the creation of a general part of European criminal law, for example in the context 
of a European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce.10 In that case, much of the political weight 
in favour of applying recklessness would cease to exist.
I explained that eventualis is primarily used to facilitate proof. Merely diluted 
forms of knowing and wanting need to be proven. However, on top of that, these 
10 See the European Union Act 2011.
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watered down conditions are accepted easily in practice, often without any actual 
connection to the specifi c state of mind of the defendant. As explained, this 
moderate objective approach, which should be applied to all fault elements, 
safeguards that dolus eventualis is kept subjective. Objective circum stances and 
conduct may be used to infer the awareness and acceptance of risks, but moderation 
is required in order to prevent that the individual defendant is equated with the 
average person. Even though most people would have been aware in specifi c 
circumstances, dolus eventualis should only be inferred if the court is certain this 
individual defendant was also aware. The approach urges the judiciary to be more 
reluctant and cautious in applying assumptions based on general experience or a 
reasonable person standard.
After all, facts or general experience are not always known or true. Moreover, 
problems of evidence should not be shifted on to the defendant. Considering how 
hard it is to disprove objective assumptions, the fact that the burden of proving fault 
rests of on the Prosecutor and the principle that it is better to acquit ten guilty than 
to convict one innocent person, any doubt that the assumption may not be correct in 
a specifi c case, should carefully be considered by reference to all the facts and 
circum stances of the specifi c case and the specifi c defendant. By requiring courts to 
clearly substantiate their reasoning, logic and inferences in judgments, this 
moderate objective approach can be controlled and enforced by higher courts.
2.4. Relevant factors
In discussing the different fault elements, several factors have surfaced that 
determine the scope of criminal liability. They determined the scope because they 
infl uence the question whether the fault element can be accepted or must be 
rejected. Two sets of factors are distinguished, one procedural and one substantive. 
The procedural set of factors became particularly evident in discussing dolus 
eventualis and strict liability. Rules and customs on how fault elements are proven 
are decisive to the question of criminal liability. If it is easily accepted that the 
defendant accepted that the risk would materialize, this criterion of dolus eventualis 
does not provide for a serious threshold against criminal liability. If it is inferred 
automa ti cally from acting whilst being aware of the risk, this criterion even 
becomes super fl uous. Finally, by identifying reversed onuses as a procedural 
alternative to strict liability, it became clear again that substantive criteria can be 
put under pressure by procedural means. Fault can be required, but if this is 
presumed, the defendant is hardly better off than if liability is strict.
Particular aspects have been identifi ed, such as how careful the judiciary is in 
considering all the circumstances of the case and how certain the judiciary is in 
accepting something as generally known, or as considerable. When intentional 
lethal offences are charged in Germany, the Courts are required to give a 
particularly careful consideration of all the diverging perspectives that are possible, 
but I have submitted that such an approach should be adopted in relation to all 
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offences and to all fault elements. Reasons of expediency in dealing with vast 
amounts of criminal cases may not overrule the presumption of innocence and 
other safeguards that aim to convict only the guilty. In inferring the knowledge and 
volition of the defendant from the actions of a reasonable person, one needs to make 
sure that this is in fact the state of mind of the particular defendant. Otherwise, fault 
would not be inferred objectively but attributed normatively. The explicit and 
elaborate grounding of the reasons in favour of criminal liability can function as a 
quality check for the Courts that they made the correct decision, allowing other 
jurists and the public to control this. Since such a motivation is generally not 
required from juries, this quality check appears to be incompatible with juries 
deciding on mens rea.
Another important aspect in this regard is the principle of in dubio pro reo. It 
can be said that this is taken seriously only in Germany, but it can also be said that 
this is taken too seriously in Germany This became evident in the assessment of the 
volitional element in dolus eventualis and the causal requirements in culpa. 
Although the required level of assurance is similar in theory in all three Member 
States, attitudes clearly differ. In the context of defences, the German judiciary also 
often takes a very lenient approach to in dubio pro reo, accepting the circumstances 
that are most benefi cial to the defendant, without there being any factual reason to 
do so. It has been argued that this can lead to absurd assumptions, that seem to 
overlook the fact that criminal law not only aims to protect the defendant but also 
the public. As explained in the second chapter, if the criminal law clearly fails to 
protect its citizens, it loses its credibility. This also has the risk that, as a reaction, 
the criminal legal system with all its guarantees is sidelined.
The second set of factors that determines the scope of criminal liability is 
substantive in character, meaning that they deal with the requirements of the fault 
elements themselves. Obviously, the national differences relating to the criteria of 
fault elements are important, but so is the national character of fault. The criteria of 
the element and the outcomes of most criminal cases are not so different amongst 
the three Member States, but in solving issues of criminal liability, distinctly 
different characters of fault appear. In England for example, dolus turned out to be 
sensitive to moral connotations, requiring intent as to the illegal nature of the 
conduct. In contrast, dolus was positioned as a neutral concept, which strengthened 
the distinction between the offence defi nition, wrongfulness and blameworthiness, 
on which the framework of criminal liability is built.
In addition, dolus and fault in general, were presented in the fi nal section as 
general concepts. They need not relate to more specifi c elements than required by 
the offence defi nition. Offences in principle do not individualize the object of the 
crime like the victim or the way in which a result should be brought about. As a 
result, fault should also not relate to it. Mistakes will negate intention or awareness, 
but only in as far as this is relevant to the pertinent offence. Thus, John can be held 
to have intended to kill the police offi cer, because he wanted to kill a human being 
and succeeded. It would not be any different if he had mistaken the police offi cer 
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for the police commissioner. The offence is to kill a human being, not to assassinate 
a police commissioner. Dolus is neutral and general, much like it is generally 
considered in the Netherlands. I rejected the opposing trends in England and Ger-
many that are at odds with its neutral and general character respectively. 
Nevertheless, this need not lead to much controversy, as the outcomes are almost 
identical in all approaches.
A fi nal set of categories can be identifi ed and labelled ‘legal culture’. German 
criminal law attempts to account for all the rules of criminal liability into an all-
encompassing and consistent legal framework. English legal culture traditionally 
focuses only on the fairness and utility of the outcome of a case. The Dutch are 
positioned somewhere in between. It can be concluded that the legal thinking and 
culture of a Member State infl uences the scope of criminal liability. For example, 
some legal outcomes are diffi cult to reconcile with principles of mens rea, yet are 
accepted as fair. Should the intoxicated killer benefi t from his intoxication and 
merely be held liable for negligent killing? The most straightforward manner to 
approach cases like these is to accept them as an exception, grounded in the 
interests of the legal order. By trying to reconcile these cases with the rule, 
unnecessary complex legal rules are created that serve only pure academic interests. 
As noted in chapter II, a general part must be simple and easy enough to apply. 
Cases like these make clear that mens rea often does not lend itself to be captured 
in straightforward rules and defi nitions.11 As Dressler accurately formulated, “there 
are times when we may scratch our heads and concede that our culpability system 
is imperfect. But isn’t the real question whether, in the vast majority of cases, our 
current culpability system works well?”12
3. DEFENCES
The defences in this legal research do not negate the offence charged, but one of the 
two implied elements of criminal liability wrongfulness or blameworthiness. They 
are general because in principle, they can be raised to any offence charged. The 
defences deal with a case on its merits and assess the question of criminal liability. 
When accepted, they therefore do not bar proceedings or mitigate sentencing, but 
completely negate criminal liability. It is accepted that when the plea to a defence 
fails, the fact that the defendant or his actions did meet the fundamental conditions 
of the defence will generally lead to a mitigation of the sentence.
Just like mens rea, defences enable courts to ground liability and thereby 
punish ment in retribution and deterrence. A justifi ed offence is right or permissible. 
There is no use in deterring the perpetrator or others to do what is at least 
permissible. Many excuses are based on the presumption that in some circumstances 
a person cannot be deterred by the criminalization and the sanction. Already in the 
11 Halpin 2004, p. 148.
12 Dressler 2000, p. 962.
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case of the shipwrecked sailors, who ate the cabin boy, it was accepted that the 
possibility of a death penalty for their actions was incapable of operating as a 
deterrent to their canni balism. For this reason, it is also useless to preclude an 
excuse like duress to homi cide charges. Because someone can only be blamed for 
doing something wrong, there is not retributive goal in punishing the person who 
committed a justifi ed act. Excuses are the tailpiece of the principle that the 
blameless cannot be punished.
Defences serve both pragmatic and normative goals. Defences safeguard the 
fundamental legal principles that criminal liability may not be imposed without 
wrong ful ness and blameworthiness. The recognition of these general elements of 
criminal liability through defences guarantees its non-derogatory normative status 
in law. Defences acknowledge the implied elements of criminal liability as 
something that the legislator cannot simply circumvent, as something more 
fundamental than an offence defi nition or statutory defence. Regardless of the 
manner in which the legislator has drafted an offence, a defence will always negate 
liability based on the fundamental principles of wrongfulness and blameworthiness.
It is also convenient to safe guard these principles by including them in defences, 
because typically when an offence is committed, that offence was wrongful and the 
offender blameworthy. These implied elements are assumed with the fulfi lment of 
the offence defi nition, their absence seen as the excep tion. It is therefore a matter of 
effi ciency and drafting ease that the absence of these implied elements need not be 
included in every offence defi nition. In addition, because defences are treated as 
general principles of law, they gain in coherency and consistency. Accordingly, 
values such as fair warning, clarity and predictability are served.
In some offences, the legislator did include the absence of wrongfulness and/or 
blame worthiness in the offence defi nition. Again, this can be explained in a prag-
matic and normative manner. In some offences, the committing of an offence whilst 
not acting wrongful is not so exceptional. For instances, police offi cers often have 
to infl ict injuries in their work. It would be ineffi cient for the police offi cer to invoke 
his offi cial powers as a defence, so many offences, like the infl iction of bodily 
injury and the deprivation of liberty, include wrongfulness as an offence element. It 
is sensible to draft offence defi nitions so that they encompass the most common 
situations, also if that includes the absence of defences.
However, the decision of what to include in the offence is not merely matter of 
drafting ease and effi ciency. The offence should not only encompass the most 
common situations but also the typical character of the offence. If the typical 
character of the offence constitutes conduct that is wrongful, this should be included 
in the defi nition. For instance, rape is criminal not because having sexual 
intercourse is criminal, but because having sexual intercourse without consent is 
criminal. The lack of consent is essential to the offence because it gives the offence 
its typical character. By contrast, killing as such is criminal. The circumstance that 
the victim was not killed in self-defence need not be included in the offence 
defi nition. An offence should include all the elements that make it a typical wrong. 
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In a regulatory context, this means that an offence should have all those elements 
that make it possible to clearly distinguish it from other offences.
3.1. The distinction with the offence
Accordingly, this typical character of the offence enables a principled distinction 
between offence and defence. This was questioned by the existence of offences that 
include wrong ful ness or blameworthiness in its defi nition, like the lack of consent 
in rape or the wrong ful infl iction of bodily injury. When these offences are charged, 
it this seems that a justifi cation is treated like the negation of a charge. The defence 
is not affi rmative but a failure of proof defence, and thus does not seem to differ 
from a denial of intent or an alibi. Culpa absorbs the element of wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness, making any justifi cation or excuse a failure of proof defence. 
These examples can be called non-ideal offences, in contrast to the ideal or normal 
case where the defence is the exception and not part of the offence.
A principled distinction is very important in dealing with these non-ideal 
offences, because the inclusion of elements into the offence or defence part of 
criminal liability brings about several implications. First of all, the inclusion of an 
implied element into non-ideal offences has the procedural consequence that the 
Prosecutor must prove the absence of the defence, whereas in the ideal case, the 
defendant would have had to make probable the defence. Secondly, in Dutch law, 
verdicts distinguish acquittals as a result of the failure to prove the charge from 
acquittals due to the acceptance of a defence. By contrast, if the absence of the 
defence is part of the offence and it is accepted, a simple acquittal follows.
Although there is not much support for this differentiation, a special verdict is 
recognized as very useful in communicating why the defendant is acquitted. Due to 
the special verdict, the defendant and the public will better appreciate the difference 
between offence and defence and between justifi cation and excuse. After all, there 
is a difference between being acquitted, because you did not intentionally kill 
someone or because you did so in self-defence. There also is a difference between 
having acted, all things considered, in accordance with the legal order and merely 
being excused because you cannot be blamed for having infringed the norms of the 
legal order. Special verdicts of having acted justifi ed or being excused can thus 
improve the communicative function of the law and furthermore prevent that 
defences are limited because of the fear that excusing the defendant would send the 
wrong signal of approval of the conduct.
Another difference of elements that belong to the offence or defence is that the 
protective function of the principle of legality is traditionally developed in the 
context of offence defi nition. As a result, when the absence of defences is included 
in the offence defi nition, the defendant is in a somewhat better position. Neverthe-
less, it has been argued that the principle of legality should apply to criminal 
liability, irrespective of whether something is part of the offence or defence. After 
all, defences determine the scope of criminal liability, just like offences. For 
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example, by giving a defence a new, stricter, interpretation, the de facto result is an 
increase of the scope of criminal liability.
In order to rely on a defence and escape liability, the defendant must be aware of 
the circumstances that ground this defence, such as the fact that he was being 
attacked in self-defence. Moreover, he must act with a view to defend himself. By 
contrast, if the absence of the defence is part of the offence, this is apparently not 
required. If wrongfulness is an offence element, the defendant will be acquitted 
also if he was unaware that objectively a situation of self-defence existed.
More relevant in prac tice is the fi nal difference concerning mistakes. An honest 
mistake on the offence defi ni tion can negate intention, and if reasonable also 
negligence. A mistake on the facts that, if correct, would give rise to a defence, 
however only excuses the defendant, and only if it was reasonable. Therefore, if the 
absence of the defence is included in the offence defi nition, any mistake on the 
defence would already acquit the person, whereas in the ideal case, that mistake 
would have to be excusable in order to negate criminal liability.
The most important question that followed from these implications was whether 
defences in relation to non-ideal offences should be treated as negations of those 
offences with the abovementioned ramifi cations or be treated as affi rmative 
defences, notwithstanding that their absence is included as an element in the 
offence. The answer to this question is a differentiated one, based on the 
aforementioned principled distinction of offence and defence. Simply put, the lack 
of a defence can be included in the offence defi nition for two reasons. In the fi rst 
situation described above, the absence of a defence is included because it is an 
essential offence element. The absence of a defence is treated as an offence element. 
By contrast, in other situations, the absence of a defence is included for other 
reasons, such as a reminder to the Court that a defence may very well apply in that 
context. In those situations, the inclusion of wrongfulness and blameworthiness has 
no consequences for the assessment of defences. A defensive purpose still needs to 
be proven, a mistake still needs to be reasonable to excuse.
Defences should therefore only be treated as failure of proof defences when they 
negate a specifi c meaning of wrongfulness or blameworthiness. The specifi c 
meaning can be deduced from the wording, context and purpose of the offence. For 
example, in Dutch law, the damage to goods must have been infl icted wrongfully. 
Wrong ful ness in this context can be interpreted restrictively in line with the essence 
and purpose of the offence as damage that is carried out without permission. This 
explains why consent of the owner in regard to the damage operates as a failure of 
proof defence. In contrast, other justifi cations would not negate the offence-specifi c 
meaning of wrongfulness and therefore justify the actor. Consider that the defendant 
would have to sacrifi ce the goods of the owner without his permission in a situation 
of necessity. That damage would be wrongful in the meaning that the owner did not 
consent to it, but the defendant may invoke the justifi cation of necessity to justify 
his actions.
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This approach can explain why in most cases, the application of a justifi cation or 
excuse does not bring about that the conditions of that defence are made more 
lenient, just because it technically denies the charge. In the offence of damaging 
goods, raising self-defence or necessity would not be treated like the denial of 
intent, just because wrongfulness is an offence element. The application of defences 
to non-ideal offences therefore not undermines, but strengthens the distinction of 
offence and defence. It is useful and relevant to make the distinction.
3.2. Justifi cations and excuses
Another bifurcation in criminal law that is both common and criticized is the 
difference between justifi cations and excuses. It makes a fundamental distinction 
between wrongfulness and blameworthiness, between right and wrong, between act 
and actor, between an objective evaluation of all things considered and subjective 
reasons for acting. A justifi cation is the mirror image of wrongfulness, whereas the 
acceptance of an excuse negates blameworthiness. The dichotomy coincides with 
the second and third tier on the ladder of criminal liability. Wrongfulness and 
blame worthiness are derived and thus infl uenced by the principle of harm and guilt 
respec tively. A justifi cation is based on the principle ‘no punishment without 
wrong fulness’, an excuse is based on the principle ‘no punishment without guilt’.
The categorization of defences into justifi cations and excuses is accepted in the 
Dutch, German and EU legal system and even if not accepted generally in England, 
it is at least well known. Whereas the dichotomy was introduced in Germany and 
the Nether lands about a century ago, in England, it is still not widely accepted. 
Although England increasingly moves towards the continental perspective, English 
law generally has not been very interested in the distinction between justifi cation 
and excuse. First of all, the dichotomy of actus reus and mens rea is more infl uential 
in England. Justifi cations and excuses are often included into actus reus and mens 
rea respectively. The implied elements of wrongfulness and blameworthiness do 
not enjoy widespread recognition, whereas this is required to carve out a conceptual 
space for justifi cations and excuses. Secondly, many practitioners and scholars 
believe that the distinction has no practical legal consequences and is therefore 
irrelevant in a practice based legal culture like the English.
However, the distinction does have practical legal consequences. It can be 
concluded that although the line of criticism raised against some differences of 
justifi cations and excuses is legitimate, most of them hold up. Even if it is not 
accurate to state that only the application of an excuse enables measures, even if is 
not generally accep ted that only justifi cations completely negate its mirror image of 
wrongfulness and even if has been demonstrated that a justifi cation not always 
operates universally, there are still many other differences that warrant making the 
distinction between justifi cation and excuse. The distinction is useful. It serves a 
practical purpose and should therefore be included in a general part of criminal law 
for the EU.
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First of all, by making a distinction between condemning the act and 
condemning the defendant, the dichotomy enables important communicative 
functions of the law. If that difference is not made, there is a risk that excuses are 
applied restrictively because it is feared that an excuse implies approval of the 
conduct. Further, the condi tions of individual defences are infl uenced by the 
category to which they belong. Amongst others, the justifi catory defences have 
stricter requirements of propor tionality. It has also been confi rmed that justifi cations 
are incompatible. A defendant cannot raise a justifi cation against justifi ed conduct. 
Two opposing parties cannot both be justifi ed. Finally, the distinction is important 
to structure the order of legal reasoning. It makes no sense to assess the 
blameworthiness of the actor before it is established that the offence is wrongful.
3.3. General principles governing defences
From the research on defences, some principles applicable to all defences can be 
deduced. First of all, proportionality is the most important aspect of all defences. It 
captures and balances all factors into one normative end judgment on the wrong-
fulness of the act or the blameworthiness of the defendant. This normative condition 
is very fl exible, because it can take into account many aspects, including the 
manner and degree in which the other criteria of a defence have been fulfi lled. 
Justifi cations are based on the saving of a prevailing interest and revolve therefore 
around the weighing of interests under proportionality. Nevertheless, in effect, all 
defences revolve around proportionality. Proportionality not only distinguishes 
justifi cation from excuse, it also distinguishes the excused actor from the guilty 
one. Proportionality not only separates the justifi cation of self-defence from the 
excuse self-defence-excess, it not only separates necessity from duress. 
Proportionality also constitutes the upper limit of self-defence-excess and duress: 
what is grossly disproportionate cannot be excused.
Secondly, all defences are affected to some extent by the special position or 
capacities of the defendant, as well as the question whether the defendant is 
somehow to blame for causing the circumstances giving rise to the defence. The 
special position of the defendant makes concrete what is lawful and what the legal 
order expects from that defendant. This can be either more or less than what is 
expected from the reasonable person. Circumstances preceding the offence also 
infl uence this normative judgment. Neither mens rea, nor defences should be merely 
assessed by reference to the exact time when the offence is committed. Instead, that 
offence should be assessed by reference to all relevant circumstances. If the defen-
dant can be reproached for creating the circumstances of the defence, less will be 
allowed. Conversely, if the overall purpose of the defendant’s actions was laudable, 
the assessment of the defence will be conducted more leniently.
These two conclusions explain why a choice was made in the context of all 
defences not to apply very strict triggering conditions. These include not setting a 
strict threshold of what legal interests can be saved or sacrifi ced under a defence 
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and not precluding the defence for any degree of prior fault. Requiring more from 
other conditions, such as proportionality, compensates these lenient triggering 
conditions. For example, the fact that duress can also apply to the saving of less 
serious interests than life and limb is compensated by the fact that committing an 
offence to save these less important interests will hardly ever be proportionate.
This approach thus leads to acceptable outcomes, because it neither precludes a 
defence in cases where this would otherwise be impossible due to strict triggering 
conditions, nor does it necessitate an acquittal when this is considered inappropriate. 
For example, if prior fault not necessarily precludes self-defence, the mere fact that 
the defendant foresaw he could encounter his enemy does not preclude the defence 
when he is in fact attacked by his enemy. At the same time, if the defendant would 
have sought out the confrontation, self-defence will be rejected. This high degree of 
prior fault would militate against reliance on the defence.
Finally, the scope of the general part determines the availability of defences. 
Some defences are by their nature only available to crimes of violence. Hence, if a 
general part of European criminal law would only apply to offences of a regulatory 
nature, self-defence would not need to be included. It would also be unlikely that 
insanity and duress would ever be relevant. Against offences affecting the fi nancial 
interests of the Union, a defendant is most likely to raise a mistake of law, a 
necessity type defence or a plea of due diligence. Since I concluded in chapter II 
that the scope of a general part of criminal law for the EU may range from 
traffi cking in human beings to viola tions of fi shing quota, no such limitation was 
applied. It became clear that the pertinent offence affects the conditions of each 
defence, most notably through the requirement of proportionality. The more serious 
the offen ce committed, the less likely it will be justifi ed or excused. In some legal 
systems, specifi c defences are unavailable when they are raised against very serious 
offences, such as duress against murder or superior orders against genocide. As 
noted above and explained in more detail below, I argued against such an abstract 
and a priori limitations to defences.
3.4. Justifi cations
Justifi cations negate the wrongfulness of the act. These defences are characterized 
by the weighing of competing interests. By precluding criminal liability, 
justifi cations enable that the prevailing interest will be saved.
3.4.1. Self-defence
Self-defence clearly illustrates that justifi cations are about the weighing of compe-
ting interests. In order to establish whether and to what extent defensive force is 
justifi ed, one has to take into account the autonomy of the defendant, the reproach 
that can be made against the aggressor and the legal order as a whole, which both 
enables and limits the right to self-defence. Given the increasingly popular view 
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that the responsibility to fi ght crime is shared between the state and its citizens, the 
latter rationale and thereby the scope of self-defence has been widened in recent 
years. It is therefore unwarranted to argue that the law does not allow victims of 
crime to protect themselves, the more because the defendant can also be excused if 
he cannot be reproached for exceeding the limits of proportionality.
In order for self-defence to justify a criminal offence, the attack that is averted 
by that offence must be wrongful, of human origin and be imminent. In other 
words, self-defence must be necessary. A duty to retreat does not exist; at most a 
possibility of safe retreat can be required. Even more important, the offence 
committed to avert or stop the attack must be proportionate in relation to the harm 
avoided. More speci fi  cally, the defendant must choose the least intrusive means of 
defence and apply them in a manner that is least intrusive to the aggressor’s 
interests, as long as it is still capable of protecting the defendant’s interests 
suffi ciently. Self-defence differs from the justifi cation necessity because it does not 
require strict proportio nality between attack and reaction. It is merely required that 
the defensive force used by the defendant is not disproportionate to the attack.
The synthesis of self-defence was facilitated because the national concepts have 
grown towards each other in recent decades. Amongst others, the Dutch justifi cation 
has been widened due to a reduction of the relevancy of prior fault, whereas in 
Germany, proportionality is accepted in practice as a proper limitation of self-
defence. This brings the scope of self-defence in line with the right to life as 
protected by article 2 ECHR, which would be violated if lethal force against a thief 
were justifi ed. That article also militates against the wide scope of putative self-
defence in English law, where even an unreasonable mistake on the facts giving rise 
to self-defence can justify the offence.
A second difference of the English concept is that its scope of proportionality is 
relatively wide. This can be explained by the lack of an excuse of self-defence-
excess in English law, which would otherwise enable the acquittal of persons who 
exceeded the proportionate degree of defensive force. By accepting the excuse, the 
wider scope of self-defence under English law is rejected. In this way, the difference 
between justifi ed conduct and wrongful conduct by an excused actor is reinforced.
3.4.2. Necessity
Necessity is grounded in the rationale of protecting the legal order as a whole. By 
saving the prevailing interest, there is a net benefi t. The legislator cannot foresee all 
instances where it may be justifi ed to break the letter of the law, and given the 
enormous amount of norms from national and European origin, a legal subject is 
increasingly likely to fi nd himself in a confl ict of duties. However, the scope of 
necessity is under pressure due to competing considerations. Particularly in 
England, it is feared that the recognition of the justifi cation undermines the validity 
and authority of rules and the legislator. As a consequence, the scope of the English 
justi fi  cation is relatively narrow.
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In Germany and the Netherlands, the defence was developed out of the related 
excuse duress. In England, by contrast, necessity is still closely related to duress. It 
is often equated with duress and given the same strict conditions, such as that it 
may only be invoked to protect life and limb of the defendant or someone close to 
him. Never theless, a clear trend exists to recognize and distinguish necessity 
properly from duress. This coincides with the increased acceptance of the 
fundamental distinction between justifi cations and excuse and makes both concepts 
more coherent and consistent.
A situation of necessity exists when there is a present danger for life, limb, 
freedom, honour, property or another legal interest, that can only be averted by 
impacting other legal interests. The danger need not be as imminent as the attack in 
self-defence, explaining why arming oneself in anticipation of a feared attack can 
be justifi ed under necessity. On the other hand, the condition serves to exclude from 
the defence situations that affect many people or are recurring. Even though the 
danger can certainly be imminent to many, the defence is precluded for pragmatic 
reasons that this would invite many people to break the law, deteriorating the 
enforceability of the law. In these cases, the legislator is the appropriate authority to 
take action and if it omits to do so, it is assumed the legislator thus did not see room 
for exceptions. Similarly, if there already exists an exemption procedure to obtain a 
permit, it is assumed the legislator already exclusively dealt with all possible 
confl icts. The fear that necessity may lead to anarchy also leads to a strict condition 
of subsidiarity. Only when the breaking of the law is absolutely necessary, only 
when all else has failed, including the fulfi lment of lesser offences, can this be 
justifi ed.
Like in self-defence, the conditions of subsidiarity, including the absence of 
prior fault, should be treated as factors in a balancing of interest. This emphasizes 
again the enormous importance of the proportionality requirement in the fi nal 
assessment of necessity. Unlike in self-defence, the conduct of the defendant must 
actually outweigh the sacrifi ced interest. The difference can be explained by the 
fact that the sacrifi ced interest in necessity generally belongs to an innocent third 
party, who bears no blame for the confl ict. Conversely, when the victim can be 
blamed for giving rise to the situation of necessity, the proportionality requirement 
is more lenient. This also opens up a possibility to apply necessity to cases where a 
life has to be sacrifi ced in order to save that of another.
A related defence exists in the Netherlands, called lack of all wrongfulness. This 
offence deals with situations where there is a confl ict of norms, but not one of 
interests. The defendant claims that by fulfi lling the offence defi nition, he in fact 
furthered the interest that that offence is trying to protect. Such cases are included 
in necessity in other States. Similarly, necessity can also account for the more 
specifi c justifi  ca tions in Dutch law of legal duty and lawful superior orders. These 
defences are only recognized in the Netherlands and even there, the overlap with 
necessity led to the conclusion these justifi cations are superfl uous.
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3.4.3. Consent
A third defence that should be included in a general part of criminal law for the EU 
is consent. Consent recognizes that someone’s interests may be sacrifi ced, based on 
the autonomous will of that person. On the one hand, the general welfare or legal 
order need not be furthered, but on the other hand, it may also not be harmed. 
There fore, the act consented may not violate public policy. Consent applies if the 
consen ting party is the sole disposer over the individual legal interest at stake and is 
capable of giving his consent. The latter implies that the defendant is generally able 
to consent and was aware of the possible consequen ces of the act he consented to in 
the concrete case.
In cases where the person is not able to give his consent to for example a surgery, 
Germany applies the justifi cation of presumed consent, whereas this is treated 
under necessity or a related defence in England and the Netherlands. Presumed 
consent is about the presumed subjective will of the person concerned, not about 
what is objectively in his best interest under necessity.
This also refl ects a general difference between the English and German 
approach to consent. German law focuses on the autonomy of the person concerned, 
whereas English law relatively puts more weight on the legal order as a whole, and 
thus generally applies a more restrictive scope of consent. In the end however, these 
different approaches hardly ever lead to different outcomes, most notably because 
the criteria of consent overlap. Consent is rejected in similar cases, even if this is 
based on different criteria. Defendants are also acquitted in similar cases, even if 
this is not always based on consent. As a result, no explicit choice is made in regard 
to the different approaches.
Consent can operate as a justifi cation and as a failure of proof defence, just like 
self-defence and necessity. If it operates as a failure of proof, some criteria are 
applied diffe ren tly. It is incorrect to disqualify consent as a justifi cation on this 
basis or by arguing that it is not about a confl ict of interests, as no interest is 
violated. In consent, a confl ict of interests can also be identifi ed. For example, a 
patient accepts the pain and risks inherent in surgery because it is a lesser evil than 
letting his illness deteriorate.
3.5. Excuses
Excuses deny that the defendant could have reasonably avoided committing the 
offence. They are grounded in the principle that there can be no punishment without 
blameworthiness, which is also safeguarded as an essential condition for criminal 
liability under art. 6 ECHR. Punishment would not only be unfair but also useless, 
as the criminalization cannot motivate the defendant in these circumstances to 
comply with the legal norms. The excuse denotes that the conduct is wrong and 
thereby confi rms the norm. Most often, excuses are grounded in the fact that the 
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conduct does not refl ect on the settled or normal character of the defendant or on the 
fact that the defendant did not have a choice to act differently.
Mens rea is also explained as refl ecting that the actor had suffi cient control and 
choice over his actions. The difference with excuses lies in the degree of control 
and choice. Whereas an excuse sets out the minimum requirements for criminal 
liability, mens rea determines the level of the reproach. Even if an offence is strict, 
the defendant can escape liability if he can show that he could not reasonably act 
differently. An excuse aims to guarantee that the blameless are not punished. By 
contrast, the defendants who cannot rely on an excuse are blameworthy. In fact, 
their mens rea can increase the reproach that can be made against them: the 
negligent actor was able to avoid the violation of the legal interest; the intentional 
actor even chose to violate a legal interest.
3.5.1. Self-defence-excess
Sometimes the defendant cannot be blamed for exceeding the limits of self-defence. 
This is recognized in Dutch and German law by the excuse of self-defence-excess. 
The defendant is forgiven for either having exceeded the limits of proportionality or 
for having continued to use defensive force when this was no longer necessary. He 
may even only have started to use force after the attack had ended. Excess thus 
forms an exception to the proportionality or imminence requirement of justifi catory 
self-defence. All other conditions of self-defence need to have been fulfi lled, such 
as that the attack was wrongful.
Situations of extensive excess, where the defendant uses force only after or even 
after the attack has ended, are not included in the German defence, but often the 
defendant will nonetheless be exculpated. The German Courts apply a broad scope 
of necessity, only considering that the force is no longer necessary when the attack 
has defi nitely ended. Second, the lenient German rules on putative self-defence can 
apply where excess is not accepted. Extensive excess should be included in the 
excuse because there are no good reasons to separate these situations from those 
where the defendant reacted disproportionate. The condition should therefore be 
that a situation of self-defence must have existed at one point in time.
A specifi c condition of excess is that the exceeding of the limits of self-defence 
must have been a consequence of a certain state of mind, which in itself should 
have been a consequence of the wrongful attack. The attack needs to be the 
explanation for the excessive force. The attack must have caused certain affects, 
which brought about that the defendant had no real choice but to commit the 
offence. Therefore, the attack must be a suffi ciently important reason for bringing 
about the state of mind of the defendant and subsequently, that state of mind must 
also be so severe that it cannot be argued the defendant should have restrained 
himself.
Two categories of these states of mind can be distinguished. Asthenic affects 
like fear, confusion and desperation can be contrasted with so-called sthenic 
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emotions like anger, rage and indignation. The latter affects are excluded from the 
German defence, but in practice, the difference with Dutch law is, again, not so 
great. After all, unreasonable anger and revenge are also excluded from the defence 
in Dutch law. Secondly, in German law, anger and rage may play a role as long as 
an asthenic emotion is still also causal for the excessive use of force. Third, the 
German rules on putative self-defence fi ll part of the gap and fi nally, there is 
obligatory mitigation of punishment for those who kill because of rage provoked by 
a wrongful attack. In overcoming these differences, the simplest and therefore most 
workable solution is to include these affects in the defence.
In English law, excess is unavailable. As a result, the limits of justifi catory self-
defence are sometimes stretched to acquit the defendant. The lenient English rule 
that putative self-defence does not require a reasonable mistake also partially fi lls 
the void. In addition, there are two defences that fulfi l a similar function and share 
many of its conditions. These partial defences however only apply to murder, 
reducing that charge to manslaughter. Their most important function is to avoid the 
mandatory life imprisonment that follows upon a conviction for murder. It shows 
that a mandatory reduction of a sentence can be an alternative to excusing the 
defendant. It also demonstrates the enormous infl uence of sentencing rules on 
criminal liability.
However, if the defendant is blameless, mitigation does not suffi ce. This violates 
the principle that there can be no punishment without blameworthiness. Even the 
conviction itself is at odds with the principle of guilt, since the blameless is stigma-
tized. The focus on sentencing fails to recognize the importance of criminal 
liability and its difference with sentencing. Moreover, mandatory sentencing puts a 
lot of pressure on general principles of criminal law. Defences are stretched beyond 
foreseeable limits in order to avoid harsh outcomes dictated by minimum sentences. 
Finally, the principled approach to adopt self-defence-excess was favoured over the 
English partial defences, because a defence should apply to all charges, not just 
murder.
3.5.2. Duress
Duress excuses the defendant who could not and should not have acted differently. 
It is based fi rst and foremost on the psychological pressure on the defendant that 
made it almost impossible for him not to commit the offence. Because of this 
inability, the defendant is not blameworthy. It would also be useless to punish the 
defendant from a utilitarian perspective because the threat of punishment cannot 
deter the actor in such a situation. Secondly, duress is limited in a normative way, 
by taking into account the interests of others than the defendant. Amongst others, 
duress will be rejected if the offence was very disproportionate or when the 
defendant is expected to take the risk because of his profession.
Duress can arise out of threats made against life and limb, but also out of other 
circumstances. In the latter context, duress starts where the limits of proportionality 
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of the necessity defence are exceeded. Required is that the defendant committed the 
offence because he was impelled by an imminent danger or threat to important 
legal interests. It is not about the imminence of the danger, but about the imminence 
to act. In line with the defences of necessity and self-defence, the interests that can 
be protected should not be limited a priori to a danger to life and limb of himself or 
someone close to him. Other conditions of duress, like proportionality, already 
enable a rejection of the defence is rejected in cases where minor interests are pro-
tec ted by committing serious offences. Prior fault like joining a criminal organiza-
tion should also be treated like in other defences. It is should be treated as a factor 
that infl uences the other conditions of the defence, not necessarily precluding 
duress.
The source of the pressure needs to be extraneous to the defendant, but the line 
between what is internal and what is external is controversial and not always easy 
to draw. The criterion should not be applied rigidly. Because the pressure often 
consists of a combination of internal and external factors, at least one external cause 
can be identifi ed. As long as the external cause of the pressure is not overshadowed 
by internal causes, duress can be accepted. Moreover, individual characteristics 
that infl uence the impact of the cause on the defendant can be taken into account. 
Finally, some specifi c applications of duress have been considered. Because of the 
absolute prohibition on torture, duress cannot apply to such a charge. In contrast, 
duress should be available to homicide charges, even if killing an innocent third 
party will hardly ever be excused. The right to life in not absolute and there are no 
convincing reasons to limit duress in this way. John should be allowed to rely on 
duress for killing the police offi cer, as no penalty could have deterred him from 
doing anything to save his family.
3.5.3. Mistake as to the legal prohibition, putative defences and superior orders
Mistakes as to the legal prohibition, also called mistakes of law, do not exculpate. It 
is feared that otherwise, the norms become what the defendant thinks they are and 
ignorance would be promoted. Nevertheless, some exceptions have been recognized 
in German and Dutch law and even in English law, many situations will not lead to 
criminal liability. As mentioned, English Courts can stay proceedings or will negate 
mens rea. The conclusion is therefore that some mistakes of law should exculpate 
the defendant. In fact, mistakes that were unavoidable must excuse the defendant.
This approach follows from the fundamental principle that only the blameworthy 
may be punished. Mistakes of law should negate criminal liability if the defendant 
cannot be blamed for the error. He should only be convicted if he was able to see 
the wrongfulness of his conduct and thereby had a chance and choice to avoid the 
criminal conduct. It would be unjust, unfair and useless to punish the person who 
does not know and should not know he is committing a criminal offence. The 
insight of the illegality or wrongfulness of one’s conduct is an element of 
blameworthiness. It is not an element of the offence and hence never part of dolus, 
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recklessness or culpa. In a consistent general part of criminal law, these mistakes 
do not affect fault, but they do affect criminal liability.
Fears of allowing for the excuse are neutralized or mitigated because of its 
excusa tory nature. First of all, an excuse does not override or set aside, it confi rms 
the norm. Secondly, only excusable, that is, unavoidable mistakes of law will 
excuse. The defendant has a duty to get to know the law, the scope of which depends 
on the individual circumstances. Only in limited cases, will the excuse therefore be 
unavoidable. For example, it can be excused when the mistake is the result of 
incorrect advice of public offi cials competent to give advice on that matter. As 
another example, the defendant may be excused for not knowing something was 
prohibited, if this is due to the fact that the pertinent legislation had not been 
published. The principle of legality strengthens this conclusion.
Putative defences are treated like mistakes as to the legal prohibition because of 
the conceptual similarity: in both cases, the defendant thinks that what he does is 
lawful. In a consistent general part, such an unavoidable mistake should therefore 
also excuse the defendant. When the defendant is mistaken on the scope of an 
existing defence or believes that a non-existing defence applies, he is also mistaken 
that what he does is in line with the legal order.
Another category of putative defences are mistakes on the facts that, if present, 
would give rise to a justifi cation or excuse, such as the mistaken belief of the 
defendant that he was attacked by someone. If correct, this would give rise to self-
defence. These putative defences occur most often and are most likely to be 
accepted. The two categories of putative defences are often distinguished with a 
view to attach different criteria and legal conse quences to the two types of mistakes. 
For example, it is common in German law to negate the intention of the defendant 
who makes such a mistake on the facts regarding a justifi cation. On the contrary, I 
argued in favour of one simple rule of excusing the defendant who makes a 
reasonable mistake on a defence. It is inconsistent and absurd to justify the person 
acting in actual self-defence, whereas to negate intent for the person who is 
mistaken that someone is attacking him. This defendant still intended to injure this 
person.
More importantly, the excuse is the more appropriate outcome since it communi-
cates that the conduct of the defendant was wrong and thus takes into account the 
position of third parties, allowing them to intervene or defend themselves. Finally, 
an excusable mistake must be unavoidable or at least reasonable. Such a requirement 
of reasonableness is in line with article 2 ECHR in regard to putative self-defence 
and it follows in general from the distinction between offence and defence. After 
all, the fact that the defendant committed a prima facie wrong warrants that he 
should be diligent in assessing whether the circumstances giving rise to a defence 
are actually present.
The defence of superior orders is also generally understood to be a mistake of 
law, namely the mistaken belief of the defendant on the legality of the orders. If 
acting on legal orders is seen as a justifi cation, the excusable mistake that the orders 
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were lawful is a putative defence. This specifi c defence is reinforced by the rationale 
that the subordinate should obey superior orders. Otherwise, the hierarchical 
relationship would be jeopardized and the subordinate compelled to re-evaluate 
every decision made by his superior. Since the mistake must be unavoidable, the 
fear that defendants would be excused for committing clearly illegal acts is again 
unwarranted. Since the defence can be encompassed by the general scheme of 
excusing unavoidable mistakes of law, including putative defences, it does not need 
to be explicitly regulated.
3.5.4. Insanity
Insanity exculpates the defendant who, at the time of committing the offence, due 
to a mental disorder, did not have the capacities to be held responsible in law. This 
is based on the rationale that those who are not responsible should also not be puni-
shed, either on a retributive or utilitarian view on punishment. Secondly, the 
defence was created in order to enable that measures can be taken to protect society 
and treat or incapa citate the perpetrator. The defendant who is acquitted cannot be 
deprived of his freedom, but the perpetrator who is excused by reasons of insanity 
can be institutio na lized in a mental hospital. Be that as it may, the bifurcation 
between punishment and measures may prove to be artifi cial, not in the least in the 
eyes of the perpetrators.
In order to accept the defence, the defendant must have been suffering from a 
mental disorder when he committed the offence. There is not need to create 
categories or to limit the mental disorders that can qualify. This broad scope is 
limited by the other conditions of insanity, such as that the disorder must have 
substantially impaired the capacities to be held responsible in criminal law. In order 
to be held responsible in criminal law, the perpetrator must know what he is doing 
and that this was wrong. He must also be able to restrain himself from committing 
the offence. Although these capacities seem related to denials of fault and pleas of 
mistake of law or duress respectively, the insanity defence sets the threshold of 
these conditions very high and highlights the specifi c reason for it, namely the 
mental disorder, in contrast to an intellectual mistake or external coercion. Only 
when the capacities are substantially impaired is the complete defence accepted. In 
cases where the capacities were only diminished, mitigation may apply. The exact 
border between exculpation and mitigation is hard to draw and also depends on 
normative considerations. For example, if the defendant is somehow to blame for 
the impairment of his capacities, insanity is less likely to be accepted.
Because of this denial of fundamental capacities to be held responsible, insanity 
can be equated with infancy and treated as an exemption, rather than as an excuse. 
There do not appear to be any practical reasons to treat infancy as an excuse except 
that a defendant generally prefers to be acquitted on other grounds, which would 
imply that the issue is assessed in the fi nal stage of criminal liability rather than a 
fi rst. It has been submitted that insanity can be both an exemption and an excuse, 
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depending on the seriousness and timeframe of the impairment, the capacities 
involved and the aspect of the defence on which one focuses.
4. FINAL WORDS
I have argued what mens rea and defences should look like, based on certain 
criteria. As noted in the beginning of this book, it is very well possible that you 
disagree with some of my choices. You may give more weight to a criterion or 
underlying interest than I have done and subsequently, make a different choice. For 
example, you could argue that strict liability should never be allowed by adhering 
more weight to the interests of the individual defendant and less to effi ciency 
concerns, by focusing more on the principle of guilt as understood in German law 
than in the case-law of all other legal systems under investigation, or by focusing 
more on the critical opinions of scholars than the condoning attitude of practitioners.
As law is a normative science, this was to be expected. I tried to make my 
choices as transparent as possible and provide the reader with the consequences of 
alternative solutions. The fact that our opinions may differ is not problematic. In 
fact, this book aims to stimulate the debate on what mens rea and defences should 
look like in European criminal law. Given the rapid pace in which European 
criminal law is expanding and evolving, this debate is long overdue.
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SUMMARY
This book is about mens rea and defences in European criminal law. In short, mens 
rea encompasses the subjective elements of a crime, like intention, as well as the 
doctrines that govern its application. Defences, distinguished in justifi cations and 
excuses, refer to those situations where the defendant should not be held liable, even 
though he formally committed an offence. The central question of this research is 
what mens rea and defences should look like in a general part of criminal law for 
the European Union.
European criminal law is a multi-layered patchwork of legislation and case-law 
of European and national origin. In the past decades, the process of European 
integration has infl uenced all fi elds of law, and eventually also criminal law. 
Whereas the creation and enforcement of criminal liability used to be purely a 
national matter, European legislation now requires Member States to criminalize all 
sorts of harmful conduct. However, this legislation does not determine the full 
scope of criminal liability, omitting to defi ne general principles of criminal law. For 
example, the Union refers to ‘intention’ in its legislation, but it has not deter mined 
what qualifi es as such. In chapter I, it is explained that as a result of this lacunae, 
Member States apply their own national legal principles like intention, negligence 
and necessity when implementing Union legislation. As national concepts differ, 
the scope of criminal liability also varies throughout the Union. This is contrary to 
the purpose of Union legislation, which is the convergence of legal systems by 
approximation.
Chapter I also lists other reasons for this research, such as the development of a 
supranational European criminal justice system, in which a European Public 
Prosecutor directly enforces EU criminal law. Furthermore, this book may guide 
the Union legislator and judiciary in identifying general principles of substantive 
criminal law and promote a thorough debate on the contents of these principles 
throughout the EU. The results of the research can be of assistance to acceding and 
candidate countries, showing what the EU standards in criminal law are. Finally, 
this research can foster the understanding of national authori ties of substantive 
criminal law in other Member States. In this way, mutual trust between judges, 
prosecutors and police offi cers in the EU will increase, which is essential to further 
integration and cooperation in criminal matters.
Chapter II explains the methodology. In a fi rst stage of the research, I established 
what mens rea and defences look like in national and Union law. After all, a general 
part of European criminal law should be construed out of the legal traditions of the 
Member States and the fragments of criminal law originating from Union law. A 
signifi cant part of this research thus consists of comparative legal research. For 
practical reasons, the comparison is limited to the Dutch, English and German legal 
systems. In a second stage, I compared the data from the fi rst stage and made a 
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synthesis of mens rea and defences. The synthesis is based upon funda men tal rights 
and the common ground of mens rea and defences in national and Union law. In 
choosing between competing approaches to legal concepts, I applied certain 
criteria, such as that a general part of European criminal law should be consistent, 
coherent and enforceable. In subsequent parts, the results of the synthesis are 
presented and defended. The book does not describe in detail all concepts of mens 
rea and defences as they are applied in the different legal systems under 
investigation.
The second part of this book presents what mens rea in European criminal law 
should look like. Chapter III explains what mens rea means by demarcating it from 
related legal concepts. Mens rea and defences are positioned in a framework of 
criminal liability, consisting of the offence defi nition, wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness. By separating blameworthiness from the offence defi nition, a 
clear distinction can be made between excuses and elements of mens rea. Mens rea 
is contrasted with actus reus. Actus reus, the criminal act, ensures that thoughts 
alone or not punished. Both terms are used as analytical tools to categorize the 
elements of the offence defi nition. The term mens rea is used as encompassing not 
only the ‘subjective’ elements of the offence defi nition, but its related doctrines and 
principles as well. Mens rea and actus reus relate to each other as communicating 
vessels, meaning that if less is required from actus reus, more should be required 
from mens rea.
The dichotomy of actus reus and mens rea coincides with that of objectivism 
and subjectivism. The two are extreme perspectives on what should be most 
important for criminal liability: the conduct and harm on the one hand, or morally 
defective choices and fault on the other. The analytical distinction is also important 
as regards evidence of the offence charged. Because mens rea requires us to look 
inside of the mind of a person, problems of proving mens rea appear unavoidable. 
To avoid such problems, objectivists do not ground fault in the actual state of mind 
of an individual person. Fault is rather equated with or inferred from the so-called 
‘reasonable person’. In a more moderate version of this approach, knowledge on the 
psyche is deduced from non-psychological factors like the conduct and 
circumstances of the case, interpreted by making use of rules of general experience.
Chapter IV takes a closer look at what I call fault elements, like intention and 
negligence. A distinction is made between intention and negligence to refl ect the 
difference in culpability. The intentional killer is more culpable and should therefore 
be punished more severely than the person who caused a person to die negligently. 
In addition, fault elements can limit criminal liability, as some crimes can only be 
committed intentionally. It is argued that a general part of criminal law for the 
European Union should operate with three kinds of fault; dolus, recklessness and 
culpa. I discuss these fault elements in descending order of seriousness. Dolus is 
the most serious fault element, paramount for criminal liability as it expresses the 
greatest degree of control and choice over the fulfi lment of the offence defi nition. 
The most serious form of dolus concentrates on the will of the actor to bring about a 
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certain result. A seemingly less serious form of intent is dolus indirectus. 
Consequences are also deemed to have been intended by the actor if he knows his 
conduct will almost certainly bring about consequences that he does not desire or 
primarily aim at. In essence, dolus directus is about wanting; indirectus is about 
knowing. The two forms of dolus are often separated as refl ecting a difference in 
culpability, but they should be equated because they are morally indistinct. 
Although they are conceptually each other’s mirror image, they are at times hard to 
separate. This is possible nonetheless by applying a test of failure, or by 
distinguishing between means and side-effects.
It is emphasized that dolus should be a neutral concept. It does not encompass 
any bad motives; it is not negated by the application of a justifi cation or excuse. In 
some offences, like theft and genocide, the intent of the defendant also relates to a 
motive that need not be achieved for him to be held liable. These offences may 
question the rule that dolus is neutral. However, such an ulterior intent constitutes 
merely a very general motive and is not necessarily the ultimate goal of the crime. 
The offence defi nition distinguishes an ulterior intent from motives that are 
irrelevant to dolus by including the former as an offence element to which dolus 
directus must relate.
Dolus is also neutral from the perspective that it does not relate to the illegality 
of the conduct. People are assumed to know the law or at least are obligated to get 
to know the law. Mistakes on the legality or wrongfulness of conduct can only 
amount to a negation of blameworthiness and is discussed as an excuse in part 3 of 
the book. Wrongfulness is therefore an implied element of criminal liability and 
assumed when the offence defi nition is fulfi lled. Sometimes, the offence defi nition 
does include wrongfulness or other legal aspects, but this again confi rms that dolus 
as such is neutral. It turned out to be unwarranted to fear that this provides 
defendants with a simple exculpatory claim, which is hard to refute. There exist 
numerous approaches that limit the intent-negating effect of mistakes of law, many 
of which can also be adopted in the framework of criminal liability that is proposed 
in this book.
Fault elements are primarily discussed in relation to consequences. If dolus 
relates to circumstances, it is common to refer to knowledge. The defendant does 
not need to consciously or continuously refl ect on a circumstance, like the minor 
age of a person he has sexual intercourse with. Subconscious or latent knowledge 
can suffi ce, but it does not suffi ce to suspect a circumstance may be present. 
Nonetheless, numerous strategies are identifi ed to equate suspicion with actual 
knowledge. It is argued that only if the defendant failed to resolve his suspicion 
because he was virtually certain it would be confi rmed, this may be equated with 
knowledge as a form of dolus indirectus. Other forms of suspicion may warrant 
criminal liability, but if so, this should be explicitly included in the offence 
defi nition. By including it in a separate offence defi nition, the difference in 
culpability can be refl ected in liability and in sentencing.
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Paragraph 3 of chapter IV deals with the concept of dolus eventualis. It relates to 
the foresight of side-effects of conduct. Being aware of the risk that a consequence 
may occur or a circumstance may be present, the actor takes this risk for granted 
and acts anyway. In contrast to English law, Dutch and German law did not create a 
separate fault element in between intention and negligence but extended the concept 
of dolus. The concept makes sure that those who knowingly take risks can also be 
punished as intentional actors, which is especially important if no negligent offence 
exists. Most importantly in practice, the concept facilitates proof of intention as 
most intentional offences require proof of nothing more than dolus eventualis.
This weakest form of intention is said to consist of a cognitive element of 
awareness of a risk and a volitional element of taking the risk for granted. This 
enables Dutch and German scholars to argue that intention is about knowing and 
wanting. Although the concept is almost similar in Dutch and German law, a 
distinction can be made in the cognitive criterion of being aware of a risk. This is 
illustrated by cases in which HIV-infection is the consequence of having 
unprotected sexual intercourse. Intention is accepted in Germany because the 
chance that the other person will be infected need not be considerable, in contrast to 
Dutch law.
The volitional element of taking the risk into the bargain is what separates dolus 
eventualis from conscious negligence. In the latter fault element, the defendant is 
also aware of a risk, but trusts in a good outcome. It is diffi cult to prove the 
volitional element of dolus eventualis because it concerns an inner disposition of 
the actor, which is therefore mostly hidden from us. Given the enormous 
signifi cance of the volitional element, this is problematic. In order to avoid dealing 
with such complicated psychological processes, courts prefer to focus on the 
externalization of the presumed disposition. If it was very probable that a risk would 
occur, the volitional element is also easily accepted. In cases where the risk was less 
probable, all circumstances are important to infer whether the defendant accepted 
the risk or not. It becomes obvious that German courts are generally more reluctant 
to accept the volitional element than Dutch courts. Amongst others, this follows 
from the application of a presumed threshold against killing others and the 
importance of in dubio pro reo in Germany.
The ways in which the volitional element is proven in practice has led scholars 
to conclude that a volitional element is irrelevant and that dolus eventualis is really 
about the awareness of risks. Although I reject this theory, it is right in stressing the 
practical importance of the foresight of the risk. If the defendant foresaw the risk is 
and acted anyway, the volitional element hardly presents problems of proof. What is 
even more problematic from a subjectivist perspective is that foresight is proven by 
reference to foreseeability. In other words, the awareness of the risk is deduced 
from the circumstance that a reasonable person would have been aware. The 
assumption is that the defendant is more or less a reasonable person, so he was also 
aware of the risk. Even if this approach may be correct in the majority of cases, the 
attribution of intent based on foreseeability presents a danger that the specifi c 
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defendant is convicted for the most serious form of committing criminal conduct, 
whereas he was only negligent.
By contrast, it is argued that a balance needs to be struck between general 
experience and individual, concrete circumstances, recognizing that the state of 
mind of the individual defendant is not necessarily that of the reasonable or average 
person. When it concerns proof of fault elements, objective evidence should only be 
used in moderation. The judiciary is urged to be more reluctant and critical in 
applying assumptions based on general experience. After all, facts and rules of 
general experience are not always known or true. Problems of evidence should not 
be shifted on to the defendant. Any doubt that the assumption may not be correct in 
a specifi c case, should carefully be considered by reference to all the facts and 
circum stances of the specifi c case and the specifi c defendant. Such an evidential 
approach is advocated as a second best solution to rejecting dolus eventualis 
altogether in favour of the concept, familiar in English law, of recklessness.
Recklessness is the conscious taking of an unreasonable risk. As it straddles the 
borders of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence, it has often been compared 
with these fault elements. However, recklessness differs from eventualis, because it 
is not a form of dolus but an independent kind of fault. Moreover, recklessness 
includes an explicit normative aspect and no volitional requirement. Recklessness 
also requires awareness of a risk. The chance that the risk materializes need not be 
considerable, but this can be taken into account in the wider ranging criterion that 
the risk must be unreasonable. In assessing its reasonableness, the harm that occurs 
if the risk materialized and the social utility of the conduct is also taken into 
account. The defendant must be aware of every circumstance that is taken into 
account. By contrast, whether this risk is in fact unreasonable is assessed 
objectively, independent of the valuation of the defendant.
Next, I argue in favour of using recklessness instead of dolus eventualis in 
European criminal law. First, there is a signifi cant difference between dolus 
directus and indirectus on the one hand, and dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence on the other. Intending harm is, all other things being equal, more 
culpable than foreseeing risks. Furthermore, dolus directus and indirectus require a 
high degree of either wanting something or knowing something, whereas these 
elements are only present in a diluted form in eventualis. The rationales of 
punishing dolus directus and indirectus, like the great degree of control over and 
choice for the outcome are also only present to a small extent in eventualis. It has 
more in common with conscious negligence, which also deals with the foresight of 
risks. The supposed difference between eventualis and conscious negligence, 
accepting the risk and trusting everything will be alright, does not follow clearly 
from case-law.
Secondly, dolus eventualis distorts intent in both a legal and linguistic manner. 
Much more than dolus indirectus, dolus eventualis strains the legal and colloquial 
meaning of intent as acting in order to bring about. In using eventualis to prove the 
defendant intended the damage he caused, we in fact prove far less than what we 
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blame him for. This discrepancy of proof and label is unfair to the defendant. The 
intentional creation of danger should be punished less severely than the intentional 
violation of a legal interest. For these reasons, intention should be distinguished 
from foresight by applying three kinds of fault, rather than two. As a tertium quid in 
between dolus and culpa, recklessness criminalizes the foresight of unreasonable 
side-effects. It is also about knowledge, but distinguished from dolus indirectus by 
the degree of the likelihood that the side-effect will occur.
Another advantage of applying reckless ness is that the distinction with culpa 
can be drawn strictly by awareness. Negligence in German and Dutch law includes 
not only unconscious negligence but also conscious negligence. By doing away with 
conscious negligence, culpa does not encompass the contrasting concepts of 
awareness and ignorance. Instead, culpa is (reprehen sible) ignorance. The defendant 
is reproached because he should and could have foreseen what a reasonable person 
would have foreseen. This strict distinction furthers a consistent legal framework 
with foreseeable outcomes. A distinct form of negligence is discussed as luxuria. 
German and Dutch law consider this the most serious form of conscious negligence, 
which can increase the maximum penalty in relation to simple negligence. It is a 
recognition that the dichotomy of dolus and culpa is insuffi cient to refl ect different 
degrees of culpability. As a functional equivalent to recklessness, luxuria could also 
be adopted as a separate fault element to criminalize the foresight of risks. However, 
it is concluded that recklessness is the better option, because it provides for a clearer 
demarcation of fault elements.
Chapter V discusses several principles that determine the application of mens 
rea. The correspondence principle encompasses the rule that every offence should 
require fault and the rule that fault should apply to all offence elements. Modern 
forms of liability, like strict liability, are presented as exceptions to these principles. 
With some exceptions, strict liability is rejected in German law as unconstitutional, 
but it is not precluded in all other legal systems under investigation. The principle of 
nulla poene sine culpa only brings about an absolute prohibition of punishing the 
blameless. It does not bring about that there may never be punishment without proof 
of fault. It is concluded that strict liability can be used in European criminal law, 
but only under strict conditions of subsidiarity and proportionality. Amongst others, 
this means that no lesser alternative can achieve similar results and that serious 
offences may not be strict.
Mistakes on offence elements negate dolus and, if they are reasonable, also 
culpa. In order to avoid unwarranted acquittals, numerous strategies are applied in 
the legal systems under investigation in order to limit the exculpatory effect of 
mistakes. Recalling the concepts discussed in the context of knowledge, it is 
reiterated that only complete ignorance generally negates fault. Second, normative 
offence elements only require awareness of the underlying facts, not the valuation. 
Finally, since dolus is neutral, mistakes as to aspects that are not included in the 
offence defi nition are simply irrelevant. Special categories of mistakes concern 
error in persona vel obiecto and aberratio ictus. Since dolus is a general concept, 
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not requiring individualization of the victim, these mistakes need not negate this 
fault element.
The contemporaneity principle requires mens rea and actus reus to coincide in 
time. Problems of contemporaneity may arise when, for example, the defendant 
may believe he has already achieved his goal, whereas in reality he only achieves it 
at a later stage. It could be argued that in this decisive later stage, he no longer 
intends the consequence. It can also be argued that defendants that are intoxicated 
whilst committing an offence lack the required dolus. Several strategies are 
discussed to overcome such claims and fi nd fault. Although the solutions to the 
problems presented by the principles of mens rea are solved very differently in the 
legal systems under investigation, the outcomes are quite similar: no problem of 
contemporaneity is likely to negate fault. Either multiple events are seen as one 
whole in order to negate the problem, or the problem of dolus is recognized and an 
exception made to the principle under a doctrine of actio libera in causa. Problems 
also hardly ever arise if dolus is viewed as a neutral and general fault element.
Part 3 discusses what defences should look like in European criminal law. After 
delineating the object of research in more detail in chapter VI, the differences 
between offence and defence are discussed in chapter VII. Some offences put the 
distinction under pressure by including wrongfulness or blameworthiness in its 
defi nition. In contrast to the regular situation and to the benefi t of the defendant, 
these offences imply that the prosecutor must prove the absence of the defence, that 
the defendant need not have been aware that the conditions of the defence were 
fulfi lled and that the principle of legality offers him more protection. A mistake on 
the facts that, if correct, would give rise to a defence, can negate intent, even if the 
mistake was unreasonable.
The most important question that follows from these implications is whether 
defences in relation to these atypical offences should be treated as negations of the 
charge with the abovementioned ramifi cations, or that they should nonetheless be 
treated as regular, affi rmative defences. The answer to this question is 
differentiated, based on the aforementioned principled distinction of offence and 
defence. Simply put, the absence of a defence, that is wrongfulness or 
blameworthiness, can be included in the offence defi nition for two reasons. In the 
fi rst situation, the absence of a defence is included because it is an essential offence 
element. The absence of a defence is treated as an offence element. By contrast, 
wrongfulness or blame worthiness are also often included for other reasons, such as 
a reminder to the court that a defence may very well apply in that context. In those 
situations, the inclusion of wrongfulness and blameworthiness in the offence 
defi nition has no consequences for the assessment of defences. The defendant still 
has to make probable he acted with the purpose the defence aims to protect and a 
mistake still needs to be reasonable in order to excuse him. In other words, defences 
should only be treated as a denial that the defendant fulfi lled all the elements of the 
offence defi nition when they negate a specifi c meaning of wrongfulness or 
blameworthiness. This approach can explain why in most cases, the application of a 
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justifi cation or excuse does not bring about that the conditions of that defence are 
made more lenient, just because it technically denies the charge.
Chapter VIII discusses the categorization of defences into justifi cations and 
excuses. It makes a fundamental distinction between wrongfulness and 
blameworthiness, between right and wrong, between act and actor, between an 
objective evaluation of all things considered and subjective reasons for acting. A 
justifi cation is the mirror image of wrongfulness, whereas the acceptance of an 
excuse negates blameworthiness. Although this continental distinction is becoming 
more and more accepted in England, it generally has not attracted much interest 
there. Many practitioners and scholars believe that the distinction has no practical 
legal consequences and is therefore irrelevant. However, the distinction does have 
practical legal consequences. Even though some differences are legitimately 
criticized, most of them hold up. Even if it is not accurate to state that only the 
application of an excuse enables measures, even if it is not generally accep ted that 
only justifi cations completely negate its mirror image and even if it has been 
demonstrated that a justifi cation does not always operate universally, there are still 
many other differences that warrant making the distinction between justifi cation 
and excuse. The distinction is useful. It serves a practical purpose and should 
therefore be included in a general part of criminal law for the EU.
First of all, by making a distinction between condemning the act and 
condemning the defendant, the dichotomy enables important communicative 
functions of the law. If that difference is not made, fears can arise that an excuse 
also implies approval of the conduct with the result that they are applied 
restrictively. Furthermore, the condi tions of individual defences are infl uenced by 
the category to which they belong. Amongst others, the justifi catory defences have 
stricter requirements of propor tionality. It is also confi rmed that justifi cations are 
incompatible: a defendant cannot raise a justifi cation against justifi ed conduct. 
Finally, the distinction is important to structure the order of legal reasoning. It 
makes no sense to assess the blameworthiness of the actor before it is established 
that the offence is wrongful.
Chapter IX discusses the justifi cations of European criminal law. Justifi cations 
negate the wrongfulness of the act and are characterized by the weighing of 
competing interests. By precluding criminal liability, justifi cations enable that the 
prevailing interest will be saved. In order for self-defence to justify a criminal 
offence, the attack that is averted by that offence must be wrongful, imminent and 
of human origin. In other words, self-defence must be necessary. A duty to retreat 
does not exist. At most, not using a possibility to safely retreat can infl uence the 
other requirements of self-defence. Even more important, the offence committed to 
avert or stop the attack must be proportionate in relation to the harm avoided. More 
speci fi  cally, the defendant must choose the least intrusive means of defence and 
apply them in a manner that is least intrusive to the aggressor’s interests, as long as 
it is still capable of protecting the defendant’s interests suffi ciently. Self-defence 
differs from the justifi cation necessity because it does not require strict proportio-
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nality between attack and reaction. It is merely required that the defensive force 
used by the defendant is not disproportionate to the attack.
Necessity is grounded in the rationale of protecting the legal order as a whole. 
By saving the prevailing interest, there is a net benefi t for the legal order. The 
legislator cannot foresee all instances where it may be justifi ed to break the letter of 
the law, and given the enormous amount of norms from national and European 
origin, a legal subject is increasingly likely to fi nd himself in a confl ict of duties. A 
situation of necessity exists when there is a present danger for life, limb, freedom, 
honour, property or another legal interest, that can only be averted by affecting 
legal interests of others. The danger need not be as imminent as the attack in the 
framework of self-defence. On the other hand, the condition serves to exclude from 
the defence situations that affect many people or are recurring. Even though the 
danger can certainly be imminent to many, the defence is precluded so as not to 
invite all these people to break the law, deteriorating the enforceability of the law. 
The fear that necessity may lead to anarchy also led to a strict condition of 
subsidiarity. Only when the breaking of the law is absolutely necessary, only when 
all else has failed, including the fulfi lment of less serious offences, can this be 
justifi ed.
A third defence that should be included in a general part of criminal law for the 
EU is consent, even though it often operates as the abovementioned denial of the 
offence defi nition. Consent recognizes that someone’s interests may be sacrifi ced, 
based on the autonomous will of that person. The general welfare or legal order 
need not be furthered, but it may also not be harmed. There fore, the act consented 
may not violate public policy. Consent applies if the consen ting party is the sole 
disposer over the individual legal interest at stake and is capable of giving his 
consent. The latter implies that the defendant is generally able to consent and was 
aware of the possible consequen ces of the act he consented to in the concrete case.
Chapter X deals with excuses. These defences attack the assumption that the 
defendant could have reasonably avoided committing the offence. It is grounded in 
the principle that there can be no punishment without blameworthiness, which is 
also safeguarded as an essential condition for criminal liability under art. 6 ECHR. 
First of all, sometimes the defendant cannot be blamed for exceeding the limits of 
self-defence. This is recognized in Dutch and German law by the excuse of self-
defence-excess. The void that exists due to the lack of such an excuse in England is 
fi lled in different ways, but only partially. Moreover, the excuse of self-defence-
excess is the most consistent and principled option.
In self-defence excess, the defendant is excused for either having exceeded the 
limits of proportionality or for having continued to use defensive force when this 
was no longer necessary. It is also even possible to excuse him when he only started 
to use force after the attack had ended. Excess thus forms an exception to the 
proportionality or imminence requirement of justifi catory self-defence. All other 
conditions of self-defence need to have been fulfi lled, such as that the attack was 
wrongful. As a specifi c condition of excess, the exceeding of the limits of self-
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defence must have been a consequence of a certain state of mind, like fear or 
confusion, which in itself should have been a consequence of the wrongful attack. 
Although aggressive emotions like anger are excluded from the German defence, in 
practice, the difference with Dutch law is not so great. The simplest and therefore 
most workable solution is to include these emotions in the defence.
Duress excuses the defendant who could not and should not have acted 
differently. It is based on the psychological pressure on the defendant that made it 
almost impossible for him not to commit the offence. However, duress is also 
limited in a normative way, by taking into account the interests of others than the 
defendant. It is required that the defendant committed the offence because he was 
impelled by an imminent danger or threat to important legal interests. In line with 
the defences of necessity and self-defence, the interests that can be protected should 
not be limited a priori to life and limb of himself or someone close to him. The 
condition of proportionality will exclude cases where minor interests are pro tec ted 
by committing serious offences. The source of the pressure needs to be extraneous 
to the defendant, but the line between what is internal and what is external is not 
always easy to draw and therefore controversial. It is submitted that the criterion 
should not be applied rigidly.
Mistakes as to the legal prohibition, also called mistakes of law, in general do 
not exculpate. Nevertheless, mistakes that were unavoidable must excuse the 
defendant. This follows from the fundamental principle that only the blameworthy 
may be punished. The defendant should only be convicted if he was able to see the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and thereby had a chance and choice to avoid the 
criminal conduct. It would be unjust, unfair and useless to punish the person who 
does not know and should not know he is committing a criminal offence. Fears of 
allowing for the excuse are neutralized or mitigated because of its excusa tory 
nature. First of all, an excuse does not override or set aside, but confi rms the norm. 
Secondly, only excusable, that is, unavoidable mistakes of law will excuse. The 
defendant has a duty to get to know the law, the scope of which depends on the 
individual circumstances. Therefore, the mistake will be held unavoidable only in 
exceptional cases.
Putative defences are treated like mistakes as to the legal prohibition because of 
the conceptual similarity: in both cases, the defendant thinks that what he does is 
lawful. When the defendant is mistaken on the scope of an existing defence or 
believes that a non-existing defence applies, he is also mistaken that what he does is 
in line with the legal order. Another category of putative defences consists of 
mistakes on the facts that, if present, would give rise to a justifi cation or excuse. 
The defence of superior orders is also generally understood to be a mistake of law, 
namely the mistaken belief of the defendant on the legality of the orders. Such a 
putative defence does not need explicit regulation, as it falls under the general 
scheme of excusing unavoidable mistakes of law.
Insanity exculpates the defendant who, at the time of committing the offence, 
due to a mental disorder, did not have the capacities to be held responsible in law. 
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The defence also enables the taking of measures to treat or incapa citate the 
perpetrator and protect society. Insanity requires that the defendant must have been 
suffering from a mental disorder when he committed the offence. There is no need 
to create categories or to limit the mental disorders that can qualify. This broad 
scope is limited by the other conditions of insanity, such as that the disorder must 
have substantially impaired the capacities to be held responsible in criminal law. In 
order to be held responsible in criminal law, the perpetrator must know what he is 
doing and that this is wrong. He must also be able to restrain himself from 
committing the offence. Only when these capacities are substantially impaired is 
the complete defence accepted. In cases where the capacities were only diminished, 
the sentence may be mitigated. Because of this denial of fundamental capacities to 
be held responsible, insanity can be equated with infancy and treated as a so-called 
exemption, rather than as an excuse. It has been submitted that insanity can be both 
an exemption and an excuse, depending on the seriousness and duration of the 
impairment, the capacities involved and the aspect of the defence on which one 
focuses.
Part 4 consists of a conclusion, in which the most signifi cant proposals of the 
previous parts are reiterated. These include the choice in favour of recklessness to 
the detriment of dolus eventualis, the conditional acceptance of strict liability and 
the embrace of a wide scope of defences. The conclusion also summarizes what 
mens rea and defences should look like in European criminal law, focusing on some 
of the most signifi cant differences between the investigated legal systems. Finally, it 
is recognized that the reader may reach different conclusions based on a different 
valuation of the criteria for synthesis. For example, one may attach more weight to 
the interests of the defendant than I have done. Nevertheless, this will further the 
much-needed debate on the content of substantive criminal law of the EU.
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SAMENVATTING
Opzet, schuld en strafuitsluitingsgronden in het Europees strafrecht
Dit boek gaat over mens rea en strafuitsluitingsgronden in het Europees strafrecht. 
Mens rea omvat de subjectieve elementen van een misdrijf, zoals opzet en schuld, 
evenals de doctrines die de toepassing van deze elementen bepalen. 
Strafuitsluitings gronden, te onderscheiden in rechtvaardigingsgronden en 
schulduitsluitingsgronden, verwijzen naar die situaties waarin de verdachte niet 
aansprakelijk kan worden gesteld, ook al heeft hij formeel een strafbaar feit 
gepleegd. De centrale vraag van dit onderzoek is hoe mens rea en 
strafuitsluitingsgronden vorm gegeven zouden moeten worden in een algemeen 
deel van strafrecht voor de Europese Unie.
Europees strafrecht is een multi-gelaagde lappendeken van wetgeving en 
jurisprudentie van Europese en nationale herkomst. In de afgelopen decennia heeft 
het proces van Europese integratie alle gebieden van het recht beïnvloed, en 
uiteindelijk ook het strafrecht. Terwijl het scheppen en handhaven van 
strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van oorsprong een puur nationale aangelegenheid 
is, zijn lidstaten tegenwoordig ook op grond van Europese wetgeving verplicht om 
bepaalde vormen van schadelijk gedrag strafbaar te stellen. Deze wetgeving bepaalt 
echter niet de volledige reikwijdte van strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid, doordat 
zij nalaat de algemene beginselen van het strafrecht te defi niëren. De Unie verwijst 
bijvoorbeeld naar ‘opzet’ in haar wetgeving, maar geeft niet aan wat daaronder 
verstaan moet worden. In hoofdstuk I wordt uitgelegd dat als gevolg van deze 
lacunes de lidstaten hun eigen nationale rechtsbeginselen, zoals opzet en noodweer, 
toepassen wanneer zij Europese wetgeving implementeren. Omdat deze nationale 
concepten verschillen, varieert ook de reikwijdte van strafrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid in de Unie. Dit is in strijd met het doel van EU-wetgeving, 
namelijk het dichter bij elkaar brengen van rechtsstelsels door harmonisatie.
Hoofdstuk I noemt ook andere redenen voor dit onderzoek, zoals de 
ontwikkeling van een supranationaal Europees strafrecht, waarin een Europees 
Openbaar Ministerie het Europees strafrecht direct handhaaft. Bovendien kan dit 
boek de Europese wetgevende en rechterlijke macht ten dienste staan bij het 
identifi ceren van algemene beginselen van het materiële strafrecht en een diepgaand 
debat over de inhoud van deze beginselen in de hele Unie bevorderen. De 
uitkomsten van het onderzoek kunnen nuttig zijn voor toetredende landen en 
kandidaat-lidstaten, door te laten zien wat de EU-normen in het strafrecht zijn. Ten 
slotte kan dit onderzoek de kennis van nationale autoriteiten ten aanzien van het 
materiële strafrecht in andere lidstaten bevorderen. Dit zal het wederzijds 
vertrouwen tussen rechters, offi cieren van justitie en politie vergroten, wat 
essentieel is voor verdere integratie en samenwerking in strafzaken.
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Hoofdstuk II legt de methodologie van het onderzoek uit. In een eerste fase van 
het onderzoek is vastgesteld hoe mens rea en strafuitsluitingsgronden zijn 
vormgegeven in de nationale rechtsstelsels en het recht van de Unie. Immers, een 
algemeen deel van Europees strafrecht dient gebaseerd te worden op de juridische 
tradities van de lidstaten en de fragmenten van het strafrecht die uit Unierecht af te 
leiden zijn. Een belangrijk deel van dit onderzoek bestaat dus uit rechtsvergelijkend 
onderzoek. Om praktische redenen moest ik de vergelijking beperken tot het 
Nederlandse, Engelse en Duitse rechtssysteem. In een tweede fase heb ik de 
gegevens van de eerste fase vergeleken en een synthese gemaakt van mens rea en 
strafuitsluitingsgronden. Deze synthese is gebaseerd op fundamentele 
mensenrechten en de overeenkomsten van mens rea en strafuitsluitingsgronden in 
het nationale en Unierecht. Om een keuze tussen concurrerende perspectieven op 
juridische begrippen te maken, heb ik bepaalde criteria toegepast, zoals dat een 
algemeen deel van Europees strafrecht consistent, duidelijk en handhaafbaar moet 
zijn. In de daarop volgende delen worden de resultaten van deze synthese 
gepresenteerd en verdedigd. Het boek beschrijft niet in detail alle concepten van 
mens rea en strafuitsluitingsgronden zoals die worden toegepast in de verschillende 
rechtsstelsels die onderzocht zijn.
Het tweede deel van dit boek presenteert hoe mens rea er in het in Europees 
strafrecht uit zou moeten zien. Hoofdstuk III legt uit wat mens rea betekent door het 
af te bakenen van daarmee verband houdende juridische begrippen. Mens rea en 
strafuitsluitingsgronden worden in een kader van strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid 
gepositioneerd dat bestaat uit de delictsomschrijving, wederrechtelijkheid en 
verwijtbaarheid. Door verwijtbaarheid van de delictsomschrijving te onderscheiden, 
wordt het verschil duidelijk tussen schulduitsluitingsgronden en elementen van 
mens rea. Mens rea wordt gecontrasteerd met actus reus. Dit laatste, het strafbare 
gedrag, zorgt ervoor dat gedachten alleen niet strafbaar zijn. Beide termen worden 
gebruikt als instrumenten om de elementen van de delictsomschrijving te 
categoriseren. De term mens rea omvat in dit boek niet alleen de ‘subjectieve’ 
elementen van de delictsomschrijving maar ook de bijbehorende doctrines en 
beginselen. Mens rea en actus reus staan tot elkaar in verhouding als 
communicerende vaten, wat betekent dat als minder wordt vereist van actus reus, 
meer zou moeten worden geëist van mens rea.
De tweedeling van de actus reus en mens rea valt samen met die van 
objectivisme en subjectivisme. Dit zijn extreme perspectieven op wat er het meest 
van belang is voor strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid: het gedrag en de schade 
enerzijds, of verwerpelijke keuzes en fouten anderzijds. Het analytische onderscheid 
is ook van belang ten aanzien van het bewijs van het tenlastegelegde. Omdat mens 
rea vereist dat we in de geest van een persoon moeten kijken, lijken problemen 
inzake het bewijs van mens rea onvermijdelijk. Om dergelijke problemen te 
vermijden baseert een objectivist mens rea niet op de werkelijke psyche van een 
individuele persoon. Mens rea wordt daarentegen gelijkgesteld met of afgeleid van 
de zogenaamde ‘redelijke persoon’. In een meer gematigde versie van deze 
Samenvatting
 557
benadering wordt kennis over de psyche afgeleid van niet-psychologische factoren, 
zoals het gedrag en de omstandigheden van het geval, geïnterpreteerd met behulp 
van regels van algemene ervaring.
In hoofdstuk IV wordt nader ingegaan op de verschillende subjectieve 
elementen. Opzet en schuld worden onderscheiden om een verschil in 
verwerpelijkheid uit te drukken. Degene die opzettelijk iemand doodt, is 
verwerpelijker en moet daarom strenger worden gestraft dan degene door wiens 
schuld een persoon om het leven komt. Daarnaast kunnen subjectieve elementen 
strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid beperken, omdat sommige delicten alleen met 
opzet kunnen worden gepleegd. Ik verdedig het standpunt dat een algemeen deel 
van het strafrecht voor de Europese Unie drie soorten subjectieve elementen zou 
moeten toepassen; dolus, recklessness en culpa. Ik bespreek deze elementen in 
afl opende volgorde van ernst. Dolus is het meest ernstige type, een paradigma van 
strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid omdat het de grootste mate van controle en keuze 
over de uitvoering van de delicts omschrijving uitdrukt. De ernstigste vorm dolus 
concentreert zich op de wil van de dader om een bepaald resultaat te bereiken. Een 
ogenschijnlijk minder ernstige vorm van dit opzet is dolus indirectus. Het opzet van 
de dader wordt ook geacht gericht te zijn op gevolgen die hij niet wenst of probeert 
te bereiken, indien hij weet dat zijn handeling vrijwel zeker zal leiden tot die 
gevolgen. In essentie is dolus directus willen; indirectus bestaat vooral uit weten. 
De twee vormen van dolus worden vaak gescheiden op grond van een verschil in 
verwerpelijkheid, maar ze zouden gelijk gesteld moeten worden omdat ze moreel 
niet te onderscheiden zijn. Alhoewel zij conceptueel elkaars spiegelbeeld zijn, zijn 
deze twee vormen van dolus soms moeilijk te scheiden. Dit is toch mogelijk door 
een zogenaamde test van falen toe te passen of door een onderscheid te maken 
tussen middelen en neveneffecten.
Benadrukt wordt dat dolus een neutraal concept dient te zijn. Het omvat geen 
slechte motieven en wordt niet tenietgedaan door de toepassing van een 
rechtvaardigings- of schulduitsluitingsgrond. In sommige delicten, zoals diefstal en 
genocide, heeft de intentie van de verdachte ook betrekking op een motief dat niet 
bereikt hoeft te worden om hem aansprakelijk te stellen. Deze delicten kunnen het 
neutrale karakter van dolus in twijfel trekken. Echter, een dergelijk verdergaand 
opzet vormt slechts een zeer algemeen motief en is niet noodzakelijkerwijs het 
uiteindelijke doel van het misdrijf. De delictsomschrijving onderscheidt een 
verdergaand opzet van motieven die irrelevant zijn voor dolus door de eerste als een 
bestanddeel in het delict op te nemen, waarop dolus directus betrekking moet 
hebben.
Dolus is ook neutraal vanuit het perspectief dat het geen betrekking heeft op de 
onrechtmatigheid of wederrechtelijkheid van de gedraging. Mensen worden 
verondersteld de wet te kennen of in ieder geval de plicht te hebben om de wet te 
kennen. Rechtsdwaling kan strafrechtelijk alleen relevant zijn als een ontkenning 
van verwijtbaarheid en wordt besproken als een schulduitsluitingsgrond in het derde 
deel van het boek. Wederrechtelijkheid is dan ook een impliciet element van straf-
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rechtelijke aansprakelijkheid en wordt aangenomen wanneer de delictsomschrijving 
is vervuld. Soms zijn wederrechtelijkheid of andere juridische aspecten wel 
expliciet opgenomen in de delictsomschrijving, maar dit bevestigt wederom dat 
dolus als zodanig neutraal is. De vrees dat dit verdachten voorziet van een 
eenvoudig verweer dat moeilijk te weerleggen is, bleek ongegrond. Er bestaan 
talrijke benaderingen die het effect van rechtsdwaling op het ontkennen van dolus 
beperken, waarvan een groot deel ook kan worden toegepast in het kader van de 
strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid die wordt voorgesteld in dit boek.
Subjectieve elementen worden vooral besproken in relatie tot gevolgen. Als 
dolus betrekking heeft op omstandigheden, spreekt men over wetenschap of kennis. 
De verdachte hoeft niet bewust of continu na te denken over een omstandigheid, 
zoals de minderjarige leeftijd van een persoon met wie hij geslachtsgemeenschap 
heeft. Onderbewuste of latente kennis volstaat, maar een enkel vermoeden dat een 
omstandigheid aanwezig kan zijn, niet. Toch bestaan er verschillende perspectieven 
die het mogelijk maken om een vermoeden gelijk te stellen met daadwerkelijke 
kennis. Er wordt gesteld dat alleen indien de verdachte zijn vermoeden niet verder 
uitzoekt, omdat hij vrijwel zeker is dat het zou worden bevestigd, dit kan worden 
gelijkgesteld met wetenschap als een vorm van dolus indirectus. Andere vormen 
van wantrouwen kunnen aanleiding geven tot strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid, 
maar als dat de bedoeling is, moet dit expliciet worden opgenomen in de delicts-
omschrijving. Door dit element in een andere delictsomschrijving op te nemen, kan 
het verschil in verwerpelijkheid worden weerspiegeld in de aansprakelijkheid en 
strafmaat.
Paragraaf 3 van hoofdstuk IV behandelt dolus eventualis, dat in het Nederlands 
recht bekend staat als voorwaardelijk opzet. Dit heeft betrekking op het voorzien 
van neveneffecten van handelingen. Bewust van het risico dat een gevolg kan 
intreden of een omstandigheid aanwezig kan zijn, neemt de dader dit risico voor lief 
en handelt desalniettemin. In tegenstelling tot het Engelse recht kent het Duitse en 
Nederlandse recht geen apart subjectief element dat tussen opzet en schuld 
gepositioneerd kan worden. In plaats daarvan past men een extensief concept van 
dolus toe. Dolus eventualis maakt het mogelijk ook diegenen die willens en wetens 
risico’s nemen als opzettelijke daders te straffen, hetgeen vooral belangrijk is als er 
geen delict bestaat dat nalatigheid strafbaar stelt. De vergemakkelijking van het 
bewijs van opzet door dolus eventualis is in de praktijk het belangrijkst, omdat de 
meeste opzettelijke delicten niets meer vereisen dan bewijs van dolus eventualis.
Van deze zwakste vorm van opzet wordt gezegd dat zij uit een cognitief en 
volitief element bestaat, namelijk het bewustzijn van een risico respectievelijk het 
op de koop toe nemen van dit risico. Dit maakt het mogelijk voor Duitse en 
Nederlandse geleerden om te stellen dat opzet uit weten en willen bestaat. Hoewel 
het concept in het Duitse en Nederlandse recht nagenoeg identiek is, kan een 
onderscheid worden gemaakt inzake het cognitieve aspect van het bewustzijn van 
een risico. Dit wordt geïllustreerd door gevallen waarin hiv-infectie het gevolg is 
van onbeschermde geslachtsgemeenschap. In Duitsland wordt voorwaardelijk opzet 
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aangenomen, omdat de kans dat de andere persoon zal worden besmet, niet 
aanmerkelijk hoeft te zijn, in tegenstelling tot het Nederlandse recht.
Het volitieve element van het op de koop toe nemen van het risico onderscheidt 
dolus eventualis van bewuste roekeloosheid. In het laatstgenoemde subjectieve 
element is de verdachte zich ook bewust van een risico, maar vertrouwt hij op een 
goede afl oop. Het is moeilijk om het wilselement van dolus eventualis te bewijzen, 
omdat het gaat om een  innerlijke attitude van de dader, die dus meestal voor ons 
verborgen blijft. Gezien de enorme betekenis van het element, is dit problematisch. 
Om niet te hoeven omgaan met zulke ingewikkelde psychologische processen, 
richten rechterlijke instanties zich liever op de veruiterlijking van de veronderstelde 
attitude. Als het zeer waarschijnlijk was dat het gevolg zou intreden, wordt het 
wilselement ook gemakkelijk geaccepteerd. In gevallen waar het risico minder 
waarschijnlijk was, moeten alle omstandigheden betrokken worden in het oordeel 
of de verdachte het risico wel of niet heeft geaccepteerd. Het wordt duidelijk dat 
Duitse rechters over het algemeen minder geneigd zijn om dit wilselement aan te 
nemen dan hun Nederlandse collega’s. Dit komt onder andere doordat in Duitsland 
wordt verondersteld dat eenieder een afkeer heeft van het doden van anderen en 
doordat het beginsel van in dubio pro reo daar zeer serieus wordt genomen.
Vanwege de manieren waarop het wilselement in de praktijk wordt bewezen, 
concluderen veel geleerden dat dit element niet relevant is en dat dolus eventualis 
dus in realiteit over het bewustzijn van risico’s gaat. Hoewel ik deze theorie 
verwerp, legt zij terecht bloot dat het in de praktijk veelal gaat om het voorzien van 
risico’s. Als de verdachte het risico voorzag en toch heeft gehandeld, wordt het 
wilselement makkelijk aangenomen. Nog problematischer vanuit een subjectivis-
tisch perspectief is dat voorzien wordt afgeleid van voorzienbaarheid. Het 
bewustzijn van een risico wordt bewezen aan de hand van de omstandigheid dat een 
redelijk persoon zich er ook bewust van zou zijn geweest. De veronderstelling is dat 
de verdachte min of meer een redelijk persoon is, en dat hij zich dus ook bewust 
was van het risico. Zelfs als deze aanpak in de meeste gevallen tot het juiste 
resultaat leidt, brengt de toerekening van opzet op basis van voorzienbaarheid het 
gevaar met zich mee dat de specifi eke verdachte wordt veroordeeld voor de meest 
ernstige vorm van het plegen van crimineel gedrag, terwijl hij enkel nalatig is 
geweest.
Daarentegen wordt gesteld dat er een evenwicht moet worden gevonden tussen 
regels van algemene ervaring en individuele, concrete omstandig heden, onder-
kennende dat de gemoedstoestand van de individuele verdachte niet noodzakelijker-
wijs dezelfde is als die van de redelijke of gemiddelde persoon. Bij het bewijzen van 
subjectieve elementen moet objectief bewijs alleen met mate worden gebruikt. 
Bovendien zou de rechterlijke macht terughoudend en kritisch moeten zijn met 
aannamen op basis van regels van algemene ervaring. Immers, feiten en regels van 
algemene ervaring zijn niet altijd bekend of waar. Bewijsproblemen mogen niet 
worden afgewenteld op de verdachte. Indien in een specifi ek geval twijfel bestaat 
over de juistheid van een aanname, moeten alle feiten en omstandigheden van het 
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concrete geval en de specifi eke verweerder in het oordeel betrokken worden. Een 
dergelijke bewijs rechtelijke aanpak wordt bepleit als de op één na beste oplossing 
voor het Europees strafrecht. Het verdient de voorkeur om dolus eventualis in het 
geheel niet over te nemen in een algemeen deel van strafrecht voor de EU. In plaats 
daarvan zou een concept dat bekend is in het Engels recht moeten worden toegepast, 
namelijk dat van recklessness.
Recklessness, niet te verwarren met het Nederlandse roekeloosheid, bestaat uit 
het bewust nemen van een onredelijk risico. Omdat het deels dolus eventualis en 
bewuste schuld omvat, is het vaak met deze subjectieve elementen vergeleken. 
Recklessness verschilt echter van dolus eventualis, omdat het geen vorm van opzet 
is, maar een onafhankelijke vorm van mens rea. Bovendien kent recklessness geen 
wilselement, maar wel een expliciet normatief aspect. Recklessness vereist ook dat 
de verdachte zich bewust is van een risico. De kans dat het gevolg zal intreden hoeft 
niet aanmerkelijk te zijn, maar dit kan wel degelijk relevant zijn in de context van 
de ruimere voorwaarde dat het risico onredelijk moet zijn. Bij de beoordeling van 
de redelijkheid van het risico wordt ook rekening gehouden met de schade die 
ontstaat als het risico zich verwezenlijkt, alsmede het maatschappelijk nut van de 
gedraging die het risico in het leven roept. De verdachte moet zich bewust zijn van 
elke omstandigheid die in aanmerking wordt genomen. Daarentegen wordt de vraag 
of dit risico onredelijk is objectief beoordeeld, onafhankelijk van de waardering van 
de verdachte.
Vervolgens pleit ik ervoor om recklessness in plaats van dolus eventualis een 
plaats te geven in het Europese strafrecht. Ten eerste is er een signifi cant verschil 
tussen dolus directus en indirectus aan de ene kant, en dolus eventualis en bewuste 
schuld aan de andere kant. Opzettelijk een inbreuk maken op rechtsgoederen is, 
ceteris paribus, verwerpelijker dan het voorzien van risico’s. Bovendien vereisen 
dolus directus en indirectus een hoge mate van ofwel willen of weten, terwijl deze 
elementen slechts in zeer verdunde vorm aanwezig zijn in eventualis. De ratio om 
dolus directus en indirectus te straffen, zoals de grote mate van controle over en de 
keuze voor het resultaat zijn ook alleen in geringe mate aanwezig in eventualis. Het 
heeft meer gemeen met bewuste schuld, dat ook over het voorzien van risico’s gaat. 
Het veronderstelde verschil tussen eventualis en bewuste schuld, het aanvaarden 
van het risico en het vertrouwen dat alles goed komt, volgt niet duidelijk uit de 
rechtspraak.
Ten tweede vervormt dolus eventualis het concept van opzet op zowel een 
juridische als een taalkundige manier. De betekenis van opzet in de wet en het 
dagelijks taalgebruik als handelen om tot stand te brengen wordt door dolus 
eventualis enorm onder druk gezet, veel meer dan door dolus indirectus. Door 
eventualis te gebruiken om te bewijzen dat de verdachte de schade die hij heeft 
veroorzaakt beoogde, bewijzen we in feite veel minder dan wat we hem verwijten. 
Dit verschil van bewijs en etiket is oneerlijk tegenover de verdachte. Met andere 
woorden, opzettelijke gevaarzetting van een rechtsgoed zou minder zwaar bestraft 
moeten worden dan de opzettelijke inbreuk op een rechtsgoed. Om deze redenen 
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moet opzet onderscheiden worden van het voorzien van risico’s door drie vormen 
van mens rea toe te passen, in plaats van twee. Als een tertium quid tussen dolus en 
culpa criminaliseert recklessness het voorzien van onredelijke neveneffecten van 
handelen. Het gaat ook om bewustzijn, maar onderscheidt zich van dolus indirectus 
door de mate van waarschijnlijkheid dat het neveneffect optreedt.
Een ander voordeel van het toepassen van recklessness is dat het onderscheid 
met culpa strikt kan worden gemaakt door het criterium van bewustzijn. Schuld in 
het Duitse en Nederlandse recht omvat naast onbewuste schuld ook bewuste schuld. 
Door bewuste schuld af te wijzen, omvat culpa niet de contrasterende concepten 
van bewustzijn en onwetendheid. In plaats daarvan is culpa verwijtbare 
onwetendheid. De verdachte wordt verweten dat hij had moeten en had kunnen 
voorzien wat een redelijk persoon zou hebben voorzien. Dit strikte onderscheid 
bevordert een consistent wettelijk kader met voorzienbare uitkomsten. Een aparte 
vorm van schuld, bekend in Nederland als roekeloosheid, wordt besproken als 
luxuria. Duits en Nederlands recht beschouwen dit als de meest ernstige vorm van 
bewuste schuld, dat de maximale straf kan doen oplopen in verhouding tot 
eenvoudige schuld. Het is een erkenning dat de tweedeling van dolus en culpa 
onvoldoende de verschillende gradaties van mens rea aanduidt. Als functioneel 
equivalent van recklessness zou luxuria ook kunnen worden gebruikt als een apart 
subjectief element dat het voorzien van risico’s strafbaar stelt. Ik concludeer echter 
dat recklessness de betere optie is, omdat het een duidelijkere afbakening van 
subjectieve elementen mogelijk maakt.
In hoofdstuk V worden de beginselen besproken die de toepassing van mens rea 
bepalen. Het beginsel van correspondentie omvat de regels dat elk delict een 
subjectief element moet bevatten en dat dit element betrekking moet hebben op alle 
bestanddelen van het delict. Moderne vormen van aansprakelijkheid, zoals risico-
aansprakelijkheid, worden als uitzonderingen op deze principes gepresenteerd. Op 
enkele uitzonderingen na wordt risico-aansprakelijkheid in het Duitse recht 
afgewezen als ongrondwettelijk, maar alle andere rechtsstelsels die in het onderzoek 
betrokken zijn sluiten dit niet uit. Uit het beginsel van nulla poene sine culpa vloeit 
enkel een absoluut verbod voort om de persoon te straffen die geen verwijt kan 
worden gemaakt. Het beginsel dicteert niet dat er nimmer straf mag volgen zonder 
bewijs van een subjectief element. Geconcludeerd wordt dat risico-aansprakelijkheid 
toegepast mag worden in het Europese strafrecht, maar alleen onder strikte 
voorwaarden van subsidiariteit en proportionaliteit. Dit betekent onder andere dat 
er geen minder verregaand alternatief vergelijkbare resultaten kan bereiken en dat 
ernstige strafbare feiten niet bestraft mogen worden zonder bewijs van mens rea.
Feitelijke dwaling ten aanzien van een bestanddeel van de delictsomschrijving 
kan dolus ontkennen, en indien de dwaling redelijk was, ook culpa. Om onterechte 
vrijspraken te voorkomen worden in de onderzochte rechtsstelsels verschillende 
strategieën toegepast om het effect van dwaling te relativeren. Verwijzend naar de 
concepten die in de context van kennis zijn besproken, wordt er nogmaals op 
gewezen dat alleen volledige onwetendheid doorgaans tot een ontkenning van mens 
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rea leidt. Bovendien vereisen normatieve bestanddelen slechts bewustzijn van de 
onderliggende feiten, niet hun waardering. Ten slotte brengt het neutrale karakter 
van dolus met zich mee dat dwaling ten aanzien van aspecten die niet zijn 
opgenomen in de delictsomschrijving, irrelevant zijn. Bijzondere categorieën van 
dwaling betreffen error in persona vel obiecto en aberratio ictus. Omdat dolus een 
algemeen concept is en geen individualisering van het slachtoffer vereist, doen deze 
vormen van dwaling niets af aan dit subjectieve element.
Het gelijktijdigsheidsbeginsel vereist dat mens rea en actus reus overeenkomen 
in tijd. Problemen van gelijktijdigheid kunnen ontstaan  wanneer de verdachte 
bijvoorbeeld denkt dat hij zijn doel al bereikt heeft, terwijl hij in werkelijkheid dat 
pas op een later tijdstip bereikt. Men zou kunnen stellen dat in dit beslissende latere 
stadium, hij niet langer opzet heeft op het gevolg. Er kan ook worden gesteld dat 
veel verdachten die dronken zijn op het moment dat zij een strafbaar feit plegen, 
geen opzet hebben op dat feit. Verschillende strategieën worden besproken om 
dergelijke verweren te verwerpen en het subjectieve element aan te nemen. Hoewel 
de problemen die door de beginselen van mens rea worden opgeworpen heel anders 
worden opgelost in de onderzochte rechtsstelsels, lijken de uitkomsten veel op 
elkaar: een probleem van gelijktijdigheid leidt doorgaans niet tot een ontkenning 
van mens rea. Ofwel worden meerdere gebeurtenissen als één geheel gezien om te 
ontkennen dat er een probleem is, of het probleem wordt erkend en er wordt een 
uitzondering gemaakt op het beginsel op grond van de leer van actio libera in 
causa. Problemen ontstaan vaak ook niet eens  indien dolus wordt beschouwd als 
neutraal en algemeen subjectief element.
Deel 3 beschrijft hoe de strafuitsluitingsgronden van het Europese strafrecht 
eruit zouden moeten zien. Nadat in hoofdstuk VI het object van onderzoek verder is 
afgebakend, worden in hoofdstuk VII de verschillen tussen delictsomschrijving en 
strafuitsluitingsgrond besproken. Sommige strafbare feiten zetten het onderscheid 
tussen de twee onder druk  door de opname van wederrechtelijkheid of 
verwijtbaarheid in de delictsomschrijving. In tegenstelling tot de normale, 
‘ideaaltypische’, situatie en ten gunste van de verdachte impliceren deze delicten 
dat de offi cier van justitie de afwezigheid van een strafuitsluitingsgrond moet 
bewijzen, dat de verdachte zich er niet bewust van hoefde te zijn dat aan alle 
voorwaarden van de strafuitsluitings grond was voldaan en dat het legaliteitsbeginsel 
hem meer bescherming biedt. Een feitelijke dwaling die, indien juist, zou leiden tot 
aanvaarding van een strafuitsluitingsgrond, kan het opzet ontkennen, zelfs indien 
de dwaling onredelijk was.
De belangrijkste vraag die hieruit volgt, is of strafuitsluitingsgronden die 
betrekking hebben op niet-ideaaltypische delicten moeten worden behandeld als 
ontkenningen van het tenlastegelegde met de bovengenoemde gevolgen of dat ze 
toch behandeld moeten worden als normale strafuitsluitingsgronden. Het antwoord 
op deze vraag is gedifferentieerd, gebaseerd op het eerder genoemde principiële 
onderscheid van delictsomschrijving en strafuitsluitings gronden. Simpel gezegd 
kan de afwezigheid van een strafuitsluitingsgrond, te weten wederrechteljkheid en 
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verwijtbaarheid, om twee redenen in de delictsomschrijving worden opgenomen. In 
de eerste situatie is de afwezigheid van een strafuitsluitings grond opgenomen 
omdat het een essentieel element van het delict is. De afwezigheid van een 
strafuitsluitingsgrond wordt behandeld als een bestanddeel. Daarentegen worden 
wederrechtelijkheid en verwijt baar heid vaak ook om andere redenen opge no men, 
zoals een herinnering aan de rechter dat het goed mogelijk zou kunnen zijn dat een 
strafuitsluitingsgrond van toepassing is in die context. In die situaties heeft het 
opnemen van wederrechtelijk heid en verwijtbaarheid in de delictsomschrij ving 
geen gevolgen voor de beoor deling van strafuitsluitingsgronden. De verdachte moet 
nog steeds aannemelijk maken dat hij handelde met het doel dat de strafuit sluitings-
grond beoogde te beschermen en een vergissing moet nog steeds redelijk zijn om 
hem te verontschul digen. Met andere woorden, strafuitsluitingsgronden worden 
alleen behandeld als ontkenningen van het tenlastegelegde wanneer zij een 
specifi eke betekenis van weder rechte lijkheid of verwijtbaarheid ontkennen. Deze 
benadering kan verklaren waarom in de meeste gevallen de toepassing van een 
rechtvaardigings- of schulduitsluitings grond er niet toe leidt dat de voorwaarden 
van die strafuitsluitings gronden soepeler worden beoordeeld, enkel en alleen omdat 
het technisch gezien een ontkenning is van het tenlastegelegde feit.
In hoofdstuk VIII wordt ingegaan op de indeling van strafuitsluitingsgronden in 
rechtvaardigings- en schulduitsluitingsgronden. Hiermee wordt een fundamenteel 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen wederrechtelijkheid en verwijtbaarheid, tussen goed en 
kwaad, tussen de handeling en dader, tussen een objectieve evaluatie van alle 
omstandigheden en subjectieve redenen voor het handelen. Een rechtvaardiging 
vormt het spiegelbeeld van wederrechtelijkheid, terwijl de aanvaarding van een 
schuld uit sluitings grond verwijtbaarheid ontkent. Hoewel dit continentale onder-
scheid in toenemende mate in Engeland wordt geaccepteerd, is men er daar in het 
algemeen niet erg in geïnteresseerd. Veel geleerden en mensen uit de praktijk zijn 
van mening dat het onderscheid in de praktijk geen juridische gevolgen heeft en 
daarom niet relevant is. Echter, het onderscheid kan wel degelijk praktische 
juridische gevolgen hebben. Hoewel enkele verschillen terecht worden bekritiseerd, 
houden de meesten van hen stand. Ook al is het niet juist om te stellen dat alleen de 
toepassing van een schulduitsluitingsgrond maatregelen mogelijk maakt, ook al 
wordt het niet algemeen aanvaard dat alleen rechtvaardigingsgronden volledig hun 
spiegelbeeld ontkennen en ook al is aangetoond dat een rechtvaardigingsgrond niet 
altijd universeel werkt, zijn er nog vele andere verschillen die het maken van een 
onderscheid tussen rechtvaardigings- en schulduitsluitingsgronden legitimeren. Het 
onderscheid is nuttig. Het dient een praktisch doel en moet daarom worden 
opgenomen in een algemeen deel van strafrecht voor de EU.
In de eerste plaats faciliteert de tweedeling belangrijke communicatieve functies 
van de wet, door een onderscheid te maken tussen de veroordeling van de daad en 
de veroordeling van de verdachte. Als dat verschil niet wordt gemaakt, kan de vrees 
ontstaan dat een schulduitsluitingsgrond goedkeuring van het gedrag impliceert, 
met als gevolg een restrictieve toepassing van schulduitsluitingsgronden. 
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Vervolgens worden de voorwaarden van individuele strafuitsluitingsgronden 
beïnvloed door de categorie waartoe zij behoren. Rechtvaardigingsgronden bevatten 
bijvoorbeeld striktere eisen van proportionaliteit. Bevestigd wordt ook dat 
rechtvaardigingsgronden onverenigbaar zijn: een verdachte kan geen 
rechtvaardigingsgrond inroepen tegen gerechtvaardigd gedrag. Ten slotte is het 
onderscheid van belang omwille van de volgorde van juridisch redeneren. Het heeft 
geen zin om de verwijtbaarheid van de dader te beoordelen alvorens is vastgesteld 
dat het delict wederrechtelijk is.
Hoofdstuk IX beschrijft de rechtvaardigingsgronden van het Europese 
strafrecht. Rechtvaardigingsgronden ontkennen de wederrechtelijkheid van de 
handeling en worden gekenmerkt door het afwegen van tegenstrijdige belangen. 
Door strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid uit te sluiten, maken 
rechtvaardigingsgronden het mogelijk dat het zwaarst wegende belang gered wordt. 
Om een strafbaar feit te rechtvaardigen op grond van noodweer, moet met dit 
strafbare feit een aanval worden afgewend die wederrechtelijk en van menselijke 
oorsprong is en ogenblikkelijk dreigt. Met andere woorden, noodweer moet 
noodzakelijk zijn. Een vereiste om zich te onttrekken aan de aanval bestaat niet, 
hooguit kan het niet benutten van zo’n mogelijkheid de andere voorwaarden van 
noodweer beïnvloeden. Nog belangrijker is dat het delict dat de verdachte begaan 
heeft om de aanval af te wenden of te stoppen, in verhouding moet staan  tot de 
zodoende vermeden schade. Meer specifi ek moet de verdachte kiezen voor het 
minst ingrijpende middel van verdediging en dit toepassen op een manier die het 
minst ingrijpend is voor de belangen van de agressor, zolang dat middel en die 
toepassing de verdachte nog in staat stelt zijn belangen adequaat te beschermen. 
Noodweer verschilt van de rechtvaardigingsgrond noodtoestand, omdat het geen 
strikte proportionaliteit vereist tussen aanval en reactie. Vereist is alleen dat het 
strafbare feit dat de verdachte pleegt niet in wanverhouding staat tot de aanval.
Noodtoestand is gegrond in de ratio van de bescherming van de rechtsorde als 
geheel. Door het zwaarst wegende belang te redden, ontstaat er een nettovoordeel 
voor de rechtsorde. De wetgever kan niet alle gevallen voorzien waarin het 
gerechtvaardigd kan zijn om de letter van de wet te overtreden, en gezien de enorme 
hoeveelheid normen van nationale en Europese afkomst wordt het steeds 
waarschijnlijker dat een rechtssubject zich voor een confl ict van plichten gesteld 
ziet. Een noodtoestand bestaat wanneer er een actueel gevaar voor het leven, 
lichamelijke integriteit, vrijheid, eer, goederen of een ander rechtsgoed dreigt, dat 
alleen kan worden afgewend door rechtsgoederen van anderen aan te tasten. Het 
gevaar hoeft niet zo ogenblikkelijk te zijn als de aanval in het kader van noodweer. 
Aan de andere kant beoogt de voorwaarde situaties uit te sluiten van rechtvaardiging 
die veel mensen beïnvloeden of van terugkerende aard zijn. Ook al kan het gevaar 
zeker ook voor vele mensen tegelijk ogenblikkelijk zijn, de strafuitsluitingsgrond 
wordt in deze gevallen uitgesloten om al deze mensen niet uit te nodigen de wet te 
overtreden, wat de handhaving van de wet immers enorm zou bemoeilijken. De 
angst dat noodtoestand kan leiden tot anarchie heeft ook geleid tot een strikt 
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subsidiariteitsvereiste. Pas als het overtreden van de wet absoluut noodzakelijk is, 
alleen als al het andere heeft gefaald, met inbegrip van het plegen van minder 
ernstige strafbare feiten, kan dit worden gerechtvaardigd.
Een derde rechtvaardigingsgrond die moet worden opgenomen in een algemeen 
deel van het strafrecht voor de EU is toestemming, ook al is dit vaak verwerkt in de 
delicts om schrijving als een eerdergenoemde ontkenning van het tenlastegelegde. 
Toestemming erkent dat iemands belangen kunnen worden opgeofferd op grond 
van de autonome wil van die persoon. Het algemeen welzijn of de rechtsorde hoeft 
niet te worden bevorderd, maar mag ook niet worden benadeeld. Daarom mag het 
strafbare feit waarmee het slachtoffer heeft ingestemd de openbare orde niet 
schenden. Toestemming vindt alleen toepassing als de instemmende partij de enige 
is die vermag te beschikken over het individuele rechtsgoed dat geschonden wordt 
en in staat is om daarmee in te stemmen. Dit laatste houdt in dat de verdachte over 
het algemeen in staat moet zijn om toestemming te geven en zich bewust was van 
de mogelijke gevolgen van het feit waarmee hij in het concrete geval heeft 
ingestemd.
Hoofdstuk X gaat over schulduitsluitingsgronden. Deze strafuitsluitingsgronden 
vormen een ontkenning van de veronderstelling dat de verdachte redelijkerwijs het 
plegen van het misdrijf had kunnen vermijden. Het is gebaseerd op het beginsel dat 
er niet gestraft mag worden zonder verwijtbaarheid, wat ook wordt gewaarborgd als 
een essentiële voorwaarde voor strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid op grond van 
artikel 6 EVRM. In de eerste plaats kan het overschrijden van de grenzen van 
noodweer de verdachte soms niet verweten worden. Dit wordt in het Nederlandse en 
Duitse recht erkend door de schulduitsluitingsgrond van noodweerexces. De leemte 
die bestaat door het ontbreken van een dergelijke schulduitsluitingsgrond wordt in 
Engeland op verschillende wijzen opgevuld, maar slechts gedeeltelijk. Bovendien 
vormt noodweerexces de meest consistente en principiële oplossing.
In noodweerexces wordt de verdachte verontschuldigd voor het overschrijden 
van de grenzen van proportionaliteit of voor het doorgaan met defensief geweld 
wanneer dit niet langer nodig was. Hij kan zelfs ook verontschuldigd worden indien 
hij pas begonnen is geweld uit te oefenen nadat de aanslag was afgelopen. 
Noodweerexces vormt dus een uitzondering op de vereisten van evenredigheid of 
ogenblikkelijkheid van de rechtvaardigingsgrond noodweer. Aan alle andere 
voorwaarden van noodweer moet zijn voldaan, zoals dat de aanval wederrechtelijk 
was. Als specifi eke voorwaarde van noodweerexces moet de overschrijding van de 
grenzen van noodweer het gevolg zijn van een bepaalde gemoedstoestand, zoals 
angst of verwarring, wat zelf weer het gevolg moet zijn van de wederrechtelijke 
aanval. Hoewel agressieve emoties zoals woede zijn uitgesloten in het Duitse 
concept, is het verschil met de Nederlandse strafuitsluitingsgrond niet zo groot. De 
eenvoudigste en daarmee meest werkbare oplossing is om ook deze 
gemoedstoestanden op te nemen in de strafuitsluitings grond.
Psychische overmacht verontschuldigt de verdachte die zich niet anders kon en 
zich niet anders hoefde te gedragen. Het is gebaseerd op de psychologische druk op 
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de verdachte die het bijna onmogelijk voor hem maakte om het strafbare feit niet te 
plegen. Psychische overmacht wordt echter ook op een normatieve manier beperkt 
door rekening te houden met de belangen van anderen dan de verdachte. De 
verdachte moet het strafbare feit hebben gepleegd omdat hij werd gedwongen door 
een dreigend gevaar of bedreiging van belangrijke rechtsgoederen. In lijn met de 
strafuitsluitingsgronden noodtoestand en noodweer, moeten de belangen die 
beschermd kunnen worden niet a priori worden beperkt tot lijf en leven van de 
verdachte of één van zijn naasten. De voorwaarde van de proportionali teit zal die 
gevallen uitsluiten waarin niet zwaarwegende belangen zijn beschermd door het 
plegen van ernstige strafbare feiten. De druk die op de verdachte wordt uitgeoefend, 
moet zijn oorsprong vinden buiten de persoon van de verdachte, maar de scheidslijn 
tussen interne en externe oorzaken is niet altijd gemakkelijk te trekken en daarom 
controversieel. Gesteld wordt dat het criterium niet strikt moet worden toegepast.
Rechtsdwaling verontschuldigt over het algemeen niet snel. Toch moeten 
onvermijd bare vergissingen leiden tot het verontschuldigen van de verdachte. Dit 
vloeit voort uit het fundamentele beginsel dat alleen een verwijtbare dader mag 
worden gestraft. De verdachte mag alleen worden veroordeeld als hij in staat was 
om de wederrechtelijkheid van zijn gedrag in te zien en daarmee een kans en de 
keuze had om het criminele gedrag te vermijden. Het zou onrechtvaardig, oneerlijk 
en nutteloos zijn om de persoon te straffen die niet weet en niet zou moeten weten 
dat hij een strafbaar feit pleegt. De vrees dat rechtsdwaling tot onterechte 
vrijspraken leidt, wordt geneutraliseerd of verzacht door zijn schulduitsluitende 
aard. Allereerst plaatst een schulduitsluitingsgrond een norm niet buiten toepassing 
of heeft het daar voorrang op, maar het bevestigt de norm. In de tweede plaats zal 
alleen een verschoon bare, dat wil zeggen, onvermijdbare rechtsdwaling 
verontschuldigen. Er rust een plicht op de verdachte om de wet te kennen, waarvan 
de omvang afhanke lijk is van de individuele omstandigheden. Om die reden zal de 
dwaling slechts in uitzonderlijke gevallen als onvermijdbaar worden gezien.
Putatieve strafuitsluitingsgronden worden als rechtsdwaling behandeld vanwege 
van hun conceptuele gelijkenis. In beide gevallen denkt de verdachte dat wat hij 
doet in overeenstemming is met het recht. Als de verdachte zich vergist over de 
reikwijdte van een bestaande strafuitsluitingsgrond of van mening is dat een niet-
bestaande straf uit slui tings grond van toepassing is, vergist hij zich ook dat wat hij 
doet in lijn is met de rechtsorde. Een andere categorie van putatieve 
strafuitsluitingsgrond betreft vergissingen betreffende feiten die, indien ze correct 
waren, tot aanvaarding van een rechtvaardigings- of schulduitsluitingsgrond zouden 
hebben geleid. Het onbevoegd gegeven ambtelijk bevel kan ook worden gezien als 
een rechtsdwaling, namelijk de onjuiste veronderstelling van de verdachte over de 
wettigheid van zijn orders. Zo’n putatieve straf uit sluitings grond behoeft geen 
expliciete regelgeving, omdat het onder de algemene regeling van het 
verontschuldigen van onvermijdbare rechtsdwaling valt.
Ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid verontschuldigt de verdachte die, op het moment 
van het plegen van het misdrijf, als gevolg van een psychische stoornis niet over het 
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vermogen beschikte om in rechte verantwoordelijk te worden gehouden. De 
strafuit sluitings grond maakt het ook mogelijk om maatregelen te nemen met het 
oog op behandeling en/of incapacitatie van de dader en bescherming van de 
samenleving. Ontoerekenings vatbaarheid vereist dat de verdachte ten tijd van het 
plegen van het delict leed aan een psychische stoornis. Het is niet nodig om 
stoornissen die in aanmerking komen te beperken. Dit brede toepassingsgebied 
wordt beperkt door de andere voorwaarden van ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid, zoals 
dat de stoornis de capaciteiten van de verdachte om verantwoordelijk te worden 
gesteld in het strafrecht aanzienlijk moet hebben verminderd. Om aansprakelijk 
gesteld te kunnen worden in het strafrecht, moet de dader weten wat hij doet en 
weten dat dit verkeerd is. Hij moet ook in staat zijn om zichzelf te weerhouden van 
het plegen van het strafbare feit. Pas als dit vermogen aanzienlijk wordt aangetast, 
kan straf volledig worden uitgesloten. In gevallen waarin dit vermogen alleen 
verminderd was, kan er slechts strafvermindering volgen. Vanwege deze 
ontkenning van de fundamentele capaciteiten die nodig zijn om aansprakelijk te 
worden gesteld, kan ontoerekenings vatbaarheid worden gelijkgesteld met het niet 
strafrechtelijk aansprakelijk stellen van minderjarigen en dus behandeld worden als 
een soort vervolgings uitsluitingsgrond, in plaats van als een schulduitsluitingsgrond. 
Gesteld wordt dat ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid zowel een vervolgings- als een 
schuld uitsluitings grond kan zijn, afhankelijk van de ernst en de duur van de 
aantasting van zijn vermogens en het aspect van de strafuitsluitingsgrond waarop 
men de aandacht richt.
Deel 4 bestaat uit een conclusie, waarin de belangrijkste voorstellen van de 
vorige delen worden herhaald. Deze omvatten de keuze voor recklessness in plaats 
van dolus eventualis, het voorwaardelijke accepteren van risico-aansprakelijkheid 
en de erkenning van een breed scala aan strafuitsluitingsgronden. De conclusie vat 
tevens samen hoe opzet, schuld en strafuitsluitingsgronden er uit zouden moeten 
zien in het Europees strafrecht, waarbij een aantal van de meest signifi cante 
verschillen tussen de onderzochte rechtsstelsels benadrukt wordt. Tot slot wordt 
erkend dat de lezer tot andere conclusies kan komen op basis van een andere 
waardering van de criteria die gebruikt zijn voor de synthese. Zo kan men meer 
belang hechten aan de belangen van de verdachte dan ik heb gedaan. Niettemin zal 
dit het broodnodige debat over de inhoud van het materiële strafrecht van de 
Europese Unie bevorderen.
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